New American frigates symbolize the restoration of the US Navy
In the near future, a FF(X) frigate, an Arlegh Burke-class destroyer, and Marauder-class unmanned ships will be in formation. And for America's adversaries, all of this isn't a good thing.
It's no secret that the US Navy is in deep crisis. It certainly doesn't compare to the state of the Russian Navy, but compared to its recent past self, the US Navy is a mere shadow of its former self.
This is literally true in every respect. The US has no innovative maritime strategy. In Iran, they demonstrated the so-called "Mahan approach"—the goal fleet The enemy's fleet is the enemy's fleet, and then its maritime trade. In the case of the US, technology made its own adjustment, and the Navy also inflicted serious damage on Iranian territory.
But it worked with Iran. Will it work with China? The crisis, however, isn't just strategic. It's rooted in a serious decline in survivability skills. It's evident in manning issues, in the insufficient flight hours of Marine Corps pilots. It's evident in shipbuilding, and very clearly. To get the Columbia-class strategic submarine program moving, had to involve PalantirJust to keep the supply chains running.
However, behind the signs of a real crisis, the first signs of a correction of the situation are appearing, the first signs that some healthy forces are growing through the US Navy, capable of healing this branch of the Armed Forces as a whole.
We are talking about the people who adjusted American shipbuilding programs and pushed through decisions that could potentially transform the US Navy of today into a high-tech reincarnation of the US Navy of the end of the last century, the same people who brought to their knees (let's call a spade a spade, even if it's offensive) the USSR Navy and the Soviet political leadership.
The United States is returning to naval construction practices that are clearly reminiscent of Elmo Zumwalt and those who followed him.
Only two projects - unmanned ship Marauder и new FF(X)-class frigates They say that the US approach to building its fleet is rapidly changing.
An unmanned ship is a separate topic, but even a single frigate makes the point. Even though it's not high-tech or even simple, that's the problem...
Admiral Zumwalt, the "two-tier" fleet and the frigate problem
To understand what was happening, we need to go back to the 1960s. The Soviet Navy's dramatic growth in combat capabilities is usually attributed to the 1970s, and its peak in manpower to the 1980s. However, the navy's capabilities were laid out in the 1960s. By the late 1960s, the Americans were lagging significantly behind the USSR in a number of areas, primarily in the "missileization" of their fleets and the number of new, modern ships under construction.
In the United States, the author of the strategy to counter the Soviet Navy was Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, who became Chief of Naval Operations in 1970 (for those unfamiliar, the last name Zumwalt is pronounced exactly like that, regardless of the spelling). After analyzing Soviet shipbuilding programs and the growth dynamics of the number of ships, boats, and submarines with guided missiles, rocket weapons In the 60s, Zumwalt put forward a project to restructure the US Navy to combat the Soviet Navy, not only in the form it had in 1970, but also taking into account the future.
A table from Project 60 compares the number of large surface combatants, small surface combatants, landing ships, and attack submarines built by the US and USSR. The caption at the bottom reads: "They build more ships than we do; amphibious (landing) ships are the only category in which we surpass them."
The project was included in history Project Sixty. There's no point in recounting its entire contents here, as the topic is vast. We'll limit ourselves to the following: among other things, the project formulated the concept of a "high-low mix"—a combination of complex, expensive, and well-armed ships (high-performance ships), capable of performing any task, and simpler, cheaper, and less powerful ships (low-performance ships), designed for various relatively simple tasks or as reinforcements for more advanced units.
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations of the United States Navy
According to the plan, sophisticated and powerful, but expensive ships would form the basis of the Navy's strike capabilities, while simple and mass-produced ones would give the Navy strength and prevent the need to divert serious ships to solve simple tasks.
After Zumwalt's resignation as head of the Navy, the main "low" project—the former "patrol frigate," and later the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate—went into production.
This ship is described in detail in the article. "The frigate" Perry "as a lesson for Russia: machine-designed, massive and cheap"The ship was intentionally simplified, but ultimately proved to be very successful and durable. The Perry-class ships fought in every American war during their time in the Navy, and although their design, habitability, and armament clearly marked them as a kind of "ersatz," they performed remarkably well.
The Post-Perry Era: From Torment to Resolution
The end of the Cold War marked, as it seemed to American strategists, the transition to a new model of world order, in which the United States dictates its will to all of humanity, and the only humanity that can oppose the American Navy is motorboats with bearded men packed with explosives – and that’s in the best-case scenario.
Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates
Frigates, reaching their designated service life en masse, were sent to allies or scrapped, and in their place came the "littoral combat ships" (LCS)—colonialist ships for the era of America's unfettered naval dominance. The concept was only moderately successful, good in some ways, not so good in others. The execution was, to put it mildly, so-so. While the Independence-class is still relatively capable of operating as intended, the entire Freedom-class is, to be fair, a failure. needs to be sent to be cut upBut the main problem was different: a world where these ships were logical and necessary was never created.
It became clear long ago that the US had overstepped its bounds with its unlimited dominance, but the mechanism for building a large series of LCS ships of two types had already been launched, this theme was feeding huge masses of people, and it was simply impossible to stop it.
