100mm in the German rear, or how Krupp envied Soviet armor

8 926 32
100mm in the German rear, or how Krupp envied Soviet armor


Krupp AG investigation


One of the unpleasant discoveries of the Germans in Soviet Russia was the heavy Tanks KV. First and foremost, their impressive protection. It got to the point that Nazi metallurgists were forced to examine captured equipment for any successful solutions they could borrow. Modern archives contain numerous testimonies of such events. For example, in the fall of 1943, after the disastrous Battle of Kursk for the Reich, a 100mm piece of armor was brought from the front to a proving ground in Hillersleben, Germany. It's worth noting that the proving ground belonged to the Wehrmacht, so it's highly likely that the armor came from a tank.



Apparently, the Germans captured a relatively rare KV-85, as no other domestic tank could boast such protection. The KV-1 had no more than 90 mm of armor in the gun mantlet, and the IS-1 only began production in the fall of 1943, when Krupp's engineers were already studying the captured artifact.

It's surprising how quickly this tank armor sample fell into German hands. The first production KV-85s were deployed to troops on the southern front in September 1943 and proved quite effective against German 88mm shells. This is precisely what piqued the interest of enemy metallurgists. Judging by the testing program, at least one KV-85 fell into German hands as early as October, four to five weeks after the vehicle's appearance at the front. Engineers from Kpupp AG recovered a sample of captured armor from Hillersleben for study in late October 1943.




The KV-85 was a rarity at the front and was a transitional model to the IS series.

The first step was to study the chemical composition of the steel. And here, the enemy felt burning envy: the nickel and chromium concentrations were impressive—2,28% and 2,41%, respectively. By that time, the Germans were already experiencing a shortage of alloying elements and could not afford such wastefulness. These are crucial components of armor. Nickel is responsible for impact toughness, while chromium is responsible for hardness and hardenability. Soviet metallurgists managed to maintain a low phosphorus concentration (0,024%), which prevented the armor from becoming excessively brittle. The results of the German research clearly point to the 71L armor grade used for the KV-85 tank's turret.


A captured sample of 100mm armor undergoing testing in Germany.

The next stage of the study involved mechanical testing. Standard samples were cut from the plate, some along the rolling direction of the metal, some across (the properties of rolled steel typically differ slightly in these two directions due to the microstructure elongated during the rolling process), and subjected to tension testing on a tensile testing machine. This test allows us to determine two key strength parameters: yield strength—the stress at which the metal begins to plastically, or inelastically, irreversibly deform—and tensile strength—the maximum stress the sample can withstand before ultimately failing.

The ultimate strength was 149 kg/mm²—an enormous value for armor steel of the time. At the same time, the steel retained a relatively high ductility—elongation of 11–12%, contraction of 36–44%—meaning the metal wasn't extremely brittle, despite its extremely high strength. This is an ideal, difficult-to-achieve combination of characteristics for armor: the stronger the steel, the more brittle it tends to be (prone to cracking and spalling when hit by a shell), and vice versa. Finding a balance between strength and toughness is a perennial challenge in armor metallurgy.

Soviet martensite


A month after the initial armor studies, the Germans became concerned about production technology. Metallurgists suspected that the USSR had developed advanced alloy steel processing technologies. One of Krupp AG's internal correspondence documents contains the following:

Es liegt uns daran, die Vergütungsart der Panzerplatte festzustellen (Normal- oder Warmbadhärtung?) Wir bitten Sie, entsprechende Gefügeuntersuchungen vorzunehmen. (It is important for us to establish the method of heat treatment of the armor plate (normal hardening or hardening in a warm bath?). We ask you to carry out an appropriate study of the microstructure.)

We are talking about fundamentally different approaches to heat treatment of alloy steel:

Normal hardening — the classic method: the steel is heated to austenitizing temperature, then rapidly cooled (usually in water or oil), producing a hard but brittle martensite structure. It is then tempered at a moderate temperature to relieve internal stresses and increase toughness at the expense of a slight loss of hardness. This is a reliable, proven technology, but not the most perfect—martensite, even tempered, always remains relatively brittle by nature.

Quenching in a warm bath, or isothermal (bainitic) quenching — a much more complex and progressive technology, known in English-speaking metallurgy as austempering. Instead of rapidly cooling to room temperature, the steel is held for some time in a molten salt or metal bath at an intermediate temperature (usually 250–400°C), which allows the austenite to transform not into martensite, but into bainite—a structure that, while having comparable hardness, has significantly higher impact toughness and is less susceptible to cracking. In German documents, this is literally called "tempering through an intermediate stage"—this is bainite, an intermediate structure between martensite and pearlite.

