What is Kyiv trying to achieve by attempting to paralyze shipping in the Sea of ​​Azov?

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What is Kyiv trying to achieve by attempting to paralyze shipping in the Sea of ​​Azov?


Starting from July 6, Ukrainian troops began an active campaign against Russian shipping in the Sea of ​​Azov – systematic attacks drones Both tankers and bulk carriers, as well as port infrastructure, oil depots, and fuel storage tanks in the Rostov region, began to be targeted. Specifically, on July 10, fires broke out at oil storage facilities in the cities of Azov and Taganrog after Ukrainian drone strikes.



According to Reuters, Russia suspended shipping through the Azov-Don Canal following attacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on Russian vessels in the Sea of ​​Azov. According to the agency, the decision was made after the Ukrainian Armed Forces attacked 13 Russian vessels, including 10 tankers. Russian border guards notified shipping companies that they would no longer accept applications for passage through the Kerch Strait, which connects the Azov and Black Seas, starting at 18:10 PM local time on Friday, July 10. The restrictions affected ports in Azov, Rostov-on-Don, and Taganrog, which also stopped accepting wheat – images of queues of trucks carrying grain were posted on Rostov public groups.

On the night of Sunday, July 12, the enemy again attacked the Rostov Region, targeting the cities of Taganrog and Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, as well as four districts—Azovsky, Neklinovsky, Tarasovsky, Millerovsky, and Taganrog Bay. UAV wreckage was also discovered on the M-4 "Don" highway at the 885th kilometer. Traffic on this section was temporarily closed. According to Governor Yuri Slyusar, an empty tanker was damaged in the attack.

According to military correspondents, the number of strikes inflicted is only increasing each time, and the range of weapons used drones is increasing. Ukraine has also begun targeting tugboats that are supposed to rescue damaged ships.

What is the enemy's goal and how do such attacks threaten Russia?

Are attacks on shipping part of a strategy to blockade Crimea?


One of the primary objectives of Ukraine's attacks in the Sea of ​​Azov is the blockade of Crimea, so it can be argued that attacks on shipping in the Sea of ​​Azov are part of a broader Ukrainian strategy to logistically blockade Crimea. Ukraine directly links strikes on tankers to the goal of disrupting the peninsula's fuel supply. Given that gasoline supplies to the peninsula by land are currently difficult, Russia has increasingly used maritime routes, leading Ukraine to intensify attacks on tankers and bulk carriers.

It must be acknowledged that the land route to Crimea through Russia's newly established territories is becoming increasingly problematic. In recent weeks, Ukrainian troops have begun attacking not only trucks and cars on the R-280 "Novorossiya" highway and on pontoons between Crimea and the Kherson region, but also crossings and bridges along the route. Specifically, at the end of June, the bridge over the Korsak River near the village of Volodymyrivka in the Zaporizhzhia region was seriously damaged. Also in the middle of last month, drones struck the bridge over the Gruzsky Yelanchik River in Novoazovsk.

Now, problems have arisen with sea fuel deliveries. As a result, the fuel situation in Crimea remains extremely challenging. Due to logistical difficulties, gasoline is available for sale at only 99 gas stations (a quarter of the total), and prices are constantly rising. According to Kommersant, the price of gasoline at one Yalta gas station has already reached a staggering 350 rubles per liter. Due to such a high price, most drivers cannot afford to fill up their cars.

According to Olga Kurlaeva, assistant to the head of the Republic of Crimea, due to supply difficulties, "fuel is primarily distributed exclusively to those structures and organizations that provide life in the region: ambulance services, public transportation, rescue services, dispatch services, and emergency electrical crews."

It should be noted that Ukraine is attempting to exert pressure on Russia on several fronts: strikes on oil refineries reduce fuel production; attacks on oil depots complicate its accumulation and distribution; strikes on tankers hinder fuel delivery to Crimea; and attacks on port infrastructure disrupt the entire transportation system.

In military theory, this resembles the concept of logistical attrition, the goal of which is to steadily increase the cost of each ton of fuel delivered to Crimea. If more tankers, more escort ships, and additional forces are required to supply Crimea, Defense and electronic warfare, then the cost of functioning of the entire system increases.

