The influence of distance on the firing efficiency of Russian and Japanese armored ships, using the Battle of Shantung as an example

In a series of articles devoted to the armored cruiser Bayan, considering a hypothetical one-on-one engagement between this ship and a Japanese armored cruiser, I concluded that the best course of action for the Russian cruiser would be to close to a range of less than 20 cables, where Bayan could capitalize on its advantage in armor-piercing shells. Obviously, the closer the range, the greater the accuracy expected from its guns, equipped with mechanical sights. On the other hand, the Japanese were also expected to be more accurate.

So let's take another look at how changing the firing ranges affected accuracy. artillery fire of the parties using the example of the battle of the main forces of the Russian and Japanese fleets at Shantung on July 28, 1904

Hit statistics

As is well known, the battle took place in two phases. In the first phase, the combat distances were significantly greater than in the second: they were so great that for most of the time, 6-inch guns couldn't fire, and the battle was fought only with guns of 8-inch and longer lengths. This suggests that for most of the time, the distance was significantly greater than 50 cable lengths. Meanwhile, the second phase began at approximately 45 cable lengths, and the distance decreased to 24 cable lengths, and in some places even less: in the case of the Retvizan, to 17 cable lengths. Of course, a distance of 17-45 cable lengths is not the same as less than 20 cable lengths, but it is still possible to discern a trend.

Back in 2021, I provided my esteemed readers with data on the number of hits on Russian and Japanese ships in each phase. I based my calculations on V. Polomoshnov's "Battle of July 28, 1904 (Battle in the Yellow Sea (Battle of Cape Shantung))," which breaks down the number of hits on Russian ships before and after 16.30:16.30 p.m. as follows:

However, I was interested in the hits sustained by both sides during the battle between the main forces, so I excluded those sustained by our cruisers after 18:45, when they attempted a breakthrough. I also cross-checked V. Polomoshnov's information with the reports of the 1st Pacific Squadron's ship commanders and the memoirs of N. N. Kuteinikov, who was responsible for repairs to these ships after the battle of July 28, 1904. Unfortunately, in a number of cases the data did not match, and since eyewitness reports are more reliable, I made adjustments—both for the total number of hits and for the phases of the battle.

As for the distribution of Russian hits on Japanese ships by phase, I had no source with which I could compare the data of the respected V. Polomoshnov, and I took the information he presented without any adjustments.

According to V. Polomoshnov, in the second phase, as the distance closed, the Russian squadron's fire was suppressed. Although the number of hits on Japanese ships increased slightly—14-15 versus 12—the heavy artillery's performance worsened—7-8 hits versus 11 in the first phase. Yet, only the heavy guns mattered: only 10-12-inch shells had a chance of inflicting decisive damage on the Japanese ships.

However, back in 2019, the respected naval_manual published an excellent work, "While She Can Be Navigated at All. Damage to the Battleship Mikasa in the Battle of Cape Shantung," and I overlooked it. The strength of naval_manual's data is that he used primary sources, such as the diagram and description of the Mikasa's damage, attached to the report of the ship's commander, Captain 1st Rank Ijichi Hikojiro. Meanwhile, V. Polomoshnov relied on secondary sources, such as N. Ogasavara, "Life of Admiral Togo," and Julian S. Corbett, "Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905," among others. Accordingly, the data presented by naval_manual should be considered more accurate. Adjusted for this, the table of hits on Japanese ships would look like this:

A few clarifications to the table. In the second phase, Mikasa was reliably hit (as far as can be counted, of course) by nine 10-12-inch shells, but there were two more hits that are questionable. The Japanese believe that the explosion in Mikasa's aft turret was caused by a large-caliber Russian shell hitting the barrel, distorting it, and triggering an accidental discharge due to the shock—the shell then exploded in the warped barrel. This may have been the case, but it may not have been, and the shell may have detonated on its own, without any impact from Russian artillery.

Next. Mikasa was hit by two shells of indeterminate caliber, both in the second phase. But one of them, estimated to be between 6 and 12 inches in caliber, was most likely, judging by the damage descriptions, a 10-inch "gift." If so, it should have been counted under "10-12 inches." Therefore, I listed 1-2 shells under "n/a," and 9-11 under "10-12 inches."

Furthermore, naval_manual expressed reasonable doubts about the existence of a 75mm shell hit. The ship's commander's report mentions it, but the medical report does not. Moreover, the losses caused by it are attributed to another hit, which caused the explosion of Japanese 76mm shells. Therefore, I have labeled it as hit 0-1.

So, the adjustments have been made, and the difference doesn't seem particularly significant. However, the statistics now lead to completely different conclusions than those drawn from V. Polomoshnov's data.

On the efficiency and accuracy of shooting

By firing accuracy, I'll mean hit percentage—that is, the ratio of hits on the enemy to the shells fired at them. And I'll measure effectiveness by the ability to achieve the highest number of hits, regardless of firing accuracy. So, if a ship demonstrated 5% accuracy and scored 3 hits in the first phase of combat, and 4% and scored 10 hits in the second phase (due to the use of more shells), then I'll say it was more accurate in the first phase and more effective in the second.

On the difficulties of analyzing the shooting accuracy of Russian and Japanese artillerymen at Shantung

There's nothing easier than determining firing accuracy when the number of shells expended and the number of hits on the enemy are known. But, unfortunately, we don't know, and will never know, the number of shells expended by each side in the first and second phases of the battle separately for each phase; this data is only available for individual ships. Perhaps, of course, in the "Top Secret" stories"Data on Japanese ships will be found someday, but there is absolutely nowhere to get it from on Russian ones.

