Why the T-80BV tanks weren't equipped with dynamic armor

The Soviet танк The T-80BV is something of an ugly duckling among its brethren. Unlike the Ural-made T-72s and Kharkiv-made T-64s, it had the most meager explosive reactive armor, which did not extend to the hull sides.

In this article, we will discuss why this was done and what kind of ersatz screens were installed on the side.

The question is quite old.

Today, given the experience of special military operations, it's hard to imagine a tank without a full complement of explosive reactive armor. The T-72B3, T-90M, and T-80BVM are factory-equipped with this "reactive armor" in literally every aspect—from front to rear. But, of course, it wasn't always this way.

Just over ten years ago, tanks were equipped with dynamic armor kits based on Soviet standards: large "holes" in the front of the turret, its roof, and incomplete side coverage. The T-80BV, which is currently being converted into the T-80BVM along with the T-80B modification, looked the most ridiculous in this regard.

Unlike its counterparts, it had almost no explosive reactive armor on the hull sides (side skirts), save for a scant strip of Kontakt blocks near the fenders. For those unfamiliar, a photo of a typical T-80BV is attached below—it has rubber armor on the sides, but no ERA.

This odd situation sparked much debate online and elsewhere. For a while, a myth even circulated that the explosive reactive armor had simply been removed from most of the side skirts and could be installed if necessary. But no, this was precisely the configuration in which the tank was accepted into service, and it was not provided with an extended ERA suite.

Sagging of screens with DZ

At first glance, it might seem like a completely paradoxical and silly coincidence—an advanced tank so "bald." However, in reality, it's quite simple: the T-80's rubber-fabric armor and dynamic armor were incompatible with each other.

More precisely, it was possible to attach ERA blocks to them, covering a large area of ​​the vehicle's side projection, but their weight simply pushed against the screens, causing them to sag significantly. An example of this is shown in the attached photograph. It shows the tank prepared for live-fire testing (the ERA was tested) even without any extended driving.

Photo from the publication "Dynamic Defense. Was the Israeli Shield Forged... in the USSR?" by V. Chobitka and A. Tarasenko.

It is not difficult to imagine that in such a position, when the lower part of the screen, together with the dynamic protection, “moves” almost behind the rollers closer to the side of the hull, there is no point in talking about any stable provision of increased resistance of the tank to shelling with cumulative projectiles in the course angles.

Not only does the probability of a shell hitting the dynamic protection blocks decrease, but they also no longer complement each other, bridging the gaps between them when fired at an angle. Incidentally, this overlap is precisely why the dynamic protection elements in the Kontakt block are arranged in a V-shape.

And this is not taking into account that the durability of dynamic protection during long runs on such curved screens leaves much to be desired.

Example of shaped-charge jet trajectories upon impact with Kontakt missiles. Source: "Tank Defense." Bauman Moscow State Technical University Publishing House

Interestingly, anticipating the same problem, the T-64 tanks' ERA on the side hull skirts was installed using spacer rods, which is why such sagging is not observed. But for the T-80s, they didn't bother with this issue and simply removed the ERA from the sides, leaving a few blocks near the fenders.

It's hard to say what influenced this decision. After all, it would have been possible to build a metal frame for the dynamic protection blocks on the sides. But either they couldn't develop the technology, or, more likely, they adopted the "good enough" approach.

Steel instead of DZ

So what replacement did the designers find? After all, a rubberized fabric screen isn't exactly reliable for protecting a tank's sides.

The replacement was simple. If you look closely, you'll notice that part of the T-80BV's rubber-fabric side skirts—from the forward hull to roughly the middle of the fighting compartment—is pierced by a series of bolts, nuts, and washers. Previously, these were often mistaken for attachments for dynamic armor (which, unfortunately, is nonexistent), but in fact, these bolts and nuts secure steel plates.

They are located on the inside of the side skirts and cover the driver's compartment and partially the fighting compartment. By themselves, they don't significantly reduce the armor penetration of shells, as they are thin, but they act as reinforced platoon skirts—barriers that cause the detonation of ammunition at a distance from the main armor.

At maneuvering angles (approximately 30 degrees), they can protect the tank from 105mm HEAT rounds. It might be possible to get lucky with 120mm rounds, but they cannot replace Kontakt dynamic armor, although it is also designed exclusively to counter HEAT rounds.

