Luftwaffe: Phoenix from the Ashes of Versailles
Well, as I promised in the article Luft Hansa – Wings of the Third Reich, let's continue the story about the development of the German Air Force in the pre-war period.
Let me remind you once again that All photographs, posters, and quotes containing Nazi symbols are included in this article for historical and informational purposes only. The materials used are taken from official open internet sources from various countries and do not constitute Nazi propaganda or a justification of Nazi ideology.
In almost all the articles where I wrote about the German Armed Forces - as in historical context, as well as about the modern Bundeswehr, - for a more complete disclosure of the topic, I inevitably started from the historical milestone called the "Treaty of Versailles." So today's review is narrowly aviation We will also start the topics from 1919.
The Treaty of Versailles prohibited Germany from maintaining a military air force: combat aircraft were to be destroyed, and military flight schools were to be disbanded. Although Germany formally submitted to these conditions and lost its military air force, it nevertheless continued to train pilots.
Beginning in the 1920s, the country developed a system of covert pilot training and personnel accumulation, which subsequently became the basis for the rapid growth of German aviation.
I already discussed the key role of the formally civilian structure, the Deutsche Luft Hansa, in my previous article. Now, let's take a closer look at the development of the network of flying clubs and gliding schools that Germany managed to transform into the foundation for training future pilots for the then-nonexistent Luftwaffe.
The clouds are torn apart by the glider's wing...
In many German cities, academic flight teams—the so-called Akaflieg—were established at schools, high schools, technical colleges, and universities. They brought together students, pupils, and teachers passionate about the development of gliding and aviation technology. These teams designed and built a wide variety of gliders, from simple training models to complex in-house designs, as well as individual sport aircraft.
Students building glider models in a school workshop, circa 1928–1932. Ten years later, many of this generation of German teenagers, passionate about aviation, would meet Soviet pilots in the skies of war.
Students, regardless of their primary civilian specialty, underwent rigorous training as glider pilots here, acquiring skills that could later be applied in military aviation.
Young men from the Hitler Youth learn the basics of gliding.
At the same time, a network of glider schools was rapidly developing throughout Germany, which were subsequently to play a key role in training personnel for future motor aviation.
The first center of German gliding was the Wasserkuppe mountain in the Rhön region, where annual gliding competitions began as early as 1920. The first specialized gliding training school was also established here.
The gliding training center on the Wasserkuppe in der Rhön. Photo taken in 1928–1929.
The second major training center was Rossitten on the Curonian Spit (Rossitten auf der Kurischen Nehrung) in East Prussia. This is now the village of Rybachy in the Kaliningrad region.
This is where the gliding school in Rossitten began. Photo taken between 1925 and 1933.
In 1924, both centres were united by the Rhön-Rossitten-Gesellschaft (RRG), which coordinated the development of gliding, design work and pilot training.
During the 1920s, the network of gliding schools expanded rapidly. In addition to the major centers in Wasserkuppe and Rossitten, there were dozens of regional schools and hundreds of flying clubs. It was through these clubs that the majority of future pilots received their initial training.
Training began on the simplest basic training gliders, the most famous of which were the Zögling and Prüfling aircraft of the aeronautical engineer and aerodynamicist Alexander Martin Lippisch.
Taking off from the glider Zögling, which means "Foster Child"
And this is Prüfling, translated as “Examinee”
The design of these gliders was characterized by extreme simplicity, robustness, and affordability, which allowed them to be used in thousands of training launches across Germany. Such low-maintenance aircraft made it possible to quickly teach cadets the basics of piloting.
Years later, Lippisch played a key role in the development of the world's first production fighter with a liquid-fueled jet engine, the Messerschmitt Me.163 Komet.
Alexander Lippisch (November 2, 1894 – February 11, 1976) stands next to a glider. Photo taken in 1932.
A Grunau Baby II glider being prepared for launch in front of the maintenance hangar in Grünau, Silesia, where they were assembled. Around 6000 were built!
Mass glider training allowed future pilots to acquire excellent "feel for the machine" at minimal cost. By the early 1930s, gliding had become a truly national sport in Germany.
After the National Socialists came to power in 1933, the entire system was placed under centralized control. The RRG was transformed into the Deutsche Forschungsanstalt für Segelflug (DFS) (German Gliding Research Institute), and the network of flying clubs and schools became part of the Deutscher Luftsportverband (DLV), and later the National Socialist Flying Corps (Nationalsozialistisches Fliegerkorps), also known as the NSFK.
Nazi Germany's Nationalsozialistisches Fliegerkorps glider pilots, future Luftwaffe pilots
By the time the Luftwaffe was officially established in March 1935, Germany already had a large pool of young men who had completed basic flight training. The scale of this work is clearly demonstrated by one fact: by 1937, Germany had approximately 50 glider pilots. It was this pool of personnel that made it possible to rapidly launch pilot training for the rapidly expanding air force.
A poster from the National Socialist Flying Corps (NSFK NS Fliegerkorps), the training ground for the Luftwaffe, calling for "learn to fly"
After 1935, the designation "Akaflieg" was replaced by Flugtechnische Fachgruppe "FFG" (Aviation Technical Special Group) or Flugtechnische Arbeitsgemeinschaft "FAG" (Aviation Technical Workers' Association).
Beyond the red lines of Versailles
Germany circumvented the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles not only domestically but also internationally. Certain elements of aircraft development, production, and testing were conducted outside the country—primarily through collaboration with the Dutch company Fokker, which in the first half of 1923 received an order from the Reichswehr for 100 aircraft, including 50 of the newest Fokker D.XIII fighters.