At the same time, statistics on Japanese hits on Russian ships contain an excessively high proportion of shells whose caliber was not determined. These account for 65 out of 141 hits, or 46%, which, of course, makes it extremely difficult to assess the accuracy of Japanese guns of the same caliber. Russian hits are better "diagnosed"—the percentage of hits by shells whose caliber is difficult to determine is 17-22%.

I personally tend to believe that the overwhelming majority of "unknown caliber" shells were 6-8-inch shells, since a 10-12-inch shell would have been very "heavy" and would have caused extensive damage. Of course, such damage wasn't always significant, but it was still relatively easily recognizable. Furthermore, Russian shells produced relatively few large fragments, making them easier to identify.

In any case, it's important to remember that determining the caliber of shells that hit a ship is a very difficult task, and errors are always possible, even in cases where the shell's caliber seems to be clearly stated. Japanese sources are more complete, but they also contain inconsistencies even in the number of hits, which are easier to count than to determine the caliber of the shell that hit. And in our own country, caliber was often determined very roughly. While statistical data is certainly necessary—we have nothing else—it's still not advisable to regard it as the ultimate authority.

On the efficiency and accuracy of firing artillery with a caliber of 6-8 inch

The statistics above show that the number of hits by Japanese medium-caliber shells (6-8 inches) increased significantly in the 2nd phase. If we assume that the "8-inch and above" category actually refers to 8-inch shells and that all shells in the "n/a" category were 6-8 inches, which is likely very close to the truth, then the Japanese scored 17 hits with 6-8 inches in the 1st phase, and 70 such hits in the 2nd phase. A more than fourfold increase.

But, as I mentioned above, it's completely unclear how many medium-caliber shells the Japanese expended in the first phase and how many in the second. Yes, the two phases are quite comparable in time—the first lasted no more than 2 hours 35 minutes, the second 2 hours 15 minutes. It's also possible that there was a moment in the middle of the first phase when both sides stopped firing due to distance (after they had diverged on a countercourse). It's safe to assume that the Japanese 8-12-inch guns fired for comparable, if not identical, periods in both the first and second phases, but the same can't be said for their 6-inch guns.

Why? The fact is that the first phase was fought at much greater ranges than the second, meaning the 6-inch artillery was unable to engage for a significant portion of the battle. This is evidenced by the expenditure of 6-inch shells by three ships for which statistics for the battle phases are available.

The Japanese battleship Asahi fired only 57 6-inch shells in the first phase of the battle on July 28, 1904.

Considering that the total expenditure of 6-inch shells by the 7 Japanese armored ships that participated in the battle with the main forces of the Russian squadron (including the Yakumo) was 3592 shells, that is, an average of 513 shells per ship, it can be assumed that the Asahi spent no more than 11% of the shells of this caliber it fired in the first phase.

The Russian battleships also demonstrated a very low expenditure of 6-inch shells in the first phase; the Retvizan fired 82 (28%) of the 292 shells of this caliber it fired in the first phase, while the Sevastopol used 30 of 286 (10,5%). Here, the attentive reader will notice that my figures for total expenditure do not match those given by, for example, V. Polomoshnov, but this should not be surprising. I have excluded from the total expenditure of 6-inch shells by the Sevastopol and Retvizan segmented shells, which were obviously fired to repel destroyer attacks, but not at Japanese battleships.

It should also be noted that the distribution of shell consumption for Retvizan's 6-inch guns by phase cannot be directly applied to the Japanese battleships. This is because her 6-inch guns failed due to mechanical failures in both the first and second phases. In the first phase, two guns failed: one fired 8 shots, the other 21, but both were restored to service within an hour. In the second phase, three guns failed: after 8, 15, and 36 rounds, respectively. Accordingly, it can be said that two of the Retvizan's guns were out of action by the end of the first phase - the battleship had five 6-inch guns per side, and it is obvious that some of them either did not fire at all or fired only a few shots in the first phase - otherwise, it is impossible to explain the expenditure of 21 shells per gun with a total expenditure of 82 shells.

But by the beginning of the 2nd phase, all 5 guns were in action, and 210 shells had been fired - that is, the guns that broke on the 8th and 15th shot obviously failed at the beginning of the battle, which is why for most of it only 3 6-inch guns fired, and towards the end - only 2 at all.

Simply put, due to damage to the Retvizan's guns, many shells were unfired in the second phase. Had they been operational, the battleship would have expended far more 6-inch shells. And then the proportion of such shells expended in the first phase would have been lower than the actual 28%.

What conclusions can be drawn from the above? It can be assumed that in the first phase, both Russian and Japanese ships expended approximately 15% of their total 6-inch shells.

But in this case, the accuracy of the Japanese firing from 6-8-inch guns in phases turned out to be extremely interesting.

In total, Nisshin and Kasuga expended 307 8-inch shells in the Battle of the Yellow Sea. Let's assume that shell consumption was close to 50%—153 shells in the first phase and 154 in the second. Then the total consumption of 6-inch 8-inch shells in the first phase was 153 + 539 (15% of the total consumption of 6-inch shells) = 692 shells, and in the second phase—154 + 2874 = 3028 shells.

