Third Reich Flying Schools: How the Luftwaffe Eagle Grew Its Wings and Claws

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Third Reich Flying Schools: How the Luftwaffe Eagle Grew Its Wings and Claws


This work continues the cycle dedicated to stories the reconstruction of the German Air Force in the pre-war decade, and concludes the series of articles Luft Hansa – Wings of the Third Reich и Luftwaffe: Phoenix from the Ashes of Versailles.



As in previous publications, I consider it necessary to note that All photographs, posters, and quotes containing Nazi symbols are included in this article for historical and informational purposes only. The materials used are taken from official open internet sources from various countries and do not constitute Nazi propaganda or a justification of Nazi ideology.

Below is one of the Third Reich's propaganda posters, figuratively calling on the German people to "take flight" on the future Air Force. The poster reads:

"It cannot be otherwise: we must fly, and we certainly will fly!" - Adolf Hitler.


For Germany in the mid-1930s, these words were more than just a propaganda slogan. They reflected the political course of the country's leadership and served as a signal for the large-scale implementation of a program to create a modern air force.

Aircraft production, engineering training, and the training of thousands of pilots were rapidly launched. This article focuses on the flight training system, the activities of the aviation schools, and the lives of their graduates.

Aviation schools – step by step to perfection


Between 1933 and 1935, there were only twelve major sport flying schools in Germany. After the official creation of the Luftwaffe in 1935, the entire flight training system was gradually centralized and transferred to the Ministry of aviation Reich Ministry (Reichsluftfahrtministerium, RLM) - the highest state body responsible for the development of the aviation industry, civil aviation and the German Air Force.

Interestingly, the Minister of Aviation had his own command standard, just like the commanders of large military units. Take a look at this standard—its very existence speaks volumes about the importance the Third Reich's leadership attached to aviation.


Command standard of the Reich Aviation Ministry (RLM), 1933-1935. It was so full of Nazi symbols it was practically unbearable!

In the fall of 1935, aviation training units were reorganized. While previously flight training had been conducted at general-purpose educational institutions, it was now divided according to the branches of the armed forces.

The school commands received new names: “Command of the Flying Schools of the Ground Forces” (Fliegerschulkommando des Heeres), “Command of the Flying Schools of the Naval Forces” (Fliegerschulkommando der Marine), and instrument flight training schools (Blindflugschulen) were also created.

Between 1936 and 1939, a vast network of aviation training institutions was formed. It included military aviation schools (Luftkriegsschulen, LKS), the National Socialist Flying Corps (Nationalsozialistisches Fliegerkorps, NSFK), aviation reserve units (Fliegerersatzabteilungen, FEA), and general pilot training schools (Flugzeugführerschulen, FFS).

In the aviation reserve units (FEA), cadets underwent six months of basic general military training (Grundausbildung), studied combat service, handling weapons, the basics of military discipline, and physical training. Upon completion of this stage, a selection process was held to determine which aviation specialty the future aviator was most suited to, and the cadets were sent to basic flight training schools (Flugzeugführerschulen A/B, FFS A/B), where they began their pilot training.


Taking the oath of allegiance by cadets of the flying school at Gatow airfield near Berlin, 1937

At the same time, candidates selected for other aviation specialties were transferred to the corresponding specialized schools, including air gunnery schools (Fliegerwaffenschulen). Cadets who successfully completed the initial stage of flight training continued their studies at higher-level aviation schools depending on their chosen specialization.

The German Civil Aviation School (Deutsche Verkehrsfliegerschule, DVS), which played an important role in training pilots even before the official creation of the Luftwaffe, was fully integrated into the air force training system after 1935.

After several reorganizations, beginning in late 1938, training aviation regiments (Flieger-Ausbildungs-Regimenter, FAR) were formed, each of which had a basic flight training school subordinated to it.

From August 1940, these schools received independent status and were transformed into A/B schools (A/B-Schulen).


An archive photo of cadets from one of the flight schools (Flugzeugführerschule A/B)

Later, the A/B schools were divided into independent stages A and B, with separate training institutions established for each. This division allowed for a clearer distinction between the initial and subsequent flight training stages, as well as a unified curriculum.

It was in the pre-war years that the multi-stage system of candidate selection, flight training, and progressive pilot development was finally established. Its core consisted of basic pilot training schools (Flugzeugführerschulen, FFS), as well as specialized aviation schools designed to train pilots in various specialties.

The main feature of this system was its strict sequence: progression to each subsequent stage of training was permitted only after successful completion of the previous one.

The pre-war period is considered the peak of German pilot training efficiency. Later, as losses and frontline needs increased, it had to be significantly simplified and scaled back. Before the war, it was a well-oiled system combining rigorous candidate selection, consistent training, and a high level of flight training.

Therefore, it makes sense to take a closer look at its structure: stages of training, types of aviation schools, flight requirements, and criteria for admitting pilots to service in combat units.

Selection and training system


Selection (Auswahl) was the first stage of training future Luftwaffe pilots and was a multi-stage system of medical, physical, psychological and ideological testing.

The medical examination included an assessment of general health, cardiovascular system, vision, hearing, and the absence of chronic diseases or other limitations that would prevent flight service.

Physical training tested general endurance, motor coordination, vestibular function, and the ability to handle stress. At the same time, candidates' psychophysiological abilities were assessed: reaction speed, concentration, spatial reasoning, and resilience to stress.

An integral part of the selection process was a test of political reliability, which corresponded to the requirements of the National Socialist system of personnel training.

Before the war, a significant portion of candidates were eliminated during the preliminary testing stages and were not allowed to begin flight training. It is estimated that during this period, the system could annually process approximately 8–12 cadets through the initial stages of training, with the number of operational training centers and schools at various levels within the Luftwaffe and related Air Force structures numbering several dozen, gradually expanding as the rearmament program progressed.

Moreover, the indicated number reflects precisely the annual incoming flow of candidates into the training system, while the final number of pilots who annually reached the level of full flight qualification was significantly lower due to multi-stage selection, a consistent increase in requirements at the stages A-, B- and C-Schulen, as well as the redistribution of some personnel to ground and auxiliary aviation structures.