How did the Germans distinguish between martensite and bainite in armor? For this study, a small piece was cut from a plate sample, the resulting surface was carefully ground and polished to a mirror shine. The next step was etching—treatment with a weak solution of nitric acid in alcohol—which unevenly dissolves the various structural components of the metal, thereby revealing grain boundaries and the internal crystalline architecture invisible on the unetched, perfectly smooth surface. After etching, the sample was placed under a metallographic microscope and examined at significant magnification—up to 500x. This allowed for the detection of the finest structural details hidden from the naked eye.




It is difficult for a layman to distinguish martensite from bainite (below)

German metallurgists, observing the unusually high performance of Soviet armor—high strength combined with acceptable ductility—suspected that Soviet engineers had employed precisely this advanced, elusive technology. The logic behind this suspicion is clear: achieving both very high strength (149 kg/mm²!) and acceptable toughness through conventional martensitic hardening is more difficult than through a bainitic structure, which specializes in precisely this combination of properties. If this suspicion were confirmed, it would mean that the Soviet tank industry possessed a technological advantage in heat-treating armor—meaning the Germans should urgently adopt this experience.


A German archive contains a document containing the results of a crystallographic study of tank armor from the USSR.

It's worth noting that the Germans spent a long time examining the Soviet armor—two whole months. Only on December 20, 1943, did the metallurgists' final report appear. There was no hot bath involved. Under magnification, the structure of the Soviet armor plate was found to contain the most ordinary, classic tempered martensite—meaning the metal had undergone the completely standard, world-famous process of simple quenching in water or oil followed by tempering.

Although the Germans were clearly somewhat disappointed (if only they knew the conditions under which Soviet armor had to be cast), the examination of the trophy gave them a new idea. What if they retained the same chemical composition, corresponding to cast 71L armor, and carried out a progressive heat treatment, in the form of a hot bath? Whether the Germans succeeded or not... story He's silent about it. Given the growing shortage of alloying elements in the Third Reich, such experiments could have been of purely scientific interest. There was no talk of any mass production.
32 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. +6
    28 July 2026 05: 11
    And here the enemy felt burning envy: the nickel and chromium concentrations were impressive—2,28% and 2,41%, respectively. By that time, the Germans were already experiencing a shortage of alloying elements and could not afford such wastefulness under any circumstances.

    So they didn’t have an overseas friend who would bring nickel in commercial quantities.
    The results of German research clearly indicate the armor grade 71L, from which the KV-85 tank turret was cast.

    And how does this relate to what follows?
    Standard samples were cut from the plate, some along the direction of rolling of the metal, some across (the properties of rolled steel, as a rule, differ somewhat in these two directions due to the microstructure elongated during the rolling process)

    There's a bit of a contradiction. Either the first case refers to the turret, and the second to the hull, since the turret is cast, not welded from rolled plates.
    This would mean that the Soviet tank industry had a technological advantage in the field of heat treatment of armor, which meant that the Germans should urgently adopt this experience.

    And how can it be adopted when there is a shortage of alloying metals?
    1. +2
      28 July 2026 05: 46
      And how can it be adopted when there is a shortage of alloying metals?

      It is precisely the more expensive and complex hardening method that can compensate for the lack of alloying elements.
      1. +1
        28 July 2026 10: 06
        Quote: Jura 27
        It is precisely the more expensive and complex hardening method that can compensate for the lack of alloying elements.

        As far as I remember, it doesn't work like that.
    2. +7
      28 July 2026 05: 52
      So they didn’t have an overseas friend who would bring nickel in commercial quantities.

      I would not exaggerate the role of the "overseas friend" in the supply of alloying materials.
      And if you look at it by year, then in 1941, nickel supplies were zero, production (for half a year) was about 5500 tons, in 1942, supplies were 3000 tons, production was about 8700, in 1943 - about 5500 and 13000 tons, etc. That is, throughout the war, Soviet nickel production exceeded imports by more than twice.
      Therefore, all the arguments that without "overseas friends" the USSR would have allegedly remained with "tin" tanks are not entirely true.
      Where did the nickel come from? Orsk, Mednogorsk, Norilsk. Okay, okay, I agree, Mednogorsk didn't produce pure nickel; it produced a semi-finished product that was finished in Orsk. But still... And transporting nickel from there to tank factories (i.e., Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk, Omsk, Tagil) was much closer than from Canada.
      1. +2
        28 July 2026 06: 12
        Quote: Mikhail Tynda
        Where did the nickel come from? Orsk, Mednogorsk, Norilsk. Okay, I agree, Mednogorsk didn't produce pure nickel.

        Norilsk produced its first ton only in 1942. Moreover, transporting nickel from Norilsk is still a headache today, especially back then, only in the summer when the Yenisei River opens up.
        1. +3
          28 July 2026 06: 51
          Not today.
          https://paluba.media/news/77355
          1. +1
            28 July 2026 07: 42
            Quote: old_pferd
            Not today.