But then, taking into account that in the 1st phase a maximum of 17 hits were achieved, and in the 2nd - 70, it turns out that the accuracy of the Japanese firing from 6-8-inch caliber guns with a reduction in distance decreased and amounted to 2,46% in the 1st phase and only 2,18% in the 2nd phase.

But there's a slight twist here, too. The thing is, in Phase 2, when calculating accuracy, I used the shell consumption of H. Togo's 1st Battle Squadron. But they were joined by Yakumo, whose shell consumption I have no data on, so I didn't include them in the calculations. But in Phase 2, the 1st Battle Squadron averaged 505 medium-caliber shells per ship, and assuming Yakumo expended the same amount, that means the Japanese's 6-8-inch guns had an accuracy of only 1,98%!

So, did Japanese accuracy decline as the distance closed? Not quite, but here's the thing. The accuracy of 8-inch guns is usually higher than that of 6-inch guns. However, in Phase 1, the Japanese 6-inch guns fired little. Accordingly, we can say that in Phase 1, the accuracy of their fire was closer to that of the Japanese 8-inch guns, and in Phase 2, it was closer to that of their 6-inch guns. In other words, the accuracy of the 8-inch and 6-inch guns in Phase 2 remained roughly the same as in Phase 1, perhaps even increasing slightly. But due to the fact that the share of “more accurate” 8-inch shells in the 1st phase of the total number of fired 6-8-inch caliber shells was 17,6%, and in the 2nd phase – only 5%, it was precisely this reduction that reduced the overall accuracy of the 6-8-inch guns.

However, even taking into account all these considerations, one thing is absolutely clear - Oddly enough, the Japanese did not experience any noticeable increase in the accuracy of their 6-8 inch guns as the distances decreased.

As for the Russian squadron's battleships, things were much simpler, as they lacked 8-inch guns. The firing accuracy of 6-inch shells was approximately (assuming 15% of all 6-inch shells were expended in the first phase):

In the 1st phase - 0%, 347 shells expended, 0 hits achieved.

In the 2nd phase - 0,56%, 1967 shells were expended, 11 hits were achieved.

Of course, the accuracy of Russian 6-inch guns is much lower than that of Japanese 6-inch guns. However, it's still impossible to directly compare the 0,56% of Russian fire in the second phase with the 1,98% of Japanese fire. Firstly, the Japanese accuracy was "increased" by the use of more accurate 8-inch guns. Secondly, the calculated hit percentage for the Russians should be considered minimal, since some of the 1967 6-inch shells they fired were fired at cruisers after the main force had engaged, and probably at destroyers as well.

Taking this into account, the accuracy of Japanese 6-inch guns should be defined as less than 1,98%, and Russian ones - more than 0,56%, but by how much is absolutely impossible to say.

On the efficiency and accuracy of firing artillery with a caliber of 10-12 dm

Here, the Japanese also saw a significant increase in hits, though not as high as with 6-8-inch artillery. While they scored 20 hits on Russian ships with 10-12-inch shells in the first phase, they scored 33 in the second phase, a 1,65-fold increase. This ratio may be slightly worse if one or both hits classified as "8-inch or higher" were 10-12-inch shells, but even then, the hit rate increased by at least 1,5 times.

Let's now look at shell consumption. In total, the Japanese fleet fired 603 12-inch shells during the Battle of Shantung, or an average of 151 shells per battleship. Meanwhile, the Asahi fired 64 such shells during the first phase, or 42,4% of the average 12-inch shell consumption per battleship. But can this ratio be considered typical for other Japanese battleships?

This is unknown, and unfortunately, the statistics of Russian ships are unhelpful and don't show any trend. For example, the Retvizan expended 78 12-inch shells during the battle, 42 of which were fired in the first phase and, accordingly, 36 afterward.

But the fact is, Retvizan's statistics are completely unrepresentative. She entered the battle with only three operational 12-inch guns out of four, as the left gun in the forward turret was out of order—they were still installing the loading drum, which had failed during a reverse firing test on July 15. The gun was brought back into service during the battle, and by the beginning of the second phase it was operational, but exactly when is unclear to me.

However, it remained inactive for at least part of Phase 1, and according to naval_manual, the gun was unable to fire for the entire first phase. Moreover, at the very beginning of Phase 2 ("around 5:00 PM"), the Retvizan's bow turret sustained damage, rendering it inoperable. By the end of the battle, it was repaired, but it remained jammed, making horizontal aiming impossible. Ultimately, after sustaining damage, the turret fired only three shots, whenever the enemy happened to be in its line of fire.

It turns out that for part of the 1st phase (or the entire 1st phase), the Retvizan fired from 3 twelve-inch guns, and for most of the 2nd phase - from only 2 guns, and therefore its shell consumption by phase of the battle cannot be considered typical for the Russian squadron.

It's worth noting, however, that the number of serviceable 12-inch Retvizan guns in the 2nd phase decreased by approximately a third, while the number of shells expended decreased by roughly 15%. This indirectly confirms the Asahi statistics, which indicate that the Japanese expended more 10-12-inch shells in the 2nd phase than in the 1st.

The Sevastopol's statistics are even more remarkable. The ship fired a total of 78 12-inch shells in the battle, and according to naval_manual, only 7 such shells were expended in the first phase of the battle.