The core network included schools for basic and further advanced training, distributed both throughout Germany and partly in the “new territories” – the annexed and later captured areas of Europe, which made it possible to ensure a continuous flow of training and specialization of pilots.

National Socialist Flying Corps (NSFK)


The glider schools of the National Socialist Air Corps (Nationalsozialistisches Fliegerkorps, NSFK) played a key role in the preliminary preparations.


Archival poster of the National Socialist Air Corps (Nationalsozialistisches Fliegerkorps, NSFK) for the 1937 gliding competition[/ Center]

Formally, training at the NSFK was not a requirement for entry into the Luftwaffe, but in practice, its glider schools were where most future pilots trained. Here, cadets mastered the fundamentals of aerodynamics and glider piloting techniques, gained initial solo experience, and received recommendations for further training. Candidates who demonstrated sufficient proficiency could enter the Luftwaffe flight school system directly from the NSFK.

Most recruits were initially sent to reserve aviation units (Fliegerersatzabteilungen), where they underwent military, drill, physical training, and basic aviation training. After completing this stage, they were enrolled in flight schools. category AThe entire training system was built on the principle of sequentially completing several stages of training: Flugzeugführerschule A, B and C.

The names of the first two stages came from the pilot license system A1, A2, B1 and B2, issued after mastering the relevant training programs on land and naval aviation aircraft.


A separate classification of certificates was used for maritime and seaplane aviation. C, unlike A and B, no longer designated a type of license, but rather the training of multi-engine pilots. This system was in effect from 1935 to 1944.

Advancement to each subsequent level was permitted only after successful completion of the previous stage, confirmation of the necessary practical piloting skills, the required flight time, and the ability to confidently perform flight missions in conditions of increasing complexity.

As I wrote above, the initial stage of preparation was training in NSFK glider schools.


Basic Flight Training School (A-Schule)


Transition into A-Schulen This was carried out after the candidate was deemed fit for independent glider piloting and basic adaptation to the air environment. At this stage, the ability to stably control the aircraft in simple modes was recorded.

The first step was Flugzeugführerschule A — a basic flight training school. The duration of training typically ranged from four to six months, although combined with the preceding stage of preliminary military training, the full cycle of basic training took from six months to one year.

Here, cadets mastered the basics of aircraft piloting, navigation, radio communications, and elements of air law. The practical program included initial training with an instructor, followed by solo flights. Total flight time at this level typically amounted to 100–150 hours, although by the end of the war, due to fuel shortages and training time, it was reduced to approximately 40 hours. The primary training aircraft were Bücker and Klemm aircraft.

Completion of the course was accompanied by a practical test—a qualification exam (Zwischenprüfung)—that included solo flight in a circuit, performing assigned aerobatic maneuvers, basic navigation, and stable takeoffs and landings. Particular attention was paid to maintaining control in conditions of limited visibility and during challenging flight conditions.

Only after this was the cadet allowed to proceed to the next stage.

After finishing school categories A Some of the cadets returned to the Fliegerersatzabteilungen for additional military, drill, and physical training. Those most suitable for the selection criteria were then sent to continue their studies in Flugzeugführerschule B, the rest were assigned for further service in other specialties in Luftwaffe units.


Theoretical classes in the classroom

Advanced training: B-Schule


In schools categories B the program became much more complicated. Training in Flugzeugführerschule B Typically lasted three to five months. Cadets mastered aerobatics, navigation, instrument flying, formation flying, night flying, and missions in adverse weather conditions. Training was conducted on heavier and faster training aircraft, the primary one being the Arado Ar.66, whose performance characteristics significantly outperformed those of the primary training aircraft.


One of the Arado modifications, the AR-66c

According to available data, Category B school graduates could accumulate 180–220 hours of total flight time by the end of this stage in the pre-war period (including all previous stages). Upon successful completion of the course, graduates received a single pilot's license (Flugzeugführerschein A/B).

Narrow specialists


It was after Category B school that the cadets were assigned to further specialization. The most prepared pilots were sent to fighter schools (Jagdfliegerschulen) or attack aviation schools (Schlachtfliegerschulen).

Cadets who passed the selection for service in multi-engine aviation continued their training in Flugzeugführerschule C, where they trained to pilot heavy aircraft. At "C schools," cadets were taught blind-flying using instruments, at night, and to fly multi-engine aircraft (such as the Focke-Wulf Fw.58, Junkers Ju.52, or Heinkel He.111 and Ju.88).

After completing Category C school, future bomber crews underwent specialized training in Kampffliegerschulen, scouts - in Aufklärerschulen, and transport aviation pilots - in Transportfliegerschulen.


In this 1939 photo, cadets are examining the equipment in person. It's presumably a Junkers aircraft. The manufacturer, Heine Propellerwerke, can be identified by the inscription on the propeller blade. Their propellers were installed on aircraft from Junkers, Bücker, Focke-Wulf, Arado, and others.

The final stage of training was instruction in Ergänzungsgruppen—training groups attached to combat units. Here, pilots mastered the types of combat aircraft assigned to their units, perfected their piloting techniques, practiced crew coordination and combat missions, and then, having successfully passed the final qualification test, were assigned to Luftwaffe combat squadrons.

Overall, the clearance system formed a strictly structured filter: each subsequent stage was impossible without a confirmed practical level, not formal completion of the program. By the time a pilot entered combat aviation, the total accumulated flight time—including all completed stages and glider training—was already approximately 200–300 hours.

Alongside the main system of A-, B-, and C-Schulen, there were also specialized training units designed for in-depth training. This stage included mastering specific aircraft types within a more specialized field, as well as conversion training to specific types of combat aircraft, including experimental and specialized modifications. This represented the final stage of pilot training, available only to the best before joining combat units—a kind of "Top Gun," German style.

Having created a nearly ideal selection and training program for its time, the Germans, quite logically, provided this “conveyor belt of personnel training” with a solid fleet of aircraft.

"Steel arms like wings, and instead of a heart, a fiery motor"


The schools' fleet was quite impressive. According to the staffing schedule, the training unit training pilots for the A1/A2 program was supposed to have 45 aircraft. B1 - 21 aircraft, and B2 - 30 aircraft. In practice, the number of aircraft depended on the period of formation, location, and mission of a particular school. There are A/B schools whose fleets numbered over 100 training aircraft.

