From Redoubt to Onslaught: The Russian Field School of Rumyantsev and Suvorov
Prussian hussars attack the Russian artillery battery during the Battle of Gross-Jägersdorf in 1757. Painting by artist Wojciech Kossak, painted in 1897
The Poltava battle of 1709 was prepared in advance: a chain of redoubts, batteries, and a fortified camp. Peter the Great forced the Swedes to advance where they were expected. Sixty years later, the same principle—a pre-prepared battlefield—was employed offensively, only the role of fortifications was now taken over by a mobile infantry formation. The Russian infantry advanced against vastly superior forces and prevailed. How the defensive model of Poltava evolved into an offensive doctrine is what we will discuss.
Place in the series and reading frame
In the previous article in the series, "Moritz of Saxony: How to Rethink the War of Lines", the discussion focused on how a German prince in French service transformed linear tactics into a tool of maneuver: columns, mixed formations, and the desire to saturate the battlefield with strongpoints. Previously, we discussed Friedrich II as the Prussian response to the lessons of PoltavaUnder Frederick, the war of lines reached its utmost fiery order. Now the center of gravity shifts to Russia, to Pyotr Rumyantsev and Alexander Suvorov.
Let me clarify right away: the "Poltava-Rumyantsev-Suvorov" line is my working hypothesis, not the generally accepted version. Historians draw connections in other ways as well: through the engineering school, through reforms of the regular army, through Prussian and Austrian models. The direct influence of the Poltava model on Rumyantsev's squares is more analogous than proven continuity, and I don't claim it as anything more. I'm interested in one vector: how Russian practice translated Poltava's defensive success into an offensive. This hypothesis will have to be tested in the same way it is constructed—with dates, numbers, names, and documents.
I selected these examples specifically. Larga and Cahul demonstrate an offensive with smaller forces and the transition from a line to a square. Kozludzhi, Rymnik, Izmail, and the Swiss campaign present four different theaters—steppe, field, fortress, and mountains—and allow us to test whether the method remains consistent under changing conditions.
The Poltava Lesson and the Challenge of the Century
Poltava is most often remembered as the defeat of the Swedish army, but for military thought, it is more valuable as a model for combat organization. It combined three components.
- The engineering organization of the field: redoubts and fortifications, linked to the terrain, forced the enemy to take an unfavorable route.
- Coordinated fire and position: artillery and infantry operated from pre-prepared points rather than converging in an open field.
- Discipline and control: the army maintained its formation under attack and counterattacked at the right moment.
This is all the logic of a defensive turning point. A fortified army absorbs the blow, exhausts the attacker, and responds with movement. The redoubt here serves as the physical fulcrum that holds the entire structure together.
The task of the second half of the 18th century is posed in reverse. Lessons must be applied to the offensive: learn to organize the battlefield so that smaller forces can attack a numerically superior enemy without having time to dig redoubts. The answer is a mobile fulcrum, first the square under Rumyantsev, then the column and march under Suvorov.
"The Battle of Zorndorf" (1758) by Polish artist Wojciech Kossak. The painting depicts a fierce battle between the Russian and Prussian armies during the Seven Years' War.
Rumyantsev and the negative lesson of Prussia
Rumyantsev developed his offensive concept by observing the enemy line, the Prussian one. He learned his lesson from the Seven Years' War, where Frederick's volley-fire system dominated.
At Gross-Jägersdorf in 1757, the Russian army prevailed over the Prussians in a fierce battle, and Rumyantsev played a decisive role. At a critical moment, he voluntarily led several reserve infantry regiments out of the forest and attacked the advancing enemy in the flank, breaking the tide of battle. This action is worth remembering: the initiative, taken contrary to the norm of waiting, would later become the core of his tactics. The battle also revealed something else: the resilience of the Russian soldier coexists with the vulnerability of a heavy, poorly controlled line in the wooded and marshy terrain, where a continuous front breaks of its own accord. At Kunersdorf in 1759, the Russo-Austrian army crushed Frederick II, but at the cost of enormous losses and the overall uncontrollability of the battle.
For the future Rumyantsev-Zadunaisky, this was a negative reference point. He saw the standard line breaking under the pressure of terrain, artillery, and chaos, and began to seek a different form of battle, one where units operated independently rather than depending on the integrity of a single, extended formation. Friedrich perfected the line, and Rumyantsev learned from its encounters about its limits.
Larga and Cahul: a minority attack
Offensive tactics were born in the 1770 campaign against the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate. Here, Rumyantsev replaced the continuous line with a system of mobile divisional squares.
On July 7 (18), 1770, at the Larga River, a left tributary of the Prut, Rumyantsev had approximately 38 men and 115 guns. Opposing him were approximately 15 Turkish infantry and up to 65 Crimean cavalry under the command of Kaplan-Girey. In total numbers, the enemy outnumbered the Russians by approximately two to one, and in cavalry, the enemy outnumbered them even more. The contrast was not only numerical: regular European infantry with artillery versus the mass of steppe cavalry accustomed to open, maneuverable combat.
A correction is needed here. The square against cavalry was not a Russian invention; it was a common European practice of the 18th century, perfected in both the Austro-Turkish Wars and Western campaigns. Rumyantsev's innovation lay not in the formation itself, but in how he used it: he divided a single large square into several divisional ones, imbued them with mobility, and forced them to attack rather than defend. This is precisely what distinguishes it from the traditional defensive square.
Rumyantsev doesn't dig in. He marches forward. The troops advance in columns, deploying into squares on the field, covered by fire from all sides, while the artillery stays with the infantry and fires at the cavalry at point-blank range; at the right moment, part of the force disperses into skirmish lines. The smaller army crosses the river, engages, and breaks the superior cavalry. After eight hours, the enemy camp is captured, the Russians take 33 guns and extensive trophies with minimal losses.