We can only speculate about the reasons for such a low expenditure of ammunition, but the following should be taken into account. First, the Sevastopol was at the tail of the Russian column and, before they diverged on counter-courses, was extremely far from the Japanese ships. At the beginning of the battle, the Japanese were beyond the range of its 12-inch guns; later, the direction of the Japanese was such that only the forward turret, which was missing one gun, could fire. It can also be assumed that the battleship's commander, von Essen, was wary of firing at extreme range, lest he damage the guns, as had happened earlier during the cross-fire.

Removing the damaged 12-inch gun from the Sevastopol

However, despite all of the above, the veracity of the data on the expenditure of seven 12-inch shells in the first phase is highly questionable. If this data is accurate, it would mean that the Sevastopol fired 71 12-inch shells in the second phase. The problem is that our battleships, which had no damage to their main guns and turrets, fired significantly fewer main gun shells during the battle than the Japanese. For example, the Tsarevich fired 104 12-inch shells, and the Pobeda fired 115 10-inch shells.

While the Tsesarevich's statistics aren't particularly revealing, as her crew was the least trained and she was disabled at the end of the second phase and likely unable to fire, the same can't be said for the Pobeda. The battleship suffered the least damage and remained in action until the end of the battle. But even her 115 shells are far inferior to the "average" output of Japanese battleships—and how can one believe that the Sevastopol outperformed them in the second phase? And yet, that would have been true, since the expenditure of 71 shells per 3 guns suggests that had the Sevastopol had all four 12-inch guns operational, she would have expended 94–95 12-inch shells in the second phase, while the Japanese battleships averaged 151 such shells in both phases!

Overall, the data on the Sevastopol's expenditure of seven 12-inch shells in the first phase appears dubious, and the data on the Retvizan's shell consumption, while not in doubt, cannot be extrapolated to the remaining ships of the squadron. Consequently, there is no data to construct any credible hypotheses regarding the expenditure of Russian 10-12-inch shells during the phases of the Battle of the Yellow Sea. At the same time, the data on the Asahi's shell consumption is insufficient to confidently assume similar large-caliber shell consumption for the Japanese fleet.

Therefore, it is completely impossible to estimate the change in the accuracy of Russian and Japanese guns with a caliber of 10-12 inch with decreasing distance.

However, there is one very important fact that can hardly be disputed. The effectiveness of large-caliber gunfire from the Russian and Japanese squadrons remained at the same level in the first and second phases. In the first phase, our gunners achieved one hit for every three Japanese (20 versus 7), and in the second phase, this ratio remained the same (33 versus 11).

Conclusions

From the obvious:

1. Of course, the Russian squadron lost the artillery competition - the Japanese scored many more hits on the Russian ships.

2. The reduction in distances in the 2nd phase predictably led to a multiple increase in the number of hits – both on Russian and Japanese ships.

3. The rate of increase in the number of hits by Russian artillery was slightly higher than that of the Japanese. In the 2nd phase, Russian ships were hit by 2,81 times more shells than in the 1st phase, while Japanese ships were hit by 3,21 times more shells. However, this is a low-base effect, as in the 1st phase, the Russian 6-inch guns failed to hit the enemy at all, while in the 2nd phase, they still managed to score some hits.

4. As the distance decreased, the effectiveness of Russian and Japanese guns of 10-12-inch caliber remained virtually unchanged - in both phases, for every 3 Japanese hits with shells of these calibers, there was one Russian hit.

Less obvious:

1. Despite a significant increase in hits on Russian ships in the second phase, the Japanese were unable to suppress Russian artillery. Yes, our gunners generally shot poorly, but their effectiveness increased at roughly the same rate as that of the Japanese as the distance decreased.

2. The Japanese did not demonstrate a sharp increase in the accuracy of fire with decreasing distance, while:

2.1 The increase in the number of hits by 6-inch caliber shells is explained primarily by the increase in the number of 6-inch shells expended in the 2nd phase, compared to the 1st;

2.2 The increase in hits with 10-12-inch shells could also, to some extent, be due to the increased number of shells expended. Simply put, while Japanese battleships fired an average of 64 12-inch shells per ship during the first phase (like the Asahi), they fired 256 shells in the first phase, and 347 in the second. In this case, firing accuracy increased from 7,81% in the first phase to 9,51% in the second phase, or a mere 1,21-fold increase.

5. Unfortunately, it is completely impossible to assess the increase in the accuracy and effectiveness of firing from 8-inch guns based on the available data.

In view of the above, there is no reason to believe that in a hypothetical battle between the Izumo or Nissin and the Bayan, one on one, the Japanese cruiser would have been able to suppress the artillery of the Russian ship during an approach to a distance of less than 20 cables.

P.S. Of course, the above conclusions could be challenged by the results of the Battle of Tsushima. But such a comparison would be invalid. Japanese gunners arrived at Tsushima with a wealth of experience under their belts—H. Togo's 1st Battle Squadron had fought the Port Arthur Squadron at Shantung, and H. Kamimura's 2nd Battle Squadron had fought the VOK cruisers in the Korea Strait. Then, after repairs, combat training resumed, and undoubtedly, Japanese ships in 1905 were able to fire significantly more accurately than in 1904. At the same time, when discussing the results of a hypothetical engagement between the Bayan and a single Japanese cruiser, I am considering the period of the first half of 1904, when the training of Japanese gunners was significantly lower than at the time of the Battle of Tsushima.

