On the projects of Soviet heavy cruisers with 220-mm guns
The Project 66 cruisers were planned to be armed with 220 mm guns, which were not available in either the Russian or Soviet navy had not been used before. Let's look at where the idea of arming our ships came from. artillery of this caliber.
Heavy cruiser project 82
As is well known, before the Great Patriotic War, the USSR developed both heavy and light cruisers. Moreover, while the first light cruiser designs (Project 26 and 26-bis) carried 180mm guns, which were quite unusual for the navy, the subsequent Project 68 already featured a 152mm main caliber, standard for this class of ships. It should be noted that the transition from 180mm to 152mm was not final, as plans subsequently surfaced repeatedly to arm light cruisers with 180mm guns, although these plans were never realized.
As for the heavy ships of this class, their mission was believed to be to destroy "Washington" cruisers armed with 203-mm artillery. That's why our Project 69 heavy cruisers were armed with 305-mm guns already at the design stage—their shells were undoubtedly capable of quickly disabling and destroying a relatively lightly protected cruiser with a displacement of 10–12 tons.
The problem, however, was that the ship, armed with 305mm guns, was much larger than the "Washington" cruisers, but significantly weaker than small battleships such as the French Dunkerque, the German Scharnhorst, and the battlecruisers Kongo and Repulse, although it was already approaching their displacement. A rather predictable desire arose to make the Project 69 cruiser more or less able to fight on equal terms with these ships. This was realized, but it resulted in the standard displacement of the future "Washington scourge" increasing to over 35 tons, effectively making the ship too large and expensive for large-scale production. And the large fleet planned by I.V. Stalin required many heavy cruisers.
So the idea of creating a cruiser whose capabilities would fall somewhere between the Project 68 light cruisers and the Project 69 heavy cruisers was a natural one. And then our sailors got their hands on the German Lützow—an Admiral Hipper-class heavy cruiser acquired from Nazi Germany...
Naturally, under such conditions, the emergence of a "medium" cruiser project was only a matter of time. And just before the war, on May 15, 1941, the People's Commissar of the Navy approved the operational-tactical assignment (OTZ) for the Project 82 heavy cruiser. In terms of armament, the ship was almost a complete copy of the Lützow—the same 8×203mm guns in twin turrets (although prior to this, all projects had favored triple turrets) and 12×100mm dual-purpose guns.
Other anti-aircraft and torpedo armament was somewhat weakened: 12x37mm anti-aircraft guns and 2x3 torpedo tubes on the Project 82 versus 12x37mm, 10x20mm, and 4x3 torpedo tubes on the Lützow. On the other hand, given the extremely low rate of fire of the German 37mm anti-aircraft guns, our option seemed undesirable, although a dozen small-caliber anti-aircraft guns were, of course, far too few for a large ship.
But in other performance characteristics, the Project 82 cruiser differed significantly from the Lützow. Firstly, N. G. Kuznetsov wanted a cruiser with speeds superior to those of most light cruisers: the Project 82 was to reach 36 knots, even faster than the Project 68 light cruisers, whose speed was specified at 34,5 knots at the time of laying. The Lützow, without afterburners, had a specified speed of 32 knots. The cruising range was also expected to be increased: while the Hippers were supposed to have a range of 6800 miles at 19 knots, but in reality it was much less, the Project 82 was required to reach 10,000 miles at 20 knots.
In addition, the People's Commissar of the Navy wanted to obtain a very decently protected ship - the sides, beams and conning tower of the Project 82 cruiser were to be covered with armor providing protection from 203-mm shells at a distance of 60 kbt and above, and the deck was to "withstand" 250 kg of aerial bombs.
When assessing the Admiral Hipper-class cruisers, it's often noted that while this cruiser didn't boast exceptional armament or armor (the latter, incidentally, is highly debatable), the Germans invested heavily in its fire control systems—and this is indeed true. However, the USSR, too, traditionally placed a great deal of emphasis on fire control, and upon acquiring the Lützow, they sought to adopt all of its fire control system features. Therefore, there's no reason to believe that the Project 82 cruiser's fire control system was planned to be more modest than what was intended to be installed on the Lützow.
