Operational and tactical assignment for the Project 66 cruiser and its first adjustments

In the previous article I presented to the esteemed reader history designing cruisers with a 220 mm main caliber up to the start of work on the "medium" cruiser of Project 66. It is now time to move on to the creation of the "sixty-sixth" - the last project of a heavy artillery USSR ship.

Project 66 cruiser - the beginning

Work on the USSR's heavy cruisers followed a distinct spiral. Before the war, as part of the creation of the "Big fleetThe initial design for a cruiser with 254mm artillery was initially intended, but the caliber was later increased to 305mm and its tactical role was expanded to include countering small battleships. The resulting Project 69 heavy cruiser (TKR) closely approximated the displacement of fast battleships. Consequently, a lighter, cheaper, and more suitable ship for large-scale production was needed, yet one that would still have an advantage over the Washington-designed cruisers in terms of performance characteristics.

However, the attempt to design such a ship, the Project 82 heavy cruiser, led to a consistent increase in caliber from 203 mm first to 220 mm, and then again to 305 mm, which is why the standard displacement of the Project 82 heavy cruiser reached 36,500 tons. Thus, the Project 82 heavy cruiser followed the path of Project 69, the standard displacement of which was planned at the time of laying down to be 35,250 tons.

And just like Project 69, the Project 82 heavy cruiser proved too large and expensive for a "heavy cruiser destroyer." While it was certainly capable of destroying any cruiser in an artillery battle, only four Project 82 heavy cruisers were planned for construction: given its displacement and cost, large-scale production was completely impossible.

I. V. Stalin's view on the tactical role of the Project 82 heavy cruiser is extremely interesting. At a meeting held in March 1950, he asked the sailors what they planned to use the cruiser for. I. S. Yumashev and P. S. Abankin, who were present at the meeting, responded that the Project 82 heavy cruiser was needed to destroy enemy heavy cruisers. However, Stalin disagreed with this opinion. He retorted:

We have no reason to engage in combat with enemy heavy ships. A heavy cruiser's primary mission should be different—fighting enemy light cruisers. We need to increase its speed to 35 knots so that it can cause panic among enemy light cruisers, disperse them, and destroy them. This cruiser should fly like a swallow, be a pirate, a true bandit. It must be able to evade enemy heavy ships.

In other words, I.V. Stalin certainly didn't want the Project 82 heavy cruiser to engage enemy heavy cruisers, let alone larger warships. However, he also noted that the United States was commissioning cruisers with 203mm artillery, while our Project 68-bis cruisers had 152mm main caliber guns and would be incapable of engaging the newest American ships. Therefore, Stalin authorized the creation of an intermediate "medium" cruiser. The requirements for it were as follows: a 220mm main caliber gun with a superior firing range to the American 203mm artillery systems, a speed superior to that of the newest US heavy cruisers, and a standard displacement of approximately 24,000 tons.

In light of these instructions, N. G. Kuznetsov, by then the Minister of the Navy, approved the OTZ for the Project 66 cruiser on November 27, 1951.

Purpose of the ship

It must be said that it was quite vague. The first requirement for a Project 66 cruiser was to successfully engage cruisers armed with 203mm artillery and destroy light cruisers. The light cruisers were clear, but what constituted a "successful engagement" with enemy heavy cruisers? Apparently, the expectation was that a Project 66 cruiser would be superior to a US heavy cruiser, but not so superior as to guarantee its destruction in an encounter.

The second point called for the suppression of medium-caliber batteries and the destruction of enemy coastal fortifications. Why they singled out medium-caliber batteries is unclear to me, as the ability to destroy a land target depends on the defenses of that target, not the caliber of the guns deployed there, but that's how it was worded.

Finally, the third and final point was classically vague: "Giving stability to the actions of the light naval forces"There are no specifics regarding which units, where, and against whom this very stability should be ensured.

weaponry

Main caliber (MC) The design was to consist of nine 220mm guns in three triple-gun turrets. The projectile weight was not specified, but the muzzle velocity was to be 950–1000 m/s, with a firing range of up to 50 km (273 KB). The turrets were to have separate vertical aiming for the guns, and the ammunition load was to be 100 rounds per gun.

Long-range anti-aircraft caliber (LRAC). It had to be worked out in two versions:

Option 1: 8×130mm guns in unstabilized twin-gun turrets, ammunition complement—200 rounds per gun. Arrangement—linear, two turrets each, bow and stern;

Option 2: 12×130mm guns in stabilized deck-turret mounts (apparently something similar to the 100mm SM-5-1 that armed Project 68-bis cruisers). In addition to the number of guns, the ammunition load also needed to be increased to 250 rounds per gun.

Small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery (SCA) — 6x4x45mm and 6x4x25mm machine guns.

The OTZ did not provide for torpedo or air armament. As for fire control systems, the OTZ specified that they should provide:

For the main guns, this meant centralized fire on a single naval or coastal target, or split fire on two such targets, with all necessary data prepared for firing on both. It was necessary to provide the ability to fire on aerial targets. "in a simplified way"It was stipulated that there would be a single command and control post. In the event of a failure of the centralized fire control system, the second and third turrets were to be equipped for independent fire control. This wasn't stated directly, but it was apparently implied that the first turret would be able to fire based on data generated by the second turret.

For the ZKDB, the requirements were virtually identical: the fire control system had to be capable of firing at one or two naval or air targets. Furthermore, the ability to fire individually for each turret had to be provided.

The small anti-aircraft guns required battery-based firing with radar-based fire control devices. A battery was defined as eight 45mm or 25mm caliber guns, or two four-barrel mounts.

Control centers

In this regard, the OTZ envisioned a classic scheme: all data obtained via radar and other surveillance equipment would be sent to a combat information post (CIP), where it would be processed, and the ship would be controlled from the main command post (GKP). Since the Project 66 cruiser was expected to lead a formation, in addition to the GKP, it was also planned to have a separate flagship command post (FCP).

Radar and radio-technical equipment

In addition to the classic requirements for radar, such as detection of surface and air targets and generation of target designation for them, as well as elements of electronic reconnaissance (detection of radiation from third-party radars on a ship), there was also a requirement for the installation of equipment EW to interfere with the ship's radar stations.

Armor, mine protection and unsinkability

Overall, the armor requirements were as follows: protection of the citadel, supply pipes, main control tower, and primary control tower had to ensure that a 203-mm armor-piercing shell, either intact or fragmented, would not penetrate the armor at a range of 90 kbt or more. The deck and the ends outside the citadel were to be protected by light armor that would resist 203-mm shell fragments. The armor-piercing shell, for which the protection was designed, weighed 152 kg, and its muzzle velocity was set at 762 m/s.

The main battery turret of the heavy cruiser Salem (Des Moines class) - the Project 66 cruisers were designed to withstand these guns

At the time of the formation of the OTZ, it was assumed that such protection would be provided by a 150mm armor belt and a 90mm deck. As for the armor of the 220mm turrets, it was installed according to the specifications for the SM-6, meaning a 300mm front, 265mm rear, 180mm side, and 135-145mm roof.

The OTS also required the presence of side and bottom mine protection (PMZ). However, without specifying the blast force the PMZ was supposed to withstand, it had to be determined during the design process.

The ship had to remain afloat if any 5 compartments were flooded.

Speed ​​and range, autonomy and seaworthiness

The capacity of the OTZ's propulsion plant was not specified, but it was to provide a full speed of at least 35 knots and an economical speed of 18 knots, with a cruising range of 5000 miles at economical speed. Autonomy for reserves was 20 days. Seaworthiness was to ensure navigation in all conditions and use weapons in sea state up to and including 8. The turning circle diameter is no more than five ship lengths.

dimensions

According to the OTZ, the standard displacement of the Project 66 cruiser was to be 22,000 tons, and the full displacement was to be 26,000 tons. The ship's other dimensions were not specified, but the silhouette was to be similar to the Project 82 cruisers.

Other

The ship must be capable of navigating ice conditions with an ice thickness of up to 20 cm. Cabins and crew quarters must be located as close as possible to their combat stations. Both combat stations and living quarters were to be equipped with equipment that allows for their operation in any climate. The cruiser was to receive a full tank of fuel within eight hours. The ship was to be equipped with chemical defenses, including an automatic alarm capable of warning the crew of the presence of chemical warfare agents in the air. Anti-nuclear protection was not provided (apparently due to the uncertainty surrounding the effects of a nuclear explosion).