The Navy, meanwhile, was faced with a shortage of a mass-produced ship for the new era—a ship that would support the highly technological and expensive Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.
What was needed was a ship that, like the Perry, could be assigned tasks for which the Burke was surplus.
A creative search within the Navy's collective mind has given birth to such a strange undertaking as the Constellation-class frigates.
It's hard to say what the Navy's motives were when ordering an American-built version of the Italian-built European FREMM frigate. The ship was supposed to be somewhat smaller than the Arleigh Burke destroyer, and only slightly cheaper. It wasn't a mass-produced workhorse due to its price and design complexity, and its construction time was comparable to that of a destroyer. Instead of a frigate, the Navy received a "sub-destroyer," a "dried-up Burke," inferior to the destroyer in every way except the number of anti-ship missiles on launchers, but at a comparable cost. It also proved to be short on speed.
A rendering of a Constellation-class frigate, specifically the FFG-62 Constellation, the lead ship of the series. Source: Fincanteri
From the outside, the construction program for these frigates looked like a mistake—and it was. However, the Navy's expertise proved sufficient to ensure the ships reached production. FFG-62 Constellation was laid down in April 2024, and a second ship in the class, FFG-63 Congress, was contracted shortly thereafter. Six more hulls were planned for construction.
But in the fall of 2025, to the delight of Americans and the chagrin of those they had designated as enemies, common sense began to return to US shipbuilding programs. Following a design review, the entire series of Constellation-class frigates was canceled. It was decided to complete only the first two ships, as one was already in the shipyard and the second was fully contracted. The remaining six were canceled.
But this didn't mean abandoning the new frigate altogether. In November 2025, the "old" frigate series was cancelled, and in December, a replacement was announced.
The replacement will be the FF(X) series, a further development of the NSF – National Security Fregate – project.
This refers to a frigate design proposed many years ago based on the Legend-class Coast Guard ship. It's a simple, inexpensive, and mass-produced frigate that American shipyards will be able to build in large quantities for the first time since the last Perry was delivered.
And for America's enemies, that's not a good thing.
A big fleet is better than a small one
Before diving into the technical details, it's worth reiterating why the Americans need a cheap and mass-produced frigate.
In early May 2026, angered by the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the Americans attempted to lift it. To this end, among other things, three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers—USS Truxtun, USS Rafael Peralta, and USS Mason—were dispatched to the Strait of Hormuz.
Since early May, the US had been conducting reconnaissance, observing what would happen when tankers attempted to transit the strait unprotected. From May 4th to 5th, they attempted a forceful escort, dubbed "Operation Project Freedom," but the burning of the French vessel and several damaged tankers convinced them they needed more serious forces to accomplish this.
On the night of May 7-8, the destroyers entered the strait with the support of army helicopters. aviation.
Iran launched a massive attack using drones, anti-ship missiles, and small boats. This attack ended as such attacks against a fleet truly prepared for war should end—everything flying or swimming toward the destroyers was destroyed. The American ships suffered no losses and left the Strait of Hormuz on May 8.
It seemed the battle had been won, but the problem was, there was nothing to consolidate the success with. The Americans had fully demonstrated their ability to deal with Iranian offensive weapons, but they needed to protect dozens of merchant ships from these attacks, and they simply didn't have enough ships to do so. As predicted in an old article. "Do not touch aircraft carriers, sink destroyers"The reliance on the destroyer as the primary non-carrier ship proved to be America's Achilles heel—not because the Burke is a bad ship, which is quite good. But because there are few of them, and they are needed to protect aircraft carriers.
The Arleigh Burke-class destroyer is one of the most combat-ready ships in world history. Pictured: USS Ted Stevens. Source: Ingalls Shipbuilding
But the US cannot afford hundreds of such ships either industrially or economically.
This means that the destroyers must be supported by that same class of frigates—a multitude of simple, inexpensive mobilization ships capable of performing relatively simple tasks. If the Americans had several dozen frigates, they would simply withdraw all willing ships from the Persian Gulf, regardless of what Iran wants or doesn't want there.
And so, in April 2026, even before the battle in the Strait of Hormuz, the US allocated funds for the construction of the first four frigates – starting in 2027, they want to launch the first ship as early as 2028. And perhaps they will.
Technical part
The new frigate is based on the NSF frigate concept, proposed back in the early 2010s – a "national security frigate" unified with the Coast Guard's Legend-class patrol vessel – and the similarities between them are obvious.
U.S. Coast Guard Legend-class destroyer WMSL 758 Stone. Photo: Lance Davis/HII
A rendering of the new FF(X) frigate. Photo by the US Navy.
The Legend-class ships were discussed in the article “When people think with their heads. An example of a proper ocean patrol ship "Unfortunately, "Military Review" no longer supports storing photos for older articles, but the text gives a rough idea of what kind of ship this is.
The new frigates are planned to be built in two series—"flights." The first series will essentially be a repainted patrol ship with a reconfigured stern for interchangeable payloads, housing anti-ship missiles or, in the future, a towed sonar station (the very first frigates will not carry anti-submarine weapons), or both. The differences will be in the electronics and, unlike the Legend, the frigate will be armed from the start with the maximum possible armament for this type of ship.