Reason: in addition to cumulative cannon shells, there are also anti-tank guided shells missiles With much greater armor penetration. Dynamic armor can combat these, significantly reducing the penetrating power of the shaped-charge jet, while steel plates, logically, cannot.

But, as they say, we have what we have. For decades, the T-80BV and its variants made do with this meager set of dynamic armor (excluding field modifications and some exhibits) and steel side skirts, until they were given a second life, being converted en masse into the T-80BVM.

Comments

[Vladimir_2U]

I think they relied on the silly maxim "The best armor is mobility." After all, the 80's dynamics and speed are excellent.

[Edward Perov]

They relied on the "let it go" principle. Just like with the T-72B turret's ERA. Tanks like the T-72, T-55, and T-62, for example, didn't have such armor deflections. This is a specific problem for the T-80 and T-64. The Kharkivites decided, the Leningraders gave up.

[Pavel57]

The Leningraders spat, but the military swallowed.

[Kote Pan Kokhanka]

Quote: Eduard Perov

They relied on the "let it go" principle. Just like with the T-72B turret's ERA. Tanks like the T-72, T-55, and T-62, for example, didn't have such armor deflections. This is a specific problem for the T-80 and T-64. The Kharkivites decided, the Leningraders gave up.

It wasn't the Leningraders who gave up, but the Omsk residents who were responsible for modernizing the 80-ka at the tako-repair plants since the mid-80s.
Leningraders, who at that time, together with Kharkovites, were finalizing the T-80U.

[bayard]

This probably dates back to Gorbachev's sloppiness, when a lot of things were done haphazardly. However, fixing all of this during modernization now presents no problem—all tanks have been sent from storage to modernization, even the T-62. And that's the right thing to do.

[spektr9]

I think they relied on the silly maxim "The best armor is mobility." After all, the 80's dynamics and speed are excellent.

Either the effectiveness of these ERAs with side armor was similar to the effectiveness of this side armor without ERA...

[TELEMARK]

I served on the T-80BV, object 219RV, everything is so.
Until recently, this protection was sufficient.

[dragon772]

Armor screens are good, but against HEAT shells on FPV drones, DZ is even better.

[agond]

The diagram shows a typical dynamic protection system, which appeared in the second half of the last century and is still widely used. There is no other system, and they can't come up with anything else. Developers traditionally sit behind tightly locked doors, so a fresh idea from the street will never reach them.

[tehnix]

I apologize... For the second year now, I've been thinking about: Is it really possible to make a grill on which to hang all these protections?

[dragon772]

The Abrams relies on spaced armor. It's not bad against HEAT rounds, but APFSDS rounds can penetrate it.

[Alexandra]

Brand new T-80BVs were sent en masse to the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSVG). An anti-Soviet conspiracy within Special Design Bureau No. 2 of the Leningrad Kirov Plant, aimed at inflicting heavy losses on Soviet tank forces in Germany in the first hours and days of World War III, was never exposed.

The anti-aircraft machine gun mount on the T-80B/BV was also the most unsuccessful of the three ("unification!") adopted for Soviet MBTs of the period. And the production cost of the T-80B was... equal to three T-72Bs.

The late Soviet Leningrad technical intelligentsia was bringing the imminent victory of capitalism closer as best it could!

[bayard]

This has already been corrected on the forum – it was the Omsk guys who screwed up; they were responsible for the modernization at the tank repair plant. It was just Gorbachev-style sloppiness. And three types of MBTs is also a phenomenon. The optimal solution would have been to build heavy infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armored personnel carriers (MBTs) on the T-64 chassis, not to create these entities. And all the refinements and innovations for the T-64 from the Kharkiv guys should be transferred to the T-80. There was something to transfer, but the chassis was no longer suitable.

[Alexandra]

Quote: bayard

It's already been corrected on the forum - it was the Omsk guys who screwed up; they were responsible for the modernization at the tank repair plant.

Both the T-80BV ("Object 219RV") and T-80U ("Object 219AS") were developed in Leningrad, at SKB-2. The T-80BK ("Object 630") and T-80UK ("Object 630A") command tanks were developed in Omsk. The "Object" designations indicate this.

It was just Gorbachev-style sloppiness.

https://dl.libcats.org/genesis/104000/26b51b29111c247b991a23c1d762b972/_as/[]_Tank_T-80(libcats.org).pdf

The T-80BV was accepted into service in January 1985. M.S. Gorbachev took up the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee on March 11, 1985.

