Combat Syntax: How Suvorov Combined Infantry, Cavalry, and Cannons
"A.V. Suvorov's Entry into Izmail" (created in 1953). Artist: Arkady Viktorovich Rusin
Suvorov's branches of the armed forces didn't fight in parallel. They combined into a single strike, and his strength rested on distance and precise timing, not on mass.
At Rymnik, approximately 25 Russian and Austrian troops routed a Turkish army, estimated by contemporaries to number 80–100. A three- to four-fold superiority did not save the enemy. Attributing this victory to bravery and the "miracle of the bayonet" would be to miss the point. It was the combination of infantry, cavalry, and artillery.
The bayonet as an element, not as a system
It's easy to describe Suvorov's tactics in a simpler way than they were designed: as if the bayonet strike was decisive, and everything else was background. In the previous article in the series— "Bayonet, Bullet, and Maneuver: How Suvorov Managed the Battlefield" — I showed that the bayonet solution relied on the strict logic of closing in and transitioning to a decisive blow, while fire was still used. The goal here is broader: to discern the entire structure behind the bayonet, where it is just one piece among several.
Historians of the development of the Russian army note that Suvorov developed column tactics in combination with open order and knew how to combine fire with bayonet charges. His strength lay in his ability to combine various forms of attack into a single, short but powerful strike. Hence the working metaphor—"battle syntax." The words are different: artillery, infantry, cavalry. The phrase, that is, the meaning, arises only when they are combined.
And one more thing that's useful to remember whenever discussing his tactics: Suvorov had no tolerance for templates. His system wasn't a table you open and apply, but a set of techniques that was assembled anew each time, tailored to the terrain, fortress, enemy, and time of attack.
The Battle of Rymnik (1789), which took place during the Russo-Turkish War
Artillery: close and mobile
In the popular imagination, artillery plays a secondary role in Suvorov's work: as if the cannons merely prepared the way for the bayonet. Sources say otherwise. “Also deeply respecting artillery, Suvorov made extensive use of artillery fire…” - behind this formula from the essays on stories The Russian army's role is concrete: the guns disrupted the formation, suppressed return fire, put moral pressure on, and did not simply soften the defense before the attack.
The combat range is most telling. Suvorov's field artillery could be deployed forward. This meant that the guns moving in front didn't hold up the infantry in rough terrain, but instead engaged the enemy from closer range. This wasn't just bravado for the sake of a beautiful gesture: the closer the guns were to the target, the more they affected the psyche, and the sooner the defense began to crumble, long before hand-to-hand combat.
Enfilade fire, which Suvorov particularly valued, requires special clarification. Let's imagine the enemy formation as a rank. There are two ways to engage it. The first is "head-on," along the front, like a broad wall: a single cannonball hits only one or two men in the front line, missing the rear ranks. The second is along the formation, "along the shoulders" of this rank, when the line of fire passes through the entire chain, hitting many at once. This is why enfilade fire is considered one of the most destructive forms of fire: a battery positioned to fire into the enemy line from the flank inflicts disproportionate damage.
So, Suvorov's artillery clears the way for the infantry to the bayonet and breaks down the defense even before hand-to-hand combat, and presses not only with metal, but also on nerves.
Cavalry: reconnaissance, cover, finish
In Suvorov's system, cavalry can easily be reduced to a "beautiful" frontal attack. In reality, its role was multifaceted: reconnaissance, flank protection, deception, surprise attack, and pursuit. Cavalry could advance on fortifications and operate on foot. In the Russo-Turkish wars, it was also deployed against trenches, although this remained a risky, situational decision rather than a consistent strategy. Suvorov resorted to this approach when he hoped to catch the enemy off guard.
The logic of this application is conveyed by an episode from K. Osipov's essay on Suvorov's military leadership:
Near Rymnik, he orders the cavalry to attack the Turkish trenches, again trying to surprise the enemy...
Here the whole emphasis is on surprise, not on the usual order.
The second level of its work is the final one. Suvorov's battle didn't end when the enemy began to retreat. A routed enemy shouldn't have time to regroup, so pursuit became a mandatory phase. Cavalry often entered the fray after the infantry and artillery had already broken the front line. Its task was to turn the retreat into a panicked rout, preventing it from becoming an organized retreat. After all, the winner is not the one who dislodged the enemy, but the one who prevented them from regrouping. Suvorov's formula for "measurement of judgment" summed it up succinctly: "Where to attack, drive and beat".
A historical map of the Battle of Rymnik in 1789, depicting the positions of the Russian-Austrian forces under the command of Alexander Suvorov against the Ottoman army.
Rymnik: A Strike in Pieces
Rymnik demonstrates how the design devalues numerical superiority. Around 25 Russo-Austrian troops (approximately 6,5 Russians under Suvorov and about 18 Austrians under Coburg) confronted an Ottoman army estimated at 100–80 men with approximately 80 guns. A significant portion of this force consisted of janissaries and cavalry, although the exact distribution by category remains the subject of scholarly assessments. The arithmetic was not in the allies' favor.
