Vietnam: Battle of the Ia Drang Valley. On Nameless Hill

"War is the best school for a surgeon." Hippocrates
At 13:38 p.m., along with another batch of transports delivering reinforcements to LZ X-Ray, a medical evacuation helicopter arrived carrying Surgeon Robert Carraru, Medical Platoon Sergeant Thomas Keaton, and Staff Sergeant Earl Keith—all the medical resources the cavalrymen could count on. By that time, 20–25 wounded and dead were already lying on the ground near the termite mound. By this time, there were already about 250 GIs on the ground, and the evolving situation increasingly reminded Moore of Custers and the defeat at Little Bighorn. However, Custers lacked the fire support Moore's cavalrymen could count on, which inspired cautious optimism in the lieutenant colonel.
Delay in requesting air and artillery The lieutenant colonel decided against the strikes and ordered strikes at the foot of the Ch'ipong ridge, where, in his opinion, Vietnamese reinforcements were expected to arrive. The problem was that neither Moore himself nor aviation They didn't know the exact location of the forward positions of the landing companies, which is why Colonel Tim Brown, from the lead helicopter, began to persuade the cavalry commander to move the attack site away from the mountain and closer to his own command post. After all, Lieutenant Herrick's platoon was hanging around somewhere, pinned down and kept down by superior Vietnamese forces.
Gradually, the strike areas were coordinated, and the valley was filled with smoke mixed with reddish dust: fire support helicopters were spraying the slopes with 2,75-inch rockets, and fighter-bombers were dropping 250- and 500-pound bombs and canisters of napalm.

Anthony Nadal, commander of Alpha Company at Ia Drang
The worst thing was that the landing zone was exposed to small arms fire. weapons The Vietnamese were under attack, so Moore ordered the demolition team to fell several trees to create more space for the helicopters to land. The demolition team accomplished the task, but the seven-man team lost one killed—Specialist (specialist is a military rank between private first class and corporal) Scott O. Henry. Meanwhile, Captain Anthony Nadal's Alpha Company launched an attack to the southwest: two platoons of the company advanced to a dry creek to cover Bravo Company's left flank. Bravo Company's 1st and 3rd Platoons, with Lieutenant Walter Joe Marm's 2nd Alpha Platoon attached, went to rescue Lieutenant Herrick and his platoon, who had become encircled.
However, they failed to reach Herrick: Lieutenant Robert Taft encountered a Vietnamese infantry force of about 150 men. The experienced Captain Nadal, who had previously served in the Special Forces, immediately realized that the enemy were not guerrillas, but regular troops, and immediately reported this to Moore by radio. The Americans, according to the recollections of Taft's platoon radio operator, Robert Hazen, "we hit a lead wall"The lead squad was killed immediately: five minutes passed from the moment they set out to search for the encircled men until the first soldiers were killed. Soon, Taft himself was killed—a bullet entered his throat. The radio operator took the map and code book from his pocket, but at that moment the radio was hit and contact with the platoon was lost.

M-60 machine gun in Vietnam
The Vietnamese attack impressed the GIs. The Americans noted that the uniforms and pith helmets of Senior Colonel An's men blended perfectly with the scorched elephant grass, and the soldiers themselves were perfectly disciplined and fearless. The outcome of the entire battle depended on who retained control of the dry creek bed: the landing zone was clearly visible from there, and if the Vietnamese had retained it, landing the Huey would have been greatly hampered. The Americans were saved by two M-60 machine gun crews, who forced the Vietnamese to take cover, but the situation was critical.
— recalled Private William Beck.

The PRC-25 radio is an American classic!
Overall, Alpha Company's 3rd Platoon suffered heavy losses: platoon leader Lieutenant Robert Taft, Sergeants Travis Poss and Alexander Williams, and Specialist Albert Witcher were killed, several men were wounded, and the PRC-25 radio was disabled. However, the Vietnamese fighters failed to take the dry creek bed: they retreated and attempted to outflank Bravo Company, but instead came upon Alpha Company's 2nd Platoon, which was advancing to reinforce Bravo Company. The Vietnamese were so stunned that they had no time to open fire or even take cover. Machine gun fire from close range inflicted significant losses, and the Americans managed to capture two Gooks.
The battle was fought within line-of-sight range, which, frankly, is limited in the jungle. Sometimes fire came from five to ten meters away, and one Vietnamese soldier fell three meters from Sergeant Miller of the 1st Platoon. Captain Nadal, hearing from Sergeant Nathan, who had assumed command of Taft's platoon, that the platoon leader's body had been dumped in a creek bed while crawling, worked with Sergeant Gell to retrieve him and another dead soldier: Moore had taught his cavalrymen not to abandon either the wounded or the dead on the battlefield.