In short, the 1941 heavy cruiser design specifications made no compromises—the requirement was to design a very fast and extremely well-protected cruiser with the armament of a standard Washington cruiser, but with a highly sophisticated fire control system. In terms of its combined combat capabilities, Project 82 was expected to leave the Hipper-class cruisers far behind.
The result was immediate: the ship's displacement (apparently standard), meeting the OTZ of May 15, 1941, was to be 25,000 tons, compared to 14,990 tons for the Lützow. This increase in displacement was, of course, entirely predictable, as a cruiser always represents a compromise between combat potential and size, and the OTZ, other than armament, made no compromises. But for a 25,000-ton cruiser, the 8×203mm main caliber seemed completely inadequate.
Naturally, with this result, the naval command faced a choice. They had to either reduce the requirements for armor, speed, and range to a level that would allow the ship to be designed with a relatively cruising displacement. Or they had to accept the enormous displacement, but then strengthen the main battery.
Naturally, the second path was chosen, resulting in 210-230 mm guns being considered for the Project 82 cruiser's main battery. In 1944, N. G. Kuznetsov approved the design specifications for the Project 82 cruiser, which significantly rebalanced its characteristics.
The anti-aircraft armament was significantly enhanced, now to include 16×130mm general-purpose guns, 32 anti-aircraft machine guns of 45mm and 12×25mm calibers. While the displacement remained within 25,000–26,000 tons, the speed was sharply reduced to 30 knots. The cruiser's main battery, however, was to consist of nine 220mm guns. This is where things really begin. history development of heavy cruisers with 220 mm artillery, which were included in the first version of our shipbuilding program for 1946–1955.
The initial version of the naval shipbuilding program for 1946–1955 included 12 heavy cruisers with 220-mm artillery; N. G. Kuznetsov later reduced this number to 10. At the same time, according to the esteemed A. M. Vasiliev and A. B. Morin, Project 82 was modified yet again—its displacement was reduced to 20–22 tons, though I, unfortunately, do not know the exact reason. Interestingly, this heavy cruiser design survived the first meeting with I. V. Stalin, which N. G. Kuznetsov attended. Stalin insisted on building heavy cruisers with 305-mm main guns, but N. G. Kuznetsov defended the 220-mm heavy cruisers.
Nevertheless, the Project 82 heavy cruiser did not become the forerunner of the Project 66 cruiser. When I. S. Yumashev became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy on January 17, 1947, a meeting on naval matters was held just a few days later. At this meeting, I. V. Stalin again proposed arming the Project 82 cruisers with 305 mm guns, and I. S. Yumashev did not oppose this. In the summer of 1947, three variants of Project 82 were prepared, of which the smallest had 220 mm artillery, 150 mm of side armor, a speed of 33,5 knots, and a standard displacement of 30,000 tons, and the heaviest had 305 mm artillery, 200 mm of side armor, and a speed of 32 knots. and a displacement of 40,000 tons. The third option was intermediate - it had 305 mm guns, but the thickness of the side armor was 150 mm, a speed of 32,5 knots and a displacement of 38,000 tons.
When these designs were considered, the heaviest version of the Project 82 cruiser, with 200 mm of armor and 305 mm guns, naturally emerged victorious. This design later evolved into the Stalingrad-class cruisers. The version with 220 mm guns was rejected and never revisited.
Second approach
This may seem strange, and indeed it is, but another project for a cruiser with 220 mm artillery appeared among our sailors during the development of a subclass of light cruisers.
It all started out quite well and logically. Just before the war, Project 68 light cruisers, very good for their time, were laid down. They combined a powerful (by subclass standards) armament of 12 x 152mm guns with a high (but not excessive!) muzzle velocity, an acceptable displacement of 10,000 tons, very well-developed armor of decent thickness (100mm side), and a speed of 34,5 knots.
