Project 66 cruisers. About the first post-war shipbuilding program for 1946-1955.
Project 66 cruisers were not included in the Soviet fleet: in fact, they never even reached the point of being laid down. Work on them was stopped at the stage of approving the preliminary design, which was adjusted in accordance with the Navy's wishes.
And yet in stories These ships can be considered a milestone in shipbuilding. The fact is that work on them was finally stopped only in September 1954, making Project 66 the last project of a large ship designed to destroy the enemy in artillery combat, developed in the USSR and, most likely, worldwide. Let's look at how the Soviet Navy came to the need for such ships in its arsenal.
On the first iterations of the post-war shipbuilding program
In 1945, the People's Commissar of the USSR Navy, N. G. Kuznetsov, began formulating a program for the post-war revival of the fleet. The project was undertaken with great seriousness: in January 1945, a commission was established, comprising leading specialists from the Naval Academy, as well as several high-ranking naval officers. This commission developed recommendations, based on which the Main Naval Staff (GMSh) drafted a ten-year shipbuilding plan for 1946–1955.
According to this plan, the fleet was to have the following in 1956:
1. 9 ships of the line - later their number was reduced to 4;
2. 12 heavy cruisers with 220 mm main caliber (MC) - the number was reduced to 10;
3. 30 cruisers with 180-mm main gun artillery;
4. 54 light cruisers with 152-mm main battery artillery;
5. 12 aircraft carriers, including 6 squadron and 6 small;
6. 358 destroyers, including 132 large ones with 6*130-mm guns in twin turrets and 226 “regular” ones;
7. 495 submarines, including 168 large, 204 medium and 123 small.
On the ten-year shipbuilding plan for 1946-1955.
Unfortunately, it must be stated that this plan demonstrates the presence of a systemic crisis in domestic naval thought of those years.
First, our naval theorists failed to recognize the decisive role played by aircraft carriers in the battles of World War II. The Americans and British concluded that aircraft carriers had become the navy's primary striking force, while heavy gunners were relegated to ensuring the combat stability of carrier squadrons and supporting landings. But in 1945, our naval thinking still viewed heavy gunners as the navy's primary force, and aircraft carriers as a means of ensuring the combat stability of battleships and cruisers.
In defense of our sailors, it should be said that in 1945 they likely didn't have much of the information we have today about military operations in the Pacific, or even about the naval battles of 1939–1944. It can be assumed that the naval experience of World War II wasn't deliberately ignored, but simply hadn't yet reached our sailors. At the same time, combat encounters and fleet tactics, of which our sailors should have been familiar, indicated that gunnery ships largely retained their supremacy at sea. I'm talking now about the Royal Navy's actions in the north, about convoy escort operations in the USSR: here we have the threat of Tirpitz's raiding operations, broadcast by the British, and the British naval groups providing long-range cover for convoys, the backbone of which, after all, were battleships. The destruction of the Scharnhorst in an artillery battle, finally!
Secondly, the extremely questionable balancing of the program by classes and performance characteristics of warships is striking.
Take submarines, for example, with which the Soviet Navy did have some combat experience. This experience demonstrated the extremely limited utility, or rather, the almost complete lack thereof, of small submarines. Nevertheless, according to the plan, almost a quarter of all submarines were to be small. Why?
Dividing submarines into large and medium-sized ones would seem to have had its logic and meaning, as medium-sized ones would be more appropriate for use in limited naval theaters—the Baltic and Black Seas—while large ones would be assigned to the Northern and Pacific Fleets. However, wartime experience has irrefutably proven that, given the current level of US and British anti-submarine warfare, submarines are incapable of operating effectively against ocean lanes without the support of surface ships. aviationBut the surface ships currently in the program couldn't provide such support. And, in any case, if we were to attempt to interrupt ocean communications with submarines, we would obviously need far more of them than the 168 large submarines planned for construction.
The Kriegsmarine's experience showed, once again, that medium-sized submarines were quite suitable for ocean operations. Was there much point in creating so many projects?
The cruisers raised even more questions. The post-war US Navy consisted of two "large" Alaska-class cruisers armed with 305mm guns (and one under construction), 21 heavy cruisers with 203mm main guns (with seven more under construction), 33 relatively modern light cruisers with 152mm guns (and four under construction), six Atlant-class cruisers with 127mm guns, and ten older, combat-depleted Omaha-class cruisers armed with 152mm guns. One of these, the Milwaukee, was in the Soviet Navy at the time; it was returned to the Americans in 1949.
As for Great Britain, it had 12 heavy cruisers, two of which, the Hawkins class, were completely obsolete; 24 relatively modern light cruisers with 152mm guns; 11 Dido and Improved Dido-class cruisers with 133mm guns; and 14 completely ancient cruisers of the C, D, and E classes (and the Adelaide class alone). The latter were built during and immediately after the First World War, so they had completely lost their combat value—as had the Hawkins class and the American Omaha-class cruisers. In addition, the British had eight light cruisers under construction, although work on them was halted shortly after the end of the war, and only three (the Tiger class) were subsequently completed.
