Not a bullet, but a jammer: what is the solution for unmanned landing

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Not a bullet, but a jammer: what is the solution for unmanned landing


In July 2026, Ukraine's 123rd Territorial Defense Brigade conducted an operation it called the world's first fully unmanned amphibious assault. According to published reports, the unmanned boat (UBK, surface Drone The carrier (with no people on board) sailed across the Black Sea to the Kinburn Spit, lowered its ramp, and deployed a ground robot with a machine gun. It landed on the sand, moved inland, and opened fire. People controlled the entire operation remotely, outside the kill zone. The scale was modest: one carrier, one robot, one short episode. The platform's specifications have not been officially disclosed.



A raid that fit into one go


Let's first analyze what was accomplished, separating it from its name. Technically, a three-pronged system was implemented: a naval drone carrier, a ground combat platform, and remote fire control. The carrier delivered the robot across a water obstacle to the enemy-held shore, and the robot carried out its fire mission. Not a single person was stationed on the spit during this operation. There was nothing else in the operation, and it is precisely this absence that is most significant.

No one attempted to consolidate their position: the robot didn't take up a position, didn't dig in, didn't prepare to receive the next wave. There was no advance toward significant objectives, no hint of holding the area. A single robot with a machine gun is physically incapable of crossing a minefield or suppressing artillery, open a strongpoint, and repel a counterattack. A classic landing on a fortified shore, by comparison, involves hundreds of vehicles and thousands of men in the first few hours. Here, two vehicles operated and the approach lasted only a few minutes.

A landing, in the military sense, is the seizure and holding of territory. None of that happened here, which means the operation can't be called a landing. What we're seeing is a demonstration raid: testing the technical capabilities in combat conditions and demonstrating them to the public. There's no captured territory; the value of the episode lies elsewhere. It's now possible to deliver a combat vehicle to an enemy shore without any personnel on the line of contact.

From Okinawa to Anti-Ship Missile


To understand why the idea of ​​"giving the first wave to vehicles" is being seriously discussed, it's worth remembering the foundations of the classic amphibious assault. The American Marines developed its doctrine in the interwar decades and tested it in the Pacific, from Guadalcanal in 1942 to Okinawa in 1945. The logic was simple and stark. Landing on a fortified beach is possible if the attacker has achieved localized naval and air supremacy. They then suppress the coastal defenses with fire. fleet и aviation, and then threw a mass of men into the narrow space faster than the enemy could react. A landing without people on the sand in this scenario is unthinkable: equipment only provides transport and support, while the infantry takes the ground.

This model was undermined not by a new generation of ships, but by anti-ship missiles Rocket in conjunction with long-range reconnaissance. Compact weapon It learned to hit a large ship tens and hundreds of kilometers away, intelligence learned to detect the approach of a landing party in advance, and there was no longer a safe approach to shore. This is where the analogy with the Pacific Ocean draws its line. Back then, a ship under fire could maneuver and seek an easier spot; now it is found and destroyed before it reaches the shore. The destruction of a single large landing ship with thousands of people on board becomes a political catastrophe, not a tactical loss.

Hence the shift in military planning. In recent years, the US Navy's concept has been moving away from mass landings toward dispersed, low-observable groups relying on unmanned platforms. And here a tempting conclusion suggests itself: if the most vulnerable phase is the initial contact with coastal defenses, then let the machines do it. A robot isn't as much of a loss as a human, and its loss doesn't ruin policy. The Kinburn raid is essentially an early illustration of this line of thought, not an independent discovery.

The coast as a zone of struggle for machines


Since 2022, Ukraine has been systematically attacking Black Sea Fleet ships with unmanned naval drones, including MAGURA V5-class platforms. This campaign has forced the fleet to change its behavior, reduce its activity, and withdraw from certain areas. This same class of platform has now been adapted to deliver ground robots to shore. This is a direct continuation of this trend: the payload changes, but the concept remains the same.

But there's a hidden downside. A drone relies on communications, navigation, and control. Take away its channel or spoof its satellite signal, and the expensive platform becomes a useless hunk of metal before it even reaches the ramp. So, a "robot versus robot" battle on the shore is decided over the airwaves, with the consequences already visible on the sand. The side with a strong counter-drone defense counters the unmanned landing force by jamming communications and navigation, not by firing a bullet. Who landed the robot first is a secondary issue. The winner is the one who set up a counter-force first.

