US blitzkrieg in Libya and the USSR

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US blitzkrieg in Libya and the USSR
An F-111F from the U.S. Air Force's 48th Tactical Fighter Wing takes off from Lakenheath Air Base in the United Kingdom. This aircraft took part in Operation El Dorado Canyon and struck an airfield in Tripoli on April 14, 1986.


Chances for success


As noted earlier, Moscow had a good chance of repelling a US attack in mid-1985. Moreover, it was possible to launch an Iranian-dollar "torpedo" at the side of an American battleship.The USSR could have outplayed the US: aid to Iran and a blow to the dollar). That is, give it to the Iranians weapon (new sea mines, anti-ship missiles etc.) to disrupt tanker traffic in the Persian Gulf. Drive up the price of "black gold" and generate a much-needed influx of foreign currency. Create a new Vietnam for the Americans if they interfere with Iran.



At the same time, they could have dealt a blow to the dollar. They could have refused to sell hydrocarbons for dollars. They could have demanded other currencies instead—the Deutsche Mark, French and Swiss francs, British pounds sterling, etc.—then strengthened Western Europe's commitment to "independence" from the United States. They could also have set up a clearing agreement with Europe, similar to the 30s. To earn rubles, Europeans would have had to import their goods and sell them at our prices. And spend the proceeds on energy.

The petrodollar system, the foundation of the Western world order, was taking a powerful blow to the gut. The dollar was collapsing. The US was suffering an inflationary blow. Due to the developing economic crisis, threatening a new Great Depression, they were forced to abandon the arms race. Western Europe would have to befriend us.

At the same time, an elite schism was taking place in the United States. The fall in oil prices irritated some of the American elite. In particular, George H.W. Bush, Reagan's vice president and future president, defended the interests of the American oil business. The drop in oil prices hit hard not only the USSR but also the southwestern US states, which were not particularly fond of the "northerners."

In 1986, Bush publicly expressed concern several times about the fall in oil prices. He said stability was needed. His speeches ran counter to the Reagan administration's policy of wanting to crush the USSR through an "oil war," an arms race (which was largely a bluff), and information and psychological warfare.Financial war against the USSR; Oil war against the USSR).

Bush even went so far as to raise the need to raise oil prices in Saudi Arabia. This greatly surprised the Saudis, who had previously been under constant pressure from Washington to increase oil production in the kingdom and drive down the price of this commodity.

Thus, there were influential forces in the United States that spoke of the need to stabilize the oil market. At a closed meeting of the International Energy Agency in the spring of 1986, representatives of many countries demanded higher oil prices.

The US, in general, was also in turmoil. There were disputes within the elite. Finances and the economy were on the brink of a serious crisis. Moscow could also capitalize on this.

However, Gorbachev and his team didn't see this; their moral and willpower had already broken down. Instead of consciously playing a game to defeat the United States, the Soviet leadership watched in panic as global oil prices plummeted from $30 per barrel to $10. In 1986, the USSR received only $30 billion from foreign trade, while mandatory payments totaled $44 billion. They were forced to go into debt and sell off their strategic gold reserves. Plus, the domestic budget was in shambles due to the stupid anti-alcohol campaign. The Union's budget deficit, which stood at 17 billion rubles in 1985, tripled in a year.

Gorbachev's team, which did not include people with the spirit, mind and will of the Brahmin sorcerers, the Kshatriya warriors, but only gray bourgeois, bureaucrats and traders, began to merge the great power and the people. Those opportunities that the Tanker War of 1984-1988 provided (The "Tanker War" in the Persian Gulf and its lessons), the crisis in the United States itself, was not noticed in the Kremlin. Or they chose not to notice, fearing sudden moves and responsibility.

Moscow chose to waste a golden opportunity to spark a U.S.-Persian war and turn it into another Vietnam, which would have surely buried the American superpower. The Reagan administration, on the other hand, seized the opportunity to crush the Soviet "evil empire."