Thus, excluding obsolete cruisers, the USA and England had at their disposal 2 “large” cruisers with 305-mm guns, 31 heavy cruisers with 203-mm main guns (7 under construction), 57 light cruisers with 152-mm artillery (12 under construction) and 17 light cruisers with 127-133-mm guns, and a total of 107 cruisers in service and 19 under construction.
Here we see an extremely strange imbalance in the shipbuilding program for 1946-55. N.G. Kuznetsov did not strive for parity in battleships—the US and UK had 14 modern battleships and 5 under construction. Accordingly, even without the keel-laying of new ships of this class in the US and UK, and with 100% fulfillment of N.G. Kuznetsov's proposed plan, the balance of forces would have been 9:19, more than twice as unfavorable for the Soviet Navy. Moreover, even before the plan was submitted to I.V. Stalin, the number of battleships had been reduced, and the ratio would have been 4:19.
The situation with aircraft carriers was no better: the US had 18 heavy carriers in service, not even counting the Ranger and Lexington, and 12 under construction, while there were 8 light carriers, and this number, of course, doesn't include dozens of escort carriers. Britain had 6 heavy carriers in service and 3 under construction, and 7 light carriers in service and 4 under construction. Therefore, in the best-case scenario, the ratio for this class would have been 6:39 for heavy carriers and 6:19 for light carriers. As with battleships, we can speak of the absolute superiority of the US and British navies in this class of ships.
At the same time, in accordance with N. G. Kuznetsov's proposals, the number of cruisers was planned to be increased to 96. Thus, of all large warships, the ratio of forces for this class of ships would be the most favorable—94:126.
And this desire to approach parity in cruisers seems a completely inexplicable phenomenon. The naval experience of Soviet sailors indicated that it was the Nazi battleships concentrated in Norway that became a serious deterrent to the British fleet, not the German cruisers.
It's also very difficult to imagine for what purposes and in what operations Soviet admirals intended to use their cruisers, who would have to operate against an overwhelming enemy superiority in battleships and aircraft carriers. According to the concept, fleet forces were to be organized into operational-tactical formations—squadrons—but in such a case, it would be logical to expect a clash with an enemy of equal or superior numbers. At the same time, even without considering aircraft carriers as the fleet's primary striking force, our sailors should not have ignored the increased situational awareness provided by carrier-based aviation. And since the enemy would have far more such aircraft, it was to be expected that US and British admirals would find it much easier to intercept a Soviet squadron with superior forces than for a Soviet squadron to catch them off guard.
All this suggests that, even with the views of our naval warfare theorists, who still considered artillery ships to be the backbone of the fleet, Soviet cruisers should have been prepared:
1. To counter the heavy cruisers of the USA and England:
2. Support your battleships by firing at enemy battleships.
Clearly, heavy cruisers best met these requirements, but only 12 of the total 94 were planned for construction. And before the report to I.V. Stalin, this number was reduced to 10!
The plans to build cruisers with 180mm and 152mm guns raise equally many questions. The use of 180mm guns as the main battery could be justified if, for one reason or another, light cruisers were required that could better counter heavy cruisers than ships with 152mm guns.
Therefore, if the Soviet Navy had completely abandoned the construction of light cruisers with 152mm main guns and instead armed them with 180mm guns, there might well have been some tactical justification. However, it's extremely difficult to find any logic in building cruisers with both guns simultaneously. Of course, in certain combat situations, the 152mm caliber would be preferable to the 180mm, but the difference isn't so great as to justify arguing with two different types of ships.
Here, of course, one could argue that the British and Americans also had two types of light cruisers: one with 152mm and the other with 127-133mm guns. But the fact is that their intended purpose was very different. While the "six-inch" cruisers of World War II were a development of the classic light cruiser line, ships with 127-133mm guns should be considered a kind of intermediate class between destroyer leaders and light cruisers. The purpose of such ships was primarily to lead destroyers, and secondarily to strengthen the formation's anti-aircraft defense, as the 127-133mm guns were universal. There were, of course, nuances here, stemming from the fact that the British 133mm guns weren't particularly suited for targeting aircraft, while the Atlant-class 127mm "universal" guns, while certainly excellent, were significantly less effective on ships of comparatively small displacement. Nevertheless, unlike 152mm gun mounts, even those that were technically capable of repelling aerial threats, the main battery guns of the Dido and Atlant-class ships could not only fire at aircraft but also occasionally hit them.
