"A torsion shaft sample has been sent to Detroit for further analysis": KV-1 at the Aberdeen Proving Ground

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"A torsion shaft sample has been sent to Detroit for further analysis": KV-1 at the Aberdeen Proving Ground


I. Basis for testing


A. The basis for testing this sample was obtained from a directive from the Ordnance Directorate.
Subject: "Agreed program of testing the Russian average tank T-34 and the Russian heavy tank KV."



II. Introduction


A. This sample arrived at the Research Center along with a medium tank. artillery Aberdeen in apparently new condition on November 26, 1942. The odometer read 54 km when the vehicle was commissioned at the Research Center. Both tanks—medium and heavy—arrived fully equipped with a very extensive set of tools, fixtures, and equipment, as well as spare parts and consumables for maintenance. This immediately demonstrated the seriousness of the Soviet Union's attention to supply issues.

B. This specimen was identified as the Russian KV-1 heavy tank. This was because all Russian documents referred to the vehicle as such. However, further examination revealed that in the Russian alphabet, the letter "B" is pronounced like the English "V." Furthermore, it was discovered that the tank was named after Marshal Kliment Voroshilov. Thus, it was definitively established that the correct designation for the vehicle was the Russian KV-1 heavy tank.

C. This example was apparently in new condition and saw very limited service before arriving at Aberdeen; it is considered representative of this model of tank. This model undoubtedly underwent a number of modifications, resulting in later production examples being improved variants.

D. It is reported that the design of this tank, like that of the medium tank, was developed within a short period of time after the invasion of Poland and before Germany's attack on the USSR. Consequently, this model is one of the Soviet Union's newest tanks. As expected from a new design, further development of the program revealed a number of specific deficiencies, which were included in the test reports.


E. The purpose of the tests and the requested information are summarized in the Summary Test Program for Russian Tanks. This directive, along with its supplement, is provided in Appendix A and is not reproduced here. However, the points of the specified test program (TSTP), along with the results, are summarized in Section VI. Various requested reports on components and assemblies are listed but not included in this report, as the size of such a summary document would be prohibitively large.

The original directive and its supplement (see Appendix A) were almost completely completed before the vehicle was shipped to Fort Knox. After its return, the vehicle was not put into service because it required extensive repairs. This procedure was postponed until a reliable source of spare parts could be identified to ensure proper repairs to the tank. Below is a summary of the test items requested but not completed; it is hoped that spare parts will be provided and these tests can be completed:

1. Point No. 4 – Engine bench tests

This point was not completed due to tight deadlines. The tank requires a major overhaul before further investigation can begin. A translation of the specifications of this 12-cylinder V-shaped diesel engine [note: referring to the V-2] from the Russian manual is included in Appendix D.

2. Point No. 14 – Determining the ability to cross a ford

Not determined. Estimated value: 4 feet [note: approx. 1,22 meters].

3. Point No. 16 – Driving on slopes

During an attempted test, the main clutch slipped. The friction linings were replaced and adjustments were made, but this step is pending a major engine overhaul.

4. Point No. 19 – Determining the traction force on the hook

While attempting to record this value, the water in the radiators boiled. The engine was retuned, but this stage of the test was not possible at that time.

F. Along with this tank model, a fairly complete set of photocopies of its component parts and assemblies was received. However, many of these were missing dimensions, and some were not specific to the specific tank being tested. For the aforementioned reason, these sketches could not be reproduced in the quantity and quality required for inclusion in this report, and it is proposed that they be deposited with the Foreign Material Branch so that they are available to interested parties who wish to inspect the vehicle at the Aberdeen Proving Ground.


III. Conclusions


A. The design of the Russian KV heavy tank is fundamentally sound and easily amenable to mass production using low-skilled (semi-skilled) labor. The key identified features are:

1. Lack of final mechanical processing of the armor; the edges appear to have been cut with a gas cutter.
2. Absence of unnecessary operations for mechanical processing of parts throughout the tank.
3. A clearly expressed principle of interchangeability of components and assemblies between the T-34 and KV tanks.

B. Some of the outstanding features of this tank include:

1. Low and flattering silhouette.
2. Simplicity of design.
3. Good cross-country ability (low specific ground pressure).

C. During limited operation (running tests) conducted on this tank, it was found that although the tank has good operating speed and low rolling resistance, it lacks smoothness of ride and mechanical reliability.


D. Rolling resistance varied from 45 to 110 lb (20,4–49,9 kg) per ton (maximum), which is good for a machine fitted with open metal hinge (dry pin) steel tracks and can be attributed to the use of large diameter road wheels and a roller sprocket.

E. The torsion bar suspension is very efficient and, together with the track design, ensures very smooth movement and trouble-free operation of the track drive.

F. The thickness and slope of the hull and turret armor indicate excellent ballistic properties (projectile resistance), however, this, along with the absence of fenders (sponsons), limits the useful volume of the fighting compartment.

G. The rear location of the drive wheel apparently makes the tank less vulnerable and helps maintain track tension on the road wheels when overcoming obstacles.

H. The ammunition is conveniently located low in the vehicle's hull; however, it is impossible to draw any conclusions about its level of protection, as ballistic tests (shooting at the armor) have not been conducted.


I. Firepower is roughly comparable to the M4 Sherman tank. Although the Russian tank is armed with a 76mm gun, the muzzle velocity of the projectile is only approximately 100 feet per second [approx. 30 m/s] higher than that of the M3 75mm tank gun. The secondary machine guns are reliable and feature an extremely simple design, allowing for easy production and installation.

J. The sights are excellent, and the observation devices, although crude [primitive in execution], meet the requirements. The overall visibility from the tank is good.

K. The air starting system [pneumatic starter] is an effective auxiliary means.


IV. Recommendations


A. It is recommended that an engine overhaul be performed if it is deemed advisable to further investigate those characteristics which have not yet been investigated.

B. Until further instructions are received regarding the implementation of point "A" above, it is considered that this report should be the final one within the framework of the project, and the Russian KV heavy tank itself should be left at the disposal of the Foreign Materiel Branch.

C. The air starting system should be further investigated as a reliable auxiliary method of starting the engine.

V. Information from other sources


A. In order to illustrate combat use and form an objective opinion on the claimed effectiveness of this vehicle, an attempt was made to collect all available data from previous sources.

B. No other Russian heavy tanks had previously been tested at our Research Center; however, a Russian medium tank [T-34] was delivered in the same batch and tested during the same period. Both tanks are typical representatives of the latest types of armored vehicles used by the Russians.


C. According to available reports, there are two modifications of this tank [note: referring to the KV-1 and KV-2]. The main difference lies in the primary armament.

D. From a lecture given at the German tank school in Wünsdorf in March 1942 (the translation is contained in Military Attaché Report No. 2955, December 1942, from Cairo, Egypt), we learned about the place of the heavy tank in the Russian tactical picture. The practice of using medium and heavy tanks together apparently developed into an established principle. Upon breaking through the front line, the heaviest tank (usually the KV) would stop to observe and draw fire from anti-tank artillery. As soon as the position of such guns was identified, the heavily armored tank would immediately attack and crush the anti-tank gun on the move. This action allowed lighter tanks (usually the T-34) to engage the German tanks directly.

E. An excerpt from the intelligence bulletin "Tactical and Technical Trends No. 5" of August 13, 1942 gives the following description of the Russian KV heavy tank:

New heavy tank


Twelve months of war brought significant changes to the design of Red Army tanks. The new heavy tank was named "Kliment Voroshilov" (commonly referred to as the "KV"). It is 22 feet (~6,7 m) long, 10,9 feet (~3,3 m) wide, 8,9 feet (~2,7 m) high, and weighs 51,2 tons (note: these are American "short tons"; in the metric system, this is ~46,4 tons). Ground clearance is 1 foot 4 inches (~40 cm), and the tank can ford water obstacles 5–5,5 feet (~1,5–1,7 m) deep. Its length allows it to cross ditches 12–14 feet (~3,6–4,2 m) wide.

The KV's suspension rests on six rollers on each side, each with a central groove, giving them the appearance of a double roller setup. Each roller is independently suspended on a rocker; the track flange passes through this groove, preventing lateral movement. There are three carrier rollers and one idler.

Improvements have been made to the track link design and the way they are connected. The outer edges of the tracks are free of protrusions that could trap snow or mud. The track surface has a waffle pattern, providing reliable traction in snow and mud and reducing lateral slippage. Therefore, additional lugs for snow and mud are not required.

A new method for connecting the tracks has been developed. Each track section or plate has nine lugs, which are connected by a floating pin. The pin itself is secured in place by small discs or lock washers, which are in turn held in place by a spring ring installed in a recess between the track lugs. This prevents a pin from falling out of the lugs in the event of a break, which could lead to a track rupture and immobilize the tank.

The turret, cast in a single piece, weighs approximately 10 tons. The turret's frontal armor is 3,54 inches [90 mm] thick, making it exceptionally strong and capable of withstanding sustained enemy fire. It can rotate 360 ​​degrees, either electrically or manually. Heavy steel blocks (mounted on edge) are welded to the base of the turret to deflect projectiles that would otherwise jam the turret.
Below is information about the armament and armor of this tank:

(a) Turret armament: 76mm long-barreled gun (on some KV models, a 152mm gun is installed in a specially designed turret [note: KV-2]).

(b) One 7,62 mm machine gun, coaxial with the main gun.

One 7,62 mm machine gun in the rear of the turret.

Armament in the hull:

One 7,62 mm machine gun in the frontal part `[offensive machine gun]`.

Two spare 7,62mm machine guns can be used to replace the turret or frontal machine guns; one of these can be mounted on the turret roof for anti-aircraft fire or even used on a tripod for dismounted combat.

(c) Reservation:
(d) Forehead: 90 mm (3,543 in)
Sides: 75 mm (2,952 in)
Roof: 40 mm (1,574 in)
Engine Hatch: 30 mm (1,181 in)
Turret sides: 75 mm (2,952 in)
Stern: 40 mm (1,574 in)
Bottom: 30 to 40 mm (1,181 to 1,574 in)

The gun's ammunition complement consists of 90 armor-piercing and incendiary [note: the Americans likely mistook the high-explosive fragmentation shells for incendiary] rounds. The former are stowed behind the loader, while the latter are distributed throughout the turret, under the floorboards (the fighting compartment floor), and in the driver's compartment. The turret carries 3000 machine gun rounds in drum magazines.
The KV tank is powered by a 600-horsepower, 12-cylinder V-shaped diesel engine (V-2K), which transmits torque through the transmission and final drives to the drive wheels (sprockets) at the rear of the tank. The engine is noted to be very noisy. The tank is equipped with both electric and pneumatic (compressed air) starters.