The training aircraft fleet consisted of:
Bücker Bü.131 Jungmann, a true "flying desk" of the Luftwaffe. It was a virtually ideal aircraft for a first foray into the skies: extremely easy to fly, forgiving of piloting errors, and with a low landing speed. This is precisely why the Bü.131 became a true "calling card" of the German A-Schulen.


Heinkel He.72 KadettThe He.72 was the predecessor of the Bü.131 and was very similar in its performance. It was the He.72 that became the typical initial training aircraft of the first half of the 1930s.


Focke-Wulf Fw.44 StieglitzIt was said that such a training aircraft was a dream come true! Compared to the Bü.131 and He.72, it was a next-level aircraft. More powerful, faster, and significantly better suited for aerobatic maneuvers, it demanded much greater precision from the student and was less forgiving of mistakes.


Arado Ar.66 — this was a more impressive aircraft. Formally, it was also classified as a trainer, but in reality, it represented a transitional stage between a regular trainer and a combat training aircraft. The aircraft was significantly heavier than the Bü.131 and was equipped with an engine almost twice as powerful. Consequently, its speed, takeoff weight, and piloting complexity increased.

It was on the Ar.66 that B-Schulen cadets learned formation flying, night flying, glider towing, and the basics of combat use against ground targets.


Arado Ar.96 — the pinnacle of German training aviation.
The Arado Ar.96, introduced in 1938, was a logical development of the entire Luftwaffe pilot training system. While the Bü.131 introduced students to the basics of piloting, and the Ar.66 prepared them for more complex exercises, the Ar.96 almost completely simulated the behavior of a modern combat aircraft.

The low-wing monoplane with an enclosed cockpit, retractable landing gear, flaps, variable-pitch propeller, and a powerful Argus As.410 engine required the student not only to possess confident piloting skills but also to be proficient in operating numerous aircraft systems. This is why the transition to Messerschmitt Bf.109 fighters, He.111 bombers, and Ju.87 dive bombers after training on the Ar.96 was significantly easier than after training on earlier trainers.


In the fighter (Jagdfliegerschulen / JFS) and attack (Schlachtfliegerschulen / St.G.Sch) aviation schools, cadets mastered combat aircraft types used there for training purposes, such as the Messerschmitt Bf.109 and Henschel Hs.123.

Henschel Hs.123 — one of the main aircraft used in training pilots of the Luftwaffe's attack aircraft in the pre-war years.


Mastering combat aircraft was the final stage of training for future Luftwaffe combat pilots.

Messerschmitt Bf.109 It needs no comment or description. The photo below shows fighter pilot school cadets (Jagdfliegerschule) during training. Behind the instructor is a Bf.109E.


Between 1939 and 1941, German pilots generally had significant flight time, good basic training, and were trained according to a clearly structured, multi-stage system. This period is rightfully considered the peak of German pilot training.

Thus, the Luftwaffe training system of the 1930s was not a linear process, but a rigorous, consistent system of selection and approval, in which each level was confirmed by practical testing. This structure ensured a high level of readiness for pilots until the transition to accelerated training under wartime conditions.

As a result of the implementation of the general program of training personnel by the beginning of the Second World War, the total number of Luftwaffe personnel was approximately 370–400 thousand people, of which flight and flight-technical personnel amounted to approximately 60–80 thousand people.

By the beginning of the war, the number of people who had received the qualifications of aircraft pilots and were allowed to fly independently (Flugzeugführer) within it amounted to approximately 8,000–12,000 people.

Luftwaffe Flight Training System (1935-1944)



Beginning in 1939–1940, this established system began to gradually transform under the pressure of war. Formally, the structure of A-, B-, and C-Schulen remained, but its internal content and admission requirements began to be simplified.

The Impact of War Realities on Pilot Training


Rising combat losses and expanding fronts meant that the key factor became not the depth of training, but the speed of replenishing flight units. This inevitably affected the certification system: flight hours were reduced, and some qualification checks were simplified or combined. While in the pre-war period, each transition was accompanied by a full practical test of the pilot's relevant qualifications, in wartime, the minimum required level of task performance increasingly became decisive.

This became especially evident during the transition from training units to combat units. Where previously consistent flight hours, confident aircraft handling, and well-practiced group operations were required, the factor of accelerated graduation gradually increased.

As a result, the initially rigid system of selection and gradual approvals began to lose its closed logic. The formal structure remained, but its content shifted toward shorter training cycles. This created a gap between the pre-war level of training and the realities of the front, where the demands on pilots increased sharply, while the time for their development was reduced.

This transition period marked a turning point for the entire Luftwaffe training system: from a model of quality and selection to a model of replacement. While the basic structure of the schools remained, its effectiveness no longer matched the original level of the late 1930s.

By 1943–1945, the degradation of the training system had become quantifiable. While pre-war pilots would join combat units with a total flight time of approximately 200–300 hours, by 1943 this had dropped to 110–160 hours. In the spring of 1945, due to a catastrophic shortage of fuel, aircraft, and training time, recent cadets, aged 18–19, with only 30–50 hours of flight time, were often sent to combat units. Most of them died on their first combat missions.

The reduction affected not only the total number of flights but also their structure. Time allocated to complex flight modes, group interactions, and night training was reduced. The most critical decline was in "combat flight time"—the practice of practicing real tactical scenarios within units. As a result, pilots increasingly found themselves assigned to combat units with formally completed training, but without robust group interaction skills and limited experience in complex flight modes.

Attempts to compensate for this by reorganizing training centers and strengthening individual stages of training failed to reverse the overall trend. The system could no longer restore the previous depth of training: resources, time, and experienced instructors were limited by combat losses and the expansion of fronts.

In fact, by this point, the final divergence between the pre-war model and its military transformation had occurred. The original system, based on strict selection, multi-stage training, and high flight hours, was no longer replicable in its previous form. It was replaced by an accelerated training model focused on the rapid replacement of losses rather than the development of sustainable professionalism.

Thus, the development of the Luftwaffe training system went through a full cycle—from a highly structured model of pre-war quality to a simplified military system that prioritized speed over depth of training. It was this transition that determined the change in the quality of pilots and became one of the key factors influencing the decline in the effectiveness of German aviation in 1943–1945.