But during the war, Project 68 had, of course, become somewhat obsolete. The anti-aircraft armament needed to be reinforced, along with the installation of radar and other equipment, but it was no longer possible to fit all of this into the old hull. So even the modernized Project 68K Chapayev-class cruisers didn't fully meet the navy's requirements. To remedy this, the development of Project 68-bis cruisers was undertaken, but simultaneously with the ship's reinforcement. weapons and the equipment grew and its displacement...
At the same time, our sailors initially understood that a light cruiser shouldn't be too large: therefore, it was decided to complete the five Project 68K cruisers already laid down before the war, then lay down seven Project 68-bis cruisers, but then move on to the more modest Project 65 light cruisers. Their main caliber was to be reduced to 9×152 mm guns, and their displacement was hoped to be reduced to 8000–8500 tons.
The plan was sound, but, as often happens, the execution was lacking. The Project 65 cruiser's displacement quickly skyrocketed, and despite the sailors and designers exploring numerous options, all of them more or less corresponded to the 68-bis design, leaving no reason to switch to a new cruiser design. Ultimately, at the same meeting in January 1947, where Joseph Vissarionovich insisted on developing a Project 82 heavy cruiser with 305mm guns, it was decided to suspend work on Project 65 and expand the Project 68-bis cruiser series to 25 units.
Despite the mothballing of Project 65, the idea of creating a light cruiser with a combination of performance characteristics significantly superior to Project 68-bis still lingered in the minds of the sailors. Therefore, in 1947, a new design specification was drawn up for a light cruiser with a main battery of 9×180mm guns in triple turrets, an anti-aircraft armament consisting of 8×130mm dual-purpose guns, 24×45mm guns, and the same number of 25mm automatic guns. The armor was to protect against 152mm armor-piercing shells, a speed of 33 knots, and a cruising range of 6000 miles at 18 knots.
This would seem to be no big deal, but to meet these requirements and accommodate post-war equipment, the standard displacement of this light cruiser reached 17,000–18,000 tons. This was a significant increase, even compared to the rather immodest 13,230 tons of the Project 68-bis cruisers' standard displacement, and it is therefore not surprising that the government rejected it, arguing that the project's combat capabilities did not correspond to its displacement.
And that's when perhaps the most amusing iteration in the history of Russian light cruiser design was undertaken. The design was too weak for its displacement, which had already far exceeded the limits set for light cruisers? So let's make it stronger!
In fairness, however, it should be noted that an attempt was made to combine the increased armament of the new light cruiser design with a reduction in its displacement. The design specifications for a light cruiser with enhanced armament and lighter armor were approved by I.S. Yumashev on October 30, 1947. According to the specifications, the cruiser was to have the following characteristics:
Main caliber: 3x3x220mm guns, 125 rounds per barrel;
Long-range anti-aircraft caliber (LRAC) - 5x2x130 mm, but it was proposed to work on installing a sixth turret, ammunition - 250 rounds/barrel;
Anti-aircraft guns - 4x4x45 mm with 1000 rounds of ammunition per barrel;
Torpedo and aviation weapons - no;
Armor: side, beams, main caliber barbettes - 60 mm, deck - 50 mm, conning tower - 20 mm;
Speed: 37 knots full, 18 knots operational-economic speed;
The power plant consisted of 3 turbines, 55,000 hp each, for a total of 165,000 hp. A diesel engine was also provided for operational and economic operation;
Fuel reserves: for the main boilers – for 6 hours of full sailing (a total of 222 miles!), for the diesel plant – 4000 miles. With the combined use of the main machinery and diesel, a cruising range of 6000 miles was expected to be achieved;
Seaworthiness - must ensure the use of weapons up to and including sea state 8;
Standard displacement is 15,000 tons.
In other words, the actual design was that the diesel engine was the core of the propulsion system, which was supposed to "pull" the 165 horsepower of conventional turbines, with the latter being used only in combat. The scheme is certainly ingenious, if one doesn't remember that similar German ideas, implemented in their K-class and Leipzig-class light cruisers, didn't prove as effective as expected.