The transmission has five forward gears (four normal and one low/emergency) and one reverse gear. The tank's internal fuel tanks hold 158,5 gallons (~600 liters) of fuel; additional fuel can be carried in external (hinged) tanks, which can be jettisoned after emptying or before entering combat. The standard off-road range without using the external tanks is 110–125 miles (~175–200 km). On improved roads, the tank can reach a top speed of approximately 21 mph (~34 km/h).
The KV crew consists of five people: the commander, driver, loader, gunner, and radio operator. Sometimes a sixth crew member is a mechanic. The commander, loader, and gunner are stationed in the turret. The driver and radio operator sit side by side in the front of the vehicle, in the control compartment.


The radio is located in the front, to the left of the driver. A whip antenna is mounted in the front of the tank. Internal communication within the tank is via a telephone [tank intercom – TPU]. Communication between tanks is visual – either by hand signals or flags [note: in case of radio failure or absence].

The Russians' experience in tank battles taught them lessons that influenced the design of their vehicles. The turret is positioned far forward to allow tank infantry (desyanti) to use it as a shelter (shield) while riding on the tank's armor. Every precaution has been taken to prevent unwanted "passengers" (enemy infantry) from landing on the armor. There are no external fastenings, tools, sharp protrusions, etc.; this serves the dual purpose of depriving enemy "fellow travelers" of handrails to grab onto and also reducing the likelihood of a Molotov cocktail or other projectile getting stuck on the armor.

The tank's fenders are very narrow, so enemy tank destroyers attempting to jump aboard risk being crushed by the tracks. The newest American tanks with sponsons have no fenders as such, solving these problems through the hull design itself. As an additional measure of crew protection, the hatch on the turret roof is designed in such a way that it cannot be opened from the outside. Furthermore, opening the hatch from the inside requires a special tool [note: the Americans likely haven't fully figured out the mechanism of the Soviet latch].

F. British Technical Intelligence Report No. 78 of January 7, 1943 states that there are three types of KV tanks:

1. The first type is the KV-1. It is armed with a 76,2 mm cannon and, according to reports, was criticized by the Germans for mechanical unreliability. The main clutch is weak, and gear shifting is only possible when stopped. Visibility from the driver's seat is poor. However, the armor provides good protection, making the tank difficult to disable.

2. The second type is the KV-1 (Reinforced) [note: KV-1 with armor plates]. This is the same tank described above, but with additional armor plates (armor plates) welded onto vulnerable areas. The tank undergoing testing here is considered to fall into this category. The same criticisms regarding mechanical reliability apply to it.

3. The third type is the KV-2. This tank is identical to the first, except for modifications to the turret to allow the installation of a 12,2 cm [122 mm] or 15,2 cm [152 mm] howitzer. The same criticisms apply to it, in addition to the fact that the turret cannot be traversed if the tank is at an angle.

VI. Discussion:

A. Every effort was made to complete all aspects of the prescribed test program; however, after most of the information had been obtained, but before all the characteristics had been investigated, the tank was sent to Fort Knox for examination by the Armored Force Board. Upon its return, the vehicle was deemed in too poor a condition to undergo further testing without first undergoing a major overhaul.

B. The cover letter to the test directive instructed our directorate to dismantle and ship the radio equipment from both Russian tanks [the KV and T-34] to the Signal Corps Laboratory at Camp Coles. This was accomplished, after which a separate document was issued, entitled "Camp Coles Engineering Report No. 6," on the subject: "Russian Radios and Intercoms Installed on the Russian T-34 Medium Tank and the Russian KV Heavy Tank." This report on the radio equipment proved too voluminous to be included in this document. Therefore, several copies of it were sent to the Ordnance Office in a separate package.

C. The accompanying letter also included a request to refrain from any live-fire (armor firing) or destructive testing of any kind and to maintain the vehicle in good condition. These instructions were followed, and it is believed that this tank received the same, if not better, care than any other vehicle undergoing testing. The fact that the vehicle now requires a major overhaul can be attributed to a combination of factors, namely, a lack of operational experience with this vehicle and some initially poorly designed components.

D. Upon arrival, the tank was restored to working order, and the prescribed testing program began; however, an inevitable delay occurred due to the vehicle being shipped to Fort Knox, Kentucky, for examination by the Armored Forces Committee. All data and logs were shipped with the vehicle, and an estimated three months of testing time were lost before this material could be compiled into a report.

E. A summary of the information requested in the summary program and its supplement is provided below in the same order in which it was requested and in accordance with the TSTP [Tank Standard Test Program] items, together with answers or references to the sections of this report containing the information requested.

The Russian KV heavy tank's test program


According to the directive, the first stage of this program was to study the vehicle's design and its overall performance. The standard TSTP 1935-709 program, with the following modifications, was used as the basis for achieving this stated goal:

ITEM #1 – Test Objects (Following Items Only)

A. Determining the comparative strategic mobility of a vehicle. The characteristics that influence a tank's effectiveness in this regard, along with the observations made, are listed below to provide a basis for comparison.

1. Speed ​​- satisfactory, 21 mph [~34 km/h].

2. Ability to operate in various environmental conditions – the cooling system's poor performance limits its ability to operate in a wide temperature range. Water boiled during cooling system testing.

3. Ease of control - difficult to steer (turn) at high speeds on hard surfaces; difficult to downshift due to massive gears in the gearbox [note: a known problem with the main clutch and gearbox on KV tanks].

4. The required amount of fuel and lubricants is within normal limits (moderate).

5. Fuel capacity - 158 gallons [~600 liters].

6. Performance characteristics – good starting, reliable powertrain. Poor air filters and cooling system performance lead to the need for more frequent maintenance than necessary.

7. Ground pressure is 10,4 pounds per square inch (~0,73 kg/cm²). For a vehicle of this size, this is considered a very good figure, allowing this tank to traverse more difficult terrain than American tanks could handle.

8. Obstacle Climbing Ability – Climbed vertical walls up to 24 inches (~60 cm) high. Performed poorly on sand; performed very well on a washboard course and a shell crater.

9. Fording ability - not determined; estimated at 48 inches (~1,22 m), limited by the height of the engine air intake louvers.

10. Power per ton of weight (specific power) - 11,5 hp per ton.

11. Weight - 52 tons [note: "short" American tons; in the metric system ~47,1 tons].

12. Weight distribution is good.

13. Overall dimensions are good.

B. Determination of comparative tactical mobility of the vehicle:

1. Power per ton of weight - 11,5 hp per ton.
2. Speed ​​- 34 km/h.
3. Acceleration – up to 34 km/h in 27 seconds.
4. Handling - poor on paved roads, better on rough terrain because the steering system (side clutches with brakes) works best on soft ground [note: on soft ground the tracks may partially slip, smoothing out the jerks when turning].
5. Driving on slopes was not determined due to slippage of the main clutch.
6. Driving on sand, mud and snow - good in mud and snow, bad on sand.
7. Specific ground pressure - 10,4 pounds per square inch (~0,73 kg/cm²).
8. Obstacle Clearance - 24" (~60cm) vertical wall.
9. Fording ability - not determined, estimated at 48 inches (~1,22 m).
10. Visibility (visibility limits) – good.

C. Identification of defects affecting durability and mechanical reliability:

1. After a short period of vehicle operation, the air cleaners on this tank's engine were tested. Based on the findings, this air cleaner cannot be considered satisfactory according to our specifications. This should accelerate wear on this engine and negatively impact its mechanical reliability.

2. The engine cooling performance is unsatisfactory by our standards and, if not compensated for by the engine design itself, may become a clear source of mechanical failure affecting the reliability and service life of the machine.

3. The steel tracks and track pins showed a short service life, with noticeable pin wear becoming evident after just 242 miles (~390 km) at the Aberdeen Proving Ground. Track life is reported to be approximately 600 miles (~965 km), after which the pins and excessively worn tracks require replacement. This is considered excessive track wear and is a factor affecting the vehicle's reliability and service life.












4. Throughout the tests, significant problems with the steering clutches and the main clutch were encountered. It's important to note that the spare parts kit supplied by the Russians included new assemblies for both these and other components, indicating their awareness of this weak point.

D. Comparison of the machine with similar machines tested previously:

1. No Russian-designed or -produced tank has ever been tested at the Aberdeen Proving Ground. The Russian T-34 medium tank is undergoing testing at the same time.

2. This machine appears to be essentially of the Christie type, of which there are reports at the Aberdeen Proving Ground.

3. During performance tests such as acceleration and rolling resistance [traction resistance] testing, the results obtained on this vehicle were compared with those of the American T1E1 heavy tank [note: prototype of the M6 ​​heavy tank].

Mechanical inspection


A. A thorough mechanical inspection of the vehicle was conducted immediately upon its arrival at the Artillery Research Center. The vehicles (tanks) were opened in the presence of two Russian officers; both tanks were found to be in good condition.

B. The crude gas cutting of the armor and the rough fitting of parts in areas where higher quality workmanship was not required immediately caught my attention. The assembly of the components also demonstrated the application of principles of motion studies [note: ergonomics and labor rationalization], indicating steps toward mass production methods.

Another interesting fact is that components of both Russian tanks (medium and heavy), such as instruments, sensors, starters, relays, water and fuel pumps, are completely interchangeable. The engines of these two tanks are similar, differing only in the injection system, so most parts are directly interchangeable. This assertion is supported by service logs, which repeatedly mention parts being borrowed from one tank to maintain the performance of the other. The global design concept (standardization program) suggested by these facts likely significantly simplified the Russians' maintenance tasks by reducing the number of spare parts needed to repair the vehicles. This assertion is true if these two tank models studied constitute the core of the Soviet vehicle fleet.

C. Samples of motor oil, transmission oil, and diesel fuel were analyzed by the Automobile Division's Laboratory Division. Samples were also sent to Texas Company.

D. The torsion bar suspension generated considerable interest—it performed extremely well throughout all tests and showed very little wear considering the amount of work performed. A sample of the torsion bar shaft from this tank was sent to Detroit for further analysis.