In addition, the OTZ established many requirements for communication equipment, navigation equipment, etc., which is unlikely to be of interest to the esteemed reader.

Overall, the OTZ seemed quite understandable and reasonable for a cruiser who wanted to acquire a fleet.

Development of the technical specifications and initial adjustments

The Project 66 design specifications were repeatedly revised and revised, but the very first calculations performed at TsKB-17 and TsNII-45 showed that it was impossible to meet the ship's requirements with the stated displacement.

By adhering to the OTZ requirements for armament, speed, and range, it would have been possible to create a ship with a standard displacement of 23,000 tons, which was already 1000 tons higher than the requirements. However, even this result would have been achieved only at the cost of weakened armor protection and the complete elimination of the PMZ. If all OTZ requirements had been strictly followed, the standard displacement of the Project 66 cruiser would have increased from 23,000 to 24,800 tons. The 1800-ton increase was explained as follows:

1. Increasing the thickness of the armor belt from 150 to 160 mm, and the deck from 90 to 110 mm. Calculations showed that protection against 203 mm shells weighing 152 kg and with a muzzle velocity of 762 m/s at a range of 90 kbt would require thicker armor than previously thought. Meeting this requirement entailed increasing the ship's displacement by 660 tons;

2. Strengthening the protection of the steering compartment so that it meets the level of protection requirements for a citadel - 200 t;

3. Increasing the thickness of the armored traverse of the citadel, the barbettes of the main caliber turrets and the walls of the main command post in order to ensure the invulnerability of the said elements from 203-mm shells at course angles of 0–55 degrees at a distance of 75 kbt and more - 70 t;

4. Equipping the cruiser with a PMZ capable of withstanding the detonation of 250 kg of TNT (500 kg aerial bomb) directly at the side of the ship and 600 kg of TNT (mine or torpedo) at a distance of 7 m from the bottom - 720 tons;

5. Other weights - armoring of smoke stacks, clarification of crew size, provision for storing nitroglycerin powder, additional fenders for the first shots for 25-mm machine guns, etc. - 150 tons.

About booking

There's a difficult-to-explain oddity associated with the Project 66 cruiser's OTZ. Typically, ships used both cemented and homogeneous armor for their armor protection. Cemented armor plates typically formed vertical protection—the armor belt, conning tower, barbette, etc.—that is, those areas where enemy armor-piercing shells were expected to strike with a relatively small deviation from the normal. Conversely, horizontal protection, which shells were expected to strike tangentially, was made of homogeneous steel. The reason for this is obvious: cemented armor offered better resistance, but homogeneous armor, when struck at a higher angle, offered a better chance of ricocheting.

All this is classic, well known to anyone interested in the navies of the era of armor and steam. However, the esteemed A. V. Vasiliev and A. B. Morin, in their work "Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov's Medium Cruiser. Project 66," pointed out that the amendments to the OTZ for the Project 66 cruiser prescribed the use of only homogeneous armor—for both horizontal and vertical armor.

I found this so strange that I took the liberty of verifying this information using de Marr's formula. The American 203 mm/55 Mark 16 gun, mounted on the De Moines-class heavy cruisers, fired a 152 kg armor-piercing projectile at a muzzle velocity of 762 m/s to a distance of 27,889 m at an elevation of 45,28 degrees. Accordingly, the projectile shape coefficient was 0,5808, and when fired at a distance of 90 artillery cable lengths, its angle of incidence would be 22,4 degrees, and the speed would be 382,8 m/s. If the De Moines were at a course angle of 90 degrees and the Project 66 cruiser were on an even keel at the moment of impact, the projectile would hit its vertical armor plate with a deviation from the normal of 22,4 degrees.

To penetrate 160mm of armor with these parameters, its de Marr "K" coefficient should be only 1845. But in this case, the goal wasn't to penetrate the armor, but rather to prevent it from being penetrated, so for our armor, this coefficient should be somewhat higher. In any case, it's quite clear that we're talking about homogeneous armor, since for post-war cemented armor, this coefficient would be expected to be 2400 or higher.

Accordingly, there is not the slightest reason to doubt the information presented by the esteemed A. V. Vasiliev and A. B. Morin. But the question remains: why, and most importantly, why did we abandon cemented armor? After all, it's quite obvious that using cemented armor for vertical protection would have significantly increased the cruiser's protection—or, conversely, would have allowed for a reduction in armor thickness while maintaining the same level of protection, thereby saving on displacement.

The only theory that comes to mind is that the designers were forced to abandon cemented armor because they could not produce armor plates of the required geometric dimensions at all, or in the quantities and timeframes required for building cruisers.

Placement of universal artillery

One of the first adjustments to the OTZ was the directive to mount all four of the cruiser's twin 130mm turrets in a linearly elevated configuration—above the main battery turrets. That is, counting from the bow, the main battery turret with the 220mm gun No. 1 came first, followed by main battery turret No. 2, followed by dual-purpose turrets Nos. 1 and 2, with each subsequent turret rising above the previous one.

Accordingly, at the stern, counting from the stern, there was first the main battery turret No. 3, behind it the universal caliber turret No. 4, and behind it No. 3.

This arrangement of the dual-purpose artillery offered both tangible advantages and significant disadvantages. The firing arcs were ideal—four of the eight barrels could fire at the bow, and all eight at one side. However, by raising the dual-purpose turrets so high, the designers significantly increased the Project 66 cruiser's upper weight. Furthermore, this design necessitated very tall barbettes, which, for weight reasons, could not be protected from 203mm shells.

Продолжение следует ...

Comments

[AllX_VahhaB]

You could have included screenshots from "World of Ships" in this article. You can see the 66th from all angles, both at sea and in combat. That would be a beauty! The only photos I've got are just fragments of the model and the left turret... It's not quite the modern level of information for an article...

[Soldatov V.]

This was probably the last project before the abandonment of purely artillery-armed ships and the transition to missile weapons. That year, diesel-powered submarines with artillery armament were still being designed; even academic dissertations were being defended on the topic. At the same time, the construction of aircraft carriers and, consequently, carrier-based aviation was abandoned. This is understandable: after such a war, resources were in short supply, and space was already developing rapidly.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: V.

This is probably the last project before abandoning purely artillery ships.

This is definitely the last project, and most likely not only in the USSR, but also in the world

[Per se.]

Accordingly, at the stern, counting from the stern, there was first the main battery turret No. 3, behind it the universal caliber turret No. 4, and behind it No. 3.

For better clarity.

[Konnick]

Quote: Per se.

Accordingly, at the stern, counting from the stern, there was first the main battery turret No. 3, behind it the universal caliber turret No. 4, and behind it No. 3.

For better clarity.

The expression "universal caliber" is strange...This is universal gun could be used for firing at sea, land, and of course air targets anti-aircraft caliber 130mm

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Konnick

The strange expression "universal caliber"

Is anti-aircraft caliber better? Meanwhile, ZKDB—anti-aircraft caliber for long-range combat—was the working abbreviation of those years.

[Konnick]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Quote: Konnick

The strange expression "universal caliber"

Is anti-aircraft caliber better? Meanwhile, ZKDB—anti-aircraft caliber for long-range combat—was the working abbreviation of those years.

Of course, it's better, because a universal caliber doesn't exist in nature. A cannon is universal because it can be used both as a regular gun and as an anti-aircraft gun, so it's called universal, not a universal caliber.

[Per se.]

Quote: Konnick

Of course it’s better, because a universal caliber does not exist in nature.

Nikolai, don't be a pedant, let it be more correct - a universal weapon, universal artillery, in which the caliber of the guns themselves is chosen to be the most optimal for this purpose, that is, one could say, universal.

[Konnick]

Quote: Per se.

Quote: Konnick

Of course it’s better, because a universal caliber does not exist in nature.

Nikolai, don't be a pedant, let it be more correct - a universal weapon, universal artillery, in which the caliber of the guns themselves is chosen to be the most optimal for this purpose, that is, one could say, universal.

The caliber isn't optimal; this weapon's primary purpose is anti-aircraft defense, and a 130mm anti-aircraft gun is used. However, given its aiming angles, this gun can also be used against conventional targets with high-angle fire. The shortcomings of our cruisers' air defenses became acute during WWII. The basis for this twin-gun universal mount was the M-46 gun, the longest-range cannon in land artillery, which in turn served as the basis for the KS-30 anti-aircraft gun. The "universal" caliber was also 85mm, both tank and anti-aircraft, but here it was the other way around: the anti-aircraft gun came first, and then the tank one.