Two weeks later, on July 21 (August 1), 1770, the same army converged with the main forces of the Ottoman Empire at Cahul. The contrast became starker. Rumyantsev had approximately 40–50 men, while Grand Vizier Halil Pasha's forces, including the Crimean cavalry, were estimated at 90–150. The numbers are debatable, but the principle is clear: the Russians were vastly outnumbered, operating far from their supply bases, in a foreign theater of operations.
The scheme follows Larga, but is more precise. The army is formed into several lines of divisional squares, with gaps left between them for artillery and reserves, and each square is capable of fighting independently. The enemy cavalry encounters not a continuous front, but a scattering of fire points that are difficult to outflank and break through. At the right moment, the squares advance and charge with bayonets under the cover of cannons. The result is rout: thousands killed, many captured, dozens of guns lost, and the commander fleeing.
Here, the square replaced the redoubt. The Poltava idea of a strongpoint remained, but the earthen ramparts were stripped away, and their role was taken over by the formation itself. Poltava was the pinnacle of organized defense. Larga and Cahul demonstrated that it was also possible to attack in this manner, and with smaller forces.
The Battle of Cahul (1770), a key battle of the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774. The painting was created by the Polish-German artist Daniel Nikolaus Chodowiecki (1726–1801).
Rumyantsev the architect: "Rite of Service"
It's not enough to simply win; you need to explain how, so that another commander can replicate that victory. Rumyantsev consolidated his experience in the manual "Rite of Service." It sets forth the principles of offensive warfare: don't wait passively, force battle, and rely on the attacker's moral superiority. It also outlines the preference for columns and squares over static lines, especially against cavalry, and requirements for troop training: training in maneuver, marksmanship, operations in various formations, and the development of light troops and rangers.
There's also a line in this instruction that could easily be dismissed as a trivial matter—concern for the lower ranks. Rumyantsev is focused on the rational adjustment of equipment, striving to ease the soldier's situation. Behind this lies a calculation: the army wins and weapons, and the condition of the person using it. A tired, poorly equipped soldier won't be able to sustain the pace of an offensive, and without pace, all tactics collapse.
The significance of "Rite of Service" is that it's about a conscious approach accessible to other commanders, not a one-time revelation from a single talent. Rumyantsev isn't an improviser here, but a designer: he's constructing a form of combat that can be passed on. The next step will be taken by someone of a different mindset, someone who has worked in the same school but has shifted the emphasis from form to energy.
A document entitled "The Rite of Service" dated March 1770.
Suvorov: from scheme to onslaught
The connection between the two commanders was not merely ideological. Alexander Suvorov served under Rumyantsev in the Russo-Turkish War and witnessed divisional squares, offensives against steppe cavalry, and the training system up close. He later held the senior commander in high regard, and this respect would be reflected in his own doctrine, which we will now turn to.
Already on his own, at Kozludzha in June 1774, Suvorov, through maneuver, crushed the Turkish army and brought the war to an end: peace would soon follow Kozludzha. Here, his shift is evident: the impeccable geometry of the square gives way to his ability to quickly find a vulnerable spot and strike there.
Suvorov distilled his doctrine into "The Science of Victory," a document as weighty as "The Rite of Service," but written aphoristically. Its core is the triad. "eye, speed, onslaught"First, assess the situation, then quickly close in, and then strike. Hence the preference for accurate fire and bayonet fire over a lengthy firefight, and the rule that training should be more difficult than combat, so that a soldier acts without hesitation in combat.
In his dispute with Prussian tradition, Suvorov rejected the rigid discipline and formal bearing. He did not differ entirely from European practice: he accepted columns, squares, and mobile artillery, but rejected drill for its own sake. For him, the line was not a death sentence, but merely one aspect of battle; the decisive factor was the ability to quickly regroup and attack where it was inconvenient. And he saw the soldier not as a component of a mechanism, but as a participant in the battle, on whose endurance and will the outcome depended.
The Battle of Kozludzha, which took place on June 20, 1774, during the Russo-Turkish War. This engraving depicts the decisive blow of the Russian army under the command of Alexander Suvorov and Mikhail Kamensky.
Suvorov's Four Theatres: Steppe, Field, Fortress, Mountains
A single method should be tested where conditions are dissimilar.
At Kozludzha, it was the steppe and a field maneuver. At Rymnik in 1789, it was a major field battle: Suvorov commanded a Russo-Austrian force against a superior Ottoman army. The balance of forces was roughly as follows: 15-20 allied troops against 80-100 under Hasan Pasha. As with Rumyantsev, the regular corps was vastly outnumbered by the enemy, but Suvorov operated in a manner where the very pace of the movement served as support.
The contours of the Russian field school of the late 18th century:
- Priority of the offensive and initiative over a wait-and-see defense.
- Flexible formations - columns, squares, skirmishing formations - instead of a single rigid line.
- Mobile artillery that creates fire centers together with infantry.
- Attention to the soldier's training and condition: difficult training, trust in the commander, equipment for the task.
- The desire to turn terrain, time and weather into a means of combat.
Poltava laid the foundation. Rumyantsev built an offensive system on it, and Suvorov developed it to its extreme. Next to the Russian line stands Friedrich's Prussian line and Moritz of Saxony's maneuvering school: three different answers to the same question: how a war of lines works. How strong the chain from Poltava to the Alpine passes is, it's up to the reader to judge. It's not difficult to verify, as it's all contained in the sources, from regimental reports to the instructions themselves.
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