E. The tank's engine also attracted immediate interest, as it was discovered that the piston stroke of the left-hand cylinder bank was shorter than that of the right-hand cylinder bank. This stroke was 180 mm and 186,7 mm for the left and right banks, respectively. The difference in piston stroke was explained by the use of a hinged connecting rod design. The connecting rods for the right-hand pistons are the main connecting rods, while the connecting rods for the left-hand cylinder bank are hinged to them [trailing connecting rods]. The diameter of the circle described by the main connecting rods of the right-hand cylinder bank is 6,7 mm larger than the diameter of the circle described by the pins of the trailing connecting rods of the left-hand cylinder bank.

Engine bench testing


A. Because the directive called for the maximum number of operational tests to be conducted and data to be collected as quickly as possible before the vehicle was shipped to the Army Ground Forces, engine rig testing was not performed in the proper sequence recommended by the TSTP program. When the vehicle returned from Fort Knox, Kentucky, it was determined that a major overhaul would be required before satisfactory rig testing could be conducted. The Automotive Division suspended this item until it was certain that a source of spare parts for engine overhaul would be available.






Determining the center of gravity


A. This was done by the hanging method, the results are as follows: 41-3/8 inches [~105,1 cm] above the ground, 9 feet 4 inches [~2,84 m] in front and 9-7/8 inches [~25,1 cm] above the center of the drive wheel.

B. This center of gravity is an imaginary point located approximately 1 inch [~2,54 cm] behind the center point of the tank's length and 1 inch [~2,54 cm] below the center point of the tank's height.

Determination of load distribution and specific pressure on the soil


A. The specific earth pressure was determined to be 10,4 psi [~0,73 kg/cm²] at a subsidence depth of 0 inches for a weight of 104,000 lbs [~47,174 kg].

B. Load distribution was determined by using a pair of load cells (weighing devices) under each side of the vehicle.

Determination of ranges and firing zones


A. To answer this question, we have virtually complete data obtained during tests of the gun, ammunition, and sighting devices. The gun on the T-34 medium tank is the same as that on this heavy tank, and all data was obtained on it [note: this refers to the 76-mm tank gun, the ZIS-5 on the KV, and the F-34 on the T-34].

Definition of requirements for lubricants


A. All oil and lubricant samples accompanying the vehicles were analyzed. These samples are believed to cover the full range of Russian requirements and provide a representative picture of Russian lubricants. However, the vehicles were operated with standard US Army lubricants and did not require any special types of lubricants that were not already available.

Determining launch characteristics


A. No official starting performance tests were conducted, but this car started easily, as evidenced by log entries. This was primarily achieved by the provided air-starter system. The crankshaft speed achieved by this method was quite satisfactory for starting the engine.

Definition of protection from detection


A. The vehicle's noise and visibility levels were deemed normal. The steel tracks on steel road wheels are noisy on paved roads, but the tank's movement over rough terrain is considered within acceptable noise levels.

B. The low silhouette of the vehicle greatly contributes to its camouflage in normal field conditions.

Determining the ability to overcome obstacles


A. Throughout the tests, the vehicle climbed a 24-inch [~60 cm] vertical wall and demonstrated obstacle-crossing performance equal to or superior to standard American tanks.

Determination of fording ability


A. While not determined by actual testing, calculations indicate that the tank can ford water to a depth of approximately 4 feet [~1,22 m], limited by the height of the cooling air outlet ports. However, driving through water at any speed will be difficult due to water splashing onto the sloped frontal armor plate, obscuring the driver's view.

Determining turning and handling characteristics


A. The turning diameter on dirt was found to be approximately 26 feet [~7,9 m]. Drivers reported that the vehicle's handling characteristics were very poor throughout testing. However, after gaining experience with the system (side clutches and brakes), it was found that the tank could maneuver almost as easily as American tanks. The tracks and suspension had a very smooth and clean ride, but track slippage during turns was detrimental to the road surface.

B. Although the crew's work stations are well-positioned, the driver's station is uncomfortable due to its proximity to the sloped frontal armor. This impacts the tank's handling characteristics, as it has been found that the driver requires extensive and thorough training to achieve maximum control efficiency.

Driving on slopes


A. This test has yet to be completed. Difficulties with the main clutch while the car was still in good condition prevented this point from being explored.

B. However, this point will be investigated after the engine has been overhauled and rebuilt.

Determination of suspension elasticity, ride smoothness and stability (steadiness) of the gun platform


A. The tank has been tested on a washboard track and it has been determined that the tank can withstand maximum speed without excessive pitching or vibration.

B. The study of the torsion shafts of the suspension of this tank is included in the logs (reports) for the period from December 25, 1942 to January 7, 1943.

C. Film footage of this stage of the tests was produced and is included in Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) Film No. 566, entitled "Russian Heavy Tank KV and Russian Medium Tank T-34".

D. No track breaks (failures) occurred during testing; however, after approximately 200 miles [~320 km], significant wear on the track pins became noticeable.

Determination of tractive effort on the hook, acceleration characteristics, fuel consumption and rolling resistance (traction)


A. The towline pull was not determined due to boiling water in the cooling system. The engine was retuned, but this overheating issue was never resolved, so the towline pull could not be measured due to time constraints.

B. Practical data on fuel consumption were not obtained, but in the manual for the Russian tank these data are indicated as 160 - 180 grams per hour per horsepower of produced power [specific fuel consumption].

C. Rolling resistance (traction resistance) varied from 45 pounds per ton at 35 mph [note: obvious typo in original report, the KV could not travel at 56 km/h; probably meant 3,5 mph] to 110 pounds per ton at 19 mph [~30 km/h].

Operation in sand, mud and snow


A. The tank operated in shallow snow, mud, and ice, without any difficulties anywhere on the Perryman cross-country course, even when the course was in its worst condition. Interestingly, there is a 2-inch [~5 cm] difference in ground clearance between the Russian heavy and medium tanks, with the heavy tank having the higher ground clearance. Although they have the same ground pressure, these extra 2 inches [~5 cm] of ground clearance saved the heavy tank from getting stuck where the medium tank got stuck.

B. Even in the most sticky mud, it was noted how clean the suspension remained. In fact, by the time the vehicle returned to the hangar after the mud tests, the suspension itself had completely cleared itself of all the mud and was clean.

Study of crew comfort and safety


A. No specific tests were conducted to determine this parameter.

B. However, throughout all the vehicle testing, considerable attention was paid to determining the vehicle's impact on the crew. The cramped fighting compartment, poor or difficult control, and difficult gear shifting created a constant fatigue factor, making operating the tank very tiring. The driver's station is equipped with soft padding in areas where there is a risk of hitting the armor.

A detailed study of the KV-1 air purifier


1. Laboratory tests of this air purifier were conducted at the request of the Foreign Materials Department in order to identify the advantages and disadvantages of its design and performance characteristics, as well as for comparison with American-made units of similar purpose.

2. The air cleaner tested was one of two such units used on the Russian KV heavy tank, which is currently undergoing study and testing at this proving ground. It was apparently designed for use with the vehicle's 600 hp, 38,9 liter, 12-cylinder diesel engine. The engine's maximum speed is limited by the governor to approximately 1800 rpm, at which point the air demand is approximately 31,1 cubic meters per minute, based on an estimated cylinder filling factor of 85%. The maximum air flow per air cleaner is 15,6 cubic meters per minute, and this is the value used for the laboratory tests, the results of which are presented in this report.


3. The air cleaner is shown in the attached photographs of Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) Nos. 75607 and 75608. The attached drawing of the APC Auto LB-192 also shows a schematic diagram of the unit. Air enters the air cleaner through a 133 mm diameter inlet pipe, which is offset by approximately 67 mm from the horizontal centerline of the unit, and its center is 175 mm above the recommended oil level. The location of the air intake is such that the air is imparted a vortex motion as it enters the expansion chamber; there, it strikes a convex deflector (deflector), which is loosely mounted in the center so that it has considerable freedom of movement. The force of the air flow tilts this deflector at such angles that it is partially immersed in the oil reservoir and captures small portions of the oil.

At high airflow rates, the deflector begins to rotate, breaking the oil on its surface into small droplets and being carried by the airflow into the filter element and onto the walls of the expansion chamber. After swirling in the expansion chamber directly above the deflector and oil bath, the air passes upward through a 162 mm diameter central opening in the spiral oil baffle, then into the filter element located at the top of the air cleaner, and exits through an 89 mm diameter outlet in the center of the unit's top cover. Oil trapped in the filter element flows down onto the spiral oil baffle and then back into the expansion chamber.

The filter element is approximately 279 mm in diameter, 127 mm in height, and made of soft corrugated wire (wire tangle/gimp). It should be noted that the Aberdeen Proving Ground photograph 75608 and the APC Auto LB-192 drawing show a small protrusion (pocket) located directly below the air intake and above the oil level in the air cleaner. There are five holes in the wall of the air cleaner housing between the expansion chamber and the cavity of this protrusion. The purpose of this appendage is unknown; it can only be assumed that it is intended as a trap for some of the dust contained in the air.

4. The tests conducted and the methods employed complied with current U.S. Army air cleaner specifications, with the exception that the recovery (self-cleaning capability) test was conducted at the engine's maximum air demand, rather than at 1,5 times its maximum air demand, due to the unit's low airflow capacity. All comments regarding the satisfactory performance of the air cleaner are based on the current U.S. Army requirements against which the unit was compared.

Conclusions


1. The clean air cleaner's flow rate was 16,1 cubic meters per minute, which is only 104% of the engine's maximum air consumption and provides an extremely small safety margin compared to American-made units.


2. The aerodynamic drag, recorded at 297 mm H2O at maximum engine airflow (15,6 cu. m/min) and a clean filter, is less than the maximum allowable value of 381 mm H2O according to the current US Army specification and is therefore considered satisfactory.

3. A flow test with the air cleaner tilted at 30° from the vertical showed that oil began to be carried away from the filter after 27 minutes of operation at 100% of the engine's maximum air demand (15,6 cubic meters/min), which is an extremely unsatisfactory result.

4. The recorded cleaning efficiency at maximum engine air flow was 97,53% compared to 97,5% for the American-made reference air cleaner tested simultaneously; the result was deemed satisfactory.

5. The air cleaner performance at 20% of the engine's maximum air flow rate (3,1 cubic meters per minute) was 88,5%, compared to the minimum of 90,0% required by the current U.S. Army specification; this result is considered unsatisfactory. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that this figure could have been even lower if the air cleaner had not been run in at maximum air flow rate immediately prior to testing.