[AMG]

The 130mm caliber has been used in Russian and Soviet artillery since Tsarist times, with the B-7 model 1913 gun, which featured a 55-caliber barrel and a firing range of 20,3 km. The Obukhov plant manufactured and delivered 143 guns to the navy by January 1, 1917. They were intended to arm Svetlana-class cruisers and battleships of the Black Sea Fleet. 8 guns fought in the Great Patriotic War on the cruiser Krasny Krym". Since 1935, the B-13 gun was produced, the barrel length is 50 calibers, the range is 25,5 km. They were armed with destroyers of project 7. Before the war, a two-gun mount B-2 LM was designed, with a B-13 gun, several copies were manufactured, three of which were installed on the leader "Tashkent". After the war, these mounts were armed with destroyers 30-K and 30 bis. In 1950, the first serial two-gun mounts SM-2-1 with a ZIF-68-1 gun, a barrel length of 57,6 calibers and a firing range of 27,8 km were created. They were armed with destroyers of project 56. Around the same time, in the early 50s, the designer L.V. Lyulyev designed The KS-30 anti-aircraft gun, and the Motovili factories launched the M-46 into production. All in the same 130mm caliber.

[Vasily_Ostrovsky]

Quote: Konnick

Of course it’s better, because a universal caliber does not exist in nature.

The concept of a "universal caliber" was applied quite actively in Soviet shipbuilding and tactics, not only directly to guns, but also to all reconnaissance and target designation devices/systems, as well as fire adjustments.
Remember that depending on the class of the ship, this caliber included 100-130 mm (for example, the Project 68bis cruisers had 130 mm), as well as 76 mm.
Universal – for use against coastal, sea, and air targets. A main caliber for this range of targets was not developed for well-known reasons...
Whether we call a gun universal or a caliber requires context. It's perfectly legitimate to say that a caliber, in and of itself, is "just a hole in the barrel," as my granddaughter says. A gun will be one way or another, depending not on its caliber, but on its propellant charge, projectile, elevation angles, horizontal aiming angles, the ability to fire under various reconnaissance conditions, target designation and aiming, and so on.
So the term “universal caliber” itself has a right to exist, as it seems to me, but with reservations.

[Victor Leningradets]

Nothing strange.
Everything will fall into place when we analyze a hypothetical engagement with the cruiser De Moines. There, the effects of medium-caliber shells at medium range are taken into account.

[Victor Leningradets]

Thanks for continuing, Andrey!
I'll drop my two hryvnias on the topic of booking.
During the construction of Project 23 battleships, studies were conducted on the resistance of conventional cemented armor, armor (KTs), and armor of increased hardness without cementation (BTs). It was found that when resisting shells of 152-203 mm caliber, BTs armor is superior to KTs armor of equal thickness. Furthermore, it is approximately three times cheaper. Therefore, at thicknesses of 150-160 mm, BTs armor has the advantage in terms of quality/cost.

[vetal1942]

At the end of 44, the US Army introduced 203mm MK21M5 projectiles with superhard armor-piercing caps. These projectiles were highly rated, and I would assume they are quite capable of withstanding a strike against cemented armor without damaging the warhead at a t/d of 0,8, a velocity of 390, and an angle of 22 degrees. If the projectile's warhead remains intact, and at such a low t/d, cemented armor type KC offers minimal advantages over high-quality homogeneous armor.

[Konnick]

As a rule, both cemented and homogeneous armor were used in the armor protection of ships.

I'll dig deeper...heterogeneous armor with a cemented outer layer was used. Heterogeneous armor, while of the same thickness, had higher resistance. For example, the Sherman tanks supplied to us under Lend-Lease during WWII had homogeneous armor, while the Americans made tanks for themselves with heterogeneous armor with a cemented outer layer...

[vetal1942]

Can I get the source? I've seen information about case-hardened Stuart armor plates, but for thicker armor, the Americans used rather soft, homogeneous armor steels. And yes, I've never seen case-hardened armor plates used on tanks (except for the first T-26 prototypes and the Maus frontal armor); the case-hardening process is quite expensive and unique.

[Alexandra]

Shermans used only homogeneous armor, either cast or rolled (variants with both cast hull armor components and welded hulls made of rolled armor). The only Sherman variant with "cemented" armor was "produced" in active service and is shown in the photo below. Cement, as is well known, is an essential component of concrete.

An interesting factory-produced, heavily armored Sherman modification, the M4A3E2 "Jumbo," featured a 101,6 mm (4.1 in) thick upper glacis plate sloped at 47°, a cast lower glacis plate of variable thickness from 114–140 mm (4.7–5.7 in), and a cast turret with 152,4 mm (6.1 in) of armor all around and a 177,8 mm (7.1 in) gun mantlet. Only 254 units were produced between May and July 1944 at Fisher Tank Arsenal. These tanks saw combat in Europe beginning in the fall of 1944. The M4A3E2 "Jumbo" weighed over 38 tons, and its maximum speed dropped to 35 km/h (22 mph).

Bulletproof cemented armor was first introduced into tank design on the British Vickers Mk.E (Vickers 6-ton tank). It was used on the first tanks with shell-proof armor, such as the Pz.Kpfw. III, from the Ausf. E in 1938 to the Ausf. N, produced until the end of 1942. It was also used on the domestic T-50 tank, of which only 75-80 were produced. Some domestic T-28 tanks were equipped with cemented armor. Cemented armor was widely used on early modifications of the American M3 Stuart light tank. As the caliber of anti-tank artillery increased during the war, the relatively thin sheets of cemented armor used on first-generation shell-proof tanks, which were effective only against small-caliber (up to 75 mm) armor-piercing shells, became increasingly less useful. This, along with the high labor intensity and cost of producing cemented armor for tanks, forced the abandonment of cemented armor on later tank modifications that had previously featured it. For example, on the M3A1, the Americans switched to homogeneous armor for the turret, while the M3A3 received fully welded hulls made of homogeneous armor.

[vetal1942]

There's case-hardened armor, and there's case-hardened armor. These are different types of armor. Case-hardened armor was very rarely used for tank armor.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Konnick

I'll get to the bottom of this...heterogeneous armor with a cemented layer on the outside was used.

Heterogeneous means cemented. What's the point of picking on it?

[Macsen_wledig]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Heterogeneous means cemented. What's the point of picking on it?

Heterogeneous armor is armor made using Krupp or Harvey technology.
There's also homogeneous armor, the surface of whose plates has undergone a special heat treatment called case hardening. This is also considered cemented armor... But there's a catch. :)

[vetal1942]

There are at least 4 types of heterogeneous armor: 1) Harvey, carbon-hardened, with a thin (approximately 25 mm) surface hardening 2) Krupp KC gas-hardened, with a deep (30-50% of the volume) surface hardening 3) KNC, without case-hardening, with a deep (30-50% of the volume) surface hardening 4) FH, without case-hardening, with a thin (6 mm in the case of a blowtorch, slightly more in the case of induction) surface hardening. The first three types are for ships, FH is tank armor. Deeply hardened steels require greater thickness (from 100 mm), thin steels can be produced in any thickness, but deep hardened ones are better at breaking shells. Harvey is an older nickel armor and is somewhat inferior to other chromium-nickel and chromium-nickel-molybdenum armor types. However, the other three types also lack any special physical properties (tensile strength and impact toughness are roughly equivalent to those of homogeneous armor of medium hardness) and operate by crushing projectiles with a superhard surface layer. If a projectile's nose is broken, and especially if it is completely shattered, this armor is 20-40% more effective than homogeneous armor. If it is not, there is little difference.

[Vasily_Ostrovsky]

An excellent article, with rich material and technical elaboration, which has already become the author's hallmark of quality.

Let me add a few things, not to the content of the article itself, but to those points that the author did not dwell on, considering them, probably, not requiring detailed explanation.

So, the author writes without going into depth:

Finally, the third and final point was classically vague: "Ensuring stability in the operations of light naval forces." There were no specifics about which forces, where, and against whom this stability should be ensured.