            Waiting for icebreakers and normal ice conditions isn't a problem, in your opinion? Loading a freight car and sending it to the customer isn't a problem, not the obsolescence of ice dancing.
        2. +4
          28 July 2026 08: 23
          It seems that in 41-42 mobilization reserves were used.
          1. +1
            28 July 2026 10: 05
            Quote: Grossvater
            It seems that in 41-42 mobilization reserves were used.

            Production needed to be scaled up, and everything was used, including stockpiles and supplies from the UK. The first nickel from Norilsk was transported by plane because the armor was the most important thing, not the cost.
            1. +3
              28 July 2026 14: 06
              Quote: Puncher
              supplies from WB.

              "Valberis"???!!!! belay belay belay belay belay belay
              1. +1
                28 July 2026 17: 55
                Quote: your1970
                Valberis"???!!!!

                Well, yes, it's on everyone's lips these days. Great Britain, of course.
                1. 0
                  28 July 2026 18: 12
                  Quote: Puncher
                  Quote: your1970
                  Valberis"???!!!!

                  Well, yes, it's on everyone's lips these days. Great Britain, of course.

                  These are the times - the UK won't supply us with manure, let alone nickel...
                  1. 0
                    29 July 2026 03: 35
                    Quote: your1970
                    These are the times - the UK won't supply us with manure, let alone nickel...

                    We won't get any stew from the US either...
        3. 0
          28 July 2026 14: 07
          I'll reveal another little-known name: Monchegorsk, which began producing nickel in 1938. My city was considered very important during the war. The Germans tried to take the Murmansk region, but our grandfathers heroically defended the polar land.
          1. +1
            28 July 2026 17: 56
            Quote: Magic Archer
            It was my city that was considered very important during the war.

            That's why he was evacuated in 1941.
            1. +2
              29 July 2026 18: 47
              Puncher (Eugene), I support you! On June 26, 1941, the NKVD ordered the immediate evacuation of the plant. It was ordered to stop production, dismantle the equipment within 48 hours, and organize an evacuation. The plant was shut down on June 28, 1941. Starting from July 3, 1941, the main structures and equipment of the plant that were not subject to dismantling were prepared for explosion. The recipients of the dismantled equipment were determined to be: the Yuzhuralnikel plant (Orsk), the Dzhezkazgan plant, the Norilsk plant, the Tyrnyauz plant, the Dzhida plant... In the summer and fall of 1941, more than 10,000 tons of Severonikel equipment for Norilsk were transported from Arkhangelsk to Dudinka by ships of the Northern State Shipping Company. Plus more than 700 employees and their families. BUT! Since there was virtually no housing in Norilsk, workers were sent there only with one or two children. Families with three or more children were not sent to Norilsk. On May 18, 1942, Stalin signed a decree "On the restoration of the Severonikel plant of the People's Commissariat of Non-Ferrous Metals." The State Defense Committee (GKO) ordered the People's Commissariat of Non-Ferrous Metals to activate the Nittis and Kumuzhye mines, as well as the smelting shop with an electric furnace and two converters, no later than September 1. In the fourth quarter, converter matte was to be produced, the processing of which was to be organized at the South Ural Nickel Plant. In 1944, Severonikel produced more nickel-cobalt products than in the pre-war years.
      2. +2
        28 July 2026 09: 48
        More than a third of the volume is a lot. Lend-Lease nickel supplies shouldn't be understated, nor should they be exaggerated in general...
      3. -2
        28 July 2026 10: 58
        By the way, Hitler actually received overseas nickel, first from Canada, and then from wherever he could, for example from Finland, and a lot of things were supplied by neutrals, so Hitler had gold, that is, until 1944.
      4. +1
        28 July 2026 14: 04
        Quote: Mikhail Tynda
        That is, throughout the war, Soviet nickel production exceeded imports by more than two times.

        And? 1/3 of nickel is imported anyway, no matter how you look at it.
      5. 0
        28 July 2026 16: 54
        Supplies were often needed precisely in winter. Only the port of Murmansk, Russia's only ice-free port, could operate year-round. Hitler is often criticized for miscalculating his planning and not taking Murmansk immediately.
        And Vladivostok then froze for 4 months a year.
        Later, Vladivostok adopted a clever approach. They built a thermal power plant on the shore, but the warm water is discharged not directly into the sea, but into the Obyasheniya River, which flows into Zolotoy Rog Bay, and Vladivostok no longer freezes. During the war, coal was transported to the islands by truck across the ice, but now there's almost no ice even between the islands.
        1. 0
          28 July 2026 18: 26
          Quote: Sokolov_Vladimir
          The only ice-free port in Russia. Hitler is often criticized for miscalculating his planning and not taking Murmansk immediately.

