Armored cruiser Bayan in battle on February 12, 1904.
The battle of January 27, 1904 was the first clash of the main forces fleet In the Russo-Japanese War, it was, unfortunately, the last squadron battle fought by the armored cruiser Bayan, which was designed for squadron service. Nevertheless, Bayan did participate in several more combat episodes, some of which were quite interesting.
Shootout of February 11, 1904
The Japanese actions on the night of January 27, 1904, significantly weakened the Russian squadron, but only temporarily. Then H. Togo attempted another plan: to blockade our ships in Port Arthur by sinking specially prepared barrier vessels at the exit from the inner harbor. The first attack took place on the night of February 11, 1904, with the Japanese planning not only to block the exit from Port Arthur but also to blow up the grounded battleship Retvizan.
This attempt was unsuccessful, something which H. Togo did not yet know on the morning of February 11, but he sent S. Dev's 3rd combat detachment to reconnoiter the results achieved.
At 8:00 a.m. on February 11, 1904, the Bayan, flying the flag of Rear Admiral Molas, set out for the outer roadstead. A cruise along the Kwantung coast was originally planned for February 11, but due to a Japanese night attack, it was cancelled. The Bayan set out to meet the Novik and four destroyers sailing from Liaote Shan. At 8:25 a.m., the Askold joined the Bayan.
At 8:30 a.m., Rear Admiral S. Dev's "dogs" were sighted approaching Port Arthur. At 8:55 a.m., the Chitose, Kasagi, Takasago, and Yoshino opened fire from a range of approximately 40 cable lengths, first at the Novik and the destroyers, and then at the Bayan. Our armored cruiser immediately responded with 6-inch and 8-inch guns, supported by the Askold. The admiral ordered the Novik to take up position in the wake of the Askold, which, by this time, was apparently already following the Bayan. The Novik, having taken its assigned position, also entered the battle.
The exchange of fire was very brief. According to our data, S. Deva turned away and began to withdraw at 09:00. The Japanese report the time as 09:58—given the 55-minute time difference between the meridians of Kobe and Port Arthur, that would be 09:03 Russian time. However, according to Japanese data, they ceased fire at the same time they turned away.
Our cruisers continued firing at the retreating Japanese detachment for a while, ceasing fire sometime between 09:10 and 09:20, possibly closer to 09:20. At 09:10, the signal was raised on Zolotaya Gora to "enter the inner roadstead," which was obeyed.
One might wonder why our detachment didn't attempt to pursue Rear Admiral S. Dev's cruisers. But the fact is that around 8:30 a.m., before the "dogs" were spotted on the Bayan, lookouts on Zolotaya Gora reported spotting H. Togo's main force. According to them, six armored cruisers were visible 15-20 miles from Port Arthur, and behind them, six of H. Togo's battleships were also visible. It's not entirely clear whether the Japanese commander approached close enough to be seen, but it's clear that if our forces believed the Japanese main force was nearby, there was no point in sending the Bayan, Askold, and Novik in pursuit of the fast armored cruisers.
There were no hits on either the Russian or Japanese ships: the Bayan's commander noted in his report that the Japanese shells landed no closer than two cable lengths from his cruiser. Unfortunately, the Bayan's shell expenditure in this exchange is unknown.
Battle of February 12, 1904
In terms of the forces involved, it was perhaps the most unfair battle of the Russo-Japanese War, given the relative strength of the parties involved.
On the night of February 12, our destroyers were sent out to sea, and to ensure their return, at 6:45 a.m. on February 12, the Bayan, Askold, and Novik set out for the outer roadstead. At 7:00 a.m., four destroyers returned to Port Arthur, reporting sightings. "combat lighting and two smokes"And indeed, at 07:10, several smoke signals were noticed on the cruisers at OSO.
At 8:15 a.m., the Japanese had closed so close that it was already possible to discern the entire squadron. On Rear Admiral Molas's orders, the cruisers assumed battle formation, forming a single-file column: Bayan led the way, Novik followed, and Askold came third. Interestingly, this was a rare instance when a detachment of our warships did not leave the weakest one at the rear.