And here it's appropriate to look at the Russian side. The Russian side initially underestimated the threat posed by unmanned boats in the Black Sea. The boats took years to reach their targets, but systematic coverage of their bases, patrols, and interception points was long lacking. The response was delayed, often in response to specific strikes rather than in advance. The Kinburn raid, judging by its success, took place in an area where counter-drone defenses in a secondary direction were sparse. There is no direct data on the state of defense at this point—we can only judge its weakness by the raid's success. But this also points to a pattern: an area without tight airborne surveillance becomes an open door.

It's worth weighing the actual scale of the event against the grandiose claims. "The world's first unmanned landing" sounds like a milestone. In fact, a single robot opened fire on a spit and became a news story. Between the demonstration of a combination and the ability to conduct such operations against a resilient enemy lies a distance no one has yet covered.

What does this change and what doesn't it change?


The most realistic approach, apparently, is a division of labor, not the replacement of humans with robots. Machines take over the most dangerous phase: they are the first to reach the shore, expose minefields and firing points, conduct reconnaissance, and conduct limited fire. Humans land afterward, in an already reconnoitered and partially suppressed area. According to reports of Chinese amphibious exercises, they are practicing the same combined model, where robotic platforms operate in conjunction with, rather than in place of, landing forces.

The reason lies in a simple limitation, which the raid on the spit only confirmed. A robot can deny the enemy access to space: fire at them, plant mines, and impede their movement. But it can't occupy and hold ground—that requires people to dig in, repel counterattacks, and maintain control of the terrain. Getting a vehicle ashore and letting it fire is one thing. Conducting an assault that changes the situation on the front line is quite another, and that still relies on infantry.

The landing on the Kinburn Spit isn't about the triumph of technology. It's about the shift in the starting point for landings. Machines will increasingly make first contact with the shore. But the winner here isn't the one who learned how to deploy a robot first. The winner is the one who learned how to jam it on approach.
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  1. +1
    31 July 2026 06: 23
    I see this landing as a plea to Europe. Give us as many drones and robots as possible. And if things drag on with Ukraine, maybe that's what will happen. Everything depends on our actions.
    1. 0
      1 August 2026 15: 21
      The article is interesting and timely. I hope it will be read by those who ALWAYS prepare for the war(s) they've fought. It's clear that the operator remains the final authority. But let's not forget about AI. Therefore, if control is lost (signal jamming), no one will be able to predict the combat vehicle's actions in such a situation.
  2. +7
    31 July 2026 06: 42
    In fact, beyond the PR, all these drone landings should be taken very seriously, as should the underestimated drone war since the start of the Cold War.
    The use of BEKs forced the search for additional schemes, methods and weapons for protecting the Crimean Bridge and the fleet.
    The widespread use of unmanned systems—robots—may pose a particular danger, so countermeasures must be developed now to prevent the usual scenario.
    1. +5
      31 July 2026 09: 57
      Quote: ZovSailor
      In fact, beyond the PR, all these drone landings should be taken very seriously, as should the underestimated drone war since the start of the Cold War.

      I agree. This is a trial run, a proof of concept—whether it's feasible in reality or not. It's safe to say that this is the first test of the concept and its technical implementation on the battlefield, although there wasn't a battlefield there, and this isn't a training ground, so the enemy could counter them.

      The author emphasizes counteraction within the framework of remote communications, but this is not the case. The primary issues in controlling unmanned systems are shifting toward machine vision and the use of AI in situational assessment and battlefield control, taking into account previously obtained optoelectronic maps of the situation, terrain, and images of potential targets. Subsequent control of robots during attacks and further development of the operation will increasingly shift toward the use of AI.
  3. +1
    31 July 2026 08: 17
    A beautiful article, but there's a catch. For a successful amphibious landing operation, logistics must be in place to sustain the landing force; otherwise, it will either be dumped into the sea or destroyed on the beach.
    There are enough examples from WWII for this.
  4. +3
    31 July 2026 11: 14
    This demonstration of capabilities not only hints at the landing force of the future, but also at a shift in the way we view the water environment as a barrier. If unmanned combat vehicles can submerge below periscope level at the terminal stage and deploy UAVs and missile systems only near the shore, such an attack will have a chance of success. Water is no longer a barrier, but an opportunity to bring attack weapons close to the enemy undetected.
  5. +3
    31 July 2026 11: 26
    So why exactly did this boat go undetected? If it's possible to track aerial targets, why is it a problem on the water? And what's the problem with destroying them? An aerial target moves in three planes and is hit, while a surface target moves in only two—and what's the problem?
    1. 0
      31 July 2026 14: 14
      Quote: mexanik62
      If it is possible to track air targets, why is this a problem on the water?