What is this uninteresting concept that is embedded in the project's objectives, but which can be so easily "screwed up"?
In general, this is -
"Providing stability to the actions of light naval forces is a set of measures for the comprehensive support of combat operations aimed at maintaining high combat readiness of light forces (torpedo boats, patrol ships, small submarines and other light surface and submarine forces), preserving and restoring their combat capability, as well as creating conditions under which these formations are capable of carrying out assigned combat missions despite enemy counteraction."

The core concept here will be the combat resilience of a ship as a naval combat unit. A ship's combat resilience is its ability to withstand the effects of enemy weapons. For light forces with limited defensive capabilities, combat resilience is achieved not so much through passive defense as through maneuvering, stealth, and active countermeasures.

In general, again, the light naval forces have historically been composed of light cruisers, destroyers, torpedo boats, and patrol ships, operating primarily in coastal zones. Their combat operations are of a raiding, maneuverable nature, and stability is achieved through a combination of measures.

This is a common concept not only in textbooks on tactics, but also in student works on the naval profile; this particular one - from a work at the military department of LETI - was written back in 2014.

The 1994 Military Encyclopedia gives the following definition:
Military Encyclopedia / Dictionary of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
> "Combat resilience is the ability of a military or naval group to maintain combat effectiveness and use its combat capabilities to guarantee the completion of an assigned combat mission in the face of active enemy counteraction."

But this is also a general concept.
There is no exact equivalent to this term in foreign naval science, but there is a very close one - and the Soviet term "combat stability" is translated as "combat stability" (or "resiliency" / "survivability") and is considered primarily in the context of ensuring the survivability of strategic submarine forces (the concept of "defended bastions")
"Providing stability" is a naval concept according to which large ships (cruisers, leaders) provide combat support for light forces (destroyers, torpedo boats), which is reflected in domestic naval literature, as well as in foreign studies of the Soviet Navy - CNA (USA), Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Manchester University Press.

It is on this "obscure" foundation that the naval concept is built, and not only in our Fatherland, but also for the ruble hedgehog...

If the author had provided a definition of the concept of "ensuring combat stability for the light forces of the fleet," then the reasons for the tasks assigned by the military-political leadership of the fleet and the command of the Navy to this class of ships would have been clearer to the reader.

Translated into plain English, this class of ships was not only intended to single-handedly and autonomously carry out combat missions against equal adversaries at sea, but also to lend significant weight to small naval forces, enhancing their defenses and providing them with cover from enemy naval forces during coastal operations, for which light-class ships were designed.

Once again, respect to the author for the article, very interesting and high quality

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Good afternoon and thank you very much!

Quote: Vasily_Ostrovsky

It is on this "obscure" foundation that the naval concept is built, and not only in our Fatherland, but also for the ruble hedgehog...

That's all true. But the thing is, my IMHO tells me that the definitions are perfectly acceptable as a conceptual framework, but they're completely useless in determining a ship's performance characteristics.

Quote: Vasily_Ostrovsky

The core concept here will be the combat resilience of a ship as a unit of naval combat. A ship's combat resilience is its ability to withstand the effects of enemy weapons.

You'll agree that ensuring combat stability for a navy's light forces against another navy's light forces is one thing, against heavy artillery ships is quite another, and against carrier-based aviation is a different matter. Simply put, to define combat characteristics, one must specify the enemy against whom this stability is being planned, but I don't see such specifics.

[Vasily_Ostrovsky]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Simply put, in order to determine the performance characteristics, it is necessary to specify the enemy against whom it is planned to ensure this stability, but I do not see such specifics.

That's why the article is structured this way...
The primary thing is what threats they see and prepare to counter them based on their capabilities... that's where it all starts.
I may have overlooked an analytical article somewhere on VO about the USSR's VPR thoughts before and after the war on this topic, but the fact remains: analyzing the reasons for the selection/development of specific projects without an introduction—where it all came from...
Geopolitics determines strategy, strategy shapes tactics—that's the ideal setup, but in reality, everything is much more complex and not straightforward...
In this article, the main outlines of the USSR's naval strategy, it seems to me, should have been given more clearly, this would have removed the questions
In technical terms, the research on the project is excellent, I’m not afraid to suck up to you again and deservedly so

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Vasily_Ostrovsky

In this article, the main outlines of the USSR's naval strategy, it seems to me, should have been given more clearly, this would have removed the questions

Unfortunately, I can't :)))) That's a question for the archives; I haven't come across anything like that in secondary sources. There's literally a little bit about Project 66, but that was later and... it doesn't really look like a strategy at all.

[Vasily_Ostrovsky]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

This is a question for the archives; I haven’t come across anything like this in secondary sources.

Of course, in this case, you have to use what was published in the open press, but it is preferable to get acquainted with it personally applications The report, which was part of the work of the Commission formed in 1945 under Kuznetsov's leadership, contained appendices containing situational assessments, threats, calculations, and a breakdown of fleets and projects based on the objectives set by the country's leadership.

Scientific articles on this topic can be read here, but I think this is nothing new for the author and many readers...
https://flot.com/science/sf1.htm
https://history.milportal.ru/etapy-stroitelstva-sovetskogo-vmf-1945-1991-gg/?print=print
https://www.wardroom.ru/news/kalendar-znachimykh-sobytiy-flota/prinyata-programma-stroitelstva-okeanskogo-vmf/
https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/osobennosti-upravleniya-voenno-morskim-flotom-v-pervye-poslevoennye-gody-1945-1953-gg/viewer
https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/flotovodcheskaya-deyatelnost-admirala-flota-sovetskogo-soyuza-n-g-kuznetsova/viewer
a famous recent article on VO

and the great work of V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky "The USSR Navy 1945-1991:
https://navlib.net/%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%D0%BE-%D0%BC%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B9-%D1%84%D0%BB%D0%BE%D1%82-%D1%81%D1%81%D1%81%D1%80-1945-1991/

[Sergey Zhikharev]

But if they'd started building 66 instead of 82, they could have completed just one (Moscow). By Khrushchev's time, it would have been in a high state of readiness and could have served for a long time.

[Alexandra]

"White Elephant" (C). Project 66 was the apotheosis of the insanity of the domestic school of designing large artillery ships.

"The Project 66 cruiser became the last large artillery ship developed in the USSR. Conceived as a Soviet response to the American heavy cruisers of the De Moines class, it turned out to have a displacement almost 10,000 tons greater. However, it did not have a decisive advantage over its American opponent. The superiority in the firing range of the main caliber could not be realized due to the imperfection of the fire control systems, and when approaching, the faster-firing American cruiser gained an advantage in firepower [3]. The dimensions of the Project 66 did not correspond to its real striking power, despite the fact that in size it was close to the much more powerful ships of the Project 82 [4]. The anti-aircraft armament of the cruiser was also considered as not ensuring the repulsion of even limited air strikes [5]. But the ship turned out to be very expensive, its cost during serial construction was estimated at 900 million Soviet rubles [6]. For comparison, the Project 82 cruiser cost 1168 million rubles, project 68-bis cruiser - 322 million rubles[7]."

The only thing (even if only in draft form) that domestic naval shipbuilders had designed adequately in this area by the early 1950s was the TsNII-45 "small battleships." With a displacement similar to that of the Project 66 "medium" cruiser, the TsNII-45 proposed what's shown in the first illustration. And with a displacement increase of another ~11,000 tons, what's shown in the second illustration.

[Sergey Zhikharev]

Colleague Andrey writes that Project 66 was developed against light cruisers, and the encounter with any Demoines (or Baltimores) was more likely accidental.

[Alexandra]

Colleague Andrey writes that, in Stalin's opinion, even Project 82 was developed against enemy light cruisers.

"The A.N. Krylov Central Research Institute-45, in its conclusion on the project, signed by the director, Engineer-Rear Admiral V.I. Pershin on September 25, 1953, noted that, "although the designed cruiser satisfies the technical requirements in terms of armament, protection and main purpose, its dimensions and displacement have grown so much that they have reached a limit that does not allow the ship to be classified as a cruiser, but rather as a heavy cruiser, which was the case with the Project 82 ship, which exceeded the cruiser in question in standard displacement by 11,700 tons, but had significant advantages in terms of the caliber of the main artillery, the number of universal caliber barrels, armor, underwater protection and speed, which provided it with an overwhelming superiority over the De Moine-class cruisers."
The Project 66 cruiser, although somewhat superior to the De Moine-class cruiser, has a standard displacement of approximately 6000 tons greater. Therefore, the construction of such a ship, which would not be feasible until 1958, would not represent progress, as the ship, with its greater displacement, would only be comparable in performance to the De Moine-class cruiser built in 1948.
Based on the above, the Institute considers further development of the cruiser according to the TsKB-17 project to be inappropriate.
If the task of creating heavy artillery ships is still relevant today, the Institute considers it necessary to resume the design of such ships according to new OTK, which would more fully meet the current situation."