At 08:30 the cruisers formed a wake column, and Rear Admiral Molas signaled: "The enemy, 15 ships in number, is coming from the sea."The reaction of the squadron commander, Vice Admiral O. V. Stark, was, in my opinion, extremely strange. He remained silent for half an hour. Then came the order:
Battleships should get up steam and prepare to head for the outer roadstead at two o'clock in the afternoon. Cruisers should remain under the protection of their batteries and keep an eye on the enemy.
The first part of O. V. Stark's order raises no questions. The battleships were to put on steam just in case, since the enemy had already appeared in force in Port Arthur. And, of course, it would have been quite nice to reach the outer roadstead earlier than 2:00 PM, but the squadron considered this impossible at the time, as 2:00 PM was the time of daytime high tide. Before S. O. Makarov's arrival, it was generally accepted that the squadron could leave Port Arthur's inner harbor only at high tide.
But why leave the cruisers in the outer roadstead? It was perfectly clear that the enemy vastly outnumbered Rear Admiral Molas's force and could strike it. O. V. Stark had hoped that H. Togo wouldn't come under fire from the shore batteries and that the cruisers would be covered by them? But what if he did? Who, if not the Vice Admiral, would know that our long-range gunnery skills weren't exactly excellent, to put it mildly?
Be that as it may, the order was received, and the detachment of Russian cruisers began to sail along the coastal batteries, having a speed of 9 knots: when the detachment reached the extreme point of its route, it turned 16 points (180 degrees) “all at once”, which is why the column was led by “Bayan” and “Askold” in turn.
As for H. Togo, he intended to bombard the arsenal and the Eastern Basin, where our warships were usually stationed, from a distance, to avoid the targeted fire of the shore batteries. The Japanese admiral had six battleships, six armored cruisers, four armored cruisers, two avisos, and destroyers at his disposal. The plan was to approach Electric Rock to within approximately 50 cable lengths and, without approaching any further, bombard the Eastern Basin. H. Togo led his ships forward until a floating mine was discovered on the Mikasa, which greatly confused the Japanese admiral. Where there was one mine, there could be others, so H. Togo, to be on the safe side, turned left—this turn is marked on the diagram at 09:50 (Russian time was 08:55).
After sailing along the Tiger Peninsula and Liaote Shan, H. Togo's squadron turned around and headed back, though not at full strength. The 3rd Battle Detachment headed for Liaote Shan, hoping to find Japanese sailors there escaping from the failed attempt at a barrier. Instead, they encountered two destroyers, one of which, the Fearless, managed to slip under fire into Port Arthur, while the Imposing returned to Pigeon Bay. We subsequently lost it there—but the details of this sad event remain. stories have nothing to do with the "Bayan" fight.
Overall, the actions of the Japanese armored cruisers appear quite sensible. But the pirouette of the battleships and armored cruisers appears all the more odd because, after nearly an hour and a half of maneuvering, H. Togo returned to practically the same spot where he had turned left and where the mines were spotted. From there, turning again toward Electric Cliff, he once again headed toward Port Arthur, as envisaged in the original operation plan.
The weather was excellent, and the Japanese ships had an excellent view of the three Russian cruisers, which continued to leisurely cruise past their shore batteries. Approaching to within about 5 miles of Battery No. 15 on Electric Cliff and 40 cables from our cruisers, the Mikasa turned to starboard (11:42 Japanese time, 10:47 Russian time), after which the Japanese squadron opened fire on the Bayan, Askold, and Novik—the Askold was closest to the Japanese ships at that moment.
Unfortunately, the subsequent maneuvering of the Russian ships is completely indescribable for the reason that the reports about it contradict the above diagram and at the same time look somewhat strange.
According to the Bayan's commander's report, at 10:47, shortly before the Japanese opened fire (our data suggests this occurred slightly later than theirs), the cruiser detachment suddenly turned 16 points, setting a reverse course, with Askold leading and closest to the Japanese. All would have been well, if not for the indication that our cruisers were heading OSO, or east-southeast, or, in common parlance, southeast, but closer to the east. Meanwhile, according to the British observer's chart, the cruisers were heading northeast at this time.
Of course, no matter how good the visibility was that day, our sailors knew their course better than the British observers. But the question arises: why would the cruisers have gone to meet the approaching Japanese fleet? It's a mystery.