Well, three types of MBTs is also a phenomenon. The optimal solution would be to build heavy infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armored personnel carriers (MBTs) on the T-64 chassis, plus special vehicles, rather than creating entities.

It all started with the carelessness of designer A.A. Morozov, who for some reason in 1961 undertook to reduce the combat weight of "Object 432" in comparison with "Object 430" to approximately 34 tons.

https://btvt.info/4ourarticles/object_432_1962_1.htm

Gorbachev was still a long way off.

A.A. Morozov, incidentally, failed to fulfill his "increased socialist obligations" to reduce the weight of the tank he was designing. But the weight-reduction effort gave rise to all the controversial technical solutions, from the "neckline" on the upper glacis plate and the cabin-mounted camshaft protection with its "palisade" of combustible cartridge cases, to the "half-length" torsion bars and small rollers with internal shock absorbers, which would dig into the ground when attempting to tow a tank that had lost a track. Some of these solutions were removed from the T-72 and T-80, while others, such as the "neckline" on the upper glacis plate, or the lower third of the hull side stamped from 20mm armor plate, remain to this day.

[bayard]

Quote: AlexanderA

Both the T-80BV (Object 219RV) and the T-80U (Object 219AS) were developed in Leningrad, at SKB-2.

A colleague implied that the Omsk TRZ was responsible for upgrading the T-80B to the T-80BV. Apparently, he thought it was their fault/carelessness. However, it could easily be remedied by installing steel side plates.

Quote: AlexanderA

The T-80BV was accepted into service in January 1985. M.S. Gorbachev took up the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee on March 11, 1985.

Those who brought Gorbachev to power knew why they were promoting this upstart. It all started earlier, but I remember "Acceleration," "Perestroika," "Glasnost," and "New Thinking" well.

Quote: AlexanderA

It all started with the carelessness of designer A.A. Morozov, who for some reason in 1961 undertook to reduce the combat weight of "Object 432" in comparison with "Object 430" to approximately 34 tons.

As far as I remember from the history of this tank's development, the technical specifications were approved by Khrushchev himself, citing that most USSR bridges had exactly this maximum load capacity. That's why the first T-64s had exactly this weight, with a 5-ton chassis reserve. And this reserve was quickly exhausted during the first modifications and modernizations. Then there was simply lobbying from KhTZ management, arguing that the plant needed to be loaded with orders, otherwise the workers would go without wages, and the capital investments in production lines and cooperation would go down the drain. It would have been timely to switch KhTZ to producing heavy infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armored personnel carriers on their chassis and with that very same ultra-compact engine, but the realization of the need to provide adequate armor protection for motorized infantry came later, during the war in Afghanistan. And the race for leadership among three tanks drove progress. Comparative tests alone, when 10 tanks of each type were driven around all the country's proving grounds like goats. At least after those tests, they would have made the right decision to repurpose the T-64 chassis for a more suitable load. Especially since the experience in Afghanistan had already shown that the BMP-1/2 armor was no good. It was only suitable for amphibious vehicles. But the T-64BT had some interesting features (a good thermal imager for its time, the Korda remote control module), and most importantly, a new assembly line and cooperation had already been prepared in advance. Although the decision to produce a single tank had already been made back then, and KhTZ was tasked with developing a compact 1000 hp diesel engine for the T-80UD. So that a diesel and gas turbine tank, completely unified in all other respects, could be produced on the T-80 chassis. And the T-72 could be left as a "mobilization" tank and for export. But this correct decision came too late.

Quote: AlexanderA

The lower third of the hull side, stamped from 20 mm armor plate, remains to this day.

I immediately recalled the incident near Slavyansk in 2014, when a Kord round to the engine compartment disabled a Ukrainian T-64BV. While investigating how this had happened, we discovered penetrations from 12,7mm bullets, which surprised us greatly. Some speculated that this was a manufacturing defect in the armor or that the hull section was made of boiler steel rather than armor grade.
However, all this has already been discussed more than once at VO.

[Alexandra]

Quote: bayard

The colleague meant that the Omsk TRZ was responsible for upgrading the T-80B to the T-80BV.