A-1E at work
Given the enemy's numerical superiority, Moore's battalion could have suffered the same fate as the French at Dien Bien Phu, but air support came to the rescue. It was provided by A-1E Skyrider attack aircraft—propeller-driven aircraft from the Korean War, slow but very well armored. However, their slow speed was actually an advantage: the pilot could aim better. Captain Bruce Wallace, who flew them, recalled:
However, the active support of the cavalrymen resulted in aircraft losses: one A-1E, flown by Captain Paul T. McClellan Jr., was shot down, killing the pilot. Whether the plane was hit by a Vietnamese bullet or a fragment from its own bomb remains unclear.

Major General Harry Kinnard
Meanwhile, at 3rd Brigade headquarters, a Vietnamese prisoner was interrogated, who testified that the 7th Cavalry Battalion had been landed in the vicinity of three Vietnamese regiments: the 66th, 32nd, and 33rd. When Major General Harry Kinnrad arrived at the brigade camp and saw the situation maps, he posed a reasonable question to the assistant commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, Richard Knowles: "What the hell are you doing in this area?"To which he received an equally reasonable response:

Lieutenant Walter Joseph Marm
While the American high command pondered the all-important question: "What to do?", Captain Herren was tormented by an equally important one: "How to reach Lieutenant Herrick's platoon?" Artillery fire forced the Vietnamese to retreat, allowing Lieutenant Marm to link up with two platoons of Bravo Company. Now three platoons could come to the aid of Herrick, who had fully lived up to his name. The lieutenant received an order over the radio: fire a shot, then count to three, and fire two more—mark your position.
Having received the signal, the cavalrymen charged, but advanced no more than 10 meters: the enemy had infiltrated behind the "rescue party," and once again a desperate firefight erupted in the jungle at close range, with the Americans taking cover. Anyone who so much as took a knee was met with a bullet: at such a distance, a miss was rare. Unlucky was "Chief," Sergeant Wilbur Curry Jr. of the Seneca Indians. He barely managed to utter his final words: "These bastards are out to get me!", how "those bastards" got to him. Basically, the attempt to "rescue Lieutenant Herrick" ended almost before it began, even though they were barely a hundred meters from where he was surrounded.

Ryan Hurst as Sergeant Ernie Savage
Herrick's platoon was indeed in a tough spot: two machine guns kept the Vietnamese soldiers at bay and allowed Sergeant Ernie Savage's squad, which had broken through, to retreat to the main body of the platoon. But this maneuver cost the life of one of the machine gunners, Private First Class Bernard Birenbaum. The platoon linked up on a small hill, but both machine guns were cut off from the main force about 30 meters down the slope.
The Vietnamese managed to get within grenade throwing range and destroy one of the machine gun crews. Besides Birenbaum, Private First Class Donald Roddy and Sergeant Hurdle were killed, and the machine gun itself fell into the hands of the Vietnamese, who opened fire on the cavalrymen. The second machine gun had only one belt of ammunition left, and the machine gunner, Sergeant Wayne Anderson, was blown up by his own phosphorus grenade; chunks of burning phosphorus were cut from his face with bayonets by Sergeants Savage and Zallen.

Sergeant Carl Lee Palmer
Lieutenant Herrick was running around like a madman, organizing an all-round defense, but along with his radio operator, Specialist John Stewart, and Artillery Reconnaissance Sergeant John Brown, they were caught in a burst of fire from a captured Vietnamese machine gun. He radioed Captain Herren and reported that he was seriously wounded and was handing over command to Sergeant Carl Palmer. Herrick had been shot in the thigh and quickly bled out. Before he died, he gave his final commands: destroy the code book, redistribute ammunition, call in artillery, and get off the hill. The final command was certainly good, but the platoon was physically unable to break through with so many wounded. So Palmer decided to wait for help on the hill.

The M-79 grenade launcher, commonly known as the "blooper"
However, Sergeant Palmer was soon killed as well—the Vietnamese "returned" a grenade thrown at the cavalrymen, which calmed the new platoon commander. Soon, the M-79 grenade launcher ran out of grenades as well. The grenade launcher operator, Specialist Galen Bangham, discarded the useless "blunderbuss" and armed himself with an M-16 from one of the fallen GIs.
— he recalled later.