6. The results of the tests on cleaning efficiency and dust holding capacity at 75% of the maximum air flow rate show that the efficiency decreased from 97,02% (after feeding 310 grams of dust) to 83,7% (after feeding 2480 grams of dust), while the aerodynamic resistance increased from 165 mm H2O to 371 mm H2O. These values ​​are unsatisfactory.

7. The results of the recovery test (self-cleaning ability) were completely unsatisfactory, as the low throughput of the unit did not allow the test to be conducted at the required air flow rate (23,4 cubic meters per minute), and the filter flushing intensity at the flow rate of 15,6 cubic meters per minute at which the test was conducted was insufficient to significantly reduce aerodynamic drag. The reduction in drag over 15 minutes of operation after adding fresh oil to the purifier ranged from 622 mm H2O to 587 mm H2O, which is an extremely unsatisfactory result.

8. The air purifier's design requires breaking the seals in the clean air line for maintenance. However, once this is done, the filter element remains easily accessible for cleaning.

9. The filter element is loosely assembled and can move vertically by up to 12,7 mm. This is a design flaw, as the element is subject to excessive wear, especially when partially clogged, when air pulsations caused by the intake strokes of each engine cylinder cause the element to move up and down.

Review of previously obtained data


Although air cleaners of this exact type have not been tested at this site before, it is clear that this unit is very similar to, if not an exact copy of, the older Vortox oil bath air cleaners.

Discussion of results


1. Tests of the air cleaner on the Russian KV heavy tank show that its flow rate and oil flushing efficiency are significantly below US Army requirements for units designed for engines of this class as those on this vehicle. As a result of poor oil flushing, which is particularly noticeable at low flow rates, the low air flow rate, cleaning coefficients (efficiencies), dust holding capacity, and the unit's self-cleaning capacity are unsatisfactory compared to current US Army requirements.

2. In fact, there is reason to believe that the 88,5% cleaning efficiency recorded at 20% of the engine's maximum air consumption was somewhat higher than it would have been had the cleaner not been operated at maximum air flow for 15 minutes immediately prior to this test. It is assumed that during this operating mode, some oil was carried upward by the air flow into the filter element, and that the 165 grams of dust introduced into the air cleaner during the cleaning efficiency test was insufficient to completely saturate (contaminate) this volume of oil. In our opinion, had a larger amount of dust been introduced into the cleaner, the efficiency would have decreased as the oil retained in the filter element at high air flow became saturated. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the unit's cleaning efficiency dropped from 97,02% to 83,7% when feeding 2480 grams of dust during the dust holding test, which was conducted at 75% of the maximum air flow.

3. Another indication of poor oil circulation is the fact that oil splashing and movement across the deflector (baffle) ceased after introducing 1550 grams of dust during the dust holding capacity test. This was due to the formation of a crust of compressed dust on the deflector's upper surface. Furthermore, aerodynamic drag increased steadily and rapidly throughout the test, instead of rising very slowly at the beginning and increasing sharply only after reaching the oil's dirt-holding capacity limit, as is typical with American-made units. This indicates that, although some oil splashing onto the expansion chamber walls was observed during the first part of the test, this splashing had little or no effect on the filter element.

This test had to be terminated after introducing 2480 grams of dust, and only two of the three planned performance checks were completed. For the results to be considered satisfactory, the air purifier's dust holding capacity had to be 6190 grams, the minimum filtration efficiency had to be at least 95%, and the maximum resistance had to be no more than twice the initial value.

4. Upon completion of this test, dry dust was found throughout the entire interior of the air cleaner, with the exception of the oil pan located beneath the deflector. A layer of compacted dirt approximately 12,7 mm thick had formed at the bottom of the cleaner, beneath the oil layer; a dry dust deposit approximately 6,4 mm thick was present on the walls of the expansion chamber, and the filter element contained a significant amount of dust. All of this dust was dry, with the exception of the outer contour of the filter element—a 12,7 mm wide area around its perimeter. A small amount of dry dust was also present on the underside of the deflector. This condition provides further evidence of the poor cleaning performance of this air cleaner.

5. When airflow was increased to the engine's maximum demand during the first 30 minutes of the recovery test (self-cleaning capability), which was conducted immediately following the dust capacity test, the only observable oil movement was its tendency to "creep" up the deflector and soften the dirt crust. No attempt was made to run the air cleaner at 1,5 times the engine's maximum airflow, as required by current US Army specifications, due to the unit's inherently low airflow capacity.

The air cleaner was then filled with fresh oil and operated for 15 minutes at maximum engine demand. During this time, the upper portion of the oil deflector was so cleaned that some oil began to splash onto the expansion chamber walls, and approximately 80% of the dirt on the deflector's underside softened. However, the deflector itself did not rotate, and by the end of the test, only a small amount of dirt had been washed off the expansion chamber walls. The fact that aerodynamic drag did not decrease significantly during this test indicates that oil circulation was insufficient to flush the lower portion of the filter element. For the air cleaner's self-cleaning performance to be considered satisfactory, drag during this test had to drop from 622 mm H2O to 348 mm H2O.

6. All tests described in this report were conducted using SAE 30 viscosity grade oils, complying with US specification 2-104A, as required by the current US Army air cleaner specification. Unfortunately, information on the viscosity grade of the oil originally used in these air cleaners (in the USSR) is currently unavailable. However, if an oil thicker than SAE 30 had been used, it is likely that the flushing intensity and dust holding capacity would have been somewhat lower than those observed in this test.

7. In summary, it can be concluded that the efficiency (cleaning coefficient) at maximum engine air demand, as well as the aerodynamic drag of a clean unit, are satisfactory compared to the current US Army specification. However, the air throughput, dust holding capacity, efficiency at low air flow rates, and self-cleaning capability are unsatisfactory. Consequently, this air cleaner should be considered significantly inferior to American equivalents that would be used on an engine of the type installed on the Russian KV heavy tank.
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  1. +3
    14 July 2026 05: 28
    Thank you, Eugene!
    Despite the moderate assessments of American engineers, they chose the basic design principles of the KV for their prospective tanks. Of course, this isn't a case of direct copying, but rather creative development.
    1. +6
      14 July 2026 06: 10
      KV-1 and T-34 tanks arrived in the United States on November 26, 1942. The Americans called them new tanks. In fact, by that time, they were already obsolete. Our design bureaus were working on new heavy and medium tanks.
      I can imagine the look on the Americans' faces when they saw our IS-3 tanks at a parade in Germany in the summer of 1945. They hadn't even seen the T-44 yet.
      1. + 11
        14 July 2026 06: 50
        Our tanks of the 40s represent a surprising combination of breakthrough solutions and mossy backwardness, as is, incidentally, all first-generation engineering.
        The beautiful body shape sits alongside an archaic transmission, manufacturing technology is poorly engineered, and the weapon's power is poorly ergonomic.
        But the main focus is still on decisive combat, and the sum of the vehicles' qualities gives the crews a chance of victory.
        1. +5
          14 July 2026 12: 15
          The T-44 did not make it to the war, but its legacy became the T-54 and ultimately the MBT concept.
        2. +5
          14 July 2026 18: 03
          Do you think that tanks from countries like France, Great Britain and the USA were the pinnacle of tank design in the 1940s?
          1. +1
            14 July 2026 18: 14
            We weren't close.
            But they all had strengths.
            The Americans have technology;
            The British have weapons;
            The Germans have a rational armor scheme.
            And most importantly, they realized before us that a tank isn't an engineering masterpiece (a struggle for performance, huh?), but simply a combat vehicle operating under given conditions. That, in essence, is the formula for a basic tank.
            1. +6
              14 July 2026 18: 24
              The Americans have technology;
              The British have weapons;
              The Germans have a rational armor scheme.


              You forgot to mention the French!
              How are British tank weapons better than Soviet ones?
              The absence of high-explosive fragmentation shells on the guns?
              The use of water-cooled machine guns on some tanks, or the fact that British tanks used machine guns chambered for two different cartridges?
              Or the fact that the first British cruiser tanks had "internal" armor that wasn't armor, but structural steel.

              Do Americans have technology?
              Do you consider the use of six types of propulsion systems on the M4 Sherman to be technologically advanced?
              Or was it the lack of experience in installing a gun larger than 37mm in a turret that led to the creation of the M3 "Lee/Grand" family - also technological advancement?
              Or maybe it's technological advancement that on the M3 Stuart light tanks the tank commander acted as the loader, and the turret with observation devices was on the gunner's head?

              What makes the German tank armor system better than others?
              Nothing.
              1. +2
                15 July 2026 06: 45
                Quote: hohol95
                You forgot to mention the French!

                The French, in fact, didn't have any particular advantages...
                Quote: hohol95
                Do Americans have technology?

                "Technological efficiency is a complex characteristic that determines how much a product (device, machine or program) convenient and profitable in production, operation and repair. "
                It seems to me that technological advancement is not about caliber or the organization of combat interaction between the crew. hi
                1. +6
                  15 July 2026 09: 01
                  American tanks after Pershing had a cast hull and were machined in one installation on a machining center (they already had them back then).
                  The Sherman could be produced in automobile factories, but the T-34 and its successors could not. It's no wonder the Sherman won the 1943 competition against the T-34.
                  I've worked with Americans—they're unrivaled technologists compared to ours. They solve problems by finding optimal solutions, while ours adapt the design concept to the available capabilities, often at the expense of quality and functionality.
                  1. 0
                    22 July 2026 14: 29
                    Well, I don't know what geniuses you worked with, but the T-34 at the beginning of the war and the T-34 at the end of the war are two very different things, precisely in terms of technological advancement. The Americans, using the same equipment (in Nizhny Tagil, for example, a charging crane from 1890 was still working in the open-hearth furnace in 1985) and the labor of old men, women, and children (not even teenagers), couldn't even build carts. And even the Sherman, under frontline conditions, was only a badass in the movies with Brad Pitt. Everything the Americans do is good for show and comfort.
                    1. 0
                      22 July 2026 15: 06
                      The T-34-85 is a good tank, but a year late. The fact that the T-34 mod. 1943 received a new gearbox is thanks to the Americans, who sent the necessary machining equipment and the first batch of needle bearings.
                      Once again: the Sherman could be assembled even in automobile factories, while the T-34 could only be assembled in locomotive, railcar, and some tractor factories. Only 21000 Shermans were assembled in 1943—an unattainable figure for the T-34.
                      Our tank crews loved the Sherman for its reliability, good ergonomics, and ease of starting the engine in winter conditions.
                      This doesn't mean the Sherman is some kind of masterpiece, just a good mass-produced tank. But by 1945, it had become an anachronism. Therefore, the Americans didn't develop the version with a 90mm gun, but switched to the M-26 Pershing. The same could be said about the T-34-85, but we didn't have a well-developed vehicle with a powerful long-barreled gun, other than the IS-2. There was a suitable version, the D-5-BM, but command wanted a muzzle velocity of 1000 m/s for its armor-piercing shell, which this system couldn't provide.
                2. +4
                  15 July 2026 20: 54
                  "Manufacturability is a complex characteristic that determines how convenient and cost-effective a product (device, machine, or program) is to manufacture, operate, and repair."
                  It seems to me that technological advancement is not about caliber or the organization of combat interaction between the crew. 