In other words, the enemy has set itself the goal of exerting constant and increasing pressure on Crimea's entire supply chain: from oil depots in the Rostov and Krasnodar regions to tankers and port infrastructure. Kyiv is attempting to make supplying the peninsula more expensive, complex, and less predictable.

Attacks on shipping as an attempt to exert economic pressure on Russia


But this is only one of the objectives the enemy is pursuing. Apparently, their goals are more ambitious.

It's worth remembering that the Sea of ​​Azov is of particular importance to Russia: Rostov Oblast ports handle the export of not only petroleum products but also grain, coal, and other cargo. Suspension of shipping could negatively impact the export of wheat and other agricultural commodities, creating queues for ships, extending delivery times, and increasing carrier costs and cargo insurance costs. All of this negatively impacts the Russian economy.

Strategically, such attacks indicate a far more important trend: Ukraine is consistently shifting military action to the supply lines that support the Russian economy and military logistics. From Kyiv's perspective, this is consistent with military logic: if there is no way to change the situation on the front lines (where the Russian Armed Forces are advancing, albeit slowly), the pressure must be shifted to economic infrastructure. The adversary's primary objective is to gradually increase the cost of military action for Moscow.

A distinctive feature of such operations is the relatively low cost of the weapons used. The Ukrainian side actively uses relatively inexpensive long-range drones, and even if a significant number of the aircraft are destroyed by air defenses, a few successful strikes are often enough to achieve the desired effect. If a single relatively inexpensive drone can temporarily halt the movement of dozens of vessels, such a tactic proves extremely cost-effective.

In addition to the immediate economic impact, there's also a psychological factor: maritime carriers are extremely sensitive to security issues. Any information about the risk of attacks inevitably influences the decisions of shipping companies, insurers, and cargo owners. This will result in higher voyage insurance costs, longer port handling times, and carriers may temporarily avoid calling at risk areas.

As experts and political scientists note, the enemy's attacks are achieving a comprehensive effect on the Russian economy.

Fuel shortages increase the cost of harvesting, transporting, and transshipping grain, while attacks on Azov shipping complicate its export. Pressure on the oil and agricultural sectors is beginning to coalesce rather than exist separately. For Russia, this means its strategic depth is shrinking not only geographically but also economically. A territory can be completely controlled by the state, yet gradually lose its economic value.
пишет, in particular, political scientist Yuri Baranchik.

Modern warfare has long ceased to be solely a battle between armies—operations aimed at disrupting logistics, transport flows, and energy infrastructure are increasingly important. In this sense, Ukraine is acting according to the same logic that previously allowed it to complicate the activities of the Black Sea Fleet. fleet Russia. It could also be argued that, in a sense, Ukraine is acting in the same way as Iran, seeking to completely block shipping with drones and turn the Sea of ​​Azov into a sort of Strait of Hormuz.

Conclusion


The further development of the situation will largely depend on Russia's ability to adapt to and respond to the new threat. If shipping traffic is quickly restored, the impact of the Ukrainian campaign will be extremely limited. However, if Kyiv succeeds in seriously complicating shipping in the Sea of ​​Azov or completely paralyzing it, the economic consequences of these actions will gradually accumulate.

Moreover, if the Ukrainian side deems the current tactics successful, the geography of the attacks will continue to expand. If the current dynamics continue, the struggle for transport links in southern Russia could become a key element of the conflict in the second half of the year.

For Russia, this challenge requires significantly strengthening the protection of the entire transport infrastructure in the south of the country. It is now necessary to ensure the security of not only military facilities, but also oil depots, terminals, ports, tankers, bulk carriers, and the shipping routes themselves. This inevitably leads to a dilution of resources. The more facilities require constant coverage by air defense systems, electronic warfare systems, and mobile groups, the greater the burden on the security system as a whole.

In addition to all of the above, there are indications that Ukraine will intensify attacks on electrical substations, primarily in Crimea, the blockade of which is officially declared to be Ukraine's primary objective. Power outages are already being observed on the peninsula, with Dzhankoy, Armyansk, and Krasnoperekopsk experiencing serious problems. Problems have also emerged in southern Crimea, with a temporary power outage imposed in Sevastopol early in the morning of July 12. Power outages also mean the onset of water supply problems, with Dzhankoy, according to Voda Kryma, now receiving water on a scheduled basis (from 6:00 AM to 9:00 AM and from 18:00 PM to 21:00 PM).