To a limited extent, the German side was also active in Sweden and Switzerland, where it maintained contacts with a number of aviation companies, including the Swedish company ASJA and the Swiss firms K+W Thun and Flugzeugwerke Emmen.
However, these works were primarily engineering and testing, remained fragmented and did not allow for the solution of the problem of training flight personnel.
The most significant area was German-Soviet military cooperation, which developed on the basis of the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922 and subsequent secret agreements between the Reichswehr and the Red Army.
On April 16, 1922, in the Italian city of Rapallo, Germany and Soviet Russia signed a treaty restoring diplomatic relations. Officially, it did not provide for military cooperation, but closed negotiations began between the Reichswehr and the Red Army leadership that same year.
Representatives of the Soviet and German sides in Rapallo: Joseph Wirth, Chancellor of Germany; Leonid Krasin, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade; Georgy Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs; and Adolf Joffe, diplomat and former Plenipotentiary Representative of Soviet Russia in Berlin.
The international situation of the time literally pushed Germany and Soviet Russia toward each other. The Germans were frantically searching for ways to preserve and develop their country's military potential, and to do so, they needed to somehow move beyond the Versailles framework.
The Soviet state, which found itself in diplomatic isolation after the Civil War, needed advanced German technology and military specialists in the fields of staff work and military science.
It was within the framework of these secret agreements that the Lipetsk Aviation School and Test Base were established—a closed facility used to train German pilots and instructors, as well as to test aviation equipment outside the control of Allied inspection commissions.
"Lipetsk Tales" are everywhere and everywhere "washed to the bone"
The subtitle is a wry comment by our site member "hohol95" to the previous article, "Luft Hansa – Wings of the Third Reich." However, I simply couldn't resist the temptation to delve further into this fascinating period in German pilot training.
However, in the context of this article, it was the preparation process that occupied me most, although other interesting details of this story came to light as the work progressed.
Lipetsk in a photograph from 1927
So, it's important to emphasize the scale of the project right away. The Lipetsk Aviation Center was associated exclusively with the Reichswehr system and trained a relatively small number of personnel during the interwar period. Future Luftwaffe aces, however, were formed within the framework of the German state military aviation training system developed in the 1930s.
Nevertheless, the Lipetsk Aviation Center became one of the most closed and at the same time strategically significant projects of the interwar period, in which the interests of the Reichswehr and the Soviet side coincided on a purely pragmatic basis.
For Germany, it proved a rare opportunity, in defiance of the Treaty of Versailles, to preserve and develop a practical military aviation school, refining pilot training methods, combat use, and testing of aircraft. For the Soviet side, the project provided access to German engineering and organizational experience in military aviation and allowed them to study advanced approaches to the training and use of air forces.
All activities of the center, from the moment the protocol on its establishment was signed, were conducted under conditions of the strictest secrecy, with maximum restrictions on external control and a clear division of functions between the parties.
In essence, Lipetsk was not a training school in the classical sense, but a hidden experimental testing ground where technologies, training methods, and organizational principles were developed that would later influence the development of military aviation in both countries.
A photograph of the future secret flight school and testing ground of the Reichswehr in the Soviet Union. Part of the airfield and factory buildings are visible.
At the beginning of June 1924, under the leadership of retired Colonel Hermann von der Lieth-Thomsen, a permanent representative office of the Reichswehr Military Directorate was established in Moscow, codenamed Zentrale Moskau (Z.Mo.).
From the middle of the same year in the Red Air navy (as the Red Army Air Forces were then called) there were also seven German advisers and instructors working in the Red Army - Lieth, Johannesson, Diete, Droste, Rath, Hasener and Schröder, acting under the leadership of Martin Fiebig and known as the "Fiebig Group" (Gruppe Fiebig).
Fiebig himself, a former bomber wing commander in the German Luftwaffe during World War I, was officially listed as a retired captain (Hauptmann) after his discharge from the army in 1919.
Martin Fiebig (May 7, 1891 – October 24, 1947)
The project's practical implementation began in the spring of 1925. In March, a protocol for the establishment of an aviation training center was prepared and agreed upon, and on April 15, 1925, the final agreement on the organization of the Lipetsk Aviation School came into force.
In internal correspondence, the facility was referred to as the "Schule Stahr" (Stahr School) - after its director, retired Major August Leopold Walter Stahr - or "WIVUPAL", an abbreviation for Wissenschaftliche Versuchs- und Personalausbildungsstation ("Scientific Testing and Training Station for Personnel Training").
Here is a translation of this document, which was top secret at the time:
Copy
PROTOCOL
on agreements between the Russian Air Fleet (hereinafter referred to as RL) and the representative of the Special Group in Moscow (hereinafter referred to as SG.M.) on the organization of a flight school and equipment depot in Lipetsk.
I. General Provisions
a: RL declares its agreement that SG.M. will establish a flight school at the airfield in Lipetsk in direct connection with the RL facilities located there
b: RL transfers the former factory site in Lipetsk to SG.M. for use as a warehouse for aircraft and aviation equipment, as well as for residential purposes for SG.M. personnel arriving for the flight school and warehouse management. Use of the airfield and factory for the above purposes is provided by SG.M. free of charge.
II. Buildings and equipment
a: The buildings necessary for the operation of the flight school in Lipetsk consist of:
The location and size of buildings and equipment are determined on site in conjunction with RL representatives; more details are provided in Appendix 1.
b: Factory buildings assigned for storage and accommodation purposes will be completed or restored in accordance with the detailed description in Appendix 2 so that the accommodation of aircraft and equipment and the accommodation of personnel can be carried out properly and safely.