And one more thing. Much is said today about how the Soviet Navy, immediately after the war, was replenished with obviously obsolete ships, that our naval theory was ossified and unresponsive to the experience of war, and that it largely ignored scientific and technological progress. Well, here's evidence of the broad-mindedness of our military theorists and analysts: according to the OTZ of October 30, 1947, designers were instructed to develop the installation of A. Lyulka's jet boosters on the cruiser to temporarily increase speed to 39-40 knots for 2-3 hours!
Checkmate to anyone who doubted!
And what's interesting is that none of the above was the brainchild of a single individual. The design specifications for such a light cruiser were based on the results of a study of the tactical properties of light cruisers conducted by the Naval Academy. It's a relief that no one thought of designing a light cruiser with hydrofoils or even one capable of flying over islands and isolated areas of land.
But seriously, in a sense, Soviet naval thought returned to its roots—the ideas that underpinned the design of the first Soviet Project 26 cruisers. High speed, very weak armor (which was improved on the 26-bis), but at the same time, a main caliber that was more powerful than the 150-152 mm guns that were the generally accepted standard for light cruisers.
But in the pre-war years, the parameters of the Project 26 cruisers were fully justified by the realities in which they were created. At that time, our designers were not yet ready to create modern cruiser designs from scratch, so they drew on Italian experience.
The Italian light cruiser design we acquired naturally imposed certain limitations, and the industry wasn't yet ready to build large warships—hence the displacement restrictions. The need to operate in concert with destroyers—hence the high speed. The anticipated engagement with superior enemy forces under the concept of concentrated attack—hence the 180mm caliber—and at that time, we had no other modern guns suitable for these cruisers.
But what considerations guided our sailors when issuing the OTZ for a light cruiser with 220mm artillery, a speed of 37 knots, essentially splinter-proof armor, and a standard displacement of 15,000 tons? I don't know for sure, but I can try to guess.
When N. G. Kuznetsov presented his naval program, it included a considerable number of heavy artillery ships, but after the "chainsaw massacre" perpetrated by the shipbuilding industry's leadership, only four heavy and 30 light cruisers remained. Meanwhile, the US and British navies, including the ships under construction, could have had up to 40 heavy and large cruisers, not counting the light cruisers, by the time our 1946-1955 shipbuilding program was completed. Consequently, even if our cruisers had somehow managed to engage in artillery combat with the squadrons of our "sworn friends," they would certainly have been confronted by units including heavy cruisers, to which the light cruisers of Projects 68K and 68-bis were clearly inferior.
Of course, if these considerations were followed, the most logical course would have been to revise the program, reducing the number of light cruisers in favor of heavy ones. But the sailors were powerless to do anything about it, as I. I. Nosenko categorically declared that the industry would not be able to build more than 30 light cruisers, and I. V. Stalin agreed.
What choice did our sailors have? Of course, they could try to "slip" a heavy cruiser into the design as a light cruiser, but it was clear that this would require sacrificing some characteristics. Such a ship clearly couldn't be too large. It can be assumed that 15,000 tons of standard displacement was the limit that would allow the designed ship to be classified as a light cruiser. The powerful 220 mm guns provided an advantage in artillery firepower, but sacrificing anti-aircraft fire was impossible—only armor and speed remained. However, seriously protecting a ship with 220 mm main guns and a displacement of 15,000 tons was clearly unrealistic, while maintaining speed would allow the cruiser to operate alongside destroyers.
Whether our sailors reasoned this way or not, I don't know. But while the OTS itself seems grotesque, it may have had some sound basis, at least at the conceptual level.
KRL-22
In accordance with the OTZ dated October 30.10.1947, 6, work began on the KRL-22 (light cruiser-22). The design bureaus of the Central Research Institute of the Air Defense Forces and TsKB-17 developed 20 variants, six of which were unconventional and deviated from the OTZ requirements. The conclusion, however, was quite predictable.