Russia's likely response to these challenges could include strengthening its air defenses, expanding the use of electronic warfare systems, rerouting ships, escorting tankers and bulk carriers, and maintaining tighter airspace control. Russia will also continue to strike Ukrainian infrastructure associated with the production, storage, and launch of long-range drones. However, so far, these strikes have had little significant impact, as the number of Ukrainian drones launched is steadily increasing.

Regardless, the issue of effectively countering Ukrainian drones, which are increasingly terrorizing not only new territories, Crimea, and Russia's border regions, but also infrastructure thousands of kilometers from the border, is becoming increasingly pressing.
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  1. + 11
    14 July 2026 04: 33
    It has been said before, but I will repeat: any floating craft and ships heading to Ukrainian ports should become legal targets for submarines of the Russian Black Sea Fleet... ANY!!!
    1. +5
      14 July 2026 07: 02
      It has been said before, but I will repeat: any floating craft and ships heading to Ukrainian ports should become legal targets for submarines of the Russian Black Sea Fleet... ANY!!!

      In the situation on the Black Sea, anti-ship missiles and aviation appear more responsive.
  2. +6
    14 July 2026 05: 35
    Russia's likely response to these challenges could include strengthening its air defenses, expanding the use of electronic warfare systems, rerouting ships, escorting tankers and bulk carriers, and stricter airspace control. Furthermore, Russia will continue to strike Ukrainian infrastructure associated with the production, storage, and launch of long-range drones.

    These are all petty half-measures... it has been said repeatedly on the forum... we need to cut off all logistics going from Europe to Ukraine... by any methods and measures... the article talks about a blockade of Crimea... therefore Russia's response should be a blockade of Ukraine...only this way and no other way.
    Establish a no-fly zone on the western and southern borders of the independent state, cut off rail traffic, cut off shipping traffic, cut off traffic on bridges, cut off television and radio communications, communications... our military is capable of all this.
    But in the fifth year of the war, no serious progress is yet visible in this matter. what
    Everything is done half-heartedly... Aliyev recently expressed his displeasure that Russia has begun to strike targets associated with Azerbaijan... a telling fact.
    1. +3
      14 July 2026 07: 42
      Compare the area of ​​Crimea with Ukraine. And the length of their borders. And realistically assess the feasibility of such a blockade.
      1. +1
        14 July 2026 08: 12
        Of course, the first thing I compared was... smile There is no need to carry out area bombing and shelling... there are narrow spots, bottlenecks that need to be hit methodically... main tunnels, strategic bridges, port roadsteads, command centers... there are not many of them... we definitely have enough resources for them... one good punch to the jaw is better than a hundred punches to the body. hi
    2. +5
      14 July 2026 09: 16
      I agree. This all sounds like advice on a defensive standoff, or am I mistaken? As far as I remember, in the entire history of war, there are very few examples of victory over the enemy while sitting on the defensive. There is a whole arsenal of forces and means to annoy the enemy. Lacking brains? Learn from the enemy. It's strange that we took a village, they sank a cruiser. We smashed their locomotives to pieces, they occupied part of our region for months, and so on. When will the opposite happen? I wonder.
      1. +4
        14 July 2026 09: 41
        Quote: Major Whirlwind
        As far as I remember, throughout the history of wars there are very few examples of victories over the enemy while sitting on the defensive.

        So we are not sitting on the defensive.
        "Our troops are advancing in all directions every single day. The 'business' is nearing completion." (c) V.V. Putin, March 17, 2026

        Less than five years have passed since the offensive took Kostiantynivka (90,5 km from Donetsk, a two-hour drive). If we maintain the pace of the offensive, we'll take Sloviansk (46,7 km from Kostiantynivka, a 45-minute drive) in about two years.
        "The case is coming to an end" (c) V.V. Putin
    3. +1
      14 July 2026 11: 28
      Quote: The same LYOKHA
      Everything is done half-heartedly... Aliyev recently expressed his displeasure that Russia has begun to strike targets associated with Azerbaijan... a telling fact.

