US blitzkrieg in Libya and the USSR

An F-111F from the U.S. Air Force's 48th Tactical Fighter Wing takes off from Lakenheath Air Base in the United Kingdom. This aircraft took part in Operation El Dorado Canyon and struck an airfield in Tripoli on April 14, 1986.
Chances for success
As noted earlier, Moscow had a good chance of repelling a US attack in mid-1985. Moreover, it was possible to launch an Iranian-dollar "torpedo" at the side of an American battleship.The USSR could have outplayed the US: aid to Iran and a blow to the dollar). That is, give it to the Iranians weapon (new sea mines, anti-ship missiles etc.) to disrupt tanker traffic in the Persian Gulf. Drive up the price of "black gold" and generate a much-needed influx of foreign currency. Create a new Vietnam for the Americans if they interfere with Iran.
At the same time, they could have dealt a blow to the dollar. They could have refused to sell hydrocarbons for dollars. They could have demanded other currencies instead—the Deutsche Mark, French and Swiss francs, British pounds sterling, etc.—then strengthened Western Europe's commitment to "independence" from the United States. They could also have set up a clearing agreement with Europe, similar to the 30s. To earn rubles, Europeans would have had to import their goods and sell them at our prices. And spend the proceeds on energy.
The petrodollar system, the foundation of the Western world order, was taking a powerful blow to the gut. The dollar was collapsing. The US was suffering an inflationary blow. Due to the developing economic crisis, threatening a new Great Depression, they were forced to abandon the arms race. Western Europe would have to befriend us.
At the same time, an elite schism was taking place in the United States. The fall in oil prices irritated some of the American elite. In particular, George H.W. Bush, Reagan's vice president and future president, defended the interests of the American oil business. The drop in oil prices hit hard not only the USSR but also the southwestern US states, which were not particularly fond of the "northerners."
In 1986, Bush publicly expressed concern several times about the fall in oil prices. He said stability was needed. His speeches ran counter to the Reagan administration's policy of wanting to crush the USSR through an "oil war," an arms race (which was largely a bluff), and information and psychological warfare.Financial war against the USSR; Oil war against the USSR).
Bush even went so far as to raise the need to raise oil prices in Saudi Arabia. This greatly surprised the Saudis, who had previously been under constant pressure from Washington to increase oil production in the kingdom and drive down the price of this commodity.
Thus, there were influential forces in the United States that spoke of the need to stabilize the oil market. At a closed meeting of the International Energy Agency in the spring of 1986, representatives of many countries demanded higher oil prices.
The US, in general, was also in turmoil. There were disputes within the elite. Finances and the economy were on the brink of a serious crisis. Moscow could also capitalize on this.
However, Gorbachev and his team didn't see this; their moral and willpower had already broken down. Instead of consciously playing a game to defeat the United States, the Soviet leadership watched in panic as global oil prices plummeted from $30 per barrel to $10. In 1986, the USSR received only $30 billion from foreign trade, while mandatory payments totaled $44 billion. They were forced to go into debt and sell off their strategic gold reserves. Plus, the domestic budget was in shambles due to the stupid anti-alcohol campaign. The Union's budget deficit, which stood at 17 billion rubles in 1985, tripled in a year.
Gorbachev's team, which did not include people with the spirit, mind and will of the Brahmin sorcerers, the Kshatriya warriors, but only gray bourgeois, bureaucrats and traders, began to merge the great power and the people. Those opportunities that the Tanker War of 1984-1988 provided (The "Tanker War" in the Persian Gulf and its lessons), the crisis in the United States itself, was not noticed in the Kremlin. Or they chose not to notice, fearing sudden moves and responsibility.
Moscow chose to waste a golden opportunity to spark a U.S.-Persian war and turn it into another Vietnam, which would have surely buried the American superpower. The Reagan administration, on the other hand, seized the opportunity to crush the Soviet "evil empire."
The USS Coral Sea (CV-43) in 1986. The ship, carrying Air Wing 13 (CVW-13), was deployed to the Mediterranean Sea from 1 October 1985 to 19 May 1986. She participated in combat operations against Libya (24 March – 15 April 1986), and during Operation El Dorado Canyon, struck the cities of Tripoli and Benghazi (14–15 April 1986).US Psychological Attacks on the USSR: Libya
The Americans, sensing the weakness of Gorbachev's spineless regime, grew increasingly brazen. In the spring of 1986, they staged a spy scandal and demanded the expulsion of a hundred Soviet UN employees.
On March 13, 1986, the American cruiser Yorktown and destroyer Caron, claiming "innocent passage," entered Soviet territorial waters near the Crimean Peninsula. The American warships passed within six miles of the Soviet coast and remained in Soviet territorial waters for more than two hours.
Seeing that Gorbachev, with his "realpolitik," is weak, prone to compromise, concessions, and wants to be seen as a "dove of peace," Washington makes a strong move in the information and psychological warfare (the "Cold War"). The Americans find a convenient victim: Libya.
Libya wasn't part of the Warsaw Pact, meaning it could be bombed without fear of Moscow's military intervention. However, Muammar Gaddafi's regime demonstrated a bold independence, anti-imperialism, and anti-Americanism. Gaddafi was building his own brand of African socialism and challenging Israel and the United States. Libya was armed with Russian weapons and maintained good relations with Moscow.
The Americans accused Gaddafi of supporting international terrorism. "International terrorism" itself is a myth created in the West to achieve its own geopolitical and geostrategic goals. In particular, American and British intelligence agencies themselves nurtured and organized the "black jihad," directing it against the Russians.