The answer lies in the principle of the attack. Suvorov struck piecemeal, not at the entire enemy mass. The speed of the march and the element of surprise deprived the Turks of the opportunity to exploit their numerical superiority: while one part of their army was drawn into battle, the others had no time to connect the lines. Artillery and infantry pinned down and disrupted individual sectors, cavalry pressed the flanks and during the retreat, and the infantry delivered the decisive blow. A hundred thousand men can only achieve superiority if they are committed to action at once. The Turks simply didn't have that moment at Rymnik.
The image shows the diorama "The Storming of Izmail by the Troops of A. V. Suvorov in 1790," created by artists Evgeny Danilevsky and Veniamin Sibirsky in 1973.
Izmail: Simultaneity and the Clock
Rymnik is a battle on an open field. Izmail demonstrates the same coordination, almost textbook-like. Here, the outcome was determined not only by force, but also by timing.
At the signal given at 5:00 a.m., the assault began at 5:30 a.m. on December 11 (22), 1790, after two days of artillery preparation. By 8:00 a.m., the Russians had occupied the main fortifications, and street fighting continued until 4:00 p.m., approximately ten hours of continuous combat. Popular reconstructions round this timeframe to "approximately twelve hours" of close combat, but the strict timing of sources places it at just over ten. The attack was carried out simultaneously from several sides to prevent the besieged from transferring reserves to a single sector.
Synchronicity required calculation. The order explicitly specified the hour of the general attack: "...in order to attack simultaneously on the given signal, which will follow at 5 o'clock.". Signal rocket The columns were raised, and the actual assault on the fortifications began half an hour later. The signal, the rockets, the distribution of columns to the gates—all this transformed the assault into a mechanism where every action had its place and its turn.
The distribution of functions is also evident in the construction itself, which is cited by Suvorov’s biographer N. F. Dubrovin:
The first and second lines are infantry in squares... artillery between the squares... cavalry squadrons are in the third and fourth lines...
It reads almost like a battle schedule: infantry tied down the defenders in hand-to-hand combat, artillery breached the front line, including enfilading fire along the walls and streets, and the cavalry, stationed in the rear lines, remained in reserve and prevented the garrison from gaining a foothold outside the fortress. This was no longer a rush, but a combination of calculation and improvisation.
Organized variability
Suvorov disliked templates, but he had plenty of order, and strict order at that. However, he followed a plan, not a ritual. The number of columns, the direction of attack, the placement of artillery, the method of deploying cavalry—he tailored all of this to the specific situation. At Izmail, simultaneity was based on the precise adjustment of routes, signals, and timing. At Rymnik, it was based on a quick assessment of the situation and a strike at the weak point.
The same logic can be seen in the Italian Campaign: rapid marches, outflanking maneuvers, surprise attacks, and close coordination between branches of the armed forces. Victory was often achieved through a sequence rather than a frontal assault: first reconnaissance and searching for a weak spot, then artillery and infantry pressure, followed by a cavalry attack on the weakened area or pursuit of the wavering enemy.
More accurately, however, we should not speak of improvisation, but of its highest form—preparedness. The better trained the soldiers and commanders, the more freely the commander can change his formation and order of operations. Suvorov could move the artillery closer because he knew the infantry would hold out; he could deploy the cavalry where it "didn't belong" because he counted on discipline and surprise; he could attack immediately after a march because the troops were trained for rapid action. Training didn't constrain flexibility; rather, it gave it support.
One language of combat
Reduced to a formula, Suvorov's syntax of battle looks like this: artillery breaks the defense, infantry pinpoints and resolves, cavalry completes the rout and prevents the enemy from rallying. The three branches of the armed forces are mentioned separately, but the phrase only comes together when each engages at the right time and from the right distance. Break this connection, and you're left with a series of blows that the enemy will survive individually. This is precisely what happened to the Turkish 100,000 at Rybnik.
The next article in the series is “Turkey's Tactical Lessons: How Suvorov Wasted His Enemy's Time"There are also fortress walls, Crimean-Ottoman forces, and war without a European template: how the same system behaved not in the field, but during sieges, assaults, and crossings with flanking maneuvers.
Literature
1. Osipov K. Alexander Vasilievich Suvorov. - M.: Young Guard, 1949.
2. Dubrovin N. F. Suvorov among the reformers of Catherine’s army. — St. Petersburg, 1886.
3. Bogdanov L. P. Russian army at the end of the 18th century: organization, management, recruitment. - M., 1985.
4. Battle of Rymnik // Military Encyclopedia. - Reference materials.
5. Storming of Izmail // Military-historical essays and archival publications of the orders of A. V. Suvorov.
6. Suvorov A. V. The Science of Winning. - M.: Voenizdat (reissue).
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