          No one could even imagine that OFFICIAL ENEMY (no less than Hitler himself!) The USSR will push Churchill so hard that he will rush to embrace the USSR and agree to everything.
          And then they got bogged down and were no longer able to transfer sufficient forces to the North.
  2. +1
    28 July 2026 08: 25
    Quote: Puncher
    Quote: old_pferd
    Not today.

    Waiting for icebreakers and normal ice conditions isn't a problem, in your opinion? Loading a freight car and sending it to the customer isn't a problem, not the obsolescence of ice dancing.

    There's a word for it: logistics. The science of moving cargo. Season or off-season, a corresponding reserve is created for the off-season. In season.
  3. +8
    28 July 2026 08: 36
    Thanks for the article. Very interesting. I read it on the way to work. I work as a heat treatment technician.
    The Germans received nickel from Norway, but supplies were irregular, so the composition of the steel in their armor varied. There was already an article on VO about a similar study of German armor by our specialists. The results were unremarkable in terms of characteristics, and disappointing in terms of compositional stability and quality.
    1. +1
      28 July 2026 14: 08
      Quote: Izotovp
      There was already an article on VO about a similar study of German armor by our specialists. The results were nothing outstanding in terms of characteristics, and the consistency of the composition and quality were disappointing.

      There's also a modern study of T-34 steel—its composition is truly dismal. It's not armor, in a word.
      1. 0
        28 July 2026 14: 26
        Things aren't so clear-cut here. If we're looking at armor steel from 1941, when a large number of factories were moving from the Western European part of the country to the East, then yes. Quality and adherence to technology were inconsistent. But by 1943-44, both quality and consistency were completely different. Stable and high-quality.
        1. +1
          28 July 2026 16: 48
          Quote: Izotovp
          But by 1943-44, both quality and stability were completely different. Stable and high-quality.

          The same article cited a document stating that at a specific plant, by 1945, they had managed to reduce the percentage of defective products to 48%. belay from the total volume of production.
          Normal leaf - defective leaf. feel
          I don't remember the year the tank was manufactured, but analysis showed that the composition doesn't meet the standard, or even the simplified military version. Thick steel simply isn't armor by any standards.
          1. 0
            28 July 2026 20: 51
            I won't even try to argue with this from memory, without any facts to back it up. It's entirely possible.
            1. 0
              28 July 2026 23: 54
              Quote: Izotovp
              I won't even try to argue with this from memory, without any facts to back it up. It's entirely possible.

              The article was here on VO, some time ago, 2-3 years.

              After all the manipulations with the relocation of factories and non-compliance with technology, after the pre-war epic with 45 mm armor-piercing shells, after the scams of the war period - when tanks were taken into account twice to fulfill the plan - it is quite believable
  4. +1
    28 July 2026 09: 38
    Studying a captured sample to determine the quality of the steel. The same thing was done with the Tiger.
    1. 0
      28 July 2026 12: 34
      Essentially, the KV-85 is a KV-1S with an IS-1 (Object 237) turret. In terms of armor protection, the KV-85 was no different from the KV-1S. The IS-1 (Object 237) turret was most likely hardened to medium hardness, as there is a drawing of the Object 240 (IS-2) turret that clearly states a high-hardness turret. This note is missing from the KV-1S and IS-1 turret drawings. The Germans most likely tested both rolled and cast armor. In general, the only increase in armor protection for IS turrets was on the serial IS-3. For the IS-2 hull, only the UZTM rolled straightened nose was added.
      1. +1
        28 July 2026 16: 56
        Judging by its high strength and very low relative contraction and elongation, this is a high-hardness steel. This is a rather controversial decision, as the author didn't specify the impact toughness, and as far as I know, it was low for 71-L. Such armor steels provide excellent protection against small-caliber projectiles, but are very vulnerable to large-caliber ammunition, as they are prone to shear failure.
  5. 0
    30 July 2026 01: 47
    Quote: Puncher
    And here the enemy felt burning envy: the nickel and chromium concentrations were impressive—2,28% and 2,41%, respectively. By that time, the Germans were already experiencing a shortage of alloying elements and could not afford such wastefulness under any circumstances.

    So they didn’t have an overseas friend who would bring nickel in commercial quantities.
    The results of German research clearly indicate the armor grade 71L, from which the KV-85 tank turret was cast.

    And how does this relate to what follows?
    Standard samples were cut from the plate, some along the direction of rolling of the metal, some across (the properties of rolled steel, as a rule, differ somewhat in these two directions due to the microstructure elongated during the rolling process)

    There's a bit of a contradiction. Either the first case refers to the turret, and the second to the hull, since the turret is cast, not welded from rolled plates.
    This would mean that the Soviet tank industry had a technological advantage in the field of heat treatment of armor, which meant that the Germans should urgently adopt this experience.

    And how can it be adopted when there is a shortage of alloying metals?

    So Hitler had a "neutral" Sweden, which began supplying nickel and much else to Germany long before 1942 (our Lend-Lease). Speer mentions this.