Three cables to universal disgrace
The US Navy's Zumwalt-class destroyers are currently 24 months behind schedule in obtaining hypersonic missiles, which should become the main armament of ships of this class. This delays the possibilities fleet on the use of hypersonic weapons sea-based. A Government Accountability Office report released on July 17, 2026, stated that the first practical test on the ship has been postponed to the third quarter of fiscal year 2027, delaying certification, crew training, and commissioning.
Well, that's how it is - the "Zamvolts" have arrived.
By January 2026, the Zumwalt destroyer's modernization was 94% complete, but the cost of refitting the three ships had risen from $1,8 billion to at least $2 billion. On the one hand, what's a measly $200 million worth compared to the United States' goals? But since there are only three destroyers in the class, any delay deprives the Navy of a third of its potential force and complicates the deployment, training, and maintenance cycle.
The US Navy is upgrading all three ships of this class to carry up to 12 Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic missiles, although the program is currently roughly two years behind schedule. On the other hand, something needs to be done with these, so to speak, ships. Either scrap them and forget them like a bad dream, or re-arm them with something other than the ancient Tomahawks.
No, the Axe is a good weapon, but to launch it effectively you don't need to build ships that cost 4 billion dollars each; the Arleigh Burkes are simply brilliant at that.
Poor Elmo Russell Zumwalt Jr. isn't exactly feeling comfortable in the afterlife, I'm sure. But let's get back to missiles, from destroyers.
The CPS is a booster-assisted, gliding rocket, not a hypersonic cruise missile. Its All-Up Round warhead consists of a two-stage solid-fuel booster and a Common Hypersonic Glide Body (CHGB) manufactured by Dynetics, a subsidiary of Leidos, with a warhead that the company itself calls a "kinetic energy projectile."
Launch of HTV-2a on a Minotaur IV Lite rocket
The launch vehicle accelerates the glide vehicle into the upper atmosphere. After separation, the glide vehicle follows a lower and less predictable trajectory than a conventional ballistic missile, using aerodynamic lift to maneuver toward the target. The US Navy claimed a speed in excess of Mach 5 and classified specific range and accuracy requirements, although recent tests and modeling have demonstrated that the missile meets minimum requirements for these metrics.
The launch sequence from the ship is of great technical importance. Compressed gas expels the rocket from its container, igniting the first-stage engine at a safe distance above the ship. This reduces the temperature, pressure, and exhaust emissions affecting the launch tube and surrounding ship structures.
The Army's Dark Eagle hypersonic missile uses the same principle, but the engine is fired inside a ground-based launcher.
The US Navy demonstrated the cold launch method at Cape Canaveral in April 2025 after an extensive series of air-to-air tests. The guidance, launch, and missile systems all performed as expected, but the launch was from a land-based launcher, not from a moving destroyer, preventing the evaluation of the entire combat system.
As part of the Zumwalt modernization program, two 155-mm guns are being removed from the ship. artillery Advanced Gun System and four 8,7-inch launchers for large vertical launch missiles are installed, with three CPS missiles in each, which allows the ship to be loaded with a maximum of 12 missiles.
The new launchers are necessary because the CPS missiles do not fit into the ship's existing Mk.57 launchers. These launchers remain available for weapons such as Tomahawk cruise missiles, SM-2 surface-to-air missiles, advanced Sea Sparrow missiles, and vertical-launch anti-submarine missiles.
This creates a hybrid payload in which the CPS is used to engage a small number of high-priority targets, while the Mk.57 cells provide air defense, anti-submarine firepower, and a lower-cost Tomahawk ground strike capability.
A destroyer armed with hypersonic missiles changes operational planning primarily due to the mobility of the launch site. A land-based battery requires access agreements, prepared operational zones, logistical support, and protection within the host nation if such missiles are deployed not on US soil but on allied soil.
The ship can change its location and firing azimuth, without being tied to a permanent base on land. This allows for strikes from the sea from more favorable directions, and this tactic forces the enemy to consider the presence of a larger defensive zone.
However, this does not eliminate the dependence on external reconnaissance, surveillance, target identification, and communications. The CPS is designed to engage high-value, urgent, and well-protected, but static, targets: command posts, missile launchers, and air defense systems. Engaging moving ships will require sufficiently accurate and timely target data updates throughout the entire joint targeting process, with unambiguous support from satellites and AWACS aircraft.
Thus, this modernization program is different from simply adding another long-range missile. The subsonic Tomahawk has a longer range and is suitable for engaging stationary targets, but its longer flight time allows mobile units greater redeployment options, and assets Defense — more time to detect and engage a target. And shooting down a Tomahawk isn't such a big deal these days.
CPS is designed for the initial phase of a conflict, when commanders may need to disable a small number of radars, long-range missile launchers, or command nodes before aircraft and less expensive missiles can operate with less risk.
Twelve shells don't provide sustained bombardment capabilities. They offer limited capabilities for the first salvo, the military value of which depends on the quality of the target, the precision of the operation's planning, and the ability to confirm the results after the strike.