The execution of construction work for the flight school, as well as the reconstruction or restoration of storage and accommodation facilities, will be undertaken by RL in accordance with Appendices 1 and 2. The costs of performing the construction work will be borne by SG.M.
PROTOCOL
on agreements between the Russian Air Fleet (hereinafter referred to as RL) and the representative of the Special Group in Moscow (hereinafter referred to as SG.M.) on the organization of a flight school and equipment depot in Lipetsk.
I. General Provisions
a: RL declares its agreement that SG.M. will establish a flight school at the airfield in Lipetsk in direct connection with the RL facilities located there
b: RL transfers the former factory site in Lipetsk to SG.M. for use as a warehouse for aircraft and aviation equipment, as well as for residential purposes for SG.M. personnel arriving for the flight school and warehouse management. Use of the airfield and factory for the above purposes is provided by SG.M. free of charge.
II. Buildings and equipment
a: The buildings necessary for the operation of the flight school in Lipetsk consist of:
- aircraft hangar,
- workshop,
- administrative building,
- one warehouse for gasoline, etc., and ammunition.
The location and size of buildings and equipment are determined on site in conjunction with RL representatives; more details are provided in Appendix 1.
b: Factory buildings assigned for storage and accommodation purposes will be completed or restored in accordance with the detailed description in Appendix 2 so that the accommodation of aircraft and equipment and the accommodation of personnel can be carried out properly and safely.
The execution of construction work for the flight school, as well as the reconstruction or restoration of storage and accommodation facilities, will be undertaken by RL in accordance with Appendices 1 and 2. The costs of performing the construction work will be borne by SG.M.
Note: In the text of the protocol, the Soviet Air Force is referred to as the "Russian Air Fleet"—as it was called in German documents of the time; this refers to the same structure as the aforementioned Red Air Fleet (VVS RKKA).
On the German side (from SG.M.), the protocol was signed by Colonel Hermann von der Lieth-Thomsen, the head of the secret German military mission in the USSR and the de facto head of the “Special Group in Moscow.”
On behalf of the Soviet side (RL), the signature was given by Pyotr Baranov, Chief of the Red Army Air Forces.
At the very bottom of the sheet, one can see the service mark of the archival code: 7.9.AT Fl Flg 14, as well as the stamp of the Federal Archives of Germany - Bundesarchiv.
Despite the absence of a date on this sheet, historians from the German State Archives (Bundesarchiv) have reconstructed the chronology using related documents, office codes, and the text of the final agreement.
Founders and directors of the Lipetsk Aviation Center
The significance of the Lipetsk project for the leadership of the Reichswehr and the Soviet military command is evidenced by the personalities of the people who stood at its origins and ensured the further work of the school.
Pyotr Ionovich Baranov — one of the founders of the Soviet Air Force and organizers of the USSR aviation industry.
Pyotr Baranov (September 22, 1892 – September 5, 1933)
Born into a family of railroad employees, he joined the Bolshevik Party in 1912. During the Civil War, he held various command positions in the Red Army.
From 1924 to 1931, he commanded the Red Army Air Forces. Under Baranov, large-scale modernization of the Soviet Air Force began, along with the development of the aviation industry and a network of flight schools.
Historians unanimously consider Baranov one of the most important organizers of Soviet aviation during the interwar period. It was under his leadership that the foundations of the USSR's aviation system were laid, which later led to the creation of one of the world's largest air forces.
He died on September 5, 1933 in an air crash near Podolsk.
Hermann von der Lith-Thomsen (Hermann von der Lieth-Thomsen) was one of the leading organizers of German military aviation during World War I. From March 1915, he commanded the German Army's field aviation, and from November 1916, he served as chief of staff to the commander of the German Army Air Forces.
Hermann von der Lith-Thomsen (10.03.1867 – 05.08.1942)
From 1925 to 1928, he headed the German military mission in Moscow. A severe eye condition forced him to leave military service. After the Luftwaffe was created in 1935, he was again called up and assigned to the Military Scientific Directorate of the Reich Air Ministry, and in 1939 he was promoted to General of the Air Force.
Von der Lith-Thomsen's deputy in Moscow was a retired captain and doctor of sciences. Oscar Ritter von Niedermayer (Oskar Ritter von Niedermayer) is a staunch supporter of developing military cooperation with Russia.
Oskar Ritter von Niedermayer (11/08/1885 – 09/25/1948)
During World War I, he led the German expedition to Persia and Afghanistan (1915–1916), and then served on the General Staff of Army Group F. After the war, he was accepted into the Reichswehr for special assignments.
In May 1942, already a major general, von Niedermayer commanded the 162nd Infantry Division (Turkestan). In May 1944, he was appointed Chief of Staff of Special Task Force No. 703 under the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces on the Western Front.
After the war, he was sentenced by a Soviet military tribunal to 25 years in prison. He died on September 25, 1948, of tuberculosis in a prison hospital in Vladimir.
A retired major was appointed as the head of the school. Walter Star (Walter Stahr).
Walter Star (November 5, 1882 – March 19, 1948) headed the Lipetsk Aviation Center from 1925 to 1930. He began his aviation service during the First World War, and by its end he held the position of commander of the air forces, first of the 7th and then of the 17th Army.