                  Technology for American industry!
                  Which refused to allow the British to produce British tanks at its factories.
                  And the Yankees could only produce their own combat vehicles at home.
                  The USSR had its own technology.
                  Military equipment was produced at factories that had not previously produced it (plant 112 "Krasnoye Sormovo", GAZ, and so on).
                  Americans have a lot of skilled workers and a lot of machine tools, and they have no problems with steel, rubber, gasoline, and electricity.
                  The USSR has problem after problem...
                  German tanks were also "technological", but for German industry.
                  The same can be said about combat aviation.
                  1. 0
                    22 July 2026 15: 10
                    And the Yankees could only produce their own combat vehicles at home.

                    Oh-oh-oh! And the Canadians, without knowing it, released as many as 6 at their factories!
                    1. 0
                      22 July 2026 16: 24
                      6 thousand of what?
                      The Canadians released it.
                      "Valentines"?
                      This is an infantry support tank.
                      It cannot be compared with the T-34.
                      And if this sounds familiar to you, the Valentine was one of the best British tanks of World War II.
                      Its major drawback was that tanks with British guns did not have high-explosive fragmentation shells.
                      1. +1
                        22 July 2026 18: 13
                        No, licensed Shermans.
                        True, the guns are not 77 mm, but the old 75 mm.
                      2. 0
                        22 July 2026 18: 40
                        Not really...
                        What???
                        Not the old 75mm guns, but the American 75mm guns.
                        To which the OFS from the USA were heading!
      2. -5
        14 July 2026 06: 58
        In fact, in November 1942, work was underway on the T-43 (A.A. Morozov) and the medium IS-1 (2) (Zh.Ya. Kotin). The appearance of the first Tiger tanks on the Volkhov Front in January 1943 put an end to this dead-end work and ultimately led to the creation of the IS-2 and T-34-85.
        As for the IS-3, other than the driver's hatch, this vehicle has little to boast about. The IS-8, a reincarnation of the T-10M, can be considered a realistic solution. As early as 1945, it was clear that it was necessary to transition from medium and heavy tanks to a single main battle tank with the most extensive use of armor casting and anti-HEAT protection.
        I generally consider the T-44 and its legacy to be a useless engineering feat for achieving performance indicators, rather than an effective combat unit.
        1. 0
          14 July 2026 09: 17
          Quote: Victor Leningradets
          I generally consider the T-44 and its legacy to be a useless engineering feat for achieving performance indicators, rather than an effective combat unit.

          Expert. It's better to remain silent and look like a complete idiot than to speak up and dispel all doubts. A medium tank with the armor and armament of a heavy tank, more technologically advanced than the T-34. Yes, at the time, it had no equal. They held them back so they wouldn't be exposed prematurely. The tank was unlucky; it didn't make it to the war, and then quickly became obsolete. But its legacy is the Soviet Army's tank fleet. The D-44 tank destroyer gun was also unlucky (testing is said to have begun on May 9th). An excellent weapon, a sniper rifle in accuracy. But it didn't make it to the war, and then it became obsolete. They made it a field tank, and the idea slid to the D-48 (also missed out, but was implemented in the T-12).
          1. 0
            14 July 2026 09: 34
            Thank you, you just confirmed my thoughts:
            The T-44 is a useless vehicle with brilliant performance indicators for presentations of that time.
            Without offense or unnecessary ambitions:
            A tank is a combat vehicle with enhanced cross-country capability and protection, but its most important component is its armament. It was precisely this key parameter (which included not only the gun itself, but also ammunition and the fire control system) that prevented the T-44 from being considered viable after 1943. The same applies to all its subsequent modifications with the D-10T gun.
            The T-64 might have been a more or less decent vehicle, if not for A.A. Morozov's incomprehensible obsession with medium tanks (meaning below the Procrustean 40-ton weight limit). Even so, the tank's weight eventually crept over 45 tons!
            So the bad habit of bowing to table data has more than once played a cruel joke on our designers.
            I'm no expert in tank building myself, but I lived through the T-80's creators in their prime, so much of what I'm writing here is their thoughts from forty years ago.
            1. +6
              14 July 2026 10: 54
              Quote: Victor Leningradets
              The T-44 is a useless vehicle with brilliant performance indicators for presentations of that time.

              So, it was created primarily for the current war. The T-44 isn't even an evolutionary development (like the T-34/85), but a revolutionary project (as a whole). It features a torsion bar suspension (already mastered by us), a transverse engine, a gearbox that eliminated certain transmission issues, turret offset, and the center of gravity, as well as the danger of a long barrel jamming. The hull is simple to manufacture, with smaller geometric dimensions while maintaining the same useful volume. It features enhanced armor, with a slight increase in weight. Only the relative difficulty of restructuring production during the war prevented a complete switch to this tank (although by the end of 1945, there were more than eight hundred of them).
              Had it appeared earlier, it would have been a masterpiece of the TMV period (and even somewhat later). But it didn't. And its descendants—all subsequent T-62s, and even later ones—carry T-44 genes.
        2. +5
          14 July 2026 18: 04
          Already in 1945, it was clear that it was necessary to move from medium and heavy tanks to a single main tank with the widest use of armor casting and anti-cumulative protection.

          Who understood this?
          In which country?
          1. -4
            14 July 2026 18: 18
            Everyone, except A.A. Morozov. Both the British and the Americans were already working within this concept. And Kotin and Wiebicke understood this back in 1942.
            It's just that leaders always want records. And monsters – good and different ones.
            1. +2
              14 July 2026 18: 28
              Everyone, except A.A. Morozov. Both the British and the Americans were already working within this concept. And Kotin and Wiebicke understood this back in 1942.
              It's just that leaders always want records. And monsters – good and different ones.


              Are you saying that after World War II, neither the British nor the Americans designed monstrous designs to combat Soviet heavy tanks?
              1. -1
                14 July 2026 18: 39
                They didn't let me out. And that's the main thing.
                And no one forbade experimentation.
                1. +2
                  14 July 2026 18: 58
                  So, what kind of monsters were mass-produced in the Soviet Union?
                  IS-3?
                  IS-4?
                  T-10?
                  If no one has forbidden or is not forbidden to experiment.
                  1. -8
                    15 July 2026 06: 27
                    So, what kind of monsters were mass-produced in the Soviet Union?

                    The biggest fail is the IS-3.
                    Low-tech, capricious, tactically poor.
                    The IS-4 is a 64-ton nightmare, with a pathetic gun, but the mechanical part is interesting.
                    The T-10 was outdated by the time it was built. The T-10M was a C-grade, maybe even a C-plus, effort to correct the IS-3's flaws.
                    In the early 50s, a tank was needed with a cast hull, multi-layer armor (where necessary), anti-nuclear protection, a gun stabilizer, a semi-automatic loader (charge in the cartridge case), a turret rangefinder, and a ballistic computer.
                    The question of the engine and transmission has two solutions: diesel and good mechanics on a linear tank, and a multi-fuel gas turbine engine and hydromechanical transmission on cruising vehicles.
                    The tank's weight and dimensions are limited by the Pullman platform.
                    In fact, the pair of T-72 and T-80 is a belated solution to this problem.
                    But the T-54/T-55A—the concept of "we'll throw corpses at them, a la the T-34"—interfered with everything. Reality denied the USSR the ability to wage war against NATO in Stalin's style.
                    1. +2
                      15 July 2026 11: 19
                      Excuse me, who was throwing corpses at whom? So, are you a follower of Solzhenitsyn and other Russophobes? Are you an enemy?
                      1. +1
                        15 July 2026 11: 39
                        If it’s an enemy, then why “forgive me”?
                        If June 1941 has taught us nothing, then let's go ahead and use up all the tanks in the border districts and continue from Brest to Moscow.
                        Seriously speaking, G.K. Zhukov himself denied the possibility of a repeat of the Vistula-Oder Offensive in the current post-war reality. Given NATO's vast superiority in manpower and industry, the only way to win in Europe is a preemptive attack and a blitzkrieg-style war. But the enemy's air superiority guarantees the annihilation of our tank columns, just like the Panzerwaffe-44.
                        Therefore, to implement the operation's plans, tanks must reach the Atlantic coast of France within three days. Airborne forces and tank strike units must be capable of such a pace of advance, while ground forces will spend a week blocking the main enemy groups and clearing the area as they advance.
                        Tanks like the T-54/T-55 are barely capable of fulfilling the second objective (with astronomical losses), but they won't be able to ensure rapid advancement. Now, study the history of WWII operations.
                        And we really did throw corpses at them. This happened in the Lutsk Triangle, near Rasseni, Voronezh, Zaporizhzhia, and many other places.
                        Medium tanks are cheap, but they are generators of mass graves.
                      2. +1
                        15 July 2026 21: 57
                        Reread your comment and realize what nonsense you are talking.
      3. 0
        14 July 2026 10: 39
        I can imagine what the Americans' eyes were like.


        And so they did. It's a well-known fact. At that time, the quality and quantity of tanks played a strategic role, so the Western forces—no longer practically allies—were forced to urgently adjust their plans. Although, as far as I understand, Operation Unthinkable had already been cancelled by the time of the parade.

        Separately, I was curious about how the cars ended up in the US. The author didn't seem to mention that.
      4. +2
        14 July 2026 11: 33
        Quote: Bearded
        The Americans call them new tanks. In fact, by that time they were already obsolete. Our design bureaus were working on creating new heavy and medium tanks.

