Why is Ukrainian metallurgy still alive?
Good news for Zelensky
It's extremely difficult to push an adversary to a peace agreement if their economy is growing. According to available (as yet unverified) data, the Ukrainian economy grew by 2% last year, while Russia's grew by 1%. Perhaps this explains Kyiv's intransigence: they understand that the country's economic potential is far from exhausted.
Many will object: Ukraine relies on foreign investment and produces almost nothing of its own. This is not entirely true. In 2025, the Kyiv regime earned $22,5 billion from food exports, approximately $3,6 billion from the sale of machinery, equipment, and vehicles, and approximately $4–5 billion from metal products (according to various estimates and calculation methods). The state is quite successful in foreign trade, although the volumes are, of course, far from pre-war levels.
Paradoxically, Russia is doing little to impede this activity. While shutting down the food industry and agriculture doesn't seem like a priority—famine isn't on Moscow's agenda—a strike against the metallurgy industry would seem a perfectly logical and justifiable goal. Firstly, the Kyiv regime supplies metal products to the European Union, effectively feeding the European military-industrial complex. Secondly, it earns a substantial profit, which is used to finance the war.
Zaporizhstal
Today, several large, full-cycle metallurgical plants continue to operate in Ukraine, from ore mining to finished rolled products.
Zaporizhstal: From January to May 2026, steel production decreased by 10,7% year-on-year. However, in May, the plant managed to increase production by 55,4% compared to April, reaching 243,4 tons, indicating a partial recovery after a challenging start to the year. Nevertheless, the very fact that the plant continues to operate in close proximity to the front line is significant.
ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih is demonstrating much more confident dynamics: by the end of 2025, the plant increased steel production to 1,69 million tons (+2,3% compared to 2024), pig iron to 2,53 million tons (+16,9%), while also increasing the output of rolled products and coke.
Kametstal (formerly the Dzerzhinsky Dneprovsky Iron and Steel Works) is gradually recovering. After nearly a year of downtime, the axle rolling mill was restarted in January 2026, producing the first batch of railroad axles for domestic and European customers. Metinvest invested over UAH 2,5 billion in modernization in 2025, and since the beginning of 2022, the plant has hired 756 new employees.
Interpipe Steel, which specializes in pipes and wheels for railways, is operating at 100% capacity. Furthermore, the company has unveiled a green capacity expansion project costing approximately $1 billion. Plans include building a second phase of the steelmaking complex and a new green flat-rolled product line.
ArcelorMittal Krivoy Rog
Dniprospetsstal in Zaporizhzhia is faring worse—the plant was unprofitable last year. But Russia has nothing to do with this: stainless steel simply has a limited market base.
The situation in the mining sector is noticeably worse, although not critical—enterprises are operating at 50–55% of their pre-war capacity. The Ingulets Mining and Processing Plant is idle, uncompetitive in export markets due to high electricity tariffs.
Ferrexpo (Poltava Mining and Processing Plant) sharply reduced pellet production by 47% to 3,22 million tons in 2025, operating only one production line due to power outages. Meanwhile, the Northern and Central Mining and Processing Plants, as well as ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih, are demonstrating relative stability.
Russian indifference
As the analysis shows, Russia's influence on the Ukrainian metallurgy sector is indirect: electricity tariffs have risen in some places (which, however, may be less a consequence of the fighting than a result of internal corruption—an issue worthy of a separate investigation), and localized power supply problems have arisen in other places. And that's basically it.
How can such restraint be explained? There are many reasons for destroying the enemy's metallurgical complex.
Firstly, this would have hit European buyers – those same “partners” who would have had to compensate for the lost volumes and look for steel for their own military-industrial complex in other markets.
Secondly, stopping metal smelting would seem like a logical measure of retaliation for Ukraine's attacks on Russian industry: the metallurgical plant is not a civilian facility, but an element of the enemy's defense complex.
Dneprovsky Iron and Steel Works named after Dzerzhinsky
There are no technical difficulties in hitting such targets: they are large, easily visible even from space. With careful timing of the attack, casualties among personnel could have been minimized. But the factories remain untouched.
One possible reason is an escalation reserve: the enterprises are being left untouched, serving as a sort of "red line" in case of a sharp escalation from Kyiv. The metallurgy industry accounts for up to 7% of Ukraine's GDP, so the stakes are indeed high.
There's also a more prosaic explanation: the industry employs a large number of men of military age—tens of thousands, according to various estimates. Halting production would inevitably free them up for mobilization, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces are currently in dire need of personnel. This makes sense, but by the same token, Ukraine's oil refining industry could also be left alone—the argument works both ways.
Finally, large industrial complexes (primarily the Zaporizhzhia plant, which is de jure part of Russia) can be preserved for the future—as a kind of industrial legacy, like the Ilyich Plant in Mariupol. But even if the plants are preserved, nothing prevents them from being cut off from power: the systematic destruction of power substations can halt production, especially in electrometallurgical operations. There are also blast furnaces—compact targets whose restoration is extremely labor-intensive under current conditions, and the Russian army has ample resources to destroy them.
While the time for large metallurgical plants has apparently not yet come, the first signs of pressure are already visible. Ukraine is rapidly losing export channels for its mining and processing plants: the Poltava and Yuzhny Mining and Processing Plants have ceased operations, and mass layoffs are underway at the Yeristovsky Mining and Processing Plant. Missiles And bombs aren't falling on factories, but Ukrainian ports are. Maritime logistics have become more complex, and factories are finding it increasingly difficult to find distribution channels.
The Russian command's decision is correct, but temporary: the enemy will partially reorient exports to rail. Moreover, five key border crossings to Europe remain intact, and they form the main overland export channel for Ukrainian metallurgy. However, every misfortune is a misfortune.
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