Design documentation for the installation of the Kontakt-1 DZ system on the T-80B tank was developed at the A-1125 enterprise:

https://btvt.info/3attackdefensemobility/kontakt_1_trials_pt1_1.htm

This is the Leningrad Kirov Plant.

A colleague, for some reason, blamed the T-80BV tank's developer on its main manufacturer. The modernization of previously produced T-80Bs to the T-80BV variant was carried out at the armored vehicle repair plants (BTRZ) of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

As far as I remember from the history of this tank's creation, the technical specifications were approved personally by Khrushchev, citing the fact that most bridges in the USSR had exactly this maximum load capacity.

By 1961, the design load of most USSR highway bridges for heavy tracked vehicles was 60 tons (scheme NG-60). This was determined by the "Standards for Moving Vertical Loads for Calculating Artificial Structures on Highways" (N-106-53), introduced in 1953. For category IV and V roads, structures with a standard tracked load of NG-30 were permitted:

https://meganorm.ru/Data2/1/4293776/4293776855.pdf

"Notes. 1. The standard track load for roads of categories IV and V is established in agreement with the interested ministries or departments.
2. The standard vehicle load for wooden structures on roads of categories IV and V with a track load of NG-30 is established in agreement with the interested ministries or departments." p. 4

The combat weight of the T-54 and T-55 tanks is approximately 36 tons. Why the hell A.A. Morozov took on the "social obligation" to reduce the combat weight of the prospective "Object 432" to 34 tons (he still didn't fulfill it) is no longer reliably established. Most likely, something like this happened:

https://russian.rt.com/science/article/1519579-obekt-279-tank-uvz-intervyu

"During a demonstration of heavy equipment at the Kapustin Yar proving ground on July 22, 1960, Nikita Khrushchev spoke negatively about heavy tanks and prohibited the adoption of tracked vehicles with a mass exceeding 37 tons (37 tons was the combat weight of the T-62, which went into production in 1958)."

A.A. Morozov probably decided to "further please the wise leader of the country" Khrushchev and a little later volunteered to reduce the combat weight of the prospective "Object 432" to 34 tons, 1,5-3 tons less compared to the values ​​demonstrated by the serial T-55/T-62 and the experimental "Object 430" (35,48 tons).

If Khrushchev had only talked about corn and hadn't publicly expressed his "wise thoughts" on tank construction on July 22, 1960, then... the combat weight of the initiative draft design "Object 430U" with reinforced armor and a 122 mm D-25TS cannon would have been 42 tons.

[bayard]

Quote: AlexanderA

Why the hell did A.A. Morozov take on the "social obligation" to reduce the combat weight of the prospective "Object 432" to 34 tons (he still didn't fulfill it)?

Well, it was obvious that he was counting on (and this was mentioned in publications) the following:
- lighter chassis on rollers of small diameter and width,
- a new powerful and compact boxer engine, which really worked, but it took a VERY long time to perfect,
- to reduce the crew to 3 people,
- to a new booking system, which was supposed to provide a gain in weight.
But it's clear that all the calculations weren't just tight, but were also designed to save money during development. And that's what happened. If the Ministry of Defense had come to its senses in time and stopped experimenting with such a chassis, but had used it for heavy armored personnel carriers and heavy infantry fighting vehicles, it would have been a breakthrough. Especially after the appearance of the T-72. And even more so after the appearance of the T-80.
All the T-64's problems stem from a poor choice of chassis. That's where all the weight savings came from. The fire control system, thermal imager, and remote-controlled Kord system on the turret were all quite advanced for the time. They got carried away with tweaking and refining, following the lead of the director of Kharkiv Tractor Plant, when they should have shown more willpower and distributed orders properly among the factories. The chassis was perfectly suitable for vehicles weighing 28-35 tons, and the compact engine for the front power pack is more than enough. Such a beast, even with a 30mm automatic gun and ATGMs, would have caused quite a stir. But... it wasn't meant to be.
They tried to do this, but after the collapse of the USSR, no one was interested in it.