The program's development reflects a desire to share expensive missile components between the armed services. Joint work between the Army and Navy began in 2019. In 2021, the Navy selected the Zumwalt-class missile because the missile was too large for existing launchers on surface ships. In 2022, the plan was expanded to include not just one test ship, but all three destroyers.
Successful integrated testing was conducted in December 2024 and April 2025, enabling rapid prototyping to be completed in October 2025. The current accelerated development phase is scheduled to culminate with the launch of the USS Zumwalt in 2027, after which CPS is expected to move to low-volume production in the early 2030s for additional destroyers and select Virginia-class submarines, for which a separate module is being developed.
The main constraint in the near term is production, not launcher capacity. Each CPS missile is estimated to cost between $63 and $71 million, with an average cost of approximately $67 million as of April 2026. The Navy estimates life-cycle costs have risen from $31 billion for 262 missiles in 2020 to $41 billion for 224 missiles in 2024, while the Army plans to spend over $10 billion on 48 missiles and associated ground support equipment.
Lockheed Martin's production capacity currently allows for no more than six to seven kits per year, while 12 kits per year are needed to stabilize production. At the current rate, production of one complete Zumwalt kit will take approximately two years, not including time to meet Army requirements, flight testing of the weapon, training kits, and submarine kits.
Manufacturing problems that led to this shortage included defective thermal coatings, incomplete parts kits, partial disassembly of missiles to extract missing components (manufacturing cannibalism), work instructions written as technical specifications that inexperienced employees could not always follow, and employee turnover.
Lockheed Martin has increased its production staff from approximately 60 to 80, but management estimates it will take about a year for a new employee to become fully operational. A Navy inspection in 2023 also uncovered expired materials, insufficient part inspection, and quality assurance deficiencies. These are not minor manufacturing issues: defects in coatings, assembly, or guidance system components directly impact the missile's ability to withstand hypersonic heating and maintain the precision required for a conventional kinetic strike.
The ship's integration has resulted in further delays. In August 2025, the U.S. Navy added 230,000 man-hours and $20 million to the contract with Huntington Ingalls Industries after more electrical cables than expected were removed from the Zumwalt's bow during installation of a launcher. Restarting key systems after the first complete shutdown of the ship's integrated power system also revealed equipment malfunctions. The destroyer can generate 78 megawatts and supply 1000 volts of direct current to propulsion and combat systems, but the Navy faced repeated reports of Category 3 and 4 damage, three-month delivery times for some power system components, and a reliance on parts salvaged from the destroyer Lyndon B. Johnson.
The US Navy has also postponed a decision on replacing the class-specific SPY-3 radar system, the ship's common computing environment, and the network architecture with standard Navy equipment. The additional changes will cost between $1 billion and $2 billion for the three ships.
What matters to Congress is not whether the USS Zumwalt can physically carry 12 hypersonic missiles, but whether the Navy can simultaneously produce a combat-ready ship, a reliable supply of missiles, and a functioning targeting system that is compatible with at least other ships, and at most with aviation and other branches of the military.
At an average estimated cost of $67 million, a full complement of 12 missiles would cost approximately $804 million, not including the cost of the destroyer, launch system, and auxiliary sensors.
Launch trials in 2027 will determine whether the weapon can be safely launched and controlled from a ship, but this alone will not prove its continued operational readiness, sufficient production volume, or effectiveness against typical hard targets. The April 2025 demonstration was not intended to fully assess its operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability.
Overall, the situation is complex: both Congress, which bears full strategic responsibility for the US armed forces, and the Navy command, which is responsible for the ships tactically, are understandably interested in one thing: not throwing away (or rather, into the sea) several tens of billions of dollars of the Zumwalt-class destroyer program.
Alas, today's cutting-edge ships, built using cutting-edge technology, are armed with subsonic Tomahawk missiles from the last century. The Zumvolta's miraculous guided missile weapons have already been decommissioned, the railgun isn't ready, and the lasers haven't been tested. In other words, the very weapons that would justify spending such sums don't yet exist. And the ship of tomorrow is still armed with weapons from the day before yesterday.
Those responsible are making heroic efforts to keep the Zumwalt and its comrades from being scrapped and dismantled, but so far, it's not just not funny—it's downright hilarious. It would be downright funny if it weren't so sad, because anyone could find themselves in this situation.
This is what happened to Russia, for example, with its Project 22160 modular wonder corvettes. The corvettes turned out to be just as unseaworthy and poorly armed as the Zumwalts. The only upside was that they weren't as astronomically expensive. But Russia, realizing they hadn't quite delivered what they'd hoped for, canceled the project, and the remaining four corvettes (plus one under construction) will go to the hoards of ships after their service life ends.
But at least the half-corvettes serve as patrol ships, which can't be said of the half-destroyers like the Zumwalt class. And the last (possibly) desperate attempt to turn the Zumwalts into combat ships by equipping them with hypersonic gliders could end up wasting several billion dollars. And the Zumwalts will be scrapped anyway.
Truly, three cable lengths away from multi-billion dollar shame.
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