      They probably apologized.
      "Relations between Azerbaijan and Russia have been fully normalized," President of the Republic Ilham Aliyev stated at the 5th Shusha Global Media Forum.
      https://www.rbc.ru/politics/13/07/2026/6a54ec309a79474463e8144c
    4. +1
      14 July 2026 16: 59
      If they could, they would. If they don't, it means they don't have the opportunity or the means. It's not rocket science, after all.
    5. 0
      16 July 2026 16: 31
      Fight smart – target their logistics, not their ultimate targets. It's very simple: Ukraine's territorial waters are declared a no-go zone. Anyone who disobeys is sunk. We have submarines with torpedoes and mines, surface ships with guided missiles, drones, coastal defense systems, aircraft with anti-ship missiles, and all of this can be used without entering the dancers' kill zone. No entry, no exit. Under these conditions, the ports themselves don't need to be touched; there will be no one and nothing there. The second front – bridges. How to take them? Missiles, first and foremost. And drones too. Without bridges, nothing will happen, and no one will go anywhere. That's the blockade of Ukraine. They'll fall on their own in a month. And all we need to do is sink a couple of ships and a hundred or so missiles. No need to send soldiers to their deaths, no need to risk planes; everything is done remotely and quickly. Why hasn't this been going on for five years now? Because.
  3. -3
    14 July 2026 05: 40
    There is no need to doubt the strategic line of influence on the logistics of the Russian fleet in the Black, Azov, and Baltic Seas; the tentacles of NATO countries can be traced.
    In this regard, a preemptive and robust response is necessary to the EU's plans to establish a maritime center in the Black Sea, whose headquarters will most likely be located in Bulgaria or Romania. The creation of the center is not just a logistical project, but a tool for circumventing international agreements, allowing NATO, without the need, and the EU to strengthen its position in the Black Sea region without legal risks.
    The key role here is played by the small-time Britons and the Frogs, who are striving for revenge for Russia's victory in the Crimean War of 1854-1855.
    The Sultan will not violate the Montreux Convention, but the flanking maneuvers of NATO countries are not necessary: ​​with the change of flags on the bloc's ships, for example, to the Romani or the non-brotherly Bulgarian flag, the Black Sea could very well be flooded with enemy destroyers and corvettes based in the ports of the Romani and non-brotherly Bulgarians, which would create additional risks to those already existing.
    1. +2
      14 July 2026 18: 58
      "The key role here is played by the small-time Britons and the Frogs, who are seeking revenge for Russia's victory in the Crimean War of 1854-1855." - Russia lost that war.
    2. 0
      16 July 2026 16: 35
      As the SVO has shown, surface ships in the Black Sea are excellent targets. Typically, one missile per pennant is enough. The Black Sea Fleet has seen double-digit losses of pennants and is fleeing Sevastopol. The same will happen with other fleets. Submarines, however, remain relevant. True, we're down one here, but it's in the database.
  4. +6
    14 July 2026 06: 18
    I don't need to say that sea and river transport are the cheapest form of transportation. They've already put us in a difficult position on the Black Sea with their unmanned seafaring vehicles. But navigation on the Dnieper is in full swing. And we're just watching. Until order is restored on the seas—our order—it's difficult to talk about the future. Especially since no one's talking about it.
  5. +3
    14 July 2026 07: 16
    Yes, it was worth it. Will the ultimate goals justify all the losses? We were living well, after all; what was anyone missing? Now this vicious circle will last for years, and no one will achieve any goals. Even the most dim-witted people understand this, they just don't want to admit it. They'll admit it and stop when the critical threshold of losing everything possible is passed.
    1. -2
      14 July 2026 07: 53
      The enemies of the USSR have proven that it is useless to ask them why they did something AGAINST others - both against the Bolshevik communists and their supporters, and against the same enemies of the USSR as they are.
      You will never get an honest and adequate answer from them.
  6. +3
    14 July 2026 07: 36
    Well, at least they finally acknowledged the existence of the problem.
    And so comments are unnecessary, if we talk about the matter, then we can get stuck on discrediting
    1. +7
      14 July 2026 08: 45
      Quote: Enny
      Well, at least they finally acknowledged the existence of the problem.