After the war, Stahr served as head of the air units of the Southern Army Command, and later commanded the air base in Brig. In April 1920, he transferred to the position of a desk officer in the Ministry of the Reichswehr. In December 1922, he voluntarily left military service, but within a few years he returned to work for the Reichswehr, heading the Lipetsk Aviation School as a "civilian" specialist.
In 1934, Starr was again called up for military service, and in February 1939 he finally retired with the rank of Major General of the Luftwaffe.
Despite extensive searching, I was unable to find a photograph of Walter Stahr. However, I did find a brief profile of him compiled by the Lipetsk OGPU:
A follower of Hindenburg, a Nazi of a very harsh disposition, demanding and merciless, extremely hostile to the Soviet government, and could not stomach the Russians.
Shtar led the aviation school for five years—longer than any other director. It was under his leadership that the educational process, the pilot training system, and the main areas of testing were finally established, enabling the Lipetsk center to reach its highest level of development.
From Junkers in Fili to a flying school in Lipetsk
It should be noted that the Lipetsk project was far from the first attempt by Germany to circumvent the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles by taking advantage of the relatively friendly relations that had developed in the early 1920s between the Weimar Republic and the young Soviet state.
In the context of this hidden interaction, industrial and technical cooperation also developed, linked, among other things, to the activities of the Junkers concern. Its participation in Soviet aviation projects, including the operation of Junkers' production facilities in Fili, became both a means of circumventing the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles and a source of serious political and economic contradictions, which went down in history as the "Junkers scandal».
In 1922–1923, the German government, through a shell company called GEFU, secretly allocated millions of marks to Hugo Junkers for the construction of an aircraft factory in Fili, near Moscow. The project's goal was to produce military aircraft for the Reichswehr, circumventing the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, while simultaneously providing the Soviet Union with modern aviation technology.
The company's formal civilian status concealed its actual involvement in military and paramilitary programs, which allowed Germany to maintain its technological expertise in all-metal aircraft construction, while the Soviet side gained access to advanced German engineering solutions.
Under the concession, Junkers specialists developed and built several types of all-metal aircraft for the Soviet side, the most famous of which were the Junkers Ju.20 and Ju.21.
Junkers Ju.20
However, these machines turned out to be difficult to operate, expensive to produce, and did not fully meet the expectations of the Soviet leadership.
Junkers Ju.21 (factory designation T-21) in service in the Soviet Union
By early 1926, the concession had effectively collapsed. The Junkers concern had suffered significant losses, entered into a bitter conflict with the Soviet government, and began exerting serious pressure on the Reichswehr leadership, threatening to publicize the project's secret financing unless it was compensated for its losses.
By the summer of 1926,Junkers affair" escalated to legal proceedings and financial compensation from secret funds. After cooperation with the concern ceased, the Lipetsk Aviation Center remained the primary and most successful project of German-Soviet cooperation in the aviation sector, combining practical personnel training with testing of new technology.
The center itself was not a mass flight school. Between 1925 and 1933, researchers estimate that approximately 120 German fighter pilots and about 100 German observer pilots (navigators), as well as a significant number of German technical personnel, were trained there. However, only a few dozen cadets were on the base at any one time.
The bulk of the German contingent consisted of instructors, engineers, mechanics, testers, and administrative personnel. During the summer, the total number of German personnel in Lipetsk, including cadets, reached approximately 140, while in the winter it dropped to 40. In addition, approximately 340 local Soviet employees worked at the facility.
Hangars of the Lipetsk Aviation School, built by German forces
Thus, Lipetsk was not a "pilot training assembly line," but primarily an experimental and training base where flight training methods, air combat tactics, and the organizational foundations of the future German Air Force were developed. These aviation specialists later played a key role in the Reichswehr's personnel training system, and after the creation of the Luftwaffe in 1935, they became valuable and experienced instructors.
At the same time, the Lipetsk center served not only the interests of the Reichswehr but was also used for training Soviet aviation personnel. In addition to German cadets, Soviet specialists—more than 140 pilots and observer pilots, as well as hundreds of aircraft technicians—were also trained there.
Selection criteria for German cadets
Since the secret flying school in Lipetsk was created as a means of circumventing the strict restrictions of the Versailles Peace Treaty, the selection of candidates in Germany was under the control of the Reichswehr Air Inspectorate and was based on very strict criteria.
To paraphrase Vladimir Vysotsky: “A pilot is always healthy, a pilot is ready for anything...»
Firstly, perfect health and psychological stability were required. Future cadets would not only have to endure severe physical and psychological stress, but also live and serve for many months in conditions of the strictest secrecy on Soviet territory.
The Germans, as the saying goes, had to test through their own experience “what is healthy for a Russian,” and so the selection process based on health and endurance was especially strict.
And the status of a cadet at a Soviet aviation school who didn't speak Russian required absolute secrecy—starting with the fact that pilots arrived in Soviet Russia under assumed names.
No new recruits were sent to the USSR. Candidates had to already be able to fly and at least have completed pilot training through the German sport and civilian flight school system in Germany.
During the initial period of the Lipetsk center's operation, from 1925 to 1927, veterans of the First World War were selected to rehabilitate their skills and master new fighter aircraft.
Later, from 1928 to 1930, both young fighter pilots and observer pilots underwent training; the average age of the cadets was 19–20 years.
From 1930 to 1933, only fighter pilots were trained.
During the trip and training, the soldiers were officially discharged from the Reichswehr and were officially considered civilians. They were often listed as employees, engineers, mechanics, or simply tourists, but in reality, they remained career soldiers.
If we use modern vocabulary, the classic "ichtamnet"...