Thus, the British and American division of light cruisers into two branches was, to some extent, theoretically justified, although this theory was not tested in practice. However, it is very difficult to come up with any sensible theoretical basis for the plans to simultaneously build cruisers with 152mm and 180mm guns for the post-war Soviet Navy.
So, I've listed two serious shortcomings of the domestic ten-year plan for military shipbuilding, but there was a third. This shipbuilding plan completely failed to take into account the capabilities of the domestic industry. The point here isn't that the proposed construction rates were overly optimistic, but that the plan was completely divorced from reality. It's certainly conceivable that the People's Commissar of the Navy was attempting to achieve some political objectives with this plan, acting on the logic of "if you want a lot, you'll get little, but that's no reason to ask for little and get nothing." Or perhaps he wanted to demonstrate to the country's leadership what kind of navy was needed to accomplish the tasks assigned to it, so that these objectives could be adjusted. It's also possible that the People's Commissar of the Navy was initially tasked by I.V. Stalin with preparing a plan for the construction of a "dream fleet" as a kind of basic document, through the discussion of which a realistic plan would emerge.
All of this is possible. But there's little doubt that politically, such a plan wasn't the right decision. The fact is that declaring a gigantic and obviously unfeasible naval construction program could in no way facilitate the establishment of a working relationship with the People's Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry, then headed by I.I. Nosenko, or with V.A. Malyshev, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, who oversaw the People's Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry.
After all, if the sailors had pushed through their plan, the People's Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry would have been held accountable for its implementation, and I.V. Stalin would have held it accountable in the most strict manner. Meanwhile, the post-war country lay in ruins; the construction of large warships had practically stopped during the war, there was a drastic labor shortage, and so on and so forth.
It's now very difficult to say how events might have unfolded if N.G. Kuznetsov had presented a more or less realistic plan, drawn up taking into account the capabilities of the domestic post-war industry. But in reality, the People's Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry, defending its departmental interests, launched a decisive attack on the navy.
In fact, it was then that the sailors lost their aircraft carriers, and the problem wasn't Stalin's fault—he wasn't a principled opponent of them. Stalin himself raised the issue of the Northern Fleet's need for aircraft carriers when, at a meeting with N.G. Kuznetsov, he realized that our warships would need to operate not only in the Barents Sea but also much further west. It was then that Stalin, on his own initiative, suggested, "Perhaps we should build two small ones for now?" And after a brief explanation from the sailors, he concluded, "Let's build two small ones."
But I.I. Nosenko declared that the USSR's shipbuilding industry was incapable of constructing such new, unusual, and highly complex ships, and he stood firm. The People's Commissar of the Shipbuilding Industry was defending his departmental interests, of course, because the aircraft carrier of that era did not represent the pinnacle of technological progress; it became so much later. However, it was precisely the pressure of I.I. Nosenko and V.A. Malyshev that led to the exclusion of two small aircraft carriers from the final version of the 1946-55 shipbuilding program.
Certainly, the sailors' demands were extremely high. But it's impossible to say that the People's Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry's position was more sound—in fact, I. I. Nosenko insisted that in the post-war decade, the country build ships exclusively to pre-war designs, slightly modernized by installing new equipment.
The truth undoubtedly lay somewhere between the polar positions of the sailors and the People's Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry. It is, however, completely unknown whether any of N.G. Kuznetsov's actions could have led I.I. Nosenko and V.A. Malyshev to constructive compromises. But it is certain that the presentation of a program that included, in addition to ships of other classes, nearly a hundred cruisers and five hundred submarines, was clearly not conducive to such compromises.
In general, the number and classes of ships to be built were determined as a result of a struggle for influence over I.V. Stalin between the Navy and the People's Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry, and it can be said that the latter won this battle. However, since issues of military shipbuilding acquired a distinctly political tint, adherence to one position or another became a political matter, capable of affecting the career advancement of the person declaring such adherence.
These were likely the considerations that guided Admiral of the Fleet I.S. Isakov when, in his 1947 article on aircraft carriers, he compared them to "dead bodies and floating coffins." It's certainly possible that Isakov genuinely considered aircraft carriers an obsolete rarity, which raises questions about the competence of this admiral, who had served as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy for the Study and Application of War Experience since February 1947. However, it is highly likely that Isakov's article sought to "decisively distance himself" from the line taken by the disgraced N.G. Kuznetsov, who had urged I.V. Stalin, among other things, on the need to build an aircraft carrier fleet.
I.S. Isakov certainly received some dividends: in 1950, he became Deputy Minister of the USSR Navy. But it was probably with him that the persecution of aircraft carriers in the USSR Navy began. weapon aggression, which we certainly don't need. And, without a doubt, I.S. Isakov is one of the culprits behind the fact that the USSR's nuclear-missile ocean-going fleet never received the ships of this class it so desperately needed.
