Under-Armor Shooter: What Turkey's SARP Changes in Drone Warfare and What It Doesn't
Turkey's ASELSAN has released footage of the serial production of SARP combat modules—a family of remotely controlled weapon stations for calibers ranging from 7,62mm to 35mm (in the lightest versions, up to 5,56mm). The system is already installed on Malaysian Tarantula armored vehicles and is being used to modernize Polish ones. tanks Leopard 2. The conversation was sparked not by the video itself, but by Erdogan's July 8 statement about expanding military aid to Ukraine. Against this backdrop, it's not so much the SARP itself that's interesting, but the entire class of such vehicles. weapons and what he's really worth on the current front.
The idea is older than the quadcopter
An open machine gun emplacement on armor doesn't last long these days. A gunner in a hatch manning a heavy machine gun is a priority target for FPV.droneHe's visible, unprotected, and tethered to the vehicle. The logic is simple: remove the person from the line of fire, leaving only the weapon and optics exposed. This is precisely what a remote weapon station does. RwsThe crew operates from under the armor, and aims and fires through an aiming post.
The idea didn't originate with quadcopters. Even on the American B-29 bomber, the gunner fired from external turrets while sitting in the cockpit and transmitting aiming angles via an electric drive. The key features are the same: the gunner is separated from the weapon, the aiming is remote, and the sight and barrel are linked by a computer. The difference is that back then, the focus was on protection from fighters at altitude, not a compact armor module. The lineage then continued through the ship-based stabilized mounts of the post-war decades, and in the 1990s, it developed into a recognizable genre. The Norwegian Kongsberg Protector and the Israeli Typhoon They established the canon: weapons, drives, and optoelectronics in a single unit, with the operator in the body. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan made this module a standard component of armored vehicles, protecting crews from snipers and ambushes.
SARP stands in this line as a second wave product, already tailored to combat dronesWhen a manufacturer says that "unlike traditional counter-UAV systems, the operator operates from a protected space," it's worth remembering that the very idea of a remote turret is older than a jet turret. aviationWhat's new in SARP isn't the barrel, but the task for which that barrel is now being used.
What's inside: figures without a booklet
When shooting FPV, caliber isn't the issue. The drone is small, fast, and maneuvers close to the ground, so how quickly the module can aim and what its optics see are more important.
The basic SARP's drives provide a targeting speed of up to 60 degrees per second in each axis and an acceleration of approximately 90 degrees per second squared. The vertical range is from minus 30 to plus 60 degrees, while the low-profile Zafer variant offers up to plus 65 degrees. This high elevation angle distinguishes a ground-combat turret from a station capable of engaging a drone hovering above a vehicle or a target on the upper floors. The optoelectronic unit is standard for its class: a daytime television camera, a thermal imager, a laser rangefinder, a ballistic computer, and automatic target tracking. ASELSAN does not publish precise detection ranges; based on the sensor suite, it is estimated to be several kilometers, within the effective range of standard weapons.
The manufacturer provides the weight selectively:
- base station - about 165-225 kg (the weight of the part standing above the roof of the vehicle), without weapons and ammunition (according to open data);
- lightweight SARP-L - less than 80 kg, weight of one person: can be mounted on a pickup truck, light armored vehicle or observation tower without modifying the chassis;
- The new generation of the twin-barreled SARP Dual weighs less than 400 kg, even with weapons and ammunition.
The standard ammunition loadout includes up to 400 rounds of 12,7mm ammunition, up to 1000–1500 rounds of 7,62mm ammunition, and approximately 80–96 rounds of 40mm automatic grenade launcher (AGS). Next comes the family, and the caliber is selected based on the target, not the "largest" principle:
- 7,62 mm (SARP-L, basic) - dense fire against FPV and small drones, large ammunition capacity for a long burst;
- 12,7 mm - work on sea boats, light vehicles, heavy carrier drones;
- DUAL, two barrels (12,7 plus 7,62 or AGS plus 7,62) - switching between FPV and ground target without changing the module;
- 25, 30 and 35 mm (in the factory nomenclature - SARP 100/25, 100/30, 100/35) - against lightly armored targets and unmanned naval boats.