Flight school cadets in civilian clothes. Despite the secrecy, the Germans were radically different from the residents of Lipetsk.
It's also worth noting that all cadets were insured. In the event of a pilot's death, his family received an insurance payment of 1000 Reichsmarks (approximately 5,000 euros in today's purchasing power), while a pilot who became permanently disabled as a result of an accident received 10,000 Reichsmarks (approximately 50,000 euros). These were significant amounts: the former was equivalent to approximately three to four months' salary for a German officer, while the latter was equivalent to two and a half to three years' pay.
Duration of the training course
The duration of training in Lipetsk varied depending on the school's operating period and specific specialization. As the program became more complex, new disciplines emerged, and pilot requirements increased, the duration of training gradually increased.
Initially, in 1925, the school's leadership decided that German pilots would only need to complete the intensive four-week fighter pilot training program. However, it soon became clear that even experienced veteran pilots lacked this time to master the then-new technology.
They then switched to a standard flight course, which lasted an average of five to six months and was conducted during the warm season, from spring to fall. Winter flying was more challenging for the Germans due to the harsh climate, although it was still practiced, albeit on a limited basis.
However, practice showed that even this was insufficient. Gradually, the training cycle was extended to eighteen months.
As a result, training at the center was focused on three main areas.
The first The training included training in aerobatics, aerial combat, and practical firing of live ammunition at both aerial and ground targets. Of particular importance to the training process was the use of a machine gun camera, capable of taking up to 400 pictures per minute, thus accurately simulating machine gun fire. This allowed for objective evaluation of the results of simulated aerial combat and firing exercises.
Pilots trained in extreme maneuvering, spin recovery, formation aerobatics, and aerial combat, both individually and as part of a group, using Fokker D.XIII fighters. Specifically, they practiced such exercises as flight-versus-flight combat, defensive operations against superior enemy forces, low-altitude attacks, and flight attacks on maneuvering two-seater aircraft engaged in defensive fire.
Nine Fokker D.XIII fighters in a formation flight, formed in three flights of three aircraft.
Second direction This included training in instrument piloting in conditions of limited visibility and navigation. Particular attention was paid to night flying and piloting solely by instruments, which was considered best practice in the mid-1920s.
The third direction Observer pilots were trained. They were taught radio communications, aerial photography, interaction with ground forces, high-speed navigation, and the basics of bombing. Sometimes, bombs were dropped simultaneously with fire on ground targets.
One of the innovations was practicing cluster bomb loading into the fuselage—three bombs in a single package. One such exercise involved hitting an old barge moored on the river with incendiary bombs.
In 1928, upon completion of the course, the observation pilots were transferred to the Voronezh airfield, where they took part in exercises with the Moscow Military District. In conditions as close to combat as possible, they practiced new airborne correction techniques. artillery fire from the air.
In addition to Voronezh, according to the English journalist K. Melville, German pilots also appeared at the airfield in Borisoglebsk.
In 1931, German pilots took part in joint maneuvers with the Red Army Air Forces.
Joint operations with the Russian squadron were extremely beneficial. Significant successes were achieved in all types of attacks against daylight bombers. This experience is reflected in an amendment to the fighter pilot manual, according to a German report from 1931.
The report refers to "day bombers" as bombers operating during daylight hours.
During training, new approaches to group use of aircraft, flight coordination, and air combat management were tested. During training, each pilot logged 50 to 100 flight hours and performed approximately 200 landings.
Upon completion of the flight school, graduates were awarded the appropriate military rank, without specifying their aviation affiliation. They often served as officers in cavalry or artillery units.
The training center didn't just recruit random individuals: every German cadet already possessed flight training, had undergone rigorous medical and psychological screening, and was considered among the most promising Reichswehr pilots destined to participate in the revival of German military aviation. This is precisely why the experience gained in Lipetsk significantly influenced the development of German fighter tactics in the 1930s.
Erst die Grundlagen lernen! (Learn materiel)
The Lipetsk Aviation Center's equipment was multifunctional and largely experimental, and did not constitute a standardized training facility. Its composition was determined by the school's mission, which primarily trained fighter pilots and observation pilots.
And although, alongside fighters, two-seat training and reconnaissance aircraft and individual experimental aircraft received for testing were used here, we will focus specifically on fighters, since they formed the basis of the combat training of German pilots.
As noted above, fighter training primarily utilized aircraft of the Fokker D.XIII type, as well as a limited number of Fokker D.VIIs.
The Fokker D.VII first took to the air in 1918. For its time, it was an outstanding fighter, distinguished by its excellent handling and high maneuverability. However, the Lipetsk Aviation School trained pilots for the next generation of aviation, and by the mid-1920s, this aircraft no longer fully met the requirements of modern training. Therefore, the more advanced Fokker D.XIII became the primary "flying desk."
In the mid-1920s, this sesquiplane was considered a thoroughly modern fighter, its performance on par with the best production aircraft in its class. Powered by a British-made Napier Lion V engine producing approximately 450 horsepower, the aircraft reached speeds of up to 254 km/h (155 mph), a remarkable feat for its time. It featured a 12-cylinder, W-configured engine—three banks of four cylinders. Its service ceiling reached 8000 meters (26,500 ft), and its range was approximately 600 kilometers (375 mi). Its armament consisted of two synchronized 7,92 mm LMG 08/15 Spandau machine guns.