The USS Coral Sea (CV-43) in 1986. The ship, carrying Air Wing 13 (CVW-13), was deployed to the Mediterranean Sea from 1 October 1985 to 19 May 1986. She participated in combat operations against Libya (24 March – 15 April 1986), and during Operation El Dorado Canyon, struck the cities of Tripoli and Benghazi (14–15 April 1986).

US Psychological Attacks on the USSR: Libya


The Americans, sensing the weakness of Gorbachev's spineless regime, grew increasingly brazen. In the spring of 1986, they staged a spy scandal and demanded the expulsion of a hundred Soviet UN employees.

On March 13, 1986, the American cruiser Yorktown and destroyer Caron, claiming "innocent passage," entered Soviet territorial waters near the Crimean Peninsula. The American warships passed within six miles of the Soviet coast and remained in Soviet territorial waters for more than two hours.

Seeing that Gorbachev, with his "realpolitik," is weak, prone to compromise, concessions, and wants to be seen as a "dove of peace," Washington makes a strong move in the information and psychological warfare (the "Cold War"). The Americans find a convenient victim: Libya.

Libya wasn't part of the Warsaw Pact, meaning it could be bombed without fear of Moscow's military intervention. However, Muammar Gaddafi's regime demonstrated a bold independence, anti-imperialism, and anti-Americanism. Gaddafi was building his own brand of African socialism and challenging Israel and the United States. Libya was armed with Russian weapons and maintained good relations with Moscow.

The Americans accused Gaddafi of supporting international terrorism. "International terrorism" itself is a myth created in the West to achieve its own geopolitical and geostrategic goals. In particular, American and British intelligence agencies themselves nurtured and organized the "black jihad," directing it against the Russians.

In March, the 1986 fleet The United States launched Operation Prairie Fire. The United States deployed three carrier strike groups to the Libyan coast, led by the aircraft carriers America, Saratoga, and Coral Sea. They carried three hundred aircraft. The naval group also included five guided-missile cruisers, six destroyers, 12 frigates, and four nuclear-powered submarines. The weak Libyan Navy, with only missile boats and a few submarines, was no match for this armada.

US Navy ships demonstratively entered the Gulf of Sidra, and on March 24, A-6 Intruder carrier-based attack bombers struck a small Soviet-made Ovod-class missile boat near the port of Misrata. A Harpoon missile struck the central superstructure, killing 16 crew members. On March 25, the US cruiser Yorktown sank another large missile boat near Benghazi with two Harpoons, killing the entire 60-man crew. The Americans also struck bases. Defense and radar.

According to some estimates, the Libyans responded by shooting down three enemy attack aircraft with their S-200 (Soviet long-range air defense missile system) divisions. On March 27, the American fleet withdrew from the Libyan coast. Moscow was informed that the Americans had abandoned further military action. Therefore, the Saratoga retreated to the US coast. But this was a mistake.


A Grumman E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning and control aircraft prepares for takeoff from the USS America during operations against Libya.

The Americans were preparing a new strike. President Reagan ordered strikes on targets in the Tripoli and Benghazi areas. The operation was dubbed "El Dorado Canyon." It was complicated by the fact that Italy and Germany prohibited the use of their aviation bases, and France and Spain did not allow the use of their airspace for the flight of combat aircraft.

On the night of April 14-15, 1986, about 100 combat aircraft, including long-range bombers and aircraft EW F-111s (based in England) struck targets in the Tripoli and Benghazi areas. The attack was coordinated by Grumman E-2 Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft.

Libya was unprepared for the attack, despite having a fairly robust air defense system consisting of S-75, S-125, 2K12E Kvadrat, and S-200 air defense systems, plus Shilka-type anti-aircraft guns, MANPADS, and other anti-aircraft systems. Fighters were not scrambled; air defense fire was delayed. The Americans lost only two or three aircraft, including one F-111.

As a result, the Americans destroyed or damaged 14 MiG-23 fighters, several Il-76 transport aircraft, helicopters, and radars on the ground. Two S-75 battalions, one S-125, and one Kvadrat battalion were destroyed. Dozens were killed, and many more were wounded. Gaddafi's residence in Tripoli was also hit, but the Libyan leader was not there at the time.