According to our data, the Mikasa turned and the Japanese entered the battle at 10:55. At 11:00 Russian time, the Petropavlovsk signaled the cruisers: "Stay close to the batteries" — this would be reasonable if they were approaching the Japanese, with Askold in the lead. Following the commander's orders, the cruisers turned 16 points and headed west (that is, west). However, confusion ensued: Bayan signaled to turn left, which Askold and Novik complied with, but Bayan itself turned right. Accordingly, according to our data, the maneuvering was close to what I depicted below on the English diagram—marked with red arrows.
It is quite possible that this is how it all happened, since the British report also mentions that the Russian cruisers headed towards the Japanese fleet for some time and then turned southwest.
After turning away from the Bayan, the destroyer Besstrashny was spotted, hurrying toward Port Arthur. The armored cruisers Chitose, Takasago, Kasagi, and Yoshino were pursuing it and firing at it, and as they approached, they also opened fire on the Bayan. The Bayan then fired on the Japanese cruisers, covering the escaping destroyer. At 11:10, the Askold and Novik entered Port Arthur's inner harbor, followed by the Besstrashny. The Bayan, having ceased fire, entered the inner harbor at 11:20.
As for the British report, it states that the Japanese opened fire at around 10:47 Russian time, and at 11:10 Mikasa turned first eight points (the diagram shows the turn at 12:05), then eight points again, and set a return course behind the Japanese line. As they retreated, the Japanese battleships did shell Port Arthur, but not heavily—it is reported that the four rearmost battleships each expended five to six 12-inch shells on the harbor and arsenal.
About shooting in battle on February 12, 1904
In short, both sides performed extremely poorly. The battle itself lasted about half an hour, but the lead Japanese battleships, having started the engagement first, abandoned it after turning away, even before it was over. Therefore, each Japanese battleship had the opportunity to practice firing at the Russian cruisers for less than half an hour, about 23 minutes, which, however, should have been enough for target practice. Nevertheless, only one hit was achieved on the Askold—a shell struck the barrel of the 6-inch gun, resulting in the barrel being torn off, and a fragment from the barrel breaking the leg of one of the sailors.
This sailor was the only casualty on the Russian cruisers in the battle of February 12. Admittedly, there's some doubt that it was a Japanese shell. The Askold's commander's report states that the hit was a 12-inch shell, but a shell of that caliber would have showered the cruiser with shrapnel. Here, however, there are no casualties from shrapnel. Therefore, I can't rule out the possibility that it was a shell exploding in the gun barrel. However, if the damage to the Askold's 6-inch gun was indeed caused by a Japanese shell, it would have been the only hit on either the Russian or Japanese ships during the entire battle.
About the consumption of shellsUnfortunately, little is known. The Askold expended 257 shells, the Novik 103, of which 97 were 120mm and 6 were 47mm. I have no shell consumption figures for the Bayan or the Japanese ships.
About combat distances. There is some agreement between Russian and British sources here: both say the battle began at approximately 40 cable lengths, but the Askold's commander reported the distance closing to 32 cable lengths. On the other hand, the British attaché, observing the gunfire, reported that both Russian and Japanese fire was consistently short, with Russian shells from the cruisers falling 2-4 cable lengths short. Only one Russian shell, estimated at 8 inches (from the Bayan), landed in the Japanese line between the two ships. Accordingly, it can be concluded that both our and Japanese gunners misjudged the distances. If so, then the distances may have been 2-4 cable lengths greater than those estimated by the Russian and Japanese ships.
But there is a nuance here: it is quite possible that the Japanese rangefinder operators provided correct data, which became outdated during the transmission period due to the rapid movement of the Russian cruisers, which reached a speed of 20 knots.
Why were the Japanese so bad at shooting? The British attaché's opinion on this matter is interesting. He reported that the Japanese practiced shooting extensively at ranges of 6000–7000 yards (30–35 cables). Accordingly, when the Combined Fleet attacked our squadron on January 27, 1904, according to his observations, the battle took place at precisely this range, and, again, in his opinion, the Russian squadron managed to inflict significant damage. At Chemulpo, the Varyag was damaged and retreated after the battle to 4000–6800 yards (20–34 cables).