Vasiliev A.M., Morin A.B. "Medium cruiser of Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov Project 66" p. 53

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Sergey Zhikharev

Colleague Andrey writes that Project 66 was developed against light cruisers.

No, precisely against the heavy ones, specifically against Des Moines. Stalin reworked Project 82 into a KRL killer.

[Sergey Zhikharev]

I apologize for attributing other words to you.

[Non-fighter]

Everyone can shoot, but can they hit the target?
First: two main calibers, 220 and 406, and the 406 has two barrels? How are they going to zero them?
Second: 5 main caliber barrels, 2 and 3 in the turrets: the same thing, how to sight in?
IMHO these projects are not worth the effort of those who drew them.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Not the fighter

First: two main calibers, 220 and 406, and the 406 has two barrels? How are they going to zero them?

Thus, small battleships were supposed to operate in groups against the enemy's "big pots." This was a kind of "spaced battleship"—three turrets on three ships.

Leading specialists at the Marine Engineering Society (MES) believe that the development of a battleship based on the VMM's technical specifications is impractical and does not justify the associated public expenditure. Therefore, the MES proposes conducting a research design for a limited-displacement battleship capable of destroying any existing enemy battleship in a formation of three ships, and any existing heavy cruiser in a single ship.

In pursuance of the decision of the Central Research Institute-45, in 1951–1952, the work "Justification of the Selection of a Battleship Type" was completed (directed by F.E. Bespolov, and the person in charge was retired Vice-Admiral S.P. Stavitsky). It fleshed out the previously expressed ideas regarding battleships, and design studies were completed for nine "small" battleship variants. It was proposed to arm the ships with one or two main battery turrets (457 or 406 mm) and one medium-caliber turret (180–220 mm). The latter was intended to weaken the enemy battleship during close approaches by disabling it with individual high-explosive shell hits from long distances (command and rangefinder and artillery radars). A special feature of the “small” battleship of the proposed type was the strengthening of the armor of the bow end in order to provide protection from 406-mm shells at distances of 65-133 kbt at the most probable course angles in battle (0-28° to the side).
As calculations performed by S.P. Stavitsky showed, in most possible combat maneuvers, the enemy battleship would be disabled before at least one other ship in the group (two ships with two main battery turrets or three ships with one). Of those considered, a "small" battleship with 457-mm guns would have been the most effective. However, since there was virtually no technical groundwork for this (aside from preliminary studies by TsKB-34), TsNII-45 recommended a variant with five 406-mm main battery guns in two turrets for further in-depth development. The displacement and cost of each of these ships would be close to those of a Project 82 heavy cruiser, which could be built "in sufficient numbers."

© Vasiliev, Maureen
Optimists at TsNII-45 and the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry assumed that advances in the air defense and communications systems made squadron targeting in this situation entirely feasible: three ships, one tower per ship.
But the main thing is that all the work on the small LKs was carried out because of the SME's urgent desire to finally bury the LK Project 24, which the ministry really did not want to build.

[Non-fighter]

Thank you, I understand. Our sailors are being asked to engage a potential enemy's full-fledged battleship head-on. But what if there are two of them? Or will there be cruisers/destroyers running alongside?
In short, "eat what they give you, otherwise you won't get anything."

[Alexandra]

Quote: Not the fighter

Thank you, I understand. Our sailors are being asked to engage a potential enemy's full-fledged battleship head-on. But what if there are two of them? Or will there be cruisers/destroyers running alongside?

Well, small battleships were supposed to be built "in sufficient quantities" *(apparently, according to the TsNII-45 staff, instead of the notorious "bandit cruisers"). But Project 24 battleships, with their standard displacement of 73 tons, certainly wouldn't have been built "in sufficient quantities."

All of this, of course, was a preparation not even for the past, but for the "war before last" (in some ways, the British Nelsons, with their limited displacement and 406 mm artillery - a project from the 1920s - ideologically anticipated the "small battleships" of TsNII-45, but they looked at least somehow more adequate than the "pirate cruisers" with 220 mm and 305 mm artillery and a standard displacement of 26 thousand and 36 thousand tons, and "super battleships" with nine 406 mm guns and a standard displacement of 73 thousand tons, exceeding the full displacement of the world's largest battleships of the Yamato class.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Not the fighter

Thank you, I understand. Our sailors are being asked to engage a potential enemy's full-scale battleship head-on.

Well, that's what was thought. intelligence reported exactly - and against one enemy battleship there will be three of our small battleships. The same three towers, plus

Strengthening the armor of the bow end in order to provide protection from 406-mm shells at the most probable course angles in combat (0–28° to the side) at distances of 65–133 kbt.

Quote: Not the fighter

Or will there be cruisers/destroyers running around nearby?

They have escorts. Because without them, small battleships can't be launched at all—they conceptually lack any kind of air defense. The small battleships' only air defense is provided by 57(45)mm and 25mm automatic guns, while long-range air defense is assigned to the escort, according to the technical specifications.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Not the fighter

First: two main calibers, 220 and 406, and the 406 has two barrels? How are they going to zero them?

What zeroing? The advent of artillery radar rangefinders during World War II effectively eliminated the need for classic multi-salvo artillery zeroing.

Watch the night battle in Surigao Strait. The flagship American battleship West Virginia opened fire first at 3:52 AM, aiming her guns using the latest Mark 8 fire-control radar. Hits were scored with the first salvo. Range: 22,800 yards (approximately 20,8 km or 112 cable lengths).

Second: 5 main caliber barrels, 2 and 3 in the turrets: the same thing, how to sight in?

I believe you've already figured it out. When radar rangefinders began to continuously provide distances to naval targets with an error of tens of meters at ranges of tens of kilometers, the optical artillery sighting of naval targets from the previous era instantly became obsolete.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AlexanderA

The advent of artillery radar rangefinders during World War II effectively eliminated the need for classic multi-salvo artillery targeting.

Incorrect. The other question is that there really was a good chance of hitting the target with the first salvo.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Wrong.

The second battle at Guadalcanal (November 15, 1942) The gunners of the battleship Washington, operating in complete darkness solely on the target designation of the Mark 3 (FC) radar, accurately hit the Kirishima with the first salvo from a distance of 8400 yards (7700 m), hit with one 406 mm shell from the second salvo, hit with several 406 mm shells from the third salvo.

Battle of the North Cape (December 26, 1943). The gunners of the battleship Duke of York, using the Type 284M radar to designate targets, scored a direct hit on the Scharnhorst with their first salvo from a range of 11,920 yards (10,900 meters).

I wrote above about the hit on the Yamashiro using the Mark 8 radar from the battleship West Virginia with the first salvo at a distance of 22,800 yards (about 20800 meters) during the battle in the Surigao Strait on October 25, 1944.

In response, could you list battleship and battlecruiser engagements during World War II in which American or British battleships, using radar ranging, achieved engagements with enemy battleships with the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, or any subsequent salvo? Let's see what the Americans' and British's chances were of achieving engagements with the first, second, third, or any subsequent salvo, using radar ranging.

Regarding the battle between the battleships Rodney and King George V on May 27, 1940, and the battleship Bismarck, I will immediately note that there was an initial operator error:

"King George V" opened fire one minute after "Rodney" at 8:48, from a range of 24,600 yards (22,5 km). With the first salvo, the radar operator became confused, mistaking the splashes from the Rodney's shells for his own., which caused King George V to overshoot at first. But then it improved, and King George began to provide coverage.[53] Bismarck was periodically hidden in gunpowder smoke, but thanks to the presence of artillery radar on King George V, this was not a hindrance. The Type 284 radar performed excellently, keeping a good target: out of 34 salvos, 14 were coverages, and only two under its control were off in bearing.[54] The radar failed at 09:13 - the shock from its own gunfire destroyed the ration. By this time the range was reduced to 12,400 yards (11,3 km). Although Rodney was closer to the target, she had a more difficult time without radar, and in the same time she was able to achieve 8 or 9 coverages. By this time, the Bismarck had lost two of its forward main battery turrets and its forward command post.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Alexander, it seems we have different understandings.