The fuselage frame was welded from steel tubing, and the wings were wooden with plywood skins. While lightweight and highly maneuverable, the Fokker D.XIII was also demanding to fly. The aircraft was unforgiving and demanded high precision from the pilot. However, pilots who successfully mastered this aircraft received excellent training and had every chance of becoming true aces in the future.
It was the Fokker D.XIII that became one of the first modern fighters, which effectively began the hidden revival of German military aviation after the Treaty of Versailles.
Remember how I told you the Reichswehr ordered new fighters from Holland? Well, all fifty Fokker D.XIIIs produced were secretly delivered to Lipetsk in 1925. This operation became one of the most daring and large-scale efforts to circumvent the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles.
To circumvent the international oversight of the Allied Aviation Commission, a multi-stage scheme was devised. The entire shipment of fighters was registered through Reichswehr proxies, ostensibly for the Argentine Air Force.
The company's owner, the renowned aircraft designer Anthony Fokker, was well aware of the true customer and where his planes would actually be shipped. However, the contract promised enormous profits, and using his connections, Fokker ensured that the Dutch authorities simply turned a blind eye to the deal.
The planes were built, then dismantled, packed into huge wooden crates, and delivered to the port of Rotterdam. In customs declarations and accompanying documents, the cargo was listed as "powerful motorboats" and components for them, in transit to the final recipient.
The Napier Lion aircraft engines were declared as stationary marine engines for these very "motor boats».
Fokker hangar in the Schiphol-Oost area of Amsterdam. Aircraft ready for shipment to the USSR.
The cargo was then delivered to the German port of Stettin, where it was loaded onto the commercial steamship Edmund Hugo Stinnes IV, secretly chartered by the Germans. The route was kept strictly confidential, and in June 1925, the ship safely arrived at the Leningrad seaport.
Soviet security officers and customs officials were briefed on the details of the operation in advance. The cargo was accepted without inspection or any bureaucratic red tape.
In Leningrad, the crates were transferred to special railway platforms, carefully covered with tarpaulins, and the train was designated a special echelon of special importance. Its security was provided by OGPU officers dressed in civilian clothes.
Upon arrival in Lipetsk, the crates were delivered to the hangars and workshops whose construction had been discussed in the first protocol of the spring of 1925. Here, German mechanics, under the direction of Walter Starr, unpacked the "motorboats," assembled the aircraft, and by the end of the summer of 1925, all fifty Fokker D.XIIIs were ready to take to the skies over Lipetsk, becoming the basis for fighter training for future Luftwaffe pilots.
Fokker D.XIII fighters on the Lipetsk airfield, circa 1926–1927.
And another curious detail. It was in July 1925, when trains carrying dismantled Fokker D.XIIIs were already en route to Lipetsk, that Fokker test pilot Bertus Grasé, flying a production D.XIII, set four world speed records for aircraft with payloads, reaching a speed of 265,7 km/h.
This was further evidence that the Reichswehr specialists had made the right choice: Lipetsk received some of the most advanced fighters of their time.
Technology in Lipetsk: Russian Reality
Despite the excellent characteristics, in Lipetsk conditions, German and Soviet specialists were forced to solve serious technical problems that were simply not considered in Europe.
Fuel, oils, and spare parts for Napier Lion engines have become a real headache for the Lipetsk project.
The engines were acting up and required scarce high-octane gasoline and special oils. German "partners" were forced to secretly purchase fuel and lubricants abroad and struggle with the problem of delivering them to the USSR.
Providing aircraft with spare parts proved even more difficult.
Despite all the efforts of interested parties, Fokker was unable to officially supply components to the Soviet Union. German engineers in the Lipetsk workshops (mentioned in the first protocol) were forced to effectively establish their own small-scale production of parts and components, often literally by hand.
However, even this couldn't completely solve the problem. As the aircraft continued to operate, their technical condition inevitably deteriorated: radiators and fuel tanks began to leak, and engine malfunctions became more frequent, eventually leading to complete failure.
Added to all this were the inherent problems of the Fokker D.XIII's design—its extremely rigid controls. Due to its powerful engine, the aircraft was unforgiving of even minor pilot errors during takeoff and landing: it could swerve, turn sharply, or nose down. Over the years of the Lipetsk school's operation, more than half of the fifty Fokkers delivered were destroyed or seriously damaged in accidents and crashes.
A Fokker D.XIII nosed over on landing
It may seem paradoxical, but this was precisely the D.XIII's value as a training aircraft. From its very first flights, it instilled piloting discipline in future fighter pilots and prevented them from relaxing. It's no coincidence that, a decade later, many graduates of the Lipetsk school quickly mastered equally demanding new-generation aircraft, such as the Soviet I-16 and the German Bf.109. Of course, these were completely different aircraft, but the habit of strict flight discipline instilled on the Fokker D.XIII proved invaluable for many.
These Fokkers served faithfully in Lipetsk until the early 1930s, becoming the first training aircraft for the next generation of German fighter pilots. When they finally reached the end of their service life, they were replaced by more modern Arado Ar.64 and Arado Ar.65 fighters, beginning in 1931.
Arado Ar.64
Arado Ar.65
The reconnaissance and observation role was initially represented by eight two-seat Heinkel HD.17 reconnaissance aircraft. On orders from the Reichswehr, they were specifically brought from Germany to Lipetsk in the summer of 1926 for pilot training at the aviation school.
Heinkel HD.17
Shortly before the center's closure, the school's fleet was replenished with other types of aircraft, including the Heinkel He.46 reconnaissance aircraft.
The He.46C, developed in 1931 as an artillery reconnaissance aircraft. Naturally, there were no crosses or swastikas in Lipetsk.