The real confirmation of these tragic changes for the Germans are the dry statistics of irreparable losses of Luftwaffe flight personnel in the period from 1939 to 1945.


During the entire period of the Second World War, the irreparable losses of the Luftwaffe flight personnel amounted to
100 to 000 people. There are about pilots directly 44 000-50 000 human.

Irrecoverable losses include those killed, those who died from wounds, those missing in action, those captured, as well as military personnel who have completely lost the ability to continue serving due to serious injuries.


Another "superman" has remained in Russia forever.

It should be noted that the most common category of pilots, especially in fighter, attack and bomber aviation, were non-commissioned officers - Unteroffizier, Unterfeldwebel, Feldwebel and Oberfeldwebel.

Officer ranks (Leutnant, Oberleutnant, Hauptmann) were typically awarded to flight (Schwarm), squadron (Staffel), and group (Gruppe) commanders, as well as graduates of specialized military schools. Officer rank could also be awarded subsequently for combat merit or upon appointment to a command position.

If we look at the statistics of aircraft losses, it looks like this:


According to various estimates, the Luftwaffe irretrievably lost approximately 70–60 aircraft during World War II. These figures most often reflect irretrievable combat and critical non-combat losses—when an aircraft is more than 60% destroyed and cannot be repaired.


An Fw.190 shot down by Soviet pilots and landed on its belly somewhere on the Eastern Front.

Comparing these two figures, the average loss of one aircraft irretrievably corresponded to approximately 1,5–1,8 aircrew members. This ratio was consistent with the nature of combat operations and the structure of the Luftwaffe's fleet.

I hope I haven't overly tired the reader with an abundance of numbers, names, and listings of all sorts of titles in German and Russian, but the topic we were discussing simply required it.

The implementation of these dry figures and facts, namely the fates of pilots who passed through the German training system with which we have just become acquainted, will be continued soon.

To be continued...
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  1. + 13
    30 July 2026 07: 05
    Thank you for the article!
    To be honest, in the current context, it makes sense to adopt the experience of our DOSAAF in training certain categories of military specialties.
    A mobilization reserve is necessary.
    P.S. Why not organize free training for Category "B" and the qualification of a "C" truck or tractor driver for those fit to serve in the Motherland (with enrollment in the reserve) for the "fan" community? I think many young women would appreciate such a bonus. Similarly, it would be fashionable to develop small aviation, parachuting, SAMBO, and other sports.
    For example, if you want to get a permit for a rifled firearm, complete a sniper, radio operator, or medical officer course.
    1. +4
      30 July 2026 07: 55
      All of this requires genuine government commitment, clever propaganda, and significant funding. Does Russia have all of these?
    2. +5
      30 July 2026 09: 18
      Quote: Kote pane Kohanka
      It makes sense to adopt the experience of our DOSAF

      Very true!.. In the old days, even before finishing school, I already had a radio and television repairman's certificate from the DOSAAF school, the basic skills of which would even today be relevant for repairing the now numerous "bird zoo," for example... and those who received "truck" licenses in this system were already "white people" in the army back then :)
      P.S. I hope that slowly, with a creak (as always), something like this will appear, after all

      P.S. and I agree, thanks to the author for the work, it turns out to be a very interesting series
      1. +6
        30 July 2026 11: 50
        The series is interesting, thanks to the author. However, there are some shortcomings in the photo captions. "Theoretical classes in the classroom" is clearly taken before the Nazis came to power, judging by the cadets' uniforms and the instructor's mustache and goatee.
        The photo below shows fighter pilot school (Jagdfliegerschule) cadets during training. Behind the instructor is a Bf.109E.
        This isn't a school, it's a combat unit. I don't want to mess around with it, but it's possible to identify both the aircraft and the "instructor." Besides, the one standing with his back to the right has a stripe and three birds on his sleeve, which, if I'm correct, is Hautmann's disease, and he's clearly over 30. My point is, as Chekhov said, "Everything in a person should be beautiful, both soul and body..."—and I believe this article, both the text and the photo (or comments) should reflect that. Sincerely!
        1. +6
          30 July 2026 13: 58
          Motorized rifleman, hi I welcome you absolutely!
          It's always nice to receive feedback, even critical, that shows your work is being read with attention. Thank you for the overall positive feedback!
          Regarding the photographs.
          ""Theoretical classes in the classroom" - was clearly made before the Nazis came to power, judging by the uniform of the cadets and the mustache and beard of the teacher" - I cited it purely illustratively, without any specific reference to January 30, 1933, the beginning of the Nazi power.
          ChatGPT responded to my request about the time of events in the photo with the most likely option being 1933–1939.
          It could be:
          • aviation school for youth;
          • technical school;
          • a training unit concerned with training personnel for the rapidly growing German air force.
          During this period, Germany was officially creating the Luftwaffe, and much attention was paid to the early technical training of young people.

          According to the second photo,Cadets of the fighter pilot school (Jagdfliegerschule)...».
          In a source, I don’t remember which one, it was given with an accompanying inscription about cadets of a fighter school or a training group or a coordination (flight) group in a combat unit.
          I confess, I simplified the caption under the photo.

          By insignia.
          If we are talking about those who have already graduated from the college (aviation school), these could be:
          Oberfaehnrich.
          A graduate of an officer's academy who is already serving as an officer and awaiting promotion to lieutenant. Or an Oberfeldwebel, serving as an officer and awaiting promotion to officer rank. Legally, they are equivalent to an Oberfeldwebel, but in practice enjoy all the rights of an officer.
          Or Staff Sergeant (Stabsfeldwebel).
          The rank of Staffsfeldwebel was rarely awarded in the Luftwaffe. Typically, the highest rank for non-commissioned officers was Oberfeldwebel, and an Oberfeldwebel promoted to an officer's rank was awarded the rank of Oberfähnrich. The rank of Staffsfeldwebel was most often awarded to someone who, while holding an officer's rank, was, for some reason, ineligible for it.
          Photo below.