      What kind of aerial targets are these, and what can we use to track them? The problem lies precisely in the availability of reconnaissance and situational awareness assets. For several years now, drones, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles have been flying undetected, almost reaching their targets (for example, in Crimea), and only on the final leg are they detected and attempted to be shot down with whatever they have. This requires specialized aircraft with modern active electronically scanned arrays (AESA) capable of detecting both airborne and low-flying radar-contrast targets, as well as waterborne targets, hundreds of kilometers away, and either transmitting coordinates and direction, or, better yet, destroying them outright. On the move, all these drones, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles are easier targets than on the final leg. This means that formations of specialized aircraft should be flying 24/7, monitoring all areas of approach for dangerous Ukrainian weapons. The only thing that comes to mind as more suitable is several dozen Su-27, 30, and 35 aircraft with upgraded radars and weapons, as these aircraft are large, can fly long and far, and have plenty of space for radars. And of course, I'm not reinventing the wheel; this is how NATO's Armed Forces monitor distant approaches to cruise missiles with their workhorse F-16.
      1. +2
        31 July 2026 17: 40
        Wouldn't it be easier to install permanent towers with these AESAs along the coast or launch aerostats? And install sensors from the BEKs into the sea, like the enemy does. This could probably be done in five years.
        1. 0
          5 August 2026 11: 24
          Wouldn't it be easier to go along the coast?


          All the equipment on the towers will be carried by drones on Starlink. An aerostat is an even larger target. But hydrophones, or rather their "chain," are very difficult to detect. They're passive and emit nothing. Finding them on the seabed is practically impossible. They'll hear any "chatter" from at least ten kilometers away, and at high speeds, tens of kilometers. They'll calculate the target's movement and provide target designation. But to do this, you'd have to get off your ass and issue the technical specifications. So, yes, it's possible, but why? (c)
      2. 0
        3 August 2026 11: 27
        Quote: karabas-barabas
        The only thing that comes to mind as more suitable is several dozen Su-27, 30, 35 with upgraded radars and weapons, since the machines are large, can fly for a long time and far, and have a lot of space for radars.

        Quote: karabas-barabas
        There are specialized aircraft units that must fly 24/7.

        You are forgetting the nuance - engine hours and the resource of engines, units, and so on.
        For our territories, this will require the production of 5 new aircraft per DAY.
        1. 0
          5 August 2026 23: 10
          The F-16 with an AESA can detect low-flying cruise missiles at 100 km, I believe from the Blok 50/52, so a flight of four can monitor a 800-km range. In Afghanistan, ISAF MFIs circled the country 24/7 in three shifts. It's clear that this is expensive, costly, and complicated, but in my opinion, it's the only realistic early detection method. Everything else—balloons, airships, kites, and the like—is pure fantasy.
          1. 0
            6 August 2026 00: 05
            Quote: karabas-barabas
            So a link of 4 can monitor a strip of 800 km.

            Now let's remember how many kilometers we need to cover* the number of crews for 24/7 = an absolutely unrealistic figure
            1. 0
              6 August 2026 17: 29
              If we do a rough estimate, then all together, Crimea and the western part of the Russian Federation, taking into account those in the air, on duty, in maintenance, there are at least 150. A lot? A lot! But what's the question? Is it impossible to build 150-200 Su-27/30/35 for this purpose in the last two years? Perhaps. Expensive? And is 3 trillion Russian money expensive in Europe? A huge fleet of yachts, 300 billionaires, etc., etc.? Expensive? From 2011 to 2022, in addition to the military budget of the Ministry of Defense of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, averaging $70 billion per year, there were two packages for army modernization, totaling more than $1 trillion at the exchange rate. The first was before 2014, I think, at the exchange rate of $500 billion, and then there were more.
              1. 0
                6 August 2026 18: 23
                Quote: karabas-barabas
                150 at least. A lot.