Libya's air defenses were no longer operational. The Americans could have continued bombing Libya. However, the arrival of Soviet warships in the area forced the US to abandon further strikes.

Soviet specialists analyzed the military operation and discovered many interesting things. First, Libya had powerful air defense systems but weak radar coverage. It had no AWACS aircraft, and ground-based radars and guidance stations were insufficient. The Americans were flying low, just below radar visibility. They had good electronic warfare, jamming devices, and anti-radar missiles.

Secondly, the Libyans failed to deploy interceptors. As a result, the effectiveness of the air defenses was significantly reduced.

Thirdly, the usual Arab sloppiness played a role. They said they had the best Russian weapons in the world. But they forgot that they needed high-level organization, skilled tactics, well-trained personnel, and ingenuity. In other words, the Libyans failed to take into account the experience of the fighting in Egypt and Syria.

In particular, the Arabs failed to create a system of backup positions for the air defense missile systems; they were deployed in positions known to the enemy; the divisions were deployed in the open desert, without prepared positions. Therefore, the blast wave and shrapnel destroyed equipment and personnel.

The result was a powerful diplomatic and informational blow to Moscow. Operation El Dorado Canyon looked like the defeat of Russian weapons under the skillful attacks of the American military machine. The whole world saw that Russian weapons had failed Libya, just as they had failed the Iraqis in 1981 and the Syrians in 1982. The conclusion was drawn that the Red Empire was losing the military and technological race to the Americans.

It's worth noting that at this time, the Soviet Union's Armed Forces were deeply mired in bureaucracy and bogged down in window dressing. Of course, the Russian Armed Forces were still a long way from the level of degradation and imitation of the vigorous activity of the "new look," but the situation was dire. The experience of real combat in the Middle East (Israel, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, etc.) was almost never utilized. They were preparing for a new World War II, but with the use of nuclear weapons (Soviet Generals Prepared for Nuclear World War II). Careerists and peacetime generals flourished. Few remembered real combat training, etc.

Thus, the Americans carried out a daring and brazen operation, in the style of the Nazis during the rise of the Third Reich. The US demonstrated its strength and determination, the might of its armed forces, and their capabilities. They tarnished the reputation of Russian weapons. They once again frightened the Kremlin with their audacity, furthering their reputation as "madmen."

And the most important thing, The spineless Soviet elite, led by Gorbachev, didn't respond. And had no intention of responding! Demonstrating that they would continue to retreat, yield, and cede their positions in the world, and then the Great Union itself.