These aircraft, as well as the Albatros L.76 and Albatros L.78, were used to practice tactical reconnaissance and air force control missions.
Albatros L.76 Aeolus
Albatros L.78
Training, support and liaison functions were performed, among other things, by light multi-purpose aircraft, including the Junkers F 13, which was used as a transport and liaison platform.
Junkers F 13
For comparative testing and evaluation of design solutions, individual samples from the German companies Heinkel, Junkers, Arado and Dornier, which arrived in small batches and did not have a unified operating standard, were also used.
Thus, the Lipetsk center was not just a training school, but a multifunctional training and testing complex, where pilots were trained, new aviation equipment was tested, and the organizational principles of future military aviation were developed.
Contrary to popular myths, such a famous figure as Hermann Göring had no connection with the Lipetsk flight school.
And although the legendary German aces Günther Lützow, Günter Radusch and Johannes Trautloft passed through Lipetsk, the next generation of military pilots of the Third Reich, including fighter pilots Erich Hartmann, Gerhard Barkhorn, Adolf Galland, Werner Mölders and bomber Hans-Ulrich Rudel, were formed within the framework of the Luftwaffe training system that was developed in the 1930s, the foundations of which were laid, among others, by graduates of the secret Lipetsk center.
The changing political situation between the two countries in the early 1930s led to the closure of the base. The Soviet Union's rapprochement with the Western powers, which began in 1931 and culminated in the 1932 conclusion of neutrality and non-aggression treaties with France and Poland, significantly diminished the political significance of the Treaty of Rapallo. Additional factors included attempts at rapprochement between Germany and France in the summer of 1932, as well as Soviet dissatisfaction with the relatively minor role played by testing activities in Lipetsk for the Red Army Air Force.
When Germany's military equality was recognized at the Geneva Disarmament Conference in December 1932, the Lipetsk base finally lost its significance for the Reichswehr. After the National Socialists came to power on January 30, 1933, this was compounded by ideological opposition to cooperation with the Soviet Union. As a result, the Lipetsk base was finally closed on September 15, 1933.
Over the eight years of its existence, the Lipetsk Aviation School became a unique joint project between the USSR and Germany. Germany was given the opportunity to maintain and develop its own aviation school, train approximately 200 German pilots (approximately 120 fighters and 100 observers), and conduct testing of new aircraft, weapons, and combat tactics. The Soviet side gained access to modern training methods, flight management, and operation of the latest aircraft. Despite the relatively small scale of the project, its significance far exceeded the number of pilots trained: it was in Lipetsk that the foundations of the system that would later become the foundation of the revived German military aviation were laid.
Cadets of the school in 1932. According to tradition, after their first training air battle, they shaved their heads bald.
The opportunity to test new combat aircraft and weapons systems, as well as to practice new air combat tactics, was invaluable.
The tests conducted in Lipetsk played a significant role in the evaluation of several aircraft subsequently accepted into service. The German Ministry of War selected the aircraft, which became the engineering and design basis for the development of German aviation in the late 1930s and early 1940s.
The Luftwaffe received Arado Ar.64 and Ar.65 fighters, Heinkel He.45 and He.46 reconnaissance aircraft, and the Dornier Do.11 bomber. These aircraft formed the core of the Luftwaffe's fleet, established in 1935.
The experimental Heinkel HD 38 naval fighter and the Heinkel He.59 multirole floatplane underwent testing in Lipetsk. The results and individual technical solutions obtained were subsequently used in the further development of German naval aviation.
From Lipetsk to the Luftwaffe
Despite formal prohibitions, by the end of 1932, Germany already had a hidden air force structure, including fighter, bomber, reconnaissance, and naval aviation units. However, in terms of scale and capabilities, it was still significantly inferior to the air forces of the leading world powers.
With the rise of the National Socialists to power in 1933, the development of German military aviation accelerated dramatically. Despite the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, organizational structures were secretly created, the material and technical base was expanded, and the flight training system was improved, all aimed at developing a fully-fledged combat aviation force.
On March 1, 1935, the Luftwaffe was officially established as an independent branch of the armed forces. Just a year later, German pilots gained their first combat experience in the skies over Spain, where they served as part of the Condor Legion in the Spanish Civil War, which lasted until 1939.
I already mentioned three graduates of the Lipetsk Aviation School above. All of them began their military careers in Spain.
Günther Lützow (Günther Lützow) claimed five aerial victories there.
Günther Lützow's Bf.109 B-1 in Spain. This photo was taken on April 7, 1937, shortly after his first aerial victory. The number "1" is visible on the fuselage behind the mechanic's foot.
Lützow subsequently increased his combat tally to 110 confirmed aerial victories (5 in Spain and 105 in World War II). Considering he flew only 310 combat sorties, his success rate was exceptionally high: on average, he claimed one victory for every 2,8 sorties flown—while most pilots flew dozens of sorties for every victory.
While fighting on the Eastern Front, Lützow was shot down once. On September 23, 1941, his Messerschmitt Bf.109 F-2 was hit by Soviet anti-aircraft artillery. According to some sources, he made an emergency landing behind front lines near Krasnograd; according to others, he parachuted out. Either way, he survived and continued flying.
Günther Lützow successively held command positions: first as squadron commander of 2./J 88 of the Condor Legion, then as commander of the I Group of JG 3 and commander of the 3rd Fighter Squadron of JG 3; subsequently, he commanded the Luftwaffe Fighter Aviation in Italy (Jagdfliegerführer Italien) and the 1st Fighter Division Defense Germany.