        New tanks are actually the ones that are in the field, not in the design bureaus, but rather promising tanks. And the KV, which only began to enter service with the troops in 1940, was a completely new Soviet tank at the time.
        1. -1
          14 July 2026 23: 49
          Quote: 2 level advisor
          Quote: Bearded
          The Americans call them new tanks. In fact, by that time they were already obsolete. Our design bureaus were working on creating new heavy and medium tanks.

          New tanks are actually the ones that are in the field, not in the design bureaus, but rather promising tanks. And the KV, which only began to enter service with the troops in 1940, was a completely new Soviet tank at the time.

          Perhaps you're confusing it with the KV-1S? They're not the same thing.
          "Kvass" was much better than the KV-1 and was produced from July 1942.
    2. -5
      14 July 2026 16: 31
      An article about a tank called the KV-1, which never existed, not even remotely.
  2. -6
    14 July 2026 07: 32
    "Along with this tank model, a fairly complete set of photocopies of the drawings of its components and assemblies was received. However, many of them lacked dimensions, and SOME DRAWINGS WERE NOT RELEVANT TO THE SPECIFIC TESTED TANK." - and no need for spies - just a bunch of blueprints and off you go....

    Impressive
    1) gear with a ruler
    2) their translators - who translated "KV-1" as "KB-1" belay but THEN sorted out.
    3) honestly stolen torsion bar
    1. +6
      14 July 2026 11: 00
      A gear with a ruler was a rule of engineering photography of the time, used to provide a clear scale. In the photo of the tank itself, a ruler with feet and inches is used throughout.
      1. +1
        14 July 2026 11: 59
        Quote: Victor Leningradets
        Gear with a ruler

        Question not about the scale (this is obvious) - and the fact that gear CURVED in the plane, which is strange, to say the least. This is confirmed by the ruler in this case.
      2. +4
        14 July 2026 13: 12
        Quote: Victor Leningradets
        Gear with a ruler

        It's not a gear, it's a clutch. It's warped because it was overheated, and that's what caused it to warp. They were trying to smoothly turn the tank while it was moving, and that's what burned it out.
    2. +5
      14 July 2026 11: 23
      Quote: your1970
      "Along with this tank model, a fairly complete set of blueprints of its components and assemblies was received. However, many of them lacked dimensions, and SOME OF THE DRAWINGS WERE NOT RELEVANT TO THE SPECIFIC TESTED TANK." - no need for spies - just grab a bunch of blueprints and go...

      Rather, they cobbled together documentation from drawings of various KV variants. The resulting mess would drive any designer who tried to decipher it insane. smile
      In general, a single set of drawings for a specific model is something even our factories couldn't always obtain. I remember how STZ spent six months trying to get up-to-date drawings of the serial T-34 from KhPZ, which they were already supposed to be producing. Because from Kharkiv, they received drawings for the turret of one version and the hull of another, which didn't match. smile
      1. +1
        14 July 2026 12: 03
        Quote: Alexey RA
        I remember STZ spent six months trying to get up-to-date drawings of the serial T-34 from KhPZ, which they were already supposed to be producing. Because from Kharkiv, they received drawings of one version of the turret and another version of the hull, which didn't match.

        Yes, I read about this too - there is a tank, there is a plan, but no drawings...
        And for the PPSh or PPD (I don’t remember exactly) - the disks were adjusted individually.
      2. 0
        14 July 2026 18: 08
        Before the war, was STZ just as eager to provide T-26 drawings from Leningraders?
        Or did the Stalingraders try by all means to "dodge" the production of this tank?
        1. +3
          15 July 2026 10: 45
          Quote: hohol95
          Before the war, was STZ just as eager to provide T-26 drawings from Leningraders?

          Of course! And the situation was exactly the same: the main plant and its design bureau were constantly making changes to the T-26 design, which disrupted tooling production deadlines.
          Dies. 726 dies are required for cold-stamped parts, of which 567 have been designed as of July 15th. The remaining designs will be completed by September 1st of this year. The design was delayed due to ongoing changes to the tank's design by the Red Army's UMM and Plant No. 174, which remain ongoing. As a result, the drawings for a number of dies had to be changed.
          © Kolomiets
          Plus, there is a shortage of equipment, unfinished workshop equipment, and delays in the production of tooling at subcontractors.
          And once all of this had been more or less overcome, STZ realized the magnitude of the arctic fox they'd taken on. And they began trying by all means to ditch the T-26's serial production, employing the well-known tactic of "modernization and adapting the design to a specific plant." smile
          ...for 1935, the plant was given a production quota of 200 T-26 tanks, of which 115 were actually built. Apparently, this was the maximum annual output of T-26 tanks at STZ. No data on the number of tanks produced in 1936 has yet been found, but according to the author's information, the plant produced fewer tanks in 1936 than in 1935. Furthermore, starting in 1936, the STZ design bureau began designing its own tanks, which were developed on the basis of the T-26 and STZ-5 transport tractors. Between 1936 and 1939, the STZ design bureau produced prototypes of the 6 TK, 4 TG, STZ-25, and STZ-35 tanks, and also completed a number of combat vehicle designs using components of the STZ-5 tractor. The Stalingraders pushed their vehicles to the top, proposing to have them produced at STZ to replace the "foreign" T-26. Naturally, virtually no work was done to increase production of the latter.
          © Kolomiets

          The situation with the early T-34s was the same as with the early T-26s: KhPZ was constantly making changes to the documentation, failing to produce kits with Izms for Stalingrad.
          ...due to the heavy workload of expanding the production of the T-34, Kharkov Plant No. 183 was unable to send documents until the end of April 1940, and even then not in full - 1400 drawings out of the 3500 required.

          As a result, we've ended up with a situation where the turret is made using one Izm, and the hull is made using another. And the tooling and fixtures are completely unclear (TD was the biggest shortage). And Voltron isn't going anywhere. smile
          Stalingrad received a full set of KD and TD from Kharkov only in 1941.
          1. +1
            15 July 2026 20: 45
            Everyone tried their best...
            Both the military and the Leningraders, the Kharkovites and the Stalingraders!
            And modernization games are generally "worthy of an article."
            But probably no one was sent to cut down trees?
  3. +3
    14 July 2026 07: 59
    Quote: Victor Leningradets
    adjacent to the archaic transmission,

    And the reason for this archaism is the catastrophic shortage of gear-cutting machines.
    1. +3
      14 July 2026 09: 53
      Yes and no.
      Take a tractor gearbox and the gearbox of some Hispano-Suiza. Day and night!
      So the gearbox of the T-34 mod. 1942 and mod. 1943 are different eras for our tank building.
  4. +4
    14 July 2026 08: 02
    Quote: your1970
    ) honestly stolen torsion bar

    Torsion bar suspension, despite its structural simplicity, is very complex technologically.
    1. -4
      14 July 2026 09: 26
      What's so complicated about it? Heat treatment of the torsion shaft itself?
  5. +3
    14 July 2026 08: 13
    Yes, the tank was imperfect, but it was needed and had already done its job before 42. Lead designer of the KV-1, IS-2, and IS-3 Three times Hero of Socialist Labor Nikolai Leonidovich Dukhov Then he showed the Americans what he had to say by creating a hydrogen bomb based on the designs of our nuclear scientists. A brilliant designer can make both a tank and a bomb.
  6. +1
    14 July 2026 08: 58
    Interesting review, the air purifiers were especially intriguing. Overall, is the KV-1 combat-ready?
    1. +7
      14 July 2026 09: 13
      According to the Americans, no, just like the T-34. Based on experience from the first months of the war, both tanks—the KV and the T-34—were of very limited serviceability. Alas! The main problems were precisely with the air cleaners, gearboxes, clutches, and engine cooling.
      1. +5
        14 July 2026 11: 29
        Quote: Grossvater
        You! The main problems are air purifiers, gearboxes, clutches, and engine cooling.

        Yeah... regarding the T-34 main clutch, the GABTU wrote to the factory in 1941 that for some reason this unit was designed in such a way that its service life would not be enough to travel 200-300 km. And regarding the T-34 gearbox and the transmission in general, the verdict was given in Kubinka in 1942 - "design simplicity bought at a high price" (read - with the sweat and blood of tankers).
  7. +2
    14 July 2026 09: 09
    Quote: Victor Leningradets
    T-44 and its legacy

    T-54, T-55, T-62...
    1. -8
      14 July 2026 09: 41
      And how useful were they to us?!
      Before the appearance of the T-72-T-80 pair, a large-scale operation of our Armed Forces in Europe was simply impossible.
      Incidentally, G.K. Zhukov was fully aware of this when he was the Minister of Defense of the USSR.
      1. +3
        14 July 2026 11: 35
        Quote: Victor Leningradets
        And how useful were they to us?!

        How can I say... they fought all over the world, and even made their mark in the Central Military District... I wouldn't exactly call them useless.
      2. 0
        14 July 2026 14: 02
        The T-62 is actually a very capable vehicle. It has a barrel-launched ATGM and a fairly powerful gun. The lack of an automatic loader isn't such a serious drawback.
        And under Zhukov the T-62 didn’t exist yet.
      3. MSN
        -5
        14 July 2026 14: 36
        Without the T-72 and T-80 pairing, the evolution of tank design would have been simple, like T-64 -- T-80UD, and each new production vehicle wouldn't have increased the cost of the program. The larger the series, the cheaper the vehicle. But parochialism and the thirst for prizes and awards created a situation where we had three tanks, practically identical in performance characteristics, but completely different in production, spare parts kits, and military training institutes, and, consequently, three times more expensive than the T-64 program. This pairing of T-72 and T-80 did kill one country. It was called the USSR.
        1. -4
          14 July 2026 16: 59
          Are you sure it was a couple of T-72s and 80s that killed the country? Are you sure you're not mistaken? Or is today an open house at your establishment?
          1. MSN
            +1
            14 July 2026 21: 22
            Brilliant response. Not an ounce of constructiveness, and the very first post attempts to resort to insults.
            1. -4
              15 July 2026 08: 43
              Ukrainians, represented by you, continue to pull the blanket over themselves even during the war.
              It's fortunate that we were able to break Kharkiv's monopoly on tank production back then. How would we fight against yours now?
        2. +1
          15 July 2026 10: 29
          Quote: MSN
          Without the appearance of the T-72, 80 pair, the evolution of tank building would have been simple, like: T-64 -- T-80UD,