          In the combat units of the Luftwaffe:
          Privates (Flieger): did not have any insignia on their overalls.
          Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO):
          only "wings" (from 1 to 4 pieces).
          Unteroffizier: 1 wing.
          Unterfeldwebel: 2 wings.
          Feldwebel: 3 wings.
          Oberfeldwebel / Stabsfeldwebel: 4 wings.
          Junior officers (Leutnant - Hauptmann): 1 horizontal stripe below, 1 to 3 wings above it.
          Lieutenant: 1 stripe + 1 wing.
          Oberleutnant: 1 stripe + 2 wings.
          Hauptmann: 1 stripe + 3 wings.
          Senior officers (Major — Oberst):
          2 horizontal stripes below, with 1 to 3 wings above them.
          Major: 2 stripes + 1 wing.
          Oberstleutnant: 2 stripes + 2 wings.
          Oberst: 2 stripes + 3 wings.
          Well, in the end, we know,Nobody is perfect“Although if out of the many photographs in three articles, only two raised questions, that’s almost perfect!
          Thanks again for the comment. good
    3. +7
      30 July 2026 10: 46
      Vladislav hi ,
      Thanks for the comment! Although the theme of this series is entirely German, naturally, thoughts of comparisons with the old Soviet era and today kept popping into my head.
      And again, everything is permeated with ideological meaning.
      And today, as far as I know, in Russia there is no ideology as a goal, a call, a universal impulse and aspiration...
      Take a look at the posters of OSOVIAKHIM and DOSAAF, they say a lot.
      Thank you sincerely for your appreciation of my work!
  2. +5
    30 July 2026 10: 41
    In all the major navies of the world's powers, the prevailing view was that all naval components of the armed forces—be they ships, submarines, or air forces—should be under the control of a single commander, and for this reason, naval aviation should be an integral part of the navy. In Germany, however, Reichsmarschall of the Air Force Göring and his cronies tirelessly proclaimed, "Everything that flies belongs to us!" Such concentration may have had advantages in terms of engine development, general flight training, and industrial development, but proponents of Göring's arguments failed to grasp that the actions of aircraft and aviation as a branch of the armed forces in a land war are very different from their actions in a naval war. On land, the actions of both sides, their attacks and defenses, can be predicted based on the principles of military operations on land, and therefore a military pilot must be an expert in the methods and tactics of land warfare. Naval warfare requires men, machines, and tactics suited to naval warfare, but meeting these requirements is far more difficult, as water as an element differs greatly from land as an element. The corresponding tactics and methods of warfare are so different that only pilots with experience and knowledge of naval warfare tactics, familiar with the specifics of the sea, can be truly valuable in naval operations.
    ...
    We persisted in our plans for the creation of 62 air squadrons until 1938, when we finally obtained from Goering the agreement that they would be created in two stages, the last of which was to be completed by 1942. However, even when giving this promise in 1938, Goering declared that the Air Force would retain full control of air units operating over the sea or cooperating with the Fleet over the sea, and that the Air Force would create a special program accordingly. Therefore, he said, the Navy's claim to its own air units could in no way be satisfied. Moreover, he added, he was confident that the 13 Air Force squadrons intended [288] for naval missions would perform these tasks much better than the patrol and combat squadrons of the proposed naval aviation units.

    Edition: Reder E. Gross-admiral. - M.: ZAO Tsentrpoligraf, 2004.
    Original: Raeder, E. Mein Leben. — Tübingen: Verlag Fritz Schlichtenmayer, 1956.

    Book on the website: http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/raeder_e/index.html
    1. +5
      30 July 2026 18: 41
      Quote: hohol95
      Therefore, he said, the Navy's claims to its own aviation units could in no way be satisfied. Furthermore, he added, he was confident that the 13 Air Force squadrons designated for naval missions would perform these tasks far better than the patrol and combat squadrons of the proposed naval aviation units.

      As practice showed, Fat Herman was right. Raeder and the other admirals desperately wanted air power, but they were completely inept at commanding it and unwilling to learn. As a result, the reconnaissance squadrons assigned to the fleet soon had to be withdrawn—after numerous complaints from commanders about the naval squadrons issuing threatening takeoff orders regardless of the time of day or weather conditions—for example, during fog.
      Moreover, when the navy really needed interaction with the backlash, they organized it perfectly. It's enough to recall the same "Cerberus."
  3. +3
    30 July 2026 10: 47
    The pre-war period is considered the peak of German pilot training efficiency. Later, as losses and needs at the front mounted, it had to be significantly simplified and scaled back.

    This is the best verdict on the German training system. Good in peacetime, bad in war.
    1. +5
      30 July 2026 13: 34
      Quote: Kostadinov
      A verdict on the German training system. Good in peacetime, bad in wartime.

      Still, "sentence" is, it seems to me, an overly strong expression... during prolonged military operations, a difficult-to-resolve conflict between quality and quantity always arises - in other words, there is no "good" system during a long war and limited resources for producing a complex and at the same time high-quality product...
      P.S. A "good" peacetime system can always be "worse," simplified, adapted to increased quantitative requirements, but a "bad" one... I'm afraid that a pilot training system that's "bad" in peacetime but "good" in wartime cannot exist by definition :)
      1. +5
        30 July 2026 18: 50
        Quote: Rodez
        P.S. A "good" system in peacetime can always be "worsen", simplified, adapted to increased quantitative requirements, but a "bad" one

        Here we need to determine what is considered a good system and what is considered a bad one.
        Essentially, two main systems clashed in WWII. The first relied on training a small number of highly qualified pilots. For short-term wars, this system was perhaps the best—in the short term, class trumps quantity. But in a long war, it began to falter, because fast Rebuilding it to produce a large number of pilots without a sharp decline in quality was practically impossible—the base was too small for expansion. Plus, the leadership was itching to compensate for the losses of combat units by transferring training and combat units to the front line.
        The second system provided a plan for the shaft. True, such a system couldn't produce the elite who could see the stars in the clear sky during the day—its limit was a crowd of "average" fighters. But if the war dragged on, the enemy's elite would gradually wear down against this crowd. And one fine day, it would turn out that against the "mediocre" fighters, the enemy, with its pre-war elite training system, could only field squadrons of "a couple of aces and green meat."
        1. +4
          30 July 2026 20: 08
          Quote: Alexey RA
          in a long war it began to malfunction, because it was practically impossible to quickly redesign it to produce a large number of pilots without a sharp decline in quality