In the final weeks of the war, he flew the jet-powered Messerschmitt Me.262 as part of Adolf Galland's elite JV 44 unit.
Lieutenant Colonel Günther Lützow (1912–1945) in 1942
On April 24, 1945, Colonel Lützow, fighting as part of the famous "Expert Squadron," shot down a Martin B-26 Marauder, achieving his 110th and final aerial victory. He was also shot down and killed in the same battle.
Johannes "Hannes" Trautloft (Johannes "Hannes" Trautloft) was one of the most respected commanders and fighter pilots of the Luftwaffe, having flown 560 combat sorties and achieved 58 aerial victories. He was called the "father" of the famous 54th Fighter Squadron (JG 54 "Grünherz").
Johannes "Hannes" Trautloft (1912–1995)
Trautloft went through the entire evolutionary path of German fighter aviation - from biplanes to the very latest modifications of piston aircraft at the end of the war.
In Spain in 1936, he achieved his first aerial victory, shooting down a Republican Breguet bomber in a Heinkel He.51 biplane. He would go on to shoot down five aircraft in Spain.
He also made history as the first German pilot of the Condor Legion to be shot down in aerial combat. Shortly after his second victory, his Heinkel He.51 was shot down by a French Dewoitine D.372 fighter of the Republican Air Force.
Heinkel He.51, Condor Legion, Spain
It was also in Spain in late 1936 that he tested the first prototypes of the Messerschmitt Bf.109 (V-3, V-4). Subsequently, the Bf.109, in its E, F, and G modifications, became the primary aircraft in his fighter career.
In September 1939, as squadron leader of 2./JG 77, he shot down a Polish aircraft. He then commanded III./JG 51, fighting in France and during the Battle of Britain, where he claimed four British aircraft, including a Spitfire.
He flew camouflaged Bf.109 F-2 and Bf.109 G-2/G-6 aircraft on the Eastern Front, where he commanded the JG 54 air squadron.
From the end of 1942, Trautloft piloted the Focke-Wulf Fw.190 A-4 and shot down a total of 45 Soviet aircraft.
At the final stage of the war he switched to the long-nosed Fw.190 D-9.
It is noteworthy that after Spain, throughout the entire war, he himself was never shot down again, although he repeatedly returned to the airfield in a heavily damaged aircraft.
In the summer of 1943, on the initiative of Adolf Galland, Trautloft was transferred to the headquarters of the Fighter Aviation Inspectorate, where he took up the position of Inspector of Fighter Aviation on the Eastern Front, and then Inspector of all day fighter aviation of the Luftwaffe.
Note: In German military terminology, the position of "inspector" corresponded to the commander of an air force branch and was a general's position.
After the war, Trautloft successfully continued his career in the West German Air Force. In 1957, he joined the Bundesluftwaffe, held high command positions, became Deputy Inspector of the Air Force, and retired in 1970 with the rank of Lieutenant General. He died in 1995 at the age of 82.
Günther Radusch (Günter Radusch) was one of the first graduates of the secret flight school in Lipetsk. Radusch was not only a skilled pilot, but later became one of the most experienced organizers of the night interception system for enemy aircraft.
Günter Radusch (1912–1988)
He began his military career in Spain, where on April 22, 1937, he achieved his first aerial victory, shooting down a Republican I-15 fighter in a Heinkel He.51. There, he also tested the experimental Heinkel He.112 V5 fighter in combat conditions, as part of the testing program for new German aircraft in Spain.
Heinkel He.112 Condor Legion
After returning from Spain, Radusch served for some time in the fighter aviation inspectorate, and with the outbreak of World War II, he commanded the heavy fighter unit ZG 1. In the summer of 1940, he transferred to the newly formed night fighter aviation (Nachtjagd).
Subsequently fighting primarily in the West and exclusively in night fighter aircraft, he added 64 more Allied aircraft downed to his single victory in Spain, 57 of which were heavy four-engine bombers. In total, Radush flew approximately 140 combat sorties during World War II.
Although he could be considered a classic fighter pilot, Radusch's combat aircraft were the heavy Junkers Ju.88 and Messerschmitt Bf.110 twin-engine night fighters. He flew the majority of his combat missions in the Ju.88C and Ju.88G, while the Bf.110 G-4 became one of the primary interceptors in service with the night fighter squadrons under his command—NJG 2, NJG 3, and NJG 5.
Junkers Ju.88G heavy night fighter variant
Night interceptor Messerschmitt Bf.110 G-4
After the war, he continued serving in the West German Air Force (Bundesluftwaffe). He passed away at the age of 76.
Using these three graduates of the Lipetsk Aviation School as an example, I wanted to once again emphasize the human resource potential that this training center has created.
However, let us return to the events of the late 1930s.
By 1939, with approximately 3500–4000 combat aircraft and advanced aviation technology for its time, developed by leading German design schools, Germany was considered one of the strongest aviation powers in the world.
From this point on, pilot training finally emerged from the shadows and acquired a clearly organized, multi-stage character. A vast network of specialized flight schools was formed, unified training programs were introduced, training methods were refined, and cadet flight hours increased significantly.
It was this system, created during the 1930s, that provided the Luftwaffe with a high level of training for its flight personnel by the start of World War II.
How exactly the German pilot training system was structured, who was selected for the air force and by what criteria, what aircraft future aces learned to fly on, and how effective this system proved to be during the war on the Eastern and Western Fronts—this will be covered in the second part of the article, which will be published in a few days.
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