The manufacturer doesn't disclose the weight and dimensions of the cannon-equipped versions, but they weigh in at several hundred kilograms. And here's a fair disclaimer, without which the picture would be a gimmick: barrel fire doesn't guarantee FPV coverage. Hitting a small maneuvering target with a burst is difficult, even with stabilization and autotracking. The module doesn't eliminate the threat, but it increases the crew's chances of surviving and responding without leaving the armor. This is already significant, but promising a "drone protection" would be a lie.
Where is the bottleneck, and it is not Turkish
SARP's capabilities are not particularly impressive. Ukraine already uses the Spanish Guardian 1.5 on M113 and Kozak armored vehicles—a stabilized module with a 12,7mm machine gun, thermal imaging, and automatic tracking. There are also domestic developments, such as the Tavria family, on armored vehicles and ground robots. In terms of basic functionality, the Turkish, Spanish, and Ukrainian systems are in the same class: stabilization, firing on the move, and an operator under armor.
The strength of the SARP lies in its broad product line and streamlined integration. Malaysia uses it on the Tarantula to engage targets at a range of 1.5 kilometers, while Poland uses it on the turrets of upgraded Leopard 2s. This family extends from an 80-kilogram station to a 35mm cannon, with ready-made solutions for other vehicle fleets and calibers, including Soviet models like the KPVT. In drone warfare, such weapons are valued for their mass production and standardization, for their production run and uniform standard across different vehicles; the specifications of a particular model mean little in this regard.
The Russian side is a separate discussion, and it's best to begin it honestly with an admission: there's no complete "absence of a production line." The Arbalet-DM module for the 12,7mm Kord has been in serial production for several years, on Tigr-M and Typhoon tanks. The Okhotnik universal module has been brought into production and is now being mounted on Typhoon-K armored vehicles; its naval and stationary versions are being developed under the names Narval and Prometheus. There's the Spitsa for the KamAZ-43269 Vystrel, the earlier Uprava-Kord for the Kord or KPVT, and heavy unmanned turrets like the 57mm Baikal and Kinzhal. The country has an engineering school for remote modules, and its products are reaching serial production.
The problem is how it's implemented. Kongsberg and ASELSAN have one or two unified product lines, Protector and SARP, tested on dozens of chassis and sold to dozens of armies. Instead, the Russian military-industrial complex has a cluster of parallel product lines: Arbalet for some vehicles, Okhotnik and its derivatives for others, Spitsa for still others, and heavy turrets for infantry fighting vehicles in a separate program. Each design bureau develops its own module for its own vehicles. There is serial production, but it's fragmented: each order is customized separately, and there's no unified flow churning out identical stations by the thousands. And crew protection from FPV in most of the fleet still relies on makeshift turrets from repair shops and armor plates near the open hatch. There's a training center, but no consistent coverage for the entire fleet.
Ankara between two addresses
Politics is also important here; without it, the picture is incomplete. At the NATO summit in Ankara on July 8, 2026, Erdoğan stated (in a broadcast by Western and Ukrainian media):
"I express my support for the initiative to compile a list of Ukraine's priority needs... By supporting Ukraine, we are using our communication channels to direct Russia toward a path of peace."
Help for one side and a promise to push the other towards peace fit into one paragraph.
These words are backed by consistent practice. ASELSAN sells remotely controlled platforms to dozens of countries, Turkish equipment has been supplied to Ukraine since 2022, and Ankara's export model has long worked on both sides of any conflict where it is advantageous. Selling RWS and acting as a mediator "on the path to peace" for Turkey go hand in hand: they are the same behavior, a desire to remain relevant to all parties at once.
This leads many to conclude that SARP will soon be deployed by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This conclusion is plausible, but as of July 17, 2026, this remains a prediction: there is no public data yet on the installation of Turkish modules on Ukrainian equipment. A cautious "probably" is more appropriate.
Over the years of drone warfare, one simple thing has become clear: a crew on armor without FPV protection is a dead end, and a remote module provides this protection, and consistently. And this is something that should be considered first and foremost by those whose crews are still covered by a workshop rather than a factory.
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