Quote: AlexanderA

The advent of artillery radar rangefinders during World War II virtually eliminated the need for classical multiple-salvo artillery sighting.

How many volleys, in your opinion, were required for sighting in with optics, without radar?
Yamato, for example, zeroed in with its second salvo at a range of 173 kbt (according to the naval manual). In Danish, Bismarck was hit by Prince of Wales's fourth salvo. Eugen hit Welles with his third salvo.

Quote: AlexanderA

Regarding the battle between the battleships Rodney and King George V on May 27, 1940, and the battleship Bismarck, I will immediately note that there was an initial operator error:

Bismarck made exactly the same mistake: the battleship's fire control system assumed its second salvo had hit the ship, mistaking the impacts for Eugen's. Because of this error, it only hit Hood with its fifth salvo. And there's no reason to consider King's error but ignore Bismarck's. Generally speaking, given the fire control systems of the time (we're not counting the prehistoric fire control systems of British cruisers), achieving a hit wasn't exactly difficult, and if it wasn't achieved, it was a fire control error: and, as we can see, even radar isn't immune to such errors.
You're writing about Washington firing at Kirishima, but Kirishima fired at South Dakota and hit. Washington fired brilliantly, but the fire stopped because Washington assumed the enemy had been submerged... With artillery radar, yes.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Alexander, it seems we have different understandings.

Quote: AlexanderA

The advent of artillery radar rangefinders during World War II virtually eliminated the need for classical multiple-salvo artillery sighting.

How many volleys, in your opinion, were required for sighting in with optics, without radar?
Yamato, for example, zeroed in with its second salvo at a range of 173 kbt (according to the naval manual). In Danish, Bismarck was hit by Prince of Wales's fourth salvo. Eugen hit Welles with his third salvo.

Quote: AlexanderA

Regarding the battle between the battleships Rodney and King George V on May 27, 1940, and the battleship Bismarck, I will immediately note that there was an initial operator error:

Bismarck made exactly the same mistake: the battleship's fire control system assumed its second salvo had hit the ship, mistaking the impacts for Eugen's. Because of this error, it only hit Hood with its fifth salvo. And there's no reason to consider King's error but ignore Bismarck's. Generally speaking, given the fire control systems of the time (we're not counting the prehistoric fire control systems of British cruisers), achieving a hit wasn't exactly difficult, and if it wasn't achieved, it was a fire control error: and, as we can see, even radar isn't immune to such errors.
You're writing about Washington firing at Kirishima, but Kirishima fired at South Dakota and hit. Washington fired brilliantly, but the fire stopped because Washington assumed the enemy had been submerged... With artillery radar, yes.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

How many volleys, in your opinion, were required for sighting in with optics, without radar?

Many times greater than when using radar ranging.

Yamato, for example, zeroed in with its second salvo at a range of 173 kbt (according to the naval manual). In Danish, Bismarck was hit by Prince of Wales's fourth salvo. Eugen hit Welles with his third salvo.

Battle of May 27, 1941. "From 09:29 to 09:53 King George V used Type 279 ranging radar[54], and was quite successful. In the first 9 minutes of its use King George achieved 4 hits, and then without it for 24 minutes only 3[56]."

Action on 26 December 1943: "At 16:17 Duke of York detected Scharnhorst with Type 273 radar at a range of 45,000 yards (41 km)[63]. By this time Duke of York was equipped with a more advanced version of the Type 284M artillery radar[39] and began tracking the target with it, starting at 16:32, when the range was 29,700 yards (27 km), within the range of main battery fire. But Fraser, knowing the Scharnhorst's advantage in speed, decided to hit for sure and ordered no fire[63]. Fire was opened only at 16:51 at a range of 11,950 yards (10,900 m)[64][65], the first salvos putting the bow out of action turret "A" of the German battleship[66]... "Scharnhorst"... tried to break away from the slower enemy. The battle came down to a chase... Taking into account the rough sea and zigzag course, the difference in speed was not 4 tabulated, but about 2-3 knots, and in the first 1,5 hours "Scharnhorst" was able to increase the lead by 40 cables[67]. The Type 284M radar failed for some time, and the British had to adjust their fire based on observation data from the destroyers. By 18:20 the range was 20,000 yards (18,3 km), and the Scharnhorst ceased fire. By this time, "Duke of York" had fired 52 salvos, of which 31 were covering, and 16 fell no more than 200 yards (183 m) from enemy.

[...]

In the last 25 minutes, Duke of York fired 25 full salvos in 27 minutes, of which at least 21 (84%) hit their target.[72] One hit silenced B turret.[69] At 19:15, C turret on Scharnhorst was silenced.[73] The fate of the German battleship was sealed. Fraser ordered her to be finished off with torpedoes.[74]

In general, given the fire control systems of the time (we are not taking into account the prehistoric fire control systems of British cruisers), it was not that difficult to achieve coverage, and if it was not achieved, then it was a fire control error: and, as we see, even radar is not immune to such errors.

The radar provided range data for both the target being fired upon and the impact marks with an accuracy of tens of meters at distances of tens of kilometers. The radar simultaneously displayed the target mark and impact marks on a single electron beam indicator. This highly accurate determination of the target range and impact marks eliminated significant inaccuracies and human error in optical ranging, and the real-time display of the target and impact marks on a single indicator allowed operators to accurately determine the impact.

The result, example above: "..."Duke of York" fired 25 full salvos in 27 minutes, of which at least 21 (84%) hit the target."

You write about Washington shooting at Kirishima, but Kirishima shot at South Dakota and hit.

"The Washington's very first salvo at 01:00 from a range of ~7,7 km resulted in a clear straddle of the target. According to the report, during the first phase of the battle (before the ceasefire at 01:02), hits were recorded in at least three salvos. After fire resumed at 01:04, the straddle became continuous."

"According to American wartime estimates, nine direct hits were recorded (12% of the 406mm shells fired at the Kirishima). However, a detailed study of the Kirishima wreck by Paul Allen's expedition revealed that the ship received between 20 and 22 direct hits from 406mm shells. This means that the actual firing rate was a phenomenal 26,7% to 29,3%."

"Of the 117 heavy shells fired by the Kirishima, only 1-2 main battery shells were confirmed to have hit the South Dakota (one shattered the barbette of turret #3, the other presumably exploded in the bow). The remaining 25+ hits on the South Dakota's superstructure came from 203mm shells from Japanese cruisers and anti-torpedo shells. The Kirishima's main battery hit rate was only 0,85%-1,7%.

And so, you're absolutely right: both Washington and Kirishima hit South Dakota. But Washington's hit percentage was at least fifteen times higher – 26,7% versus 1,7%.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AlexanderA

Many times greater than when using radar ranging.

Well, yes, 1-2 volleys instead of 2-4, if there are no mistakes. If under

Quote: AlexanderA

classic multi-salvo artillery fire.

You understand exactly this:))))))

Quote: AlexanderA

However, the percentage of hits by the Washington Capitals was at least fifteen times higher - 26,7% versus 1,7%.

Really? And evil tongues say that the Washington achieved 9 hits out of 75 shells, i.e. 12%.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Well, yes, 1-2 volleys instead of 2-4, if there are no mistakes.

And in a very short period of technological development, it could be used in any weather and at any time of day. This became a military-technical revolution that did even more for surface artillery combat than radio-controlled fuses for medium-caliber shells did for anti-aircraft combat between surface combatants and aircraft.

From that moment on, a functioning, or simply better functioning, main caliber fire control radar predetermined victory in artillery battles between large artillery ships.

Really? And evil tongues say that the Washington achieved 9 hits out of 75 shells, i.e. 12%.

I already wrote that "evil tongues" rely on outdated wartime assessments, and not on the Paul Allen expedition's 2019 study of the wreck of the battleship Kirishima.

Evil tongues slander based on an outdated assessment.

https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/second-naval-battle-guadalcanal

"Hit by 20 16-inch shells from the Washington and countless 5-inch shell hits, the Kirishima slowly sank, bobbing in the waves, and finally capsized, stern first, and disappeared from sight. Deprived of their main gun, the Japanese task force attempted to track the Washington, fired a final salvo of torpedoes in protest, surrendered, turned around, and fled the scene as quickly as possible. Willis Lee saw no point in pursuing the retreating enemy."