In March, the 1986 fleet The United States launched Operation Prairie Fire. The United States deployed three carrier strike groups to the Libyan coast, led by the aircraft carriers America, Saratoga, and Coral Sea. They carried three hundred aircraft. The naval group also included five guided-missile cruisers, six destroyers, 12 frigates, and four nuclear-powered submarines. The weak Libyan Navy, with only missile boats and a few submarines, was no match for this armada.
US Navy ships demonstratively entered the Gulf of Sidra, and on March 24, A-6 Intruder carrier-based attack bombers struck a small Soviet-made Ovod-class missile boat near the port of Misrata. A Harpoon missile struck the central superstructure, killing 16 crew members. On March 25, the US cruiser Yorktown sank another large missile boat near Benghazi with two Harpoons, killing the entire 60-man crew. The Americans also struck bases. Defense and radar.
According to some estimates, the Libyans responded by shooting down three enemy attack aircraft with their S-200 (Soviet long-range air defense missile system) divisions. On March 27, the American fleet withdrew from the Libyan coast. Moscow was informed that the Americans had abandoned further military action. Therefore, the Saratoga retreated to the US coast. But this was a mistake.

A Grumman E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning and control aircraft prepares for takeoff from the USS America during operations against Libya.
The Americans were preparing a new strike. President Reagan ordered strikes on targets in the Tripoli and Benghazi areas. The operation was dubbed "El Dorado Canyon." It was complicated by the fact that Italy and Germany prohibited the use of their aviation bases, and France and Spain did not allow the use of their airspace for the flight of combat aircraft.
On the night of April 14-15, 1986, about 100 combat aircraft, including long-range bombers and aircraft EW F-111s (based in England) struck targets in the Tripoli and Benghazi areas. The attack was coordinated by Grumman E-2 Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft.
Libya was unprepared for the attack, despite having a fairly robust air defense system consisting of S-75, S-125, 2K12E Kvadrat, and S-200 air defense systems, plus Shilka-type anti-aircraft guns, MANPADS, and other anti-aircraft systems. Fighters were not scrambled; air defense fire was delayed. The Americans lost only two or three aircraft, including one F-111.
As a result, the Americans destroyed or damaged 14 MiG-23 fighters, several Il-76 transport aircraft, helicopters, and radars on the ground. Two S-75 battalions, one S-125, and one Kvadrat battalion were destroyed. Dozens were killed, and many more were wounded. Gaddafi's residence in Tripoli was also hit, but the Libyan leader was not there at the time.
Libya's air defenses were no longer operational. The Americans could have continued bombing Libya. However, the arrival of Soviet warships in the area forced the US to abandon further strikes.
Soviet specialists analyzed the military operation and discovered many interesting things. First, Libya had powerful air defense systems but weak radar coverage. It had no AWACS aircraft, and ground-based radars and guidance stations were insufficient. The Americans were flying low, just below radar visibility. They had good electronic warfare, jamming devices, and anti-radar missiles.
Secondly, the Libyans failed to deploy interceptors. As a result, the effectiveness of the air defenses was significantly reduced.
Thirdly, the usual Arab sloppiness played a role. They said they had the best Russian weapons in the world. But they forgot that they needed high-level organization, skilled tactics, well-trained personnel, and ingenuity. In other words, the Libyans failed to take into account the experience of the fighting in Egypt and Syria.
In particular, the Arabs failed to create a system of backup positions for the air defense missile systems; they were deployed in positions known to the enemy; the divisions were deployed in the open desert, without prepared positions. Therefore, the blast wave and shrapnel destroyed equipment and personnel.
The result was a powerful diplomatic and informational blow to Moscow. Operation El Dorado Canyon looked like the defeat of Russian weapons under the skillful attacks of the American military machine. The whole world saw that Russian weapons had failed Libya, just as they had failed the Iraqis in 1981 and the Syrians in 1982. The conclusion was drawn that the Red Empire was losing the military and technological race to the Americans.
It's worth noting that at this time, the Soviet Union's Armed Forces were deeply mired in bureaucracy and bogged down in window dressing. Of course, the Russian Armed Forces were still a long way from the level of degradation and imitation of the vigorous activity of the "new look," but the situation was dire. The experience of real combat in the Middle East (Israel, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, etc.) was almost never utilized. They were preparing for a new World War II, but with the use of nuclear weapons (Soviet Generals Prepared for Nuclear World War II). Careerists and peacetime generals flourished. Few remembered real combat training, etc.
Thus, the Americans carried out a daring and brazen operation, in the style of the Nazis during the rise of the Third Reich. The US demonstrated its strength and determination, the might of its armed forces, and their capabilities. They tarnished the reputation of Russian weapons. They once again frightened the Kremlin with their audacity, furthering their reputation as "madmen."
And the most important thing, The spineless Soviet elite, led by Gorbachev, didn't respond. And had no intention of responding! Demonstrating that they would continue to retreat, yield, and cede their positions in the world, and then the Great Union itself.
On April 15, 1986, during Operation El Dorado Canyon, U.S. Navy aircraft take off from the deck of the aircraft carrier America. Visible in the foreground and beyond are a Grumman F-14A Tomcat fighter from VF-102 Diamondbacks, an LTV A-7E Corsair II attack aircraft from VA-46 Clansmen (armed with AGM-88 HARM missiles), and a Grumman EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft from VMAQ-2.
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