That is, in those cases where the battle was fought within the range at which Japanese gunners had trained, they demonstrated good results. But on February 12, the battle was fought at a range of 8000 yards (40 kbt), and the Japanese had no practice firing at such distances. If they had, the Englishman believed, the Russian cruisers could easily have been destroyed.
On the assessment by eyewitnesses of the damage received by the enemy. Our observers assessed the results of the gunfire soberly and reported no hits on the Japanese ships. Meanwhile, the official Japanese history claims that two 6-inch guns on the Askold were disabled by a 12-inch shell hit, the Bayan's funnel was crushed, and the Novik also sustained damage, although no details were provided. Meanwhile, the Japanese counted 22 killed and 41 wounded on the Russian ships, and three killed and 18 wounded on land.
However, Japanese officialdom makes a significant reservation that, due to the great distance, assessing the damage to Russian ships was difficult, and hits on them were listed with the preface: "They say that..."That is, most likely, the damage and losses were described from the words of Chinese spies located in Port Arthur.
But the British attaché observed as many as four hits on the Russian ships. According to him, the Novik was hit twice, and the Askold's mainmast, with its flag raised, "fell overboard", and the aft barbette installation "Asahi" "hit a target near the tank", although it's not entirely clear what the target was: it's likely they were referring to the "Bayan," but I'm not sure. The Englishman admitted the distances were too great to say anything for sure, but he vouched for at least three hits.
He also noted that on the Cheetos, which was located at right angles The Russian ships had good visibility, and several hits on Russian cruisers were also observed.
Also, talking to artillery Asahi's officers, he found out that many of the Japanese shells he observed through his telescope, which fell short, were considered hits by the Japanese officers.
I would especially like to draw the esteemed reader's attention to the fact that we are talking about an engagement at a maximum range of 40-45 cable lengths, and that this engagement took place in excellent weather and excellent visibility—this was specifically noted by the British attaché. Let's also keep in mind that the Englishman was assigned to the Japanese ships to provide a clear and impartial account of the combat operations, so lying and playing along with the Japanese would have been decidedly undesirable for him. He had no interest in inflating the hit count.
Accordingly, we are talking about an honest mistake: and therefore there is no point in attacking our sailors with accusations every time they testified about hits on Japanese ships, which were subsequently not confirmed by the Japanese side.
On the participation of coastal artillery. Of particular interest is the British assessment of the performance of Russian coastal artillery in this battle. According to the British attaché's report, our coastal batteries opened fire at the very beginning of the battle, simultaneously with the cruisers:
It was obvious that all the Russian guns were waiting for the moment when the Japanese fleet was about to come closest.
The high accuracy of Russian gunnery is also noted: it is claimed that when the Mikasa and the three battleships following it set their course for battle, three Russian 12-inch shells fell into the water no more than 140 meters (150 yards) off the Asahi's starboard side. It was these impacts that forced H. Togo to abandon the idea of resuming the battle after its turn.
According to official Japanese historiography, the fire of the Bayan, Novik, and Askold was supported by numerous batteries from the Tiger Tail, Golden Mountain, and Tahe.
At the same time, the official domestic historiography claims that the main forces of the Japanese could have been fired upon by a single battery located on Electric Cliff, which included 5 10-inch caliber guns and 2×57-mm rapid-fire guns.
The battleship Petropavlovsk is visible in the background.
It is clear that in that battle only ten-inch guns could fire at the Japanese battleships.
But it's noteworthy that hitting anything with these guns was very difficult, as both loading and aiming were done manually, unlike the 10-inch/45 mm guns mounted on Russian battleships. The combat rate of fire of Battery No. 15's guns did not exceed one shot every four minutes; in practice, it was likely even lower, and significantly so.
But it was this battery that opened fire on the Japanese, landing three shells 150 yards off the Asahi's starboard side (mistakenly identified as twelve-inch shells), which greatly dampened H. Togo's ardor. So perhaps O. V. Stark's expectation that coastal artillery would be able to cover the cruisers in the outer roads wasn't entirely groundless after all. And, as experience showed, cruisers were very capable of retreating to the inner roads very quickly.
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