                And at least 600 crew for 24/7.
                The engine resource is approximately 20 days of 24/7 flights, the units are smaller.
                And it turns out that the sides need to be produced at almost the speed of the WWII era.
                And yachts suddenly - ugh, pennies.
                Quote: karabas-barabas
                there were two packages for army modernization at a combined rate more than 1 trillion $.

                Let me humbly remind you that ALL The Russian Federation budget for 2026 is 46 trillion.
                Therefore, even in theory, they could not allocate a trillion dollars.
                1. 0
                  7 August 2026 04: 02
                  Quote: your1970
                  Let me modestly remind you that the ENTIRE budget of the Russian Federation for 2026 is 46 trillion.
                  Therefore, even in theory, they could not allocate a trillion dollars.

                  What does a single year's budget have to do with this? It was a special budget item for several years, 20 trillion rubles from 2011 to 2019. Here's an Interfax article from 2010 about how it all started.

                  Economy 09:40, December 14, 2010
                  Recovered 20 trillion rubles
                  The government promises a new state arms program, costing over 20 trillion rubles and costing a record amount, will be presented to the president by the end of the year. The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff have successfully justified the need for such expenditures: by 2020, the share of modern weapons in the Russian army should increase to 70%.

                  At the exchange rate at the time, that was $500 billion. Then, after 2019, there were several more separate large tranches, since Shoigu had been in charge of budgets and programs since 2011, and after counting the chickens in the fall, they noticed the results weren't great. So they allocated another 20 trillion rubles. And if you add it all up, the total amount is almost a trillion dollars. Another thing is that the bulk of the funds either went away, or were spent in state programs with no results, or who knows where else. There are tons of articles about this.

                  Quote: your1970
                  And at least 600 crew for 24/7.
                  The engine resource is approximately 20 days of 24/7 flights, the units are smaller.
                  And it turns out that the sides need to be produced at almost the speed of the WWII era.

                  Of course, the crews had to be trained, perhaps even more than 600. Regarding engine life, I'm not sure it's all that bad. Flights at a gentle cruising speed, without afterburners or maneuvers, shouldn't be particularly taxing on engines. But overall, it's unclear what you're arguing with. I'm simply talking about current practice, such as NATO, which constantly flies along its borders even when not at war. So far, no other effective means of defense have been devised. If Ukraine accelerates production of cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and long-range drones, then no air defense system will be able to cope. Air defenses are already struggling precisely because they try to engage targets at the last minute rather than being prepared in advance. Air defense and facility protection have a completely different chance if all these swarms of drones and missiles can be detected hundreds of kilometers away, and that's only possible from the air. All they're discussing here are some kind of nonsense and other absurd theories, although there are concrete tools in the form of the Su-27 and its variants. Of course, in addition to the aircraft themselves, we also need light, inexpensive, short-range missiles, so that each Su-25 can carry up to 20 of them. Overall, I think the Russian Federation would be capable of creating such air force units for monitoring, reconnaissance, detection, tracking, and destroying drones and cruise missiles at long range. It's clear that such scenarios weren't considered when the Air Defense Forces began, but they could have at least started considering them once the Shaheed missiles were deployed.
  6. +1
    31 July 2026 17: 46
    Concepts are "through the roof," especially when it comes to war... But, as always, the "final word" will belong to "Homo sapiens"... Under the current state system of upbringing and education, lacking a plan, hopes for strong, "breakthrough" brains in science and technology are "melting" like a snowball under the spring sun... The Soviet "regiments" of "breakthrough" ideas and developments have been practically "cleared"...
  7. +1
    31 July 2026 22: 27
    Personal opinion...
    If there is no radio signal, there will be no "you have to go there. Where there? Where the arrow is."
    A robot is now made in months. But a sergeant still needs a few months of acquaintance, nine months before giving birth, and 15 years before becoming a teenager with principles.
    Then another 2-5 years until someone can get drunk and fall asleep, and fight "for fun", and...
    And only later, at 19-25 years old, often later, do those appear for whom every day is wonderful because the morning has already arrived, and they can still see this morning.