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Comments

[Jura 27]

Fortune telling on coffee grounds will be more accurate!

[Jura 27]

Quote from the previous post:

But "Bayan" should have kept a different distance:

- Either 19–22 cable lengths, at which both cruisers’ turrets and casemates are vulnerable, but their citadels are invulnerable;

1. The citadel at Bayan is short and does not include the cellars.
2. Based on more reliable data (i.e. from two or more sources), I calculated n/s=899 m/s for the Russian 8"/45 gun and armor for the Iwate KH (K=2200), not GN (K=2100).
On 20 artillery cable 8"/45 it penetrates only 146 mm of KH armor at normal angle and 127 mm at an angle of 25 degrees from the normal.
The 19th Artillery KBT is slightly better, but even at a small angle, it can't penetrate the 6" armor of the KH. If it's purely Krupp, then the Bayan is in a really bad way.
3. Completely forgotten is the six-inch artillery, which is more numerous than that of the Bayan, and which, at all real combat distances of the Russian Navy, easily penetrates the 60-mm casemates and belts of the Russian cruiser.

3. Speed. Like Bayan, he can choose the distance.

Thus, the Bayan was ahead of its opponent by approximately 2 knots, which means that it was the Bayan’s commander who, in a hypothetical clash with the Izumo, would determine the distance at which the battle would be conducted.

In reality, there are no two knots. Indeed, Iwate's sustained sea speed is 19 knots, which is 2 knots slower than Bayan's.
But the battle can't last for days; there simply won't be enough ammunition. And Iwate has two other speed settings, including a maximum short-term speed of 22 knots (other data: 22,3 knots). Furthermore, Bayan needs to cover a greater distance to close, and the Japanese can easily counter the decreasing range by briefly increasing speed to 21 knots.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Jura 27

The citadel at Bayan is short and does not include the cellars.

Yes. And what good is this Izumo with its non-armor-piercing shells?

Quote: Jura 27

2. Based on more reliable data (i.e. from two or more sources), I calculated n/s=899 m/s for the Russian 8"/45 gun and armor for the Iwate KH (K=2200), not GN (K=2100).

Yura, this isn't "more reliable data," but rather "your dear fantasies" regarding the 2200 armor. But let's assume you're right. So what?

Quote: Jura 27

On the 19th artillery tank it's a little better, but even at a small angle of attack, the 6" armor of the KH is not penetrated.

And "Bayan" doesn't care, he can get as close as 15 kbt. As for my statement

Quote: Jura 27

But "Bayan" should have kept a different distance:
- Either 19–22 cable lengths, at which both cruisers’ turrets and casemates are vulnerable, but their citadels are invulnerable;

You're taking the phrase out of context—it would have been appropriate if the Izumo had decent armor-piercing shells. But it didn't, so there's no need to maintain that range.

Quote: Jura 27

Completely forgotten is the six-inch artillery, which is more numerous than the Bayan's, and which, at all real combat ranges in the Russian Navy, easily penetrates the 60-mm casemates and belts of the Russian cruiser.

Yeah, yeah, a 10-12 inch shell can't handle 50,8 mm of armor (cracks and minimal fragments behind the armor), but a 6 inch shell can easily penetrate 60 mm :))))
Both French and English experiments showed that high-explosive shells of those years did not penetrate half-caliber armor.

Quote: Jura 27

and the Japanese can easily counter the decrease in distance with a short-term increase in speed to 21 knots.

And in which combat episode did the Izumo reach 21 knots?:)))))))
Yuri, maybe it's time to stop playing along with the Japanese cruiser and equipping her with Krupp armor, Russian Model 1907 high-explosive shells, and a high-quality propulsion system? If you want the Izumo to win for sure, just equip her with Granit anti-ship missiles right away; paper will take it.

[Jura 27]

[And what good is this Izumo with its non-armor-piercing shells?...
...it would have been worth holding on to if the Izumo had decent armor-piercing shells. But it didn't, so there was no need to maintain that range...
...Yeah, yeah, a 10-12 inch shell can't handle 50,8 mm of armor.

Catch the time traveler!!! This is all pure hindsight; back then, ships should have been built with three-inch armor and a huge number of guns.

Yura, this isn't "more reliable data," but rather "your dear fantasies" regarding the 2200 armor. But let's assume you're right. So what?

And the fact that the ZSM on the 19-22 kbt "Bayan" did not have, if we take into account the data of those years and calculate the theoretical battle without hindsight.

And in which combat episode did Izumo reach 21 knots?

The theoretical one-on-one fight didn't actually occur, but in practice, Izumo and Iwate achieved higher top speeds than Bayan. This is precisely what needs to be taken into account, as such data was known at the time.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Jura 27

Catch the time traveler!!! This is all pure hindsight; back then, ships should have been built with three-inch armor and a huge number of guns.

Yuri, I don't want to upset you, but Bayan, without any hindsight, wasn't afraid to engage the Japanese EBRs at 19 kbt, and might have gone even closer if Stark hadn't called him off. The point is, our commanders considered short ranges essential, so without the enemy's multiple superiority, closing in at short ranges was a natural process, without any need for a time traveler.

Quote: Jura 27

And the fact that the ZSM on the 19-22 kbt "Bayan" did not have, if we take into account the data of those years and calculate the theoretical battle without hindsight.