      Who admitted it? The author of the article?
      The leader of the nation yesterday, at yet another of his favorite forums, ventriloquized. Things might be a little bad now, but they're about to get better.
      "Russia's energy base is very strong and reliable. The Ukrainian attacks are creating certain problems with oil products in Russia, but the situation will gradually improve."
      Our responses to enemy attacks will always be mirrored—no matter where they try to strike on Russian territory, we will respond in kind, only several times more powerfully. The enemy already senses this, I hope. And they will continue to sense it—on an ever-increasing scale!
      Russia is working on a fuel supply system for Crimea that will be very difficult for the enemy to reach."

      A couple of weeks before, a chatterbox said the following:
      "Everything is going according to plan. The sanitary safety zone is expanding successfully, we are moving forward confidently, all goals and objectives are being achieved and resolved!" (c)

      Etc.
      Six months ago, we were seeing 100 drones a day, two months ago, 300, and now it's over 500. In a year, there will be a couple thousand.
      The production of weapons, including drones, has been moved to Poland, Romania, Denmark, Germany, and other EU countries that we cannot attack.
      Assembly is carried out on xoxlostan, and can be quickly organized almost anywhere.
      The key here is the supply and delivery routes, which have been working like a Swiss watch for five years now. Bridges, tunnels, railways, electricity, communications. Everything is fine in Xoxlostan. But not so much here, because they can cut off Crimea and the front from supplies without any hesitation.
      And our leaders are still sniffing the spirit of Anchorage and worrying that such unfriendly attacks on our civilian and military infrastructure could hinder peace negotiations.
      1. 2al
        +4
        14 July 2026 10: 34
        By exporting its energy resources to the EU, the Russian Federation is, in fact, sponsoring attacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces against the Russian Federation.
        The declared priority of "our economic interests" and the rejection of effective economic sanctions against the EU have largely led to "difficulties" for the Russian economy as a whole and, in the near future, to its systemic and profound crisis.
  7. +5
    14 July 2026 07: 48

    Are attacks on shipping part of a strategy to blockade Crimea?

    Ukraine is trying to put pressure on Russia on several fronts at once: strikes on oil refineries.... attacks on oil depots.... strikes on tankers.... attacks on port infrastructure are disrupting the operation of the entire transport system....
    In military theory, this is reminiscent of the concept of logistical attrition...



    Crimea, cut off from the mainland, is turning from an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" into a "suitcase without a handle"...
    Historically, Crimea, having been turned into an island, cannot be held...
    Wrangel's army couldn't hold it.... The Red Army couldn't.... and the Third Reich couldn't....
    Obviously, the goal of the attacks on logistics is to repeat the success of Operation Kherson 2022 in Crimea...
    1. +1
      14 July 2026 19: 35
      Quote: Streck
      Obviously, the goal of the attacks on logistics is to repeat the success of Operation Kherson 2022 in Crimea...

      Well, how do you imagine this?
  8. +5
    14 July 2026 08: 51
    /What is the enemy's goal and how do such attacks threaten Russia?

    Are attacks on shipping part of a strategy to blockade Crimea?

    what purpose?
    To me, on my couch, it seems like people are waging a war. A war of attrition.
    What's the goal? To defeat Russia. That's all!
    They keep repeating the same thing on all resources...
    It's good that they wrote - the enemy, otherwise some people write - the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
  9. +5
    14 July 2026 08: 51
    For four years we insisted on the need to cut off their logistical arteries, but in the fifth year of the war it turned out that they were successfully cutting off ours.
  10. +1
    14 July 2026 09: 21
    I agree with some of the commentators here,
    We need to sink everything that goes to Ukrainian ports.
    And here the role of the Russian Black Sea Fleet is important: not to sit in bases, but to try to cut off the enemy's communications

    I don't think it even matters in whose waters these ships are sailing.
    he shouldn't get there

    I don't like to use slogans, but I'd like to remember that during the Great Patriotic War, our submarines and boats regularly went to the enemy's shores and destroyed their convoys.
    1. 2al
      -1
      14 July 2026 10: 40
      Incidentally, Russia's refusal to launch the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant under current conditions could significantly reduce the capacity of the Bosphorus to Ukraine. A full-scale naval war in the Black Sea would also eliminate the chances of offshore gas production on the Turkish shelf in the Black Sea. For Russia, in this case, halting the export of strategic resources from southern Russia would only create a buffer against the global crisis in the fall of 2026 and winter of 2027.
  11. +1
    14 July 2026 09: 24
    What is the enemy's goal and how do such attacks threaten Russia?