Fire on yourself is unpleasant!
The platoon held a 25-meter perimeter; of the 29 men, eight were killed and thirteen wounded. Sergeant Stokes, the platoon's weapons spotter, reported to Captain Herren that ammunition was running low and they needed to break out. The captain replied that it was impossible. Stokes was soon killed. He spotted mortar fire until the very end, but soon the mortars ran out, and the crews took up rifles to help the "lost platoon" break out of the encirclement. They were unable to break through: the Vietnamese fire was as dense as a "lead wall." Sergeant Savage now assumed command of the platoon. He called in artillery fire as close to the platoon's defensive perimeter as possible, which was dangerous (the sergeant described the platoon's positions very roughly), but the gunners prevailed and drove off the Vietnamese.
The next Huey flight, just after two o'clock, delivered the last soldiers of Captain Robert Edwards's Charlie Company and the first Delta Force party of Captain Ray Lefevre to the landing zone. This was a significant reinforcement—a machine gun platoon and a few remaining mortars. However, the landing zone was already quite hot—the Gooks were shelling it from both sides. While evacuating the wounded, pilot Bruce Crandall noted that the Vietnamese demonstrated excellent aim—most of the wounds were either to the head or neck.
Warrant Officer Ricardo Lombardo's helicopter was damaged enough to return to the airfield in Plei Me, but the X-Ray never flew back to the landing zone. It was sent to Camp Holloway for repairs, and the crew listened exclusively to the radio for the rest of the presentation. 1st Lieutenant Roger Bean, flying the Huey behind Crandall, was hit in the head by a bullet, twisting his helmet so that his headphones obscured his eyes. The co-pilot, Captain Gene Mesh, landed the helicopter. Moore then ordered all flights to cease until he could "cool down" the landing zone.
But the Vietnamese commander wasn't having much of a good time either. Senior Colonel An sent scouts to pinpoint the American company positions, but communications were poor, and the battalion commanders were also wandering around searching for the enemy. When Major Le Tien Hoa, commander of the 7th Battalion, discovered a gap in the American defenses and decided to enter, he hesitated to execute the maneuver, and the gap was closed by the arriving Charlie Company. Captain Edwards, the company commander, had a tiny lead: his men had barely taken up their positions when the Vietnamese attack began five minutes later. Had they hesitated even six minutes,... But in stories there is no subjunctive mood.
"Edwards shouted over the radio, assessing the enemy attack. But the attack was repelled.

For the M-16, Vietnam was its debut...
Captain John Herren was reporting to the brigade commander, who was monitoring the battle from a helicopter, when he spotted a Vietnamese soldier. He fired a burst from his M-16, but the rifle fell apart in his hands—he couldn't bring himself to call the new weapon reliable (M-16s jamming and failing to fire are a recurring refrain in accounts of this battle!). He then threw a grenade at the enemy, but it bounced off a branch and landed in front of the captain and his radio operator—miraculously, the explosion killed or wounded no one. He decided to find Lieutenant Dennis Deal's platoon in a stream bed, but instead found a Vietnamese machine gun crew, which opened fire on him. However, here, for the first time, the captain had a stroke of luck—the machine gunner missed, and he managed to dive for the nearest cover. His radio operator, however, was less fortunate—he took a bullet to the forehead.

Helicopter CH-47 "Chinook"
Captain Lefebvre was also seriously wounded shortly after landing. He handed over his company to Sergeant Gonzalez and was carried by medics to the battalion command post. But his company proved to be the straw that broke the back of the Vietnamese attack: about a platoon of NVA soldiers ran into their machine guns and were unable to penetrate the gap in the cavalry's defenses.
Moore notes the enemy's almost complete lack of radios: commands were given by telephone, whistles, bugle calls, or voice. In fact, it was precisely these communications problems that saved the American battalion from being routed by a three-regiment Vietnamese division. And then there was the air cover—usually overlooked in accounts of the battle in the Ia Drang Valley, as was American artillery fire. On Sunday alone, aircraft carried out over 50 sorties to support the cavalry. CH-47 Chinook helicopters couldn't keep up with the delivery of missiles for the attack helicopters and shells for the 12 105mm howitzers firing from LZ Falcon. So the disparity in forces was quite relative.

Medical helicopters did not fly to the Ya Drang River valley...
Helicopters delivered ammunition to the landing zone and evacuated the dead and wounded. The airlift operated smoothly, and the Vietnamese lacked the strength to disrupt it. During a routine flight, battalion intelligence officer Captain Thomas Metzker was helping load another wounded man onto a helicopter when he himself was shot—he arrived dead in Plei Me. It should be noted that the troop-carrying Hueys weren't supposed to be doing all this: the wounded were supposed to be evacuated by medical helicopters, but they were forbidden to land in the "hot" zone—standard military bureaucracy!
Subsequently, the following scheme was chosen: transport helicopters would evacuate the wounded to LZ Falcon, from where they would be picked up by ambulances. During the flights to LZ X-Ray, one of the helicopters was hit and crashed within the battalion's defensive perimeter. The crew survived and was evacuated by the second vehicle.
By 15:00 PM, the Vietnamese assault had been repelled, but Lieutenant Colonel Moore realized he couldn't hold out with just one battalion, even with artillery and air support. So Brigade Commander Timothy Brown alerted Bravo Company of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment...

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