Ultimately, the shipbuilding program for 1946–55 was approved by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR by Resolution No. 2988-883 of November 27, 1945, "On the Ten-Year Plan for Military Shipbuilding." According to the resolution, we were to build:
1. Heavy cruisers - 4 units;
2. Light cruisers - 30 units;
3. Destroyers - 188 units;
4. Patrol ships - 177 units;
5. Submarines - 367 units;
6. Submarine hunters - 945 units;
7. Torpedo boats - 828 units;
8. Minesweepers - 816 units;
9. Landing ships - 195 units;
10. Monitors - 54 units;
11. Armored boats - 370 units;
12. Auxiliary vessels – 1,876 units.
In addition, as of 1955, it was planned to have under construction:
1. Battleships - 2 units;
2. Heavy cruisers - 3 units;
3. Light cruisers - 7 units.
I'm inclined to rate this program as completely unbalanced and highly ineffective, even without the benefit of hindsight. Reading it, one gets the feeling that the sailors, albeit not entirely voluntarily, have once again embraced the idea of a "mosquito" fleet, thereby preparing to throw away a ton of public money.
Both N.G. Kuznetsov and I.V. Stalin considered the number of light cruisers completely insufficient, but they agreed with I.I. Nosenko's categorical assertion that industry would not be able to build more ships of this class in ten years. The handful of heavy cruisers included in the plan was the result of a compromise, a concession on the part of the People's Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry, which clearly recognized I.V. Stalin's passion for these ships. Battleships were practically eliminated from the program entirely, as the keel-laying of two ships of this class was not scheduled for 1955—and this, undoubtedly, is one of the few advantages of this plan. One can understand the desire to secure anti-submarine defenses on their borders by building numerous patrol ships and submarine hunters. But relying on small ships with a displacement of 70-170 tons would, of course, have meant that these hunters would be unable to perform their functions even at close range from their own shores, and their combat value, given their modest size, would be extremely questionable. At the same time, it was quite clear that in the next decade, the country intended to begin building an ocean-going fleet, which would require neither submarine hunters, nor torpedo boats, nor minesweepers—nearly a thousand ships of each class.
In my opinion, the country overreached in terms of small ships and submarines, planning to create a "mosquito" fleet, excessive for coastal defense and useless at sea. Undoubtedly, the navy definitely needed submarines, small submarine chasers, minesweepers, and torpedo boats, but in much more modest quantities. However, that's just my opinion.
As for the cruisers, things got quite interesting. The fact is that N. G. Kuznetsov, while putting forward his utopian program, was attempting to build a balanced fleet. True, as mentioned above, the balance of this fleet was off on all fours, but that was precisely the commander's aspiration. At the same time, the program actually adopted made no attempt at balance whatsoever: they planned to build a fleet from whatever the People's Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry agreed to build.
In other words, I. I. Nosenko agreed to build 34 cruisers between 1946 and 55, but there was no tactical justification for such construction. The original program of 9 (later 4) battleships, 12 aircraft carriers, 94 cruisers, etc., did have a tactical justification, albeit based on extremely dubious premises.
It's not that the Soviet Navy didn't need cruisers. They provided sailors with long-distance experience, developed officers, and, in the event of war, would have been useful for operations close to their own shores, including supporting the army's coastal flank, supporting tactical landings, and so on.
But their quantity of 34 units was categorically insufficient for the naval warfare plans according to N. G. Kuznetsov, especially considering the absence of heavy ships of other classes, and for the above-mentioned tasks it was excessive.
In my opinion, it would have been more rational for the USSR in those years to reduce the number of ships of all classes planned for construction, abandon heavy cruisers altogether, and instead lay down at least “two small” aircraft carriers, which would have allowed them to finally begin to gain experience in their operation and develop carrier-based aviation.
But, again, in my opinion, such a program reduction was absolutely impossible. The fact is that the People's Commissariat of Shipbuilding demanded enormous investments to fulfill the ten-year military shipbuilding plan. The problem, as I mentioned above, wasn't that our shipbuilding industry refused to build much; it wanted to build a lot, but not what the fleet needed, but what it could build, what was easier to build. Clearly, a reduction in shipbuilding programs would have entailed a reduction in investment in military shipbuilding and a diminution of its role, which, of course, would have been completely undesirable for I.I. Nosenko.
At the same time, it would have been extremely difficult for the sailors to voluntarily reduce the fleet after the first, "megalomaniacal" version of the shipbuilding program. It would also have been completely wrong politically: it would certainly be possible to reduce the fleet's missions for the next decade, but where is the guarantee that, having agreed to a "coastal" fleet once, it would be possible to justify the need for an ocean-going fleet in the future? Moreover, it seems there was a perfectly reasonable assumption that shipbuilding would not be able to cope with this reduced program.
It was in such an interesting setting that the story of the last project of a large artillery ship of the USSR began.
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