On April 15, 1986, during Operation El Dorado Canyon, U.S. Navy aircraft take off from the deck of the aircraft carrier America. Visible in the foreground and beyond are a Grumman F-14A Tomcat fighter from VF-102 Diamondbacks, an LTV A-7E Corsair II attack aircraft from VA-46 Clansmen (armed with AGM-88 HARM missiles), and a Grumman EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft from VMAQ-2.
13 comments
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  1. +4
    31 July 2026 05: 09
    I believe Gorbachev's actions amount to nothing more than outright betrayal of the country. While the United States was busy with its own affairs, Gorbachev was tormented by one question: how could Warsaw Pact troops be withdrawn from the USSR without public notice and absorbed into the general public? He would later do the same with the Afghan group, to protect his own affairs. 1986 was a year of declining labor and industrial discipline. As a result, the country suffered a rash of accidents with fatalities. Yeltsin found himself in the shadows, for whom the ground was being laid.
  2. +7
    31 July 2026 05: 33
    It all began with the April plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1985. Although I would have named the exact date much earlier: November 10, 1982! When the entire country mourned, but didn't yet understand that we were bidding farewell not only to Leonid Ilyich, but to the entire nation known as the USSR!
  3. +1
    31 July 2026 06: 41
    This is what's called the degradation of the system. Those at the top don't want it, those at the bottom can't, and they don't want it either. The average Soviet citizen didn't need Libya for nothing, just like they didn't need Afghanistan, Egypt, or Syria.
    The average person is concerned about where to buy something to eat.
    1. 0
      31 July 2026 13: 48
      You're exaggerating the economic problems of the 80s. Serious problems began in 1990, when Yeltsin took over the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. Before that, roughly speaking, everything was relatively normal. Or at least until the price of 583-carat gold was raised from 33 to 50 rubles.
      Those at the top wanted to do just that, and they continued to tighten the screws, disregarding the potential consequences. Above all, the housing policy was the most vicious. It was impossible to simply join a housing cooperative or get a garage without a car. Housing was used as a means of controlling the masses, like a carrot and a stick. While temporary supply difficulties were manageable, it was extremely difficult to come to terms with the housing policy and comply with its rules and regulations. It was precisely the murky process of obtaining housing that created a feeling of absolute hopelessness.
    2. The comment was deleted.
    3. -2
      31 July 2026 15: 13
      And lace panties! Where do you come from like that!?
  4. +1
    31 July 2026 18: 51
    I have an extremely negative attitude toward Gorbachev. Even when this... uh... creature was alive, I repeatedly suggested erecting a bust of him. It could be made of gold. But only in Langley, in front of CIA headquarters.
    But still, if we think about it with a cool head, the blow to the gut that threw the country off balance was dealt by Andropov.
    His "Discipline" methods gained trust in the leadership.
    I personally have a memory of walking down the street of our city, back and forth, as far as I can see, not a single person. And this is during the day. It feels like something out of a sci-fi movie... Like a deserted city.
    Chernenko... well, a complete zero, whatever he was or wasn't...
    And then there's that spotted tractor driver. He's still convinced that it wasn't he, but the raisa, who really ruled the country. He probably wanted to show off as "First Lady" among the international elite and so on.
    The degradation of the management back then was monstrous. I had the "pleasure" of interacting with Komsomol, Party, and city leaders of the time, at the local level. I still remember my amazement.
    It was still not clear to me back then that our city was not an exception to the general rule.
    Perestroika. Crowds of enthusiastic idiots listening to this idiot's speeches... Yes, yes, I'm talking about the masses...
    My words almost made them shake their heads, like, "What are you talking about, it's freedom..."
    1. 0
      1 August 2026 00: 10
      Quote: Aleksandr Bezfamilnuy
      The blow to the gut that threw the country off balance was dealt by Andropov.

      In Stankino, a very interesting philosopher taught seminars on scientific communism. He convincingly argued that there was no difference between Gorbachev, Chernenko, and Andropov; rather, they were attempting to radically change the existing system using different methods as their primary levers. Andropov tried to give more power to the security forces and intimidate the people; Chernenko relied on propaganda and agitation; Gorbachev on glasnost, hoping that anti-Soviet humanitarians would better inspire the people to abandon their support for socialism. In Turkmenistan and Ukraine, it was precisely the local KGB officers who destroyed socialism and the Communist Party using Andropov's Chekist methods. Moreover, the proponents of this method were the most successful Russophobes.
  5. +1
    1 August 2026 00: 19
    "In mid-1985, Moscow had a good chance of repelling a US attack. Moreover, it could have launched an Iranian-dollar torpedo at an American battleship (the USSR could have outmaneuvered the US: aiding Iran and attacking the dollar). That is, it could have given the Iranians weapons (new naval mines, anti-ship missiles, etc.)" – in 1985, Iran aided the Afghan mujahideen, and in the Iraq-Iran war, we aided Saddam...so all this is pure fantasy...
  6. 0
    1 August 2026 04: 37
    MSG wasn't alone—it was the fruit of the degradation of the Soviet elite. They wanted property and money, to eat and drink sweets. They had no need for a great country. Therefore, people like Masherov and Romanov would never have come to power—they were in the minority. The result is well known: the collapse of the country and wild capitalism.
  7. 0
    1 August 2026 18: 07
    There was a clearing with Germany in the 30s. Was there any with others, like England or France?
    And... Let's send those who are far away even further, and let's fraternize with those who are close and might want to annex some new lands?
    Especially with Poland in the 30s.
  8. +2
    1 August 2026 18: 41
    Quote: Aleksandr Bezfamilnuy
    I have an extremely negative attitude toward Gorbachev. Even when this... uh... creature was alive, I repeatedly suggested erecting a bust of him. It could be made of gold. But only in Langley, in front of CIA headquarters.
    But still, if we think about it with a cool head, the blow to the gut that threw the country off balance was dealt by Andropov.
    His "Discipline" methods gained trust in the leadership.
    I personally have a memory of walking down the street of our city, back and forth, as far as I can see, not a single person. And this is during the day. It feels like something out of a sci-fi movie... Like a deserted city.
    Chernenko... well, a complete zero, whatever he was or wasn't...
    And then there's that spotted tractor driver. He's still convinced that it wasn't he, but the raisa, who really ruled the country. He probably wanted to show off as "First Lady" among the international elite and so on.
    The degradation of the management back then was monstrous. I had the "pleasure" of interacting with Komsomol, Party, and city leaders of the time, at the local level. I still remember my amazement.
    It was still not clear to me back then that our city was not an exception to the general rule.
    Perestroika. Crowds of enthusiastic idiots listening to this idiot's speeches... Yes, yes, I'm talking about the masses...
    My words almost made them shake their heads, like, "What are you talking about, it's freedom..."