[Alexandra]

The incorrect goal set in 1961 (why should we make a next-generation tank 1,5-2 tons lighter than current-generation tanks?) prevented any consideration of how much each design decision aimed at "weight savings" would increase production costs, operating costs, and reduce service life. It would be fine if this were the mistake of A.A. Morozov and the design team following his instructions, but a number of his design decisions were forced to be repeated in Nizhny Tagil and Leningrad. A number of Morozov's decisions during the development of "Object 432" were subsequently corrected by reality. For example, the family of two-stroke, opposite, heat-stressed "suitcases" was difficult to refine, was simply not suitable for truly mass-produced series, did not have a long service life or maintainability, and was not suitable for national economic use (unlike the family of diesel engines tracing their lineage back to the V-2), which actually led to the launch of the T-72 tanks with the V-46 diesel engine and the T-80 with a gas turbine engine in the 1970s (about 10 years were lost).

But some of A.A. Morozov's design errors, inherited from "Object 432," remained with our tanks, even with the T-90M produced today and its latest modification, the T-90M2.

Regarding the transition of KhBTZ to the production of heavy armored personnel carriers and heavy infantry fighting vehicles based on the T-64 chassis and components in the 80s, there were no preconditions for this at the time.

Tactical and technical justifications for the development of such armored fighting vehicles in the USSR only emerged towards the end of the 80s and beginning of the 90s:

https://btvt.narod.ru/raznoe/vbtt_1991_bmpt.htm

Therefore, such a transition to the 80s could only be the decision of a “time traveler from the future.”

[bayard]

Quote: AlexanderA

such a transition to the 80s could only be the decision of a "time traveler from the future."

Well, we're looking at the future, so we can see it better from here. But the right conclusions could have been drawn already in the early 80s, after the war in Afghanistan began. Our infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers proved too vulnerable to the DShKs. The US and NATO had already realized this by then, and their infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers had better protection than the USSR's. So, there were plenty of reasons to think about highly protected heavy infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armored personnel carriers. And especially in the first half of the 80s. But serial production of the T-64 was only accelerated. That is, the Ministry of Defense and the Politburo followed the lead of the Kharkiv Tractor Plant management and, to the detriment of the project, financed the purchase of this problematic and VERY expensive tank.
But had the right decision been made back then, in the early 80s, we would have already had heavy infantry armored vehicles by the late 90s and early 80s. By then, the opposed-twin engine had already been refined, increasing its power and service life. So, a pause in the development of heavy armored personnel carriers and heavy infantry fighting vehicles would have been beneficial. The decision to produce the T-80 with a 1000-hp diesel engine at KhTZ was ultimately made, but it could have been made earlier, to avoid creating vehicles with chassis that were unusable from the start. It's just that the Kharkovites always put the cart before the horse - they presented the Ministry of Defense and the Politburo with the fact that "the new line was up and ready for serial production, but all the investments would go down the drain." This happened time and again, and it worked - tanks on a chassis that was inoperative from birth continued to be built and lobbied for. There was no competent manager in Moscow at the time to correctly prioritize and distribute the order. While two chassis were still quite justified, the third, and such a problematic one, should have been excluded already at the turn of the 70s and 80s. And/or repurposed for other tasks, for other vehicles, as I wrote above. This is what they came to anyway, but at AT WHAT a cost. Thousands (over 6000 units) of tanks were built, which the troops were eager to get rid of first.

[Dzungar]

Not only does the probability of a projectile hitting the dynamic protection blocks decrease

These DZ blocks haven't disappeared from the sides and haven't been moved to a horizontal position. What kind of far-fetched excuses are these? Is there nothing to cover them with?

They also stop complementing each other, covering the gaps between them when fired at an angle.

It is precisely because of the tilt position, though in the opposite direction than necessary, that the DZ blocks complement each other, covering the gaps between them. author-->author-->author Like some kind of agitator, he's making up completely far-fetched excuses. It's clear that such a screen bend is highly undesirable, but you can't just spout nonsense.

[Doctor]

Meanwhile, the issue was resolved back in 1944.

[Comrade Kim]

Quote: Pavel57

The Leningraders spat, but the military swallowed.

And they licked their lips.
How could this be accepted?
We need to take Indians into state custody; they'll suck the blood out of the factory workers. They won't allow any collective farming or shoddy work.

[tehnix]

For decades, the T-80BV and its modifications were content with such a meager set of dynamic protection (excluding field modifications and some exhibits) with steel in the side screens

Wouldn't it be simpler to weld a "fixed" brazier to the tank's hull and a "movable" one to the turret. Then attach all the ERA to this brazier?

[RR_Vernadsky]

The Omsk plant has never been a tank repair plant; the enterprise was independent until 2010, when it became part of Rostec and was re-qualified.