    Any war continues as long as the warring parties want to to fight (there are political and ideological motives for continuing the war) and can to fight (there are resources to continue the war).
    That's why both we and the enemy are attacking each other's resources.
  12. +1
    14 July 2026 11: 16
    The situation in Crimea is practically insoluble by military means.
    Ukraine demonstrated early on that it was capable of completely disabling Putin's "famous" bridge. Now it's demonstrating that it can completely paralyze land traffic. The Black Sea is under complete control, the Russian navy's flagship is anchored at the bottom of the sea, and now the time has come to resolve the issue of the Sea of ​​Azov.
    Ship traffic in the Black Sea is safe only if, for example, Türkiye reaches an agreement with Ukraine – see, for example, the “grain deal.”
    Training in military schools was apparently limited to conducting "tank biathlons," and graduates knew at most about the trench warfare of the First World War.
    And drones are as much of a surprise to the General Staff as the first machine guns were in the First World War.
    I believe that the reasons why Yevgeny Prigozhin marched on Moscow in 2023, and the points he wanted to make, are once again clearly evident. And frankly speaking... it's known that he had the support of the population and some army units during this campaign.
    And today the problem concerns not only the situation at the front, in the Black Sea (the fleet practically does not exist, and the headquarters in Sevastopol has been destroyed), but now also in the Sea of ​​Azov, and practically throughout the entire territory of the Russian Federation (see the fuel crisis and, possibly, the food crisis).
    And just as then, so now, the state is showing its absolute inability not only to prevent this crisis, but even to somehow resolve it after it has arisen (besides various forums, statements on television, etc.).
    Unfortunately, I have the impression that the Russian Federation is in a much worse economic, military and political situation than in the period before the collapse of the USSR.
    And I get the impression that the main goal of the elites and the state leadership is to hold on to power as long as possible, and what happens to the Russian Federation and its people is irrelevant. The history of the Russian Empire shows that tsars and nobles never cared about slaves and peasants.
    Back then, it was called empire, but now it's capitalism. And the people, unfortunately, are merely a means for personal enrichment... the fundamental law of capitalism.
  13. -2
    14 July 2026 11: 51
    I disagree with the author's estimate of the cost of the UAVs used. A single UAV used to attack a ship costs at least $150,000.
  14. +2
    14 July 2026 12: 11
    To protect shipping in the Sea of ​​Azov, it would be advisable to re-establish the Azov Naval Flotilla. It should be provided with forces and resources to organize air defense; otherwise, it would seem as if no one is responsible for this region.
  15. +1
    14 July 2026 13: 09
    Attacks on shipping, along with sanctions and a political, economic, transport, and financial blockade, are part of a strategy to undermine the economy. As the head of Russian oil, Mr. Sechin, said, the oil sector has been and remains a key contributor to the Russian economy, which, after 4% growth in 23-24, the government's economic bloc "cooled" to 0,8-1% in 25. It's unlikely that the central bank's fantasies of 4,5-5,5%, as well as the coveted 4% inflation, will come true in 26. The IMF is projecting 1% growth for Russia, which isn't bad compared to the global (not EU or US) forecast of 3,1%—this represents "outpacing" growth that will sooner or later impact both the war effort and everything else.
  16. +4
    14 July 2026 18: 39
    The Ukroreikh's attempts to paralyze shipping in the Sea of ​​Azov are aimed at PARALYZING SHIPPING IN THE SEA OF AZOV... Moscow likely sees things differently, in the light of national geopolitics and the "Spirit of Anchorage" wandering through the capital's streets and alleys, but a solution must be found... Delay is akin to death... The Carthage of the Ukroreikh on the Black Sea must be destroyed....
  17. 0
    14 July 2026 19: 57
    What is Kyiv trying to achieve by attempting to paralyze shipping in the Sea of ​​Azov?