          I completely agree with you, because that's exactly what I wrote about... the fact is that there is no system for the rapid and simultaneous mass production of pilots of at least "satisfactory" combat quality, or I don't know of one / I'm not able to imagine one... let's also not forget about the limited resources, both territorial and material in the case of Germany
          P.S. An aircraft with a pilot in combat conditions, from a technical point of view, turns into an expensive consumable, no matter how it sounds, and its cost can only be reduced by lowering requirements. The analogy with today is easy to come by, but replacing a living pilot with something else back then was not possible.
          P.S. I only objected to the "sentence" to a system, an alternative to which, in a protracted war of attrition, was not in sight, and I believe did not exist
  4. +5
    30 July 2026 12: 24
    I hope I haven't overly tired the reader with an abundance of numbers, names, and listings of all sorts of titles in German and Russian, but the topic we were discussing simply required it.
    You didn't tire me out at all. Thank you, Evgeny, it was very interesting!
    P.S. Regarding the numbers: I was very surprised by the equipment losses in Poland...
    1. +4
      30 July 2026 12: 57
      Thus, the losses in tanks during the attack on Poland "somewhat puzzled" the German generals.
      And there was an urgent need to strengthen the armor of German tanks.
      1. +3
        30 July 2026 13: 10
        Hi Aleksey!
        To lose 400 units of equipment in 3 weeks over Poland, which had neither aviation nor any clear air defense, that would take a lot of effort!
        1. +4
          30 July 2026 13: 20
          Hi Guys!
          Quote: 3x3zsave
          Hi Aleksey!
          To lose 400 units of equipment in 3 weeks over Poland, which had neither aviation nor any clear air defense, that would take a lot of effort!

          We lost slightly fewer when liberating western Ukraine and Belarus. True, this was mostly due to technical reasons, and there were few irreparable losses.
        2. +3
          30 July 2026 13: 20
          There has never been any experience of global military operations.
          The experience of Spain was shared by a narrow circle of people from Goering's people.
          It is also worth remembering that the combat aircraft that started the war with the Poles were of pre-war design.
          Minimal or no armor or protection of fuel tanks, minimal number of defensive firing points on bombers.
          1. +4
            30 July 2026 13: 33
            Vlad, Lesha, my respects! hi
            Let's do it this way: I'll write to Linnik and ask him to look into the issue of the Luftwaffe planes shot down over Poland in September 1939. Agreed?
            1. +2
              30 July 2026 13: 58
              Good day Anton!
              What objections can there be!
              drinks drinks drinks
            2. +4
              30 July 2026 14: 05
              Anton, hi
              What, Renk can't? "to sort out the issue of Luftwaffe aircraft shot down in September 1939 over Poland", only Linnik? request
              1. +4
                30 July 2026 14: 10
                Quote: Fachmann
                So, Renk won't be able to "sort out the issue of the downed Luftwaffe aircraft in September 1939 over Poland," only Linnik?

                I'm not an expert on this issue at all... No.
                1. +3
                  30 July 2026 14: 13
                  Yes, it was a joke, but in every joke... lol
              2. +4
                30 July 2026 14: 12
                I'm terribly sorry, Evgeniy, but Linnik is my priority in air defense matters.
                1. +6
                  30 July 2026 14: 15
                  I have no knowledge of air defense matters.
                  But I can dig up information from German sources. smile
                  1. +3
                    30 July 2026 14: 24
                    I have no knowledge of air defense matters.
                    But I can dig up information from German sources.

                    Dig it up, I'll be a grateful reader!
                    1. +2
                      30 July 2026 14: 52
                      Jawohl, zu Befehl (Yes sir, I hear you)! good
            3. +3
              30 July 2026 14: 08
              Quote: 3x3zsave
              Let's do it this way: I'll write to Linnik and ask him to look into the issue of the downed Luftwaffe planes.

              Anton, you greatly overestimate my authority and knowledge. But still, I generally agree with Alexey:
              Quote: hohol95
              There has never been any experience of global military operations.
              The experience of Spain was shared by a narrow circle of people from Goering's people.
              It is also worth remembering that the combat aircraft that started the war with the Poles were of pre-war design.
              Minimal or no armor or protection of fuel tanks, minimal number of defensive firing points on bombers.

              In this regard, one can also compare the losses of the Red Army and Finnish Air Forces in the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940.
              1. +4
                30 July 2026 14: 16
                Okay, I'll read something else. In Polish and German.
                Thank you, Sergey!
        3. +5
          30 July 2026 13: 26
          In peacetime, the Polish Air Force had well-trained aircrew, but only 340 pilots, 250 navigators, and 210 gunners were available for combat. The rest lacked aircraft, and they performed well on the ground in air defense. The German Luftwaffe's losses in the war against Poland amounted to 285 aircraft completely destroyed and 279 disabled. 734 crew members were killed. By comparison, during the three-year war in Spain (1936–1939), the Germans lost 96 aircraft.

          https://militera.lib.ru/h/alyabyev_an/01.html
          1. +4
            30 July 2026 13: 52
            I understand, at the very least, that Alexey disagrees. We're waiting for an expert; I've already contacted him.
        4. 0
          4 August 2026 16: 26
          Quote: 3x3zsave
          Hi Aleksey!
          To lose 400 units of equipment in 3 weeks over Poland, which had neither aviation nor any clear air defense, that would take a lot of effort!