You surprise me. Without hindsight, you can't calculate the ZSM at all. It can only be calculated with hindsight, which, by the way, tells us that K=2200 is an exaggeration for Harvey.

Quote: Jura 27

But in practice, Izumo and Iwate developed a top speed higher than Bayan.

And where is this "practice"? What is the point of the table you provided?

[Jura 27]

Bayan, without any hindsight, was not afraid to converge with the Japanese EBRs at 19 kbt

Courage and madness in one bottle. Then he came to his senses and didn't even save everyone from the Terrible.

Without hindsight, you won't be able to calculate the ZSM at all.

Why would that be? All the data was known at that time.

that K=2200 for Harvey is exaggerated by you.

Iwata/Izumo didn't have the GN that was planned. It was either Krupp or KN, like on Mikasa.

What is the purpose of the table you provided?

These are actual recorded speeds, confirmed by British sources. Or do you think the Japanese are exaggerating?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Jura 27

Courage and madness in one bottle.

Yura, this is your personal interpretation and it is incorrect.

Quote: Jura 27

Why would that be? All the data was known at that time.

Well, look at what K the Harvey armor had according to the officers of the 1st TOE. It's no secret, really.

Quote: Jura 27

Iwata/Izumo didn't have the GN that was planned. It was either Krupp or KN, like on Mikasa.

No problem, prove it. And yes, what do you mean by "KN"?

Quote: Jura 27

These are actual recorded speeds, confirmed by British sources. Or do you think the Japanese are exaggerating?

You yourself write the date when this speed was recorded. And I don't see what displacement it was recorded in, but the date is the key.

Quote: Jura 27

Please 20,8 knots July 3, 1902 (35 - 7 - 3):

What does this have to do with combat speed in 1904?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Well, look at what K the Harvey armor had according to the officers of the 1st TOE. It's no secret, really.

By the way, if you forgot, I can tell you - the 2,200 you recommended, according to 1TOE, even Krupp did not have

[Jura 27]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Well, look at what K the Harvey armor had according to the officers of the 1st TOE. It's no secret, really.

By the way, if you forgot, I can tell you - the 2,200 you recommended, according to 1TOE, even Krupp did not have

What is this "1TOE opinion"? Did it have a firing range where it fired at different armor plates?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Jura 27

What is this "1TOE opinion"?

Yura, you stated that all the data on the armor was publicly known.

Quote: Jura 27

Why would that be? All the data was known at that time.

Now you're claiming they weren't known? What kind of Schrödinger armor is this? :)))) You should definitely decide whether you knew the data on the resistance of Harvey and Krupp armor at the 1st TOE or not.
And then I'll tell you what they knew about this armor at 1TOE

[Jura 27]

You stated that all the data on the armor was publicly known.

Yes, the results of the shelling were published in reference books and other specialized publications.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Jura 27

Yes, the results of the shelling were published in reference books and other specialized publications.

Well, at the 1st TOE, armor penetration tables were calculated—it's all in Korsakov and Cherkasov's "Instructions." And according to the data they provided (normal penetration), Krupp armor had a K value approaching 2,150.
And the "Instructions" were, in general, for all squadrons at 1 TOE

[Jura 27]

And according to the data they provided (normal penetration), Krupp armor had a K value tending to 2,150.

In this case, I took your data 1825/2100/2275. So that everything is in the same value system.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Jura 27

In this case, I took your data 1825/2100/2275

How did armor with K=2000 appear in my data?

Quote: Jura 27

Iwate's armor is KH (K=2200)

How could the Russian sailors have guessed even if Iwate had such armor, if they even considered Krupp 2,150?

[Jura 27]

How did armor with K=2000 appear in my data?

Where is the number 2000 here 1825/2100/2275?

How

None, I calculated the theoretical battle in your data system 1825/2100/2275.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Jura 27

Where is the number 2000 here 1825/2100/2275?

Oh, I get it, my keyboard is just acting up. 2200

[Jura 27]

This is your personal interpretation and it is incorrect.

Yes, if Bayan's commander is a time traveler and knows for sure that 12" armor-piercing armor almost never penetrates.

No problem, prove it. And yes, what do you mean by "KN"?

P. Brook and the reference book that was sent to you are already twice as large as the data from the "Engineer", built by the Japanese.
KN - Krupp Harvey steel, similar in chemical composition to Krupp's (chromium-nickel), but case-hardened and tempered according to Harvey's method. A logical British proposal for a time when carburizing steel was just beginning to be developed and the Harvey process was well established. The Japanese should have liked the price, too.

And I don’t see what displacement it’s registered in.

The second column from the left is 9906 t.

What does this have to do with combat speed in 1904?

Exactly the same as the speed during the Bayan tests in relation to its combat speed in 1904.
But for a theoretical battle, the speed based on test results is important.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Jura 27

P. Brook and the reference book that was sent to you are already twice as large as the data from the "Engineer", built by the Japanese.

Brook makes a lot of mistakes in Bayan, I wrote to you about that. And Brook is a modern publication; how could they not find information on Bayan there?

Quote: Jura 27

KN - Krupp Harvey steel, Krupp's in chemical composition (chromium-nickel), but case hardening and tempering according to Harvey.

This seems like an oxymoron. Because the Germans, while creating Krupp armor, discovered that adding chromium made case-hardening extremely difficult, so after some clever thinking, they came up with the Krupp method of case-hardening.