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AlexanderA

I already wrote that "evil tongues" rely on outdated wartime assessments, and not on the Paul Allen expedition's 2019 study of the wreck of the battleship Kirishima.

You see, this study gives the best estimate of Washington's accuracy. And you wrote

Quote: AlexanderA

But the percentage of hits by the Washington Capitals was minimum fifteen times higher - 26,7%

So this isn't a minimum, but a maximum. And a maximum that inspires very little confidence, considering York's performance.

Quote: AlexanderA

The Kirishima slowly sank, bobbing in the waves, and eventually capsized, sinking stern first, and disappearing from sight. Having lost its main gun, the Japanese task force attempted to track the Washington.

(crying with laughter) - Is it okay that the Kirishima sank only the morning after the battle?
Perhaps you will nevertheless cite sources that do not allow even the most serious errors in chronology?

[tjeck91]

That's what I think too. The trough is similar in tonnage to a Durkenk-class battleship, but much larger in size. However, if it encounters the Des Moines or two other decent battleships, the outcome is a foregone conclusion. They might not sink it, but they could open fire with high explosives and set a fire that lasts for a week.

Sverdlov seemed much more logical than this.

[Vasily_Ostrovsky]

A small additional remark on the concept of light naval forces...
In 2020, Timokhin published an article on the Navy's light forces:
https://topwar.ru/amp/167853-legkie-sily-vmf-ih-znachenie-zadachi-i-korabelnyj-sostav.html

[solar]

The motto for this series of articles could be "The best is the enemy of the good"...

[Grossvater]

From a purely technical perspective, all these projects were ruined by unreasonable demands on speed. Speed ​​is the true high-tech in shipbuilding, and it is speed requirements that dictate all other purely shipbuilding parameters of a vessel. Incidentally, speed is the most vulnerable tactical element of a combat vessel. One lucky hit and that's it. The Italians will tell you that.
And, in my deep conviction, perhaps the most important requirement for any weapon is affordability and abundance. Only when a combat unit is expendable, when the thought of "I need to send this into battle" leaves the senior commander's pants clean. , proven tactics and reasonable risk, well-coordinated teams and units, and dashing commanders appear.
Nelson could allow his two lines to be thrust right into the French line because he knew that he was not leading the last ships of England.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Grossvater

From a purely technical perspective, all these projects were ruined by excessive demands on speed.

The plans were ruined by unreasonable demands on everything. The 220mm turret weighed as much as the 305mm turret on the Sevastopol-class battleships. Well done, designers.

[Grossvater]

If I'm not mistaken, the armor on the new turrets was one and a half to two times thicker.

[Alexandra]

Speaking of 305mm turrets:

MK-3-12 "Sevastopol": front 203 mm, side 203 mm, roof 76 mm (later reinforced to 152 mm in Soviet times), rear wall 305 mm (counterweight), barbettes 150 mm (in the upper part)
MK-15: forehead 305 mm, sides 125 mm, roof 125 mm, barbette 330 mm
SM-31 forehead 240 mm, side 225 mm, roof 125 mm, rear wall (counterweight) 400-726 mm, barbette 200-235 mm

As we can see on the SM-31 Project 82, in comparison with the MK-15 Project 69, the front and barbette have been significantly weakened, the side has been strengthened, the counterweight has flown into space... the total mass of the turret has increased from 1200 tons to 1370 tons.

Speaking of the SM-6 Project 66, various sources estimate the turret weight to be 730-750 tons. The front is 300 mm thick, the rear is 265 mm thick, the sides are 180 mm thick, the roof is 135-145 mm thick, and the barbettes are 155-180 mm thick.

It's frankly difficult to find any logic in all this. Judging by the turret's front, Project 66 was intended to fight the "Alaska" class, not Project 82. The only thing that ruins it is the barbette.

In the SM-6 turret, they somehow managed to balance the turret without hanging a thick counterweight plate on the rear wall.

And of course, who knows why the thickness of the turret side jumped from 125 mm to 225 mm.

Why the SM-6 turret needed such a thick front and side armor, which increases its weight, if the enemy was considering the "De Moines" with 203 mm guns is a mystery shrouded in darkness.

The only logical option would have been armor protection for the small TsNII-45 battleships, designed to "tank" the Montana from the bow angles of free maneuvering (±0–28°). But neither the admirals nor Comrade Stalin seriously considered these.

[Ambrose]

Wouldn't it have been easier to just stick a 4x2 220 into the 68-bis and see what happened? And why 220, when the 229 seems to be the closest standard... That's how the Japanese turned light cruisers into slugs.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Ambrose

Wouldn't it have been easier to stick a 4x2 220 into the 68-bis and see what happens?

It will drown:)))))))

[Victor Leningradets]

Nah!
It will turn over.
The Project 68 cruisers were a mistake from the start, and the Project 68bis cruisers were a crime. But the devils are beautiful!

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Victor Leningradets

Nah!
It will turn over.

But then it will drown!

Quote: Victor Leningradets

Project 68 cruisers were initially a mistake

Why? It's a good KRL for a pre-war vehicle.

[Victor Leningradets]

For the pre-war class, they emulated the Towns and Clevelands. However, due to their increased speed with strict displacement limits, their foreign counterparts outperformed our cruisers in terms of defense and anti-aircraft artillery.
After the war, the main inconsistencies of Projects 68 and 68K were eliminated in Project 68-bis, but time had passed its verdict on light cruisers, so-called "first rank." Hence, their complete unsuitability for operations in the Korea/Taiwan area.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Victor Leningradets

At the same time, due to the increased speed with strict displacement limits, foreign analogues surpass our cruiser in terms of protection and anti-aircraft artillery.

In fact, the Project 68 has a significant advantage in defense. And in terms of air defense, the Project 68 is clearly superior to the Town.

[Macsen_wledig]

Quote: Victor Leningradets

For the pre-war class, they emulated the Towns and Clevelands. However, due to their increased speed with strict displacement limits, their foreign counterparts outperformed our cruisers in terms of defense and anti-aircraft artillery.

Excuse me, but in what way are his "towns" superior?

[Sergey Zhikharev]

I remember someone—we won't point fingers—installed 406mm artillery on the 68th. Something to do with peaceful nuclear energy. True, the number of 406mm guns was reduced, but the caliber remained!

[Ambrose]

I remember someone, we won’t point fingers, but he installed 406mm artillery on the 68th.

The "linear-light" Furious carried eighteen-inch guns—a Grand Fleet record. It practically anticipated the Yamato in caliber.

[anzar]

+++A wonderful series about little-known (to me) projects. Although I expected a sequel about the Russian Navy's ships, this series (about the "great Stalinist" fleet of the USSR) is more interesting.
What I find interesting is that the 220mm gun weighs as much as the "Tsarist" 305/52, but has only ~60% of its muzzle energy (yes, the recoil impulse is also less). The advantage in muzzle velocity (985 m/s with a projectile weight of 176 kg), which is important for long-range shooting, is also offset by the use of the 12-inch Mod. 1928 projectile - 950 m/s with a projectile weight of 314 kg (1,8 times more). Maybe there's something wrong with the accuracy? But it has heavier ones... And yet, the gun and ammunition exist.
Perhaps Stalin was right in insisting on 305mm guns for "medium" cruisers?

[Victor Leningradets]

A useful comment!
At one point, I considered what would happen if the 220mm turrets were replaced with correspondingly re-armored Imperatritsa Maria turrets. The weight difference was about 200 tons per turret. The fact is that the weight of a 220mm turret and a 305mm turret, still of the Tsarist design, are the same if you take the former as a whole, and the latter only the rotating part.
I have to interrupt, I'll finish writing later.

[Victor Leningradets]

I continue:
Anticipating the epic about the impotence of Project 66 against the achievements of capitalism in the style of De Moines, you just need to take the nautical charts of the Inland Seas of the Chinese coast, and solve the problem of confronting in a SHORT-TERM artillery duel Project 66 with probable (conditionally) opponents in this theater of military operations.
There will be such opponents:
- two Cleveland-class cruisers against a Project 66 cruiser;
- De Moines type cruiser versus Project 66 cruiser;
- Alaska-class cruiser against two Project 66 cruisers.
The encounter with battleships should be excluded from consideration due to the obviousness of the outcome.
And based on the results of mathematical modeling of a short-term battle (10 minutes), it will be possible to draw the appropriate conclusions.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: anzar

What I find interesting is that the 220mm gun weighs as much as the "Tsarist" 305/52,

No, the 220mm is significantly lighter. The problem is that the weight of the 220mm's swinging section is often compared to the weight of a 305mm/52" barrel.