Provided the OTK requirements for armament, speed, and armor are met, the standard displacement of a light cruiser would be 19,000–19,500 tons. However, this would be with a traditional hull architecture typical of light cruisers, which lacks any significant protection against underwater explosions, which is hardly acceptable for a ship of this size. With a "traditional" hull, the KRL-222 could have the following performance characteristics:
Artillery - 9×220 mm, 10×130 mm, 16×45 mm;
Armor: side 60 mm, deck 50 mm, anti-splinter bulkhead 20 mm;
Speed: 37 knots with a propulsion plant power of 220,000 hp (4×55,000 hp);
Standard displacement – 19,500 t.
A more balanced version, which provided side and bottom protection from high-power explosions, as well as armor capable of protecting the ship from 152-mm armor-piercing shells, looked like this:
Artillery - 9×220 mm, 12×130 mm, 24×45 mm;
Armor: main armor deck and side armor belt - 60 mm, "citadel armored screen" and upper deck - 30 mm, anti-splinter "pickup deck" and, apparently, bulkheads of the same purpose behind the main armor belt - 20 mm. As for the citadel armored screen - apparently, the 60 mm armor belt was internal, that is, recessed into the hull, and the 30 mm "screen" was light armor plating, probably designed to detonate high-explosive shells and remove armor-piercing caps from armor-piercing shells;
Speed: 35 knots with a propulsion plant power of 220,000 hp (4×55,000 hp);
Standard displacement: 22,000 tons. A light cruiser. I imagine that at that moment, somewhere, the two surviving Sevastopol-class battleships, whose standard displacement at the time of their laying down was quite comparable, quietly began to cry.
Following this, 40 more KRL-22 variants were developed, but their conclusions remained the same. The KRL-22, with its traditional light cruiser hull design and 9×220mm guns, was only feasible with a standard displacement of 18,000–19,000 tons. Reducing the displacement below this limit would only be possible by reducing armament or completely eliminating armor and underwater protection. At the same time, the lack of adequate underwater protection on a ship with a standard displacement of nearly 20,000 tons was considered a significant drawback.
Ultimately, three of the best options were selected. The most promising, from the naval specialists' point of view, was the design that called for 9×220-mm, 10×130-mm, and 16×45-mm guns and anti-aircraft machine guns, 100-mm armor on the sides, 65-mm on the deck, 20-mm on the sides outside the citadel, and a splinter deck, as well as mine protection—from explosions at the side and at a depth of 5 m under the FAB-500 bottom. It was assumed that the armor would protect against 152-mm shells at a distance of 70–100 kbt at all course angles. With a propulsion plant of 260,000 hp (4×65,000 hp), the speed was to be 36 knots, and the cruising range was to be 6000 miles at 18 knots. The ship's standard displacement was 19,000 tons. It was recommended that further development reduce the displacement by another thousand tons, and increase the number of 45mm anti-aircraft gun barrels to 24.
Of interest is another of these three variants, which envisioned a radical reduction in displacement—to 10,800 tons. The hull was standard for a light cruiser, without advanced underwater protection. The propulsion plant was 165,000 hp (3 x 55,000 hp), producing 37 knots. The cruising range was 5000 miles at 18 knots. Armor was apparently at the level of the original OTZ, with 60 mm sides and 50 mm deck. This radical reduction in displacement was achieved by reducing the main caliber guns from nine to six. However, the artillery arrangement was not planned to mimic "pocket battleships," but rather to be placed in three twin-gun turrets.
However, the "small" variant wasn't even considered by the Main Naval Staff. As for the "most promising" variant, it was quite rightly noted that its armor protection was very weak, and that upgrading it would result in the ship's displacement approaching that of the Project 82 heavy cruisers. Therefore, it was decided that continuing work on the KRL-22 was impractical, and work on this ship was discontinued.
Thus, neither the Project 82 heavy cruisers nor the "light" cruisers developed under the designation KRL-22 served as prototypes for the Project 66 medium cruiser. However, during the development of Projects 82 and 22, our designers and sailors certainly gained considerable experience in balancing the performance characteristics of a cruiser armed with 220mm guns. And this experience undoubtedly proved very helpful in the design of the Project 66 medium cruisers.
At least, no one has proposed installing jet boosters on Project 66 ships.
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