          More interesting:

          During Operation Hollandia (May 10–14, 1940), the Luftwaffe suffered catastrophic losses, losing between 225 and 275 aircraft completely destroyed and another 250 damaged. The most devastating blow fell on military transport aviation: Germany lost about half of its entire fleet of Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft, which seriously undermined the ability to conduct further airborne operations (including the failed invasion of Great Britain).
  5. +5
    30 July 2026 14: 00
    A very high level publication! good Thank you!
    1. +5
      30 July 2026 14: 07
      A very high level publication!
      I agree with this.
      1. +6
        30 July 2026 14: 10
        Thank you, thank you, guys! drinks
        1. +2
          30 July 2026 14: 29
          Let's be honest, we're a different bunch here. Some come, some go...
        2. +1
          30 July 2026 14: 41
          men
          By the way, the term "men" isn't widely used in St. Petersburg these days. If you want to address more than one person, say: "Hey, guys!"
          1. +2
            30 July 2026 14: 54
            Well, I'm a "wild one," from Sakhalin. And now, here I am, in the German region... wassat
            1. +1
              30 July 2026 14: 59
              Well, that happens. I regularly communicate with a colleague from London.
  6. 0
    30 July 2026 14: 39
    The Messerschmitt Bf.109 needs no comment or description. The photo below shows fighter pilot school (Jagdfliegerschule) cadets during training. Behind the instructor is a Bf.109E.
    Behind the "instructor" is a Bf 109-3 from JG53 "Pick Ace." Judging by the "white hat" and the white number "1," it's 1/JG52. Judging by the camouflage, it's from 1939/40, and the letter "T" on the air intake looks like the engine supercharger intake cap. The photo was taken at least after September 1939, when the "Ace of Spades" emblem appeared on JG53 aircraft. This isn't a training unit, but a combat one, and in front of the plane is not an instructor, but at least a staff commander, giving orders for the next sortie or, most likely, debriefing a combat sortie. There's a more detailed description of this photo somewhere in monographs on "Emil." Frankly, I'm too lazy to look for it.
    1. +2
      30 July 2026 15: 02
      A man has arrived who really understands airplanes! laughing
      1. +1
        30 July 2026 15: 50
        Quote: 3x3zsave
        A man has arrived who really understands airplanes! laughing

        Not in all, but there are a few. laughing
        If you believe Western publications, this FW 190 simply made a forced landing. laughing According to their records, all German planes that crashed on their territory made forced landings, having sustained a certain percentage of damage. But this one, judging by the uniforms of those standing in front of it, is German. So the plane wasn't shot down—it made a forced landing. laughing
        1. 0
          30 July 2026 16: 10
          Interesting photo. I mean, it's the same photo I found in "Western edition", naturally in German, but presented by you, with people!
          In my opinion, the angle is slightly different.
          1. 0
            30 July 2026 17: 30
            Quote: Fachmann
            In my opinion, the angle is slightly different.

            Yes, the angle has shifted slightly, but the plane is the same.
        2. 0
          30 July 2026 16: 22
          Is it forced only for technical reasons?
          Didn't the pilots of the downed planes have to resort to forced landings?
          1. -1
            30 July 2026 17: 32
            Quote: hohol95
            Is it forced only for technical reasons?
            Didn't the pilots of the downed planes have to resort to forced landings?

            Of course they did, especially in the Luftwaffe, a pilot with a parachute in one place, a plane in another...
            1. +1
              30 July 2026 17: 58
              According to Western publications, this FW 190 simply made a forced landing. According to their records, all German aircraft that crashed on their territory made forced landings with a certain percentage of damage. And this one, judging by the uniforms of those standing in front of it, is German. This means the plane wasn't shot down - it made an emergency landing.


              Is there a description that this "Focka" crashed due to technical problems?
              1. 0
                31 July 2026 00: 21
                Quote: hohol95
                Is there a description that this "Focka" crashed due to technical problems?

                Therefore, there is also an indication of the front line section where it fell, the unit it belonged to, the pilot’s name and the aircraft’s serial number?
    2. The comment was deleted.
    3. +1
      30 July 2026 15: 36
      I found the full photo. The caption reads, "Condor Legion veteran Lieutenant Huberek Krök mentors young pilots." Another publication also has the photo, though it says he's actually conducting a debriefing as a squadron commander. The photo is dated late September, while others say early October 1939. The aircraft in the background is No. 12 from II/JG. The "white cylinder" on the side is the standard emblem of a veteran of the J/88 Condor Legion.
      1. +3
        30 July 2026 15: 43
        Alexander hi ,
        With all due respect, Lieutenant Huberek Krek was not listed in the Condor Legion.
        At least that's the only answer I received from two independent sources. recourse
        The Bf.109 with the tactical designation II./JG and the photo are dated to the end of September - beginning of October 1939, which most likely indicates a Luftwaffe unit from the Polish campaign period.
        1. +1
          30 July 2026 16: 51
          Quote: Fachmann
          Alexander ,
          With all due respect, Lieutenant Huberek Krek was not listed in the Condor Legion.
          At least that's the only answer I received from two independent sources.

          It might not be listed. I haven't checked the Condor Legion lists. I simply wrote down what's listed in other publications. Moreover, none of them mention that the photo shows an instructor with cadets from one of the flight schools. One Polish publication says that this is his aircraft. And this side is attributed to the 4th (?) Staffell. And only J/88 veterans painted such a cylinder. At the beginning of World War II, JG53 was stationed on Germany's western border. These two aircraft have an early camouflage, since a different camouflage scheme was introduced in the early winter of 1939-40: the sides and vertical stabilizer were painted RLM 65. The fact that this was at the end of September is indicated by the ace of spades emblem, which appeared at that time, when III/JG53 was being formed. Incidentally, Mölders, having become a captain on October 1, 1939, became the commander of this III/JG53. He was a Condor veteran, but the commander of the III Group has a group commander's chevron in front of his cross, not a 1. Let's return to Kroech. In the monograph "BF109 in action part 1," on page 24, there's this photo where they write in white, non-Russian letters in the corner: "Lt. Hubert Kroech, a Legion Condor veteran..." and so on. If one translator gives us Kroech, another Kroech, then a third gives Hubert Kroech. And the translation is as follows:
          Lieutenant Hubert Kroech was a German military pilot during World War II. He was a veteran of the Condor Legion and served in the fighter squadron JG 53 (JG 53 "Pica A"), where he taught air combat tactics to young pilots. On his Bf 109 fighter, he wore a personal insignia—a top hat—which was depicted on the fuselage.
          Krech was killed in action on December 13, 1943. You can find anything you want, even without digging through old paper records. You can even find out which Luftwaffe flying schools used which markings on their aircraft. If you want to, you'll have to. hi
          1. +2
            30 July 2026 16: 57
            There was a desire to find this Hubert, but he does not appear in the archives accessible via the Internet, either in Spain or Poland...
            1. 0
              30 July 2026 17: 34
              Quote: Fachmann
              There was a desire to find this Hubert, but he does not appear in the archives accessible via the Internet, either in Spain or Poland...