[anzar]

No, the 220mm is significantly lighter.

Perhaps I can only look in navweaps, where the SM-40 weighs 53,5 tons with a similar length - 65 cal. = 14,3 m to 15,85 m (12 "/52), BUT the max. pressure is 3600 to 2700 atm. They write that after Stalin's death and the cancellation of the project, the gun was completed as an experimental one and tested in Rzhev from December 12.1953 to November 11.1954.
There, with reference to "Midship frame" No. 33, the design weight of the SM-6 3-gun turret is determined to be 665/730 t (rotating/full) with an armor thickness of 300-180-265 mm and a roof of 145-135 mm.

[Alexandra]

So to speak, to illustrate the depth of the depths of the full weight of the towers.

Mk 16 (Des Moines, USA) 3 × 203 mm / 55 caliber. 451 tons
Drh LC/28 (Deutschland, Germany) 3 × 283 mm / 52 caliber. 600 tons
“Dante Alighieri” (Italy) 3 × 305 mm / 46 klb. 655 tons
SM-6 (Project 66) 3 × 220 mm / 65 caliber. 730 tons
MK-3-12 ("Sevastopol") 3 × 305-mm / 52 caliber. 872 tons
MK-8 (Alaska, USA) 3 × 305 mm / 50 caliber. 920-940 tons
MK-15 (Project 69) 3 × 305-mm / 54 caliber. ~1200 tons
SM-31 (Project 82) 3 × 305-mm / 61 caliber. 1370 tons
Mk 6 (South Dakota, USA) 3 × 406 mm / 45 cal. ~1410-1437 tons
Mk I (Nelson, UK) 3 × 406 mm / 45 caliber. 1504 tons
Mk 7 (Iowa, USA) 3 × 406 mm / 50 caliber. 1700-1708 tons
"Montana" (USA, project) 3 × 406 mm / 50 klb. ~1720-1750 tons
MK-1 (Project 23) 3 × 406-mm / 50 caliber. 2364 tons
SM-28 / MK-1M (Project 24) 3 × 406-mm / 50 caliber. ~2400-2450 tons
Yamato (Japan) 3 x 460mm / 45 caliber. 2774 tons

[Grossvater]

Thank you! Very interesting, but without specifying armor thickness and rate of fire at different elevation angles, it's a bit... uh...

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

It's not interesting, because the weights are very confusing. Some places list the weight of the entire installation, others only the rotating part.

[Alexandra]

The list contains some errors. In some cases, the mass of the rotating part of the turret is listed instead of the total mass.

But the difference between the total mass and the mass of the rotating part is not that dramatic.

For example, the Project 23 battleship's MK-1 turret's gross weight is 2364 tons, while the rotating part's mass is 2067 tons. The difference between the gross mass and the rotating part's mass is approximately 12,6%.

According to various sources, the mass of the rotating part of the Mark 7 Iowa-class light tank turret is 1700-1735 tons.

According to Shirokorad:

The MK-3-12 has a rotating turret weighing 780-784 tons. The total mass of the turret mount is 955 tons. The difference between the total mass and the rotating mass is ~18,3%.

SM-6 - rotating part of the turret 665. The total mass of the turret mount is 730 tons. The difference between the total mass and the mass of the rotating part is ~9%.

The MK-15 has a rotating turret mass of 1024 tons. The total mass of the turret mount is 1200 tons. The difference between the total mass and the rotating mass is approximately 14,7%.

In general, it's clear that domestic large-caliber turrets never demonstrated superior weight characteristics compared to foreign designs. Even taking into account that the above figures primarily refer to the rotating parts of American and British battleship turrets, our turrets, even in their rotating sections, were still hundreds of tons heavier.

[anzar]

MK-3-12 ("Sevastopol") 3 × 305-mm / 52 caliber. 872 tons

This is the weight of the tower not of Sevastopol but of Maria (its armor is thicker)

[Alexandra]

Yes, correction:

https://litlife.club/books/232986/read?page=29

"The changes made to the design resulted in a total increase in the mass of the tower installation by 23 tons. This overload was partially compensated for by the difference between the installation mass specified in the technical specifications (780 tons) and the mass of the designed tower (769,4 tons). The Metal Plant was obliged to eliminate the remaining overload by reducing the mass of individual tower parts and mechanisms."

https://dl.libcats.org/genesis/157000/8f69320a818ff5088a5a4a3f5f8db9db/_as/[L.Amirhanov,_N.Titushkin]_Glavnuei_kalibr_linkoro%28libcats.org%29.pdf

"Mass of the rotating part
with armor: 780 t
(on the ship "Sevastopol": 784 t)
Mass of fixed part
with armor: 300 t
Armor weight: 230 t
total weight
artillery installation: 1080 t
(on the ship "Sevastopol": 1084 tons)

[dragon772]

A heavy cruiser would be interesting.

[deddem]

Quote from: AllX_VahhaB

You could have included screenshots from "World of Ships" in this article. You can see the 66th from all angles, both at sea and in combat. That would be a beauty! The only photos I've got are just fragments of the model and the left turret... It's not quite the modern level of information for an article...

Are these the ones with fancy decorations for the next Chinese New Year?

;)

[deddem]

Quote from solar

The motto for this series of articles could be "The best is the enemy of the good"...

Well, yes.
The management consistently demanded a "Cleveland killer," while the shipbuilders and sailors continued to stubbornly draw a "Des Moines killer," or even an "Alaska killer."

[Alexandra]

Quote: deddem

The management consistently demanded a "Cleveland killer," while the shipbuilders and sailors continued to stubbornly draw a "Des Moines killer," or even an "Alaska killer."

Moreover, neither the command, nor the shipbuilders or sailors, for some reason, realized that they would never get around to killing the Clevelands. Because the killers attempting to engage the Clevelands and Des Moines with artillery would, in the overwhelming majority of cases, be killed by aircraft.

Of the eight Japanese battleships sunk in 1944-1945, five (Musashi, Yamato, Ise, Hyuga, and Haruna) were destroyed by aircraft. Two (Fuso and Yamashiro) were destroyed by torpedoes from American destroyers and gunfire from American battleships, respectively. One (Kongo) was torpedoed by a submarine.

Of the 12 heavy Japanese cruisers destroyed in 1944-1945, eight (Suzuya, Chikuma, Chokai, Mogami, Nachi, Kumano, Tone, and Aoba) were destroyed by aircraft. Three (Atago, Maya, and Ashigara) were torpedoed by submarines. Haguro was torpedoed by British destroyers.

And these statistics were already available from open sources in 1945.

[deddem]

Quote: AlexanderA

And these statistics were already available from open sources in 1945.

Moreover, someone at the meeting asked point-blank: "Why do you need such a fleet? Do you want to butt heads with the British and Americans? Then yes, you need it. If not, then we'll proceed from our geographic position and play from the land."

[Kostadinov]

What did Stalin call a "light cruiser"? Ships with a displacement of less than 20 tons and 150-210 mm artillery were considered "light" cruisers by Soviet classification, while the "heavy" cruiser Stalingrad, weighing 35 tons, was comparable to the German Scharnhorst.

[Kostadinov]

Because the killers who try to engage in artillery battles with the Clevelands and Des Moines will, in the overwhelming majority of cases, be killed by aviation.

What carrier-based aircraft would destroy the cruiser "Stalingrad" in the Black Sea, 150-200 kilometers from the Soviet air bases in Crimea, with MiG-15/17/19 fighters?

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Kostadinov

What carrier-based aircraft would destroy the cruiser "Stalingrad" in the Black Sea, 150-200 kilometers from the Soviet air bases in Crimea, with MiG-15/17/19 fighters?

The only question left is: who will this cruiser engage in naval combat with under these initial circumstances? Who needs a "Stalingrad" in the Black Sea, 200 kilometers from the coast?
And yes, 200 km from the airfield is already dangerous in terms of fighter cover from the shore. Because this means that the enemy strike group must be detected no closer than 220-250 km from the naval formation. Otherwise, the reserve from the shore won't be able to reach it in time.