Quote: Jura 27

Exactly the same as the speed during the Bayan tests in relation to its combat speed in 1904.

That is, none. But the "Bayan" gave 20 knots, but this was not observed at Izumo in 1904.

Quote: Jura 27

But for a theoretical battle, the speed based on test results is important.

No. It is needed at a specific point in time.

[Jura 27]

Brook makes a lot of mistakes in the same Bayan, I wrote to you about this.

And I wrote that the accordion was not of English construction.

And Brook is a modern publication, how could they not find information about Bayan there?

Melnikov R. M. is also a modern publication and nevertheless even he did not find that Bayan ended up with GN.

But "Bayan" gave 20 knots, but this was not observed for Izumo in 1904.

Neither of them competed in head-to-head races, so it's pointless to make any firm conclusions. For a theory boy, the test results are sufficient.

This seems like an oxymoron. Because the Germans, while creating Krupp armor, discovered that adding chromium made case-hardening extremely difficult, so after some clever thinking, they came up with the Krupp method of case-hardening.

However, Ishibashi has the Mikasa KN armor.

No. It is needed at a specific point in time.

What? If the ships never met one-on-one?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Jura 27

And I wrote that the accordion was not of English construction.

True, but Bayan's data is well known, and if a person writes a book and can't find it, then there's little trust in him.

Quote: Jura 27

Melnikov R. M. is also a modern publication and nevertheless even he did not find that Bayan ended up with GN.

So Brook didn't even bother to determine the armor thickness correctly:)

Quote: Jura 27

Both did not participate in one-on-one races with each other.

But they participated with other ships

Quote: Jura 27

For a theory boy, the test results are sufficient.

In a spherical vacuum, undoubtedly. Under nuclear warfare conditions, obviously not.

Quote: Jura 27

However, Ishibashi has the Mikasa KN armor.

Yeah. But that doesn't mean this armor was created using the algorithm you mentioned, nor that it occupied an intermediate position between Harvey and Krupp.

[anzar]

For a theory boy, the test results are sufficient.

In a spherical vacuum, undoubtedly. Under nuclear warfare conditions, obviously not.

Dear colleagues, you are talking/arguing about different things.
Yura—about a theoretical battle devised then and there, i.e., with the data available to both sides. The Japanese believed their anti-tank guns could penetrate thick armor, and so did the Russians. And that the Iwate's maximum speed was 22 knots, while the KTs had a K <2150...
You, Andrey, are talking about a theoretical battle that is close to the realities of the participants' equipment.
And apart from the material, in such a “real” theory battle we need to add the decisions of the commanders, which they made not only based on their knowledge/understanding of the material, but also (mainly) on their personal qualities (the desire to win or formalism...) and the instructions of the command (to take risks/not to take risks)

[Jura 27]

Bayan's data is well known, and if a person writes a book and cannot find it, then there is little trust in him.
... So Brook didn't even bother to determine the armor thickness correctly:

Brook writes about Armstrong's ships, not Bayan's. Are there any issues with the data on Armstrong's ships? If not, then why discuss a book that isn't about Bayan?

But they participated with other ships

Which Russians did Iwate/Izumo go head-to-head with? Don't suggest squadron speed—that's determined by the slowest ship.

However, it does not follow from this that such armor was created according to the algorithm you voiced, nor that it occupied an intermediate position between Harvey and Krupp.

Okay, I can take your Krupp with K=2275. Bayan will only feel worse.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Jura 27

Are there any complaints about the data on Armstrong's ships?

Yes. Krupp armor.

Quote: Jura 27

Squadron speed is not recommended - it is determined by the slowest ship.

And which slowest ship prevented the FOC from catching up on June 18, 1904? The Azuma? According to your chart, it had a speed of 18,6 knots without boosting its boilers. So why couldn't it catch up with the FOC, which was going at 16 knots with boost?

Quote: Jura 27

Okay, I can take your Krupp with K=2275.

I'm telling you, just get the Granit anti-ship missile system right away - and you won't have to chase the Bayan:)))

[Jura 27]

Yes. Krupp armor.

Don't read Soviet newspapers before lunch, i.e. the Engineer magazine, when the ships haven't been built yet.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Jura 27

Don't read Soviet newspapers before lunch.

Yura, I'm, of course, incredibly interested in following your research, but don't pull out some source and declare it to be the truth because it suits you, while declaring all the others to be "Soviet newspapers" because they don't suit you. Just recently, you claimed that Izumo was protected.

Quote: Jura 27

KN - Krupp Harvey steel

Now you have Krupp again:))))
The truth is that, from the perspective of simulating the battle between Bayan and Izumo, it doesn't matter at all whether Izumo was armed with a Krupp or a Harvey. Because Bayan could close to the range at which Izumo could penetrate with AP shells, while Izumo couldn't penetrate Bayan's armor with AP shells—some had only a chance of penetrating 8-inch armor at 60 mm.