          And how would the Kharkiv T-64 have evolved into the Leningrad T-80, which would later be converted into the Kharkiv T-80UD? A chasm can't be bridged in two leaps.
          Without the appearance of the T-72, the evolution of tank building would have been An extremely complex scenario. Because in that case, the T-64 would have been distributed not to elite units, but to all tank regiments in all military districts—either in the basic version (Kharkiv) or in the simplified version (Tagil). And the flood of letters demanding improvements in such a scenario would have been much greater, which could well have led to a decision to hold a new MBT competition. And it's not a given that the GABTU would have chosen the Kharkiv-made vehicle again.
          1. MSN
            +2
            15 July 2026 11: 54
            This isn't about the Leningrad tank or any other tank, but about ensuring the proper combat readiness of the armored fighting vehicles and the economy. Each country should have only one main battle tank. Three, practically identical ones, mean three times more logistics and three times the cost.
            Regarding complaints, this is one of the components of endurance testing. The more complaints there are, the faster problem areas are identified and corrected. Which is indeed what happened. But not as quickly as we would have liked.
            How would the T-64 have become the T-80UD? Evolutionarily. Improving armor effectiveness isn't just a matter of Leningrad, but also the Steel Research Institute, Kharkiv Design Bureau, the same KB-3, and VNIITransMash. Would the suspension have been changed to resemble the T-80? Perhaps. The 6TD would have appeared much earlier, its performance would have improved, and the suspension would have needed work. One MBT, easier and cheaper to modernize.
            1. +1
              15 July 2026 12: 23
              Quote: MSN
              How would the T-64 have become the T-80UD? Evolutionarily. Improving armor effectiveness isn't just a matter for Leningrad, but also for the Steel Research Institute, Kharkiv Design Bureau, the same KB-3, and VNIITransmash. Would the suspension have been changed to the T-80 model? Perhaps. The 6TD would have appeared much earlier, its dynamics would have improved, and the suspension would have needed work. A single MBT would be easier and cheaper to upgrade.
              Without the Kirov Plant and the Ural UVZ, this evolution would not have happened. Just as the T-64 tank was once forced upon all tank factories, each one produced its own derivative. UVZ, after testing the T-64 at its own testing grounds, developed cracks in the tank's underbody (at the torsion bar attachment points), so it installed its own suspension (from Object 167) on its own version of the tank. They also installed its own automatic loader (lower in the side projection, and one of the advantages was that the driver always had access to the fighting compartment). At the Kirov Plant (Leningrad), it became clear that the T-64's suspension couldn't handle the engine's power (a 1000 hp turbine), so they developed their own suspension. The suspension proved very successful, and it was decided to develop a tank based on it and, again, produce it at all tank factories in the country. But with a cheaper engine (compared to the T-80's turbine). The Kirov plant proposed a T-80 variant with a 2V-16-2 engine (1200 hp, the ancestor of the one currently installed on the T-14), the Object 219R. Omsk proposed a T-80 variant with a diesel engine from the T-72 (Object 644, with a V-46-6 engine). And Kharkov offered the Object 478B [T-80UD "Bereza," T-84] (6TD engine). Then the country collapsed, and the T-80UD "Bereza" became Ukrainian, and a significant batch of this tank was sold to Pakistan.
              If the country had not fallen apart, perhaps they would have come to a single tank.
              1. MSN
                +2
                15 July 2026 15: 42
                How the production of the T-64 tank was once forced on all tank factories

                It's important to understand that "forced" is a bad thing, isn't it? But it wasn't Kharkov that imposed it, but rather USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No. 693-291. The same thing had previously been "forced" on factories to produce the T-34, T-54, and T-55.
                Without the Kirov Plant and the Ural UVZ, this evolution would not have happened.

                Of course it would have. Or rather, it would have been, without any woulds. The first two experimental T-64s (object 476) with 6TD-1 engines were produced in 1976. For the 2th Congress of the CPSU. And in 1983, the T-64BM with the 6TD-1 was accepted into service. But they were not produced. The T-80 got in the way. And in 1987, Kharkov began producing the T-80UD, again with the 6TD. Again: 1976, the first tanks with the 6TD-1, 11 years of disputes between the design bureau, the Central Committee, the Politburo, a change of defense ministers, and finally, in 1987, the T-80UD. I think evolution and modernization would have been an order of magnitude faster without the "couple" of T-72s and 80s. And an order of magnitude cheaper.
                UVZ, after testing the T-64 on its own testing grounds, developed cracks in the tank's bottom (where the torsion bars are attached), so it installed its own chassis (from Object 167) on its version of the tank.

                I've already written about complaints. This involves conducting resource tests and eliminating any issues that are noticed.
                1. +2
                  15 July 2026 17: 05
                  Quote: MSN
                  We need to understand that "imposed" is bad?
                  While the flawed T-64 was being put into production, UVZ was deciding which tank to build. UVZ proposed the Object 167 (whose chassis was later installed on the T-72, along with a V-26, 700-hp engine). But since it had already been decided that the T-64 would be the main tank, UVZ decided to produce a cheaper tank, the T-62 (Object 166), while it was being finalized. While the T64's flaws were being ironed out, 20000 T-62s were produced. If the Object 167 (and not the T-62) had gone into production, we would have immediately received a tank with combat capabilities quite comparable to the T64 (of course, if they were equipped with the same components, which was decided far above, not in the design bureau), but without the T-64's flaws (suspension, engine).
                  1. MSN
                    +1
                    15 July 2026 18: 20
                    UVZ proposed Object 167

                    Every factory has a vested interest in promoting its product. They'll push it, insist on it, force it, bribe it. They might even kill you, there's so much money involved...
                    There's just one simple procedure: adopting a main battle tank. That's it. It's adopted, and it's the only one. If this simple procedure doesn't work, and there are two main battle tanks at the same time, or (no, that doesn't happen) three!!!, then the conservatory is in trouble. The result: no conservatory.
            2. +1
              15 July 2026 15: 39
              Quote: MSN
              This isn't about the Leningrad tank or any other tank, but about ensuring the combat readiness of armored fighting vehicles and the economy. There should only be one MBT per country.

              No one disputes that. The problem is that, given the Ministry of Defense's appetite, creating a single MBT was practically impossible. The Ministry wanted both a powerful first-line tank and a cheap, mass-produced second-line tank—all on the same chassis. The T-64 was very difficult to simplify. And the T-72 wasn't even close to being a "first-line tank."
              Quote: MSN
              How would the T-64 have become the T-80UD? Evolutionarily.

              The T-80 is a profound evolution of the T-64, with only the gun and main battery remaining from the original model. Essentially, LKZ has rolled out a new tank. With no competitors, will Kharkov pursue such a project? Or will it squeeze every ounce of performance out of its design?
              1. MSN
                +2
                15 July 2026 16: 09
                The T-80 is a profound evolution of the T-64, with only the gun and magazine remaining from the original model. Essentially, LKZ rolled out a new tank.

                That's the whole problem. The tank is new, only in design. But its performance characteristics are the same. Better mobility, but only under certain conditions. Meanwhile, in 1976, the T-64 with its 6TD already existed, its power was equal, and the T-80's advantage was gone. But there's the cost of developing and launching a "new" tank.
              2. MSN
                +2
                15 July 2026 16: 27
                The T-64 was very difficult to simplify.

                Object 439. T-64A with B-46-3. Complete continuity in everything except the engine. But. You don't get State Prizes or awards for producing someone else's tank. That's why everyone was arguing... And the old men from the Central Committee were already busy. They got what they got.
              3. MSN
                +2
                15 July 2026 18: 00
                Without competitors, will Kharkiv pursue this? Or will it squeeze every ounce of performance out of its design?

                What can be known for sure? The 6TD would have appeared on the vehicle sometime in the mid-1970s, since the 6TD technical design was completed back in 1960. All the teething troubles were worked out on the 5 TDF, and the design of the 5TD and 6TD is identical. Plus one cylinder difference. The armor and fire control system would have been similar to those of existing tanks, since they were a response to emerging threats. M 111, M827, M829, L 15, L 23. FCS of the Leo 2, Abrams. The suspension would most likely have remained. Like on the Bulat. Object 477 is already on the way, why bother? Something like that.
                1. +2
                  15 July 2026 18: 58
                  Quote: MSN
                  The chassis would likely remain the same, like on the Bulat. Object 477 is already on its way.
                  The T-64's suspension was a dead end. Kharkov built its new T-84 tank on the T-80's suspension. Even the Object 477's later variants switched from the T-64's seven-wheel chassis to a seven-wheel chassis based on the T-80's.
                  1. MSN
                    +1
                    15 July 2026 20: 29
                    No, it's not a dead end. A lacy track with small, non-rubberized rollers is the best in slush and muddy conditions in terms of self-cleaning and maneuverability. It's the worst on concrete at top speeds. It's a matter of priorities. Each person needs what they need.
  8. +4
    14 July 2026 09: 41
    Quote: Sergey Alexandrovich
    What's so complicated about it? Heat treatment of the torsion shaft itself?

    Everything, starting with the rolling of the blank. Heat treatment is very complex: salt bath quenching, shot peening, and grinding. The torsion bar operates by twisting; take a piece of aluminum wire, try twisting it, and examine the surface.
    1. +4
      14 July 2026 09: 49
      Torsion bars are no more complex than other elastic elements, but they require a high level of manufacturing culture. For a country that has mastered the mass production of anti-aircraft guns, producing torsion bars is not a difficult task; simply adherence to the technology and heat treatment regimen is essential.
      1. +5
        14 July 2026 11: 22
        Not just no more difficult, but much simpler. It's just a matter of manufacturing technology. Torsion bars were, of course, made for the KV, IS, and light tanks, but industrial resources were also a factor. Vasily Semenovich, in his memoirs, describes a situation where the entire country couldn't find a spare carbide finger-shaped cutter. Not a workshop, not a machine. Just finger-sized cutters. They had to redesign the armored hull and create an intermediate casting to mount the T-34's observation devices.
        Yemelyanov and Novikov describe well the extreme stress and lack of reserves that industry faced during the war years.
        Look, Novikov redirected a couple of trains with coal to Izhevsk through Gosplan, and the destitute recipients started putting machine gunners on the brake platforms.
        That's why constant-mesh gearboxes, planetary steering mechanisms, and torsion bar suspensions on medium tanks all appeared towards the end of the war, when equipment availability became at least a little easier.
  9. +3
    14 July 2026 11: 14
    4. Point No. 19 – Determining the traction force on the hook

    While attempting to record this value, the water in the radiators boiled. The engine was retuned, but this stage of the test was not possible at that time.