While replacing the Phalanx CIWS with a RAM SAM is an option on a patrol ship, the frigate will have a SAM system immediately, along with a 30mm Mk.38 mod.4 automatic cannon on a stabilized turret for defense against unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and motorboats carrying suicide bombers. The Navy is not disclosing technical details about what else will be in the hull, but the published parameters clearly indicate that the propulsion plant is roughly identical to that of the coastal defense ship, and apparently not only the propulsion plant.
Artillery The installation will be the same as that of the Coast Guard ship - Mk.110 with a 57-mm caliber, most effective against air targets and small-sized high-speed surface targets.
The second "Flight" class will feature vertical launch systems for missiles, which will be used to carry anti-aircraft missiles (although the possibility of arming the frigates with Tomahawks in the future cannot be ruled out). All ships of the second series will also be fully capable of anti-submarine warfare.
A photo from the project presentation shows that the frigates are being prepared for joint operations with unmanned ships, as well as the enormous range inherited from their predecessor, and the weaponry they carry. Source in the photo
Interesting armament options include Mk.70 container launchers with anti-aircraft missiles or modular Hellfire missile launchers to combat large-scale attacks by small boats or unmanned aerial vehicles.
Tactical capabilities
At first glance, it seems that such a simple ship would be ineffective in a real war, but this is not the case. To understand this, let's imagine the use of such ships in Operation Project Freedom.
So, on May 7, 2026, an American task force, consisting of three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, as in reality, and six FF(X) frigates, enters the Strait of Hormuz. As in reality, they are covered by Army Aviation helicopters, and as in reality, Air Force and Navy strike aircraft carry out massive strikes on coastal targets to support the accomplishment of their combat mission.
Only now the Americans are moving deeper into the Persian Gulf, and while the wave of missiles and drones turns into aluminum chips and plastic dust in the fight against destroyers, while helicopter pilots demonstrate the full value of small surface strike vehicles like the BEK and similar ones against a capable enemy, frigates break through into the depths of the Persian Gulf.
They are not at all defenseless, three frigates sailing in formation Defense, that's 63 anti-aircraft missiles, and if anything manages to penetrate them, jamming stations and three 57mm automatic guns, particularly effective against aerial targets, will spring into action. Having broken through the carnage unleashed by the air force, the unmanned combat vessel will also have to overcome automatic fire from the 57mm cannon, then from the same cannon and a 30mm automatic gun with semi-automatic guidance, specially designed to engage such targets, then, closer to the hull, from the onboard 12,7mm machine guns and the small arms of the crew, who constantly practice firing at such targets. The frigates' task is to use the time it takes the destroyers and helicopters to engage Iranian UAVs, anti-ship missiles, and unmanned combat vessels to organize the ships into a convoy by radio and then, under their cover, escort them out of Hormuz. In the actual battle on the night of June 7-8, Iran used everything it could, and everything it could muster was shot down by the Americans.
Under such conditions, what would have prevented six frigates, operating under the cover of destroyers, in two groups, from withdrawing 9-12 ships? Or even more?
Nothing. Anything that might have miraculously managed to reach the frigates would have been finished off by them. At worst, remember that the Legend-class patrol ships were built with military use in mind, and their survivability is quite on par with American military standards.
But this is an extreme example; in reality, things are simpler. Frigates are designed to operate alongside unmanned ships, and the latter are designed to be equipped with towed sonar systems.
A trio of such ships and a frigate with a pair of anti-submarine helicopters can seriously complicate submarine operations over a very large area. Patrolling, intercepting merchant vessels in communications lanes, and other similar tasks will be better accomplished by the new frigates than the Perry and better than destroyers – if only because of the range and endurance inherited from their predecessor. It's worth remembering that the Coast Guard operates worldwide, but has no bases of its own.
But the main thing is not even that.
Revival of military power
For a long time, many of the US Navy's new shipbuilding programs could only be dismissed as foolishness. Of course, as the saying goes, we wish we had their problems. But the fact that the US Navy has turned its back on the principles that brought America victory in the Cold War is obvious to any honest observer.
An example of what frigates offered in the past. A battleship has 32 shore-attack cruise missiles, 16 anti-ship missiles, powerful all-purpose (and therefore anti-aircraft) artillery, and super-powerful main caliber artillery. The downsides are no anti-aircraft missile system, no helicopters, and no anti-submarine capability. But let's give it just one frigate with a SAM system, a towed sonar station, and a pair of helicopters, and to destroy such a pair would require a disproportionately large force.
For American patriots, the Navy's mission statement was a persistent sore. For America's enemies, or those it designated as its enemies, it was a risk that they would approach a major war unprepared.
And now they've begun to improve. Behind the small frigate lies a revival of the approaches to military development that allowed the US to defeat the USSR. Moreover, this is only the beginning.
The Americans have much to be happy about. We certainly don't. No one can say how long this trend will last, but for now, the US is taking the right steps to boost its naval power, and that's definitely bad for us.
Information