              He won't be seen in Poland; he was on the Western Front during the Polish campaign.
        2. +2
          30 July 2026 19: 47
          Quote: Fachmann
          The Bf.109 with the tactical designation II./JG and the photo are dated to the end of September - beginning of October 1939, which most likely indicates a Luftwaffe unit from the Polish Campaign period.

          By the way, the Marinenluftstreitkrefte also fought with the Polish ships in this company: the Heikel 59 is a torpedo bomber... however, the brothel in the organization (mentioned in Raeder's memoirs) did not give them a chance to properly develop
          1. +2
            30 July 2026 22: 13
            Raeder and Dönitz blamed Göring.
            Goering blamed the "naval aristocrats"!
            50/50.
            1. +2
              31 July 2026 08: 03
              Quote: hohol95
              50/50

              I diplomatically just outlined the state of affairs, without poking any further :)
              Despite the positive experience in this area dating back to the First World War and the enormous potential, it was organizational confusion and the lack of a clear concept and strategy for use that prevented German torpedo bombers from becoming a truly formidable force.
              1. +2
                31 July 2026 08: 27
                In this brawl, everyone was a "good guy"!
                The main thing is that this squabble of theirs hindered them and helped us, the British and Americans, to fight against the Teutons!
                1. +2
                  31 July 2026 09: 01
                  Quote: hohol95
                  In this brawl, everyone was a "good guy."

                  fortunately, not only in this one :)
                  Having read Albert Speer's "Empire," the entire top management system was one big toad-viper

                  Quote: hohol95
                  this quarrel of theirs hindered them and helped us

                  that's it, "absolutely exactly"@ !
                  1. +1
                    31 July 2026 09: 50
                    Albert Speer
                    Perhaps the only memoirist with an independent opinion.
                    1. +1
                      31 July 2026 10: 14
                      Quote: 3x3zsave
                      a memoirist with an independent opinion

                      Probably because he didn't give a damn about ideology, was professionally involved in his work with some pleasure (like von Braun, for example) and was a "bon vivant", and after leaving prison, he even managed to make a second, literary career and wasn't at all averse to young women :)
                      P.S. Some "decoration" (like a fisherman/hunter) is naturally present, but does not interfere with the overall impression.
  7. +1
    30 July 2026 16: 03
    A very well-written article! Many thanks to the author! After reading it, I felt saddened by the lack of such training in the USSR during the initial stages of the war. Pokryshkin wrote in his book that the newly arrived reinforcements mastered takeoffs and landings.
    1. +1
      30 July 2026 16: 20
      Alexander hi ,
      Thank you for your positive feedback on my work.
      The final segment is in the editorial office, undergoing moderation. It will be published in the coming days.
      I think you will find it interesting.
    2. +2
      30 July 2026 17: 45
      Quote: alberigo
      I felt sad that there was no such training in the USSR during the initial period of the war.

      Really? Flight schools in the USSR recruited cadets after graduating from flying clubs. Incidentally, Yemelyanenko was a flight instructor at a flying club.
      Quote: alberigo
      Pokryshkin wrote in his book that the new arrivals had mastered takeoff and landing.

      Which book? And read again carefully what he writes about the flight training of personnel arriving at the unit. If you're not aware, after flight school, pilots were sent to the Western Aviation Regiment. And the takeoff/landing part comes from "...Only Old Men Go to Battle!" And even with consultants, Bykov screwed up that film... Just look at the mock battle between Romeo and Maestro. The squadron commander, a Hero of the Soviet Union who's been fighting for years, had fought in more than one air battle, and yet he couldn't defeat a young pilot in a mock battle? He climbed out of the plane dripping wet. Oh, and by the way, pilots from the Orenburg School couldn't arrive at this fighter aviation regiment in the summer of 1943, since in the fall of 1941, it began training attack aircraft pilots.
      1. +1
        30 July 2026 18: 01
        At the end of 1941, the first half of 1942, were young pilots from the flight school sent to the ZAP or directly to the unit?
        1. +1
          31 July 2026 00: 26
          Quote: hohol95
          At the end of 1941, the first half of 1942, were young pilots from the flight school sent to the ZAP or directly to the unit?

          It varies. Read Emelianenko, he describes this point well. And Drapkin too. Both about the training of pre-war pilots and during the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. It's there. There were also orders from the People's Commissariat of Defense... Read them if you're interested.
  8. +1
    30 July 2026 16: 55
    Thanks for the interesting article series! I was just recently rereading books about Luftwaffe aces—fighters, bombers, and attack aircraft—on the subway.
    1. +2
      30 July 2026 20: 44
      Savar hi In a couple of days we will talk about aces as a result of the training system.
  9. +1
    30 July 2026 17: 13
    During long-term military operations, there always arises a difficult-to-resolve conflict between quality and quantity - in other words, there is no "good" system during a long war and limited resources for producing a complex and at the same time high-quality product.

    I completely agree that there is a conflict between quality and quantity in a protracted war with a powerful enemy. But there is a "good" system for such a war, and it is one that provides an optimal compromise between the quantity and quality of pilots (product). To a large extent, the optimal solution also depends on the optimal balance between the quantity and quality of combat aircraft. You can adopt an aircraft that turns a good pilot into an average one and an average one into a bad one, and vice versa. You can produce aircraft that turns a bad pilot into an average one and an average one into a good one.
  10. +1
    30 July 2026 20: 23
    EXCELLENT ARTICLE, IT'S A NICE TO READ, EVERYTHING IS PROFESSIONAL. THANK YOU.
    1. +3
      30 July 2026 20: 41
      Oh, what a BIG and nice comment!
      Thank you for your rating. hi
  11. 0
    31 July 2026 17: 16
    I wonder why the well-known Lipetsk Aviation School isn't mentioned here?
    1. +1
      31 July 2026 17: 25
      Jury hi ,
      Click on the link at the very beginning of the article, or here
      https://topwar.ru/286204-luftwaffe-kak-feniks-iz-pepla-versalja.html
      and you will be able to read, among other things, about the Lipetsk training center.