    The problem is well-known. Testing of KV tanks in the summer of 1940 revealed that the tank's cooling system prevented the engine from fully utilizing its power:
    ...when driving on the highway, the U-7 tank reached a maximum speed of 24,3 km/h. The ability to achieve higher speeds and fully utilize the engine's power was limited by the water and oil temperatures in the cooling system, which reached 107 and 112 degrees Celsius, respectively.

    In general, the KV engine operated under the harshest conditions - on the one hand, it was "choked" by the air cleaner (low throughput + insufficient dust cleaning), and on the other - by the cooling system.

    LKZ did not correct any of the identified deficiencies, justifying this by saying that all comments would be taken into account on the heavy tank that would replace the KV in production.
  10. +2
    14 July 2026 11: 28
    Quote: Victor Leningradets
    For a country that has mastered the mass production of anti-aircraft guns

    So, the 61K and 72K barrels are suitable in length and diameter. 22+ of the former were made, while 4,5+ of the latter were produced. Let's assume 27. The T-34 has 10 road wheels on both sides. So, in place of these barrels, only 2700 torsion bar sets could have been made.
    1. +3
      14 July 2026 12: 44
      The technology is replicable once mastered. By the way, I didn't understand something about twisting aluminum wire: within the limits of elastic deformation, the behavior of solids is absolutely similar.
  11. 0
    14 July 2026 11: 40
    They made a decent machine, but they didn't work on the air purifier. Crews suffered, equipment malfunctioned, and combat readiness dropped.
    1. +4
      14 July 2026 12: 08
      Oh, oh, oh! What bad guys! Downright villains! Excuse me, but are you familiar with the concept of "technical refinement"? I understand, of course, electricity comes from the socket and water comes from the tap, but I recommend reading something on the topic and trying to understand the dire shortage of everything—equipment, raw materials, skilled engineers, and workers—the country endured in the pre-war years.
      As for tank engines, for comparison, I recommend reading Shirokoryadov's book, "The Cromwell Cruiser Tank: On the Edge of the Royal Sword," Moscow, 2017, Eksmo, Yauza.
      This is a circus with horses!
      No! The Americans never produced a proper tank engine by the end of the war, the British were basically scavenging used aircraft engines from the trash heaps, and the Germans' Panthers burned out without any assistance at Kursk (due to a design flaw, by the way).
      This is obviously normal. The USSR produced the world's first large-scale 50-ton tank in the shortest possible time, but no. Hare, why aren't you wearing a hat?
      1. 0
        14 July 2026 12: 52
        The USSR quickly produced the world's first large-scale 50-ton class tank.

        The only KV variant that justifies the existence of this series is the KV-14, also known as the SU-152. The others simply diverted resources from the T-34, which was truly needed in 1941-1942. So, the sharp reduction in KV production in the summer of 1942, while simultaneously focusing the plant on T-34 production, was absolutely the right decision.
        A massive heavy tank with powerful armament was actually needed in 1944 in connection with the Red Army's transition to a general offensive.
        Nevertheless, the KV was a necessary stage in the development of the Russian school of tank building.
    2. +5
      14 July 2026 12: 11
      The KV is a "good car" only as a concept.
      Considering the tank's weight is over 50 tons (not comparable to short American tanks, but quite comparable to our own, based on the winter 1941/1942 weighting), the vehicle's main drawback is its armament, which is incapable of combating field fortifications, let alone permanent ones. Its poor mobility and low reliability also contribute to its detriment.
      Moreover, all the issues could be resolved separately, but it was only in the IS series that the solutions could be brought together.
      A problem that still persists today is the dominant role of manufacturers in the development of military equipment. As a result, the opinions of both military personnel and designers are perceived as mere recommendations that, thanks to connections and connections within the ministry (or People's Commissariat), can be successfully ignored. And this is the blood of fallen tank crews.
      1. +3
        14 July 2026 14: 18
        If the KV had been initially designed with less armor than a medium tank, it would have been a much more successful, spacious, and technologically advanced vehicle compared to the T-34.
        The cramped T-34 hull with its coil springs inside turned out to be a dead-end solution for the layout.
        1. +3
          14 July 2026 14: 46
          I completely agree with you. The KV does have a good balance of weight, internally cushioned road wheels, and the ability to mount a massive turret. So, theoretically, switching to a modern transmission (Shashmurin was right about that!) and a proven diesel engine for boats could have yielded significant benefits. So would arming the tank with a 107mm gun with moderate ballistics.
          But what happened, happened. We approached the war with the slow-moving monster KV-2 and the poorly armed and unreliable KV-1.
          Then life forced the creation of a perfectly decent tank, the IS-2, but further development of this line was superseded by the ultra-fashionable IS-3 and its ilk. It would have been possible to create a fully developed, mass-produced main battle tank weighing around 50 tons as early as the late 40s.
          It's a pity!
        2. +1
          15 July 2026 10: 48
          Quote: Sergey Alexandrovich
          If the KV had been initially designed with less armor than a medium tank, it would have been a much more successful, spacious, and technologically advanced vehicle compared to the T-34.

          If the KV had been initially designed with a tank weight of 50 tons, then it would be a much more successful, spacious and more technologically advanced vehicle compared to the T-34.
          1. 0
            15 July 2026 11: 34
            It still wouldn't have been a very successful tank. The 520 hp of the B2 tank at the time was still insufficient for a heavy tank. Even the IS-3's power-to-weight ratio can't be considered satisfactory.
    3. +3
      14 July 2026 16: 01
      Quote: alberigo
      They made a good car, but they didn’t finish the air purifier.

      Hmm... the air cleaner was the least of the KV's problems.
      The KV's main problem, which could not be solved by any modernization, was that its suspension and chassis were originally designed for a 40-ton tank. To solve this problem (while still meeting the tank's protection requirements), it would indeed have been simpler to build a new tank.
  12. +2
    14 July 2026 13: 26
    On Stachek Avenue in St. Petersburg, an experimental KV-1-85 stands on a pedestal.
    This tank received an 85mm gun because the Nazis first used six Tiger tanks near Leningrad, three of which fell into the hands of Kirov Plant engineers, who were trying to figure out what to use to beat these cats. The answer was: definitely not the 76mm! It won't kill!
    But the anti-aircraft gun 85 takes it!
    Later, production of this tank model was transferred to Chelyabinsk (Leningrad was still under siege for a long time). This solution to the problem was very helpful to us in the battle of Prokhorovka, when the Tigers did not come as a surprise to us. By the end of the war, the 85mm found its way onto the T-34-85 medium tank, the victorious tank from the streets of Berlin and Prague.
    1. +4
      14 July 2026 14: 12
      During the war, the Kirov Plant was evacuated to Chelyabinsk. There, the KV-85 was developed as a temporary measure until the IS-85 arrived.
      The tank in Avtovo (about 1 km from my house) has had an interesting history. Designed as a base tank, it served as both the standard KV-85 and the experimental KV-122. Then, after the Leningrad Kirov Plant collection was destroyed, it was erected as a monument near the Krasnenkaya River. A turret from the standard IS-85 was mounted on it. The standard IS tank itself, with its KV-122 turret, is located on the grounds of the Kirov Plant, opposite the design bureau and a bust of Zh. Ya. Kotin.
  13. +2
    14 July 2026 19: 04
    A new method for connecting tracks has been developed. Each track section or plate has nine lugs, which are connected by a floating pin. The pin itself is held in place by small discs or lock washers, which in turn are held in place by a snap ring installed in the recess between the track eyes. This prevents a pin from falling out of the lugs in the event of a break, which could cause the track to break and immobilize the tank.
    From what I saw on the T-55 and T-62 tracks, this connection was significantly simplified.
    Firstly, from what I've seen on subsequent tracks (not the RMSh), the pin doesn't lock in place at all. The pin head is located on the tank's hull side, meaning the pin can only protrude toward the hull. Near the rear drive sprocket, there's a protrusion on the hull that retracts the protruding pin back into the track (the pin can't protrude too much from the track right away; there's no reason for it to). Over time, a groove develops in the pin (as in the photo in the article), and the pin can no longer be pulled out of the track.
    With the advent of the rubber-metal hinged track (RMH), the need for a pin stop disappeared (RMH pins are locked with a nut)
    1. 0
      15 July 2026 18: 42
      On the tracks with an open metal hinge (OMSh, not RMSh) of the T-55-T-62 tanks, a retaining ring made of round spring wire was mounted (in the groove of the pin) on the pin, in the gap behind the first external connecting hinge (eye) of the track, and not only the pin stop on the hull of these tanks worked.
      In the 1980s, I personally assembled and disassembled the tracks of these tanks (both with the OMSh and the RMSh).
      1. 0
        15 July 2026 19: 05
        Quote: pishchak
        On the tracks with an open metal hinge (OMSh, not RMSh) of the T-55-T-62 tanks, a retaining ring made of round spring wire was mounted (in the groove of the pin) on the pin, in the gap behind the first external connecting hinge (eye) of the track, and not only the pin stop on the hull of these tanks worked.
        In the 1980s, I personally assembled and disassembled the tracks of these tanks (both with the OMSh and the RMSh).
        In training, I had to do a track re-pinning. That is, a tank's track was removed and completely rolled out on concrete. Then a new pin was taken, placed against the pin of the unrolled track (on the side opposite the cap), and driven into the track. The new pin completely replaced the old one (the old one simply popped out the other side). And that's it, no additional wires, rings, or springs.
        96 tracks, correspondingly the same number of connections, pins.
        1. 0
          15 July 2026 19: 12
          Quote: Bad_gr
          96 tracks, correspondingly the same number of connections, pins.
          I didn't have time to add (editing time expired) that there are 2 caterpillars (which is logical, I just reminded you)
        2. 0
          16 July 2026 13: 02
          Quote: Bad_gr
          no additional wires, rings, springs.
          96 tracks, correspondingly the same number of connections, pins.
  14. +3
    14 July 2026 19: 50
    Quote: Sergey Alexandrovich
    The T-62 is actually a very capable vehicle. It has a barrel-launched ATGM and a fairly powerful gun. The lack of an automatic loader isn't such a serious drawback.
    And under Zhukov the T-62 didn’t exist yet.


    An automatic loader for the T-62 was developed (the "Acorn" theme), but it did not go into production (actually it did, but for the T-72).