    You're probably around 70. Was Andropov around in 1983? How is it that an adult can walk down an empty city street without anyone stopping him or asking why he's not at work? You weren't a teenager anymore, but you haven't even seen women with children, schoolchildren, or barrels of kvass?
    Sorry, I'm not being sarcastic.
    But personally, I don’t believe that the country’s leaders wanted to destroy the country in order to become not the leaders, but appointees.
    But I do believe that "they wanted the best..." and read what was in the reports instead of unscheduled stops near the grocery store.
  9. 0
    1 August 2026 18: 48
    Quote: gsev
    Quote: Aleksandr Bezfamilnuy
    The blow to the gut that threw the country off balance was dealt by Andropov.

    In Stankino, a very interesting philosopher taught seminars on scientific communism. He convincingly argued that there was no difference between Gorbachev, Chernenko, and Andropov; rather, they were attempting to radically change the existing system using different methods as their primary levers. Andropov tried to give more power to the security forces and intimidate the people; Chernenko relied on propaganda and agitation; Gorbachev on glasnost, hoping that anti-Soviet humanitarians would better inspire the people to abandon their support for socialism. In Turkmenistan and Ukraine, it was precisely the local KGB officers who destroyed socialism and the Communist Party using Andropov's Chekist methods. Moreover, the proponents of this method were the most successful Russophobes.


    Excuse me, but are you a humanitarian?
    Or do you think that all humanists are forever anti-statists?
    A country of soldiers, a country of workers and peasants, or a country of oil workers—how should you treat others? Doctors and teachers? Or do you possess all the skills, knowledge, and abilities of all professions?
    Why didn't you register for the presidential elections?
  10. +1
    1 August 2026 18: 59
    Quote: Sergey Alexandrovich
    You're exaggerating the economic problems of the 80s. Serious problems began in 1990, when Yeltsin took over the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. Before that, roughly speaking, everything was relatively normal. Or at least until the price of 583-carat gold was raised from 33 to 50 rubles.
    Those at the top wanted to do just that, and they continued to tighten the screws, disregarding the potential consequences. Above all, the housing policy was the most vicious. It was impossible to simply join a housing cooperative or get a garage without a car. Housing was used as a means of controlling the masses, like a carrot and a stick. While temporary supply difficulties were manageable, it was extremely difficult to come to terms with the housing policy and comply with its rules and regulations. It was precisely the murky process of obtaining housing that created a feeling of absolute hopelessness.


    What about the multi-family housing complexes that began appearing in 1986-88? These were housing built by factory workers for themselves and for those who stayed on at the plant instead. And those who stayed on didn't work double shifts. But more per worker needed to be built.
    There were also those who worked double shifts for months. They weren't fired from their jobs, and they earned more. These were mostly those who got married yesterday and needed a place to live tomorrow.
    I mentioned factories where production depended on the worker. It's unlikely that something like that existed in metallurgy or mining.