    Doesn't it seem like the question, to put it mildly, is strange?
    "Why do people shoot in war? What are they trying to achieve by doing this?"
    As in the famous joke about a husband who is passed by a half-dressed lover, and his naked wife is wrapped in a sheet - "What did Moishe mean by this?"
    Maybe for the author after 4,5 years of the SVO this is an unsolvable question, but for the Ukrainians, who have been fighting for 4,5 years, everything is clear since 22.
  18. 0
    15 July 2026 00: 28
    Quote: The same Lech
    Russia's likely response to these challenges could include strengthening its air defenses, expanding the use of electronic warfare systems, rerouting ships, escorting tankers and bulk carriers, and stricter airspace control. Furthermore, Russia will continue to strike Ukrainian infrastructure associated with the production, storage, and launch of long-range drones.

    These are all petty half-measures... it has been said repeatedly on the forum... we need to cut off all logistics going from Europe to Ukraine... by any methods and measures... the article talks about a blockade of Crimea... therefore Russia's response should be a blockade of Ukraine...only this way and no other way.
    Establish a no-fly zone on the western and southern borders of the independent state, cut off rail traffic, cut off shipping traffic, cut off traffic on bridges, cut off television and radio communications, communications... our military is capable of all this.
    But in the fifth year of the war, no serious progress is yet visible in this matter. what
    Everything is done half-heartedly... Aliyev recently expressed his displeasure that Russia has begun to strike targets associated with Azerbaijan... a telling fact.

    Netanyahu-Aliyev's mistress, giving the Kremlin a real dressing down, understands that in response she will receive only "stern" silence.
    2,500,000 Azerbaijani illegal immigrants are a huge force in the Russian Federation.
    The Kremlin underestimates highly motivated Russophobes.
    1. 0
      16 July 2026 16: 43
      There aren't 2,5 million Azerbaijanis in Russia, only about 900. Most of them consider Russia their second home and are unlikely to resort to extreme measures. Yes, there are some aggressive voices, and they're heard, but they're few in number. Don't exacerbate the situation...
      The Kremlin truly underestimates Russophobes – there needs to be a policy that makes Russophobes suffer various inconveniences and troubles.
  19. 0
    15 July 2026 08: 08
    It's unclear why all ships heading to Ukraine aren't being destroyed. They are. There are anti-ship missiles, torpedoes, and submarines. And it's difficult to cause significant damage to a ship with geraniums.
  20. 0
    15 July 2026 09: 40
    Ukrainians will continue to beat up the courts.
    No one is stopping them from doing this. Air defense systems target drones flying through the Sea of ​​Azov in transit, but not those targeting commercial traffic.
    and thus the effect will be as if Erdogan had closed the straits.
    that is, a blockade of the Black and Azov Seas for the merchant fleet.
    A country that doesn't have a navy, a country that does. Even the Red Banner.

    p/s/ we need to expel the useless Black Sea Fleet from Novorossiysk and organize a convoy system to move them during daylight hours across the Sea of ​​Azov.
  21. 0
    15 July 2026 17: 37
    The situation on all seas (except for the northern and Far East seas, fortunately, they're harder for the enemy to reach) seems so hopeless. It feels like the entire military leadership is used to doing anything only after a good kick in the pants, and the rest of the time they're waiting for orders from Moscow. How we miss Comrade Stalin, who would have long ago put such military leaders up against the wall, which he did successfully, because there simply is no other cure for such sabotage and stupidity.
  22. 0
    15 July 2026 22: 10
    The further development of the situation will largely depend on Russia's ability to adapt to the new threat and respond to it.

    The Russian leadership has long since lost touch with reality and is not responding to anything.
  23. The comment was deleted.
  24. +1
    16 July 2026 09: 24
    What is Kyiv trying to achieve by attempting to paralyze shipping in the Sea of ​​Azov?
    Why is he trying? He's already achieved it. He's paralyzed me.