[Dmitry24]

In the end, it all came down to the fact that we were comparing not the cruisers, but their shells, and exclusively armor-piercing ones at that...
The second moment - we move from a shootout to fencing, then to a knife fight and wrestling... Then - the squabbling of grappling cats...
It is clear that reducing the distance will ultimately lead us to the conclusion that the destroyer is in control!
Even such an amateur as your humble servant and (very occasionally) critic understands that the "Bayan" is the best cruiser in the Russian Imperial Fleet (excluding the "Ruriks"), but size matters - the "Izumo" is equipped with twice the artillery, one and a half times the armor protection, plus (damn it!!!) it also has one and a half times more coal...
It's a shame to realize that a mediocre French-made cruiser is head and shoulders above what we had, and in turn is just as inferior (damn it!!!) to a cheap knockoff for the Indians (and how else can you evaluate the entire Asamoids series?).
Well, it so happened that at that moment Britain was in trouble... The admirals and ministers of the Russian Empire are too well-mannered people to know which way to pee in the wind(((

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Dmitry24

In the end, it all came down to the fact that we were comparing not the cruisers, but their shells, and exclusively armor-piercing ones.

Well, I don't reduce it to that:))))

Quote: Dmitry24

But size matters -- Izumo is equipped with twice the artillery, one and a half times the armor protection, plus (damn it!!!) it also has one and a half times more coal...

Formally, that's all true. But in essence, the 8-inch gun's dual-use artillery is nullified by the twin turrets, the Bayan's relatively weak armor is compensated for by non-armor-piercing shells, and the Japanese ship's coal capacity—yes, the Japanese ship has 1,4 times more—but Izumo's full displacement is 1,25 times greater, so the difference isn't all that great. The only thing is, Bayan has a larger normal coal supply, and that's important.

Quote: Dmitry24

It's a shame to realize that a mediocre French-made cruiser is head and shoulders above what we had.

We had nothing, after Diane we gave the cruisers over to foreign companies - there weren't enough slipways

Quote: Dmitry24

and in turn is just as inferior (damn it!!!) to a cheap Indian knockoff

Are you kidding?:))))) These are ships of different purposes, and if we compare analogs, then the "Asamoid" is an analog of Peresvet and Pobeda

[Dmitry24]

Is this how you keep the honor of the lady of your heart?
Asamoid is an analogue of Peresvet (God bless him, but also Pobeda) for the same (approximately) reason that the comparison of Izumo with Bayan is all the pranks of quiet C-students with a stuffed owl in the geography room)
Bayan is equal to and superior to Izumo (I won't deny it) in a chance encounter "at point-blank range," and Asamoids owe their chance of being comparable to Peresvets to domestic precision mechanics... Imagine their range, willpower, and scope with a full reserve of over two kilotons.
Here we have a multiple-to-one and a half advantage, the same picture in the GK art.... Watch your hands (your own) -- Izumo=Bayan.,.. Asamoid (even any kind)=Victory....
and....
Bayan = Victory (that's it, we've arrived)

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Dmitry24

Asamoid is an analogue of Peresvet (God bless him, but also Pobeda) for the same (approximately) reason that the comparison of Izumo with Bayan is all the pranks of quiet C-students with a stuffed owl in the geography room)

But you didn't guess:)))))
You're comparing ships based on their similar performance characteristics, but that's a mistake; don't do that. You need to compare ships with similar missions. So, the Pobeda and the Asamoid are the same.
1) They were not squadron battleships
2) Intended for squadron combat
In essence, both were second-class battleships, but the Japanese prioritized speed and sacrificed protection and main battery artillery for it, while we wanted to achieve range and autonomy, so we slapped on a high side, three engines, and a large supply of coal.
But Bayan and Izumo had nothing in common, because Bayan was not supposed to stand in line; he was seen as an armored reconnaissance aircraft with the squadron.
You see, if you and I both need to hammer a nail into a wall, but you use a hammer and I use a microscope, then the microscope becomes analogous to the hammer, because I use it to accomplish the same task as the hammer. But if I use the microscope strictly for its intended purpose, then it's hardly worth comparing it to a hammer.

[Dmitry24]

OK then)
Indeed, everything is logical...
Can I then classify "Izumo" as a good hammer, and "Bayan" as a bad microscope (let's be honest - our "Bayan" will run full speed there and back a couple of times, and then only on foot and preferably in a straight line)?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Dmitry24

Can I then classify "Izumo" as a good hammer and "Bayan" as a bad microscope?

You are free to define them as you please. Well, I'll express my thoughts later, in the final articles of the series.

[Jura 27]

but there is no need to get hold of some source and declare it to be true because it suits you, and declare all the others to be "Soviet newspapers"

This isn't "someone," but a Japanese one—Ishibashi. And it's already the third one, against your single non-English and non-Japanese one, from the time one cruiser was on the slipway. So, you have a single secondary one, against three primary ones.

Now you have Krupp again:

No, the calculations were based on the assumption that the armor was not pure Krupp, but KN. You expressed doubt that such armor was possible, and I suggested recalculating it based on pure Krupp, which immediately lowers the Bayan's armor from the baseboard to a lower level.

[Because Bayan could get close to the distance from which Izumo could penetrate with BB shells

He couldn't get closer because he was inferior in maximum speed.

Izumo couldn't penetrate Bayan's armor with BB shells.

This is an afterthought.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Jura 27

And already the third, against your one, not English and not Japanese, time of one cruiser being on the slipway.

This isn't the third, but the second. Ishibashi with his KN is against Krupp, who is a KS.

Quote: Jura 27

That is, you have only one secondary, versus three primary ones.

Why is the Engineer secondary and Ishibashi primary? You have some strange notion of primacy. A primary source is a document, an eyewitness account, and all your sources (and mine) are secondary.
So, it's two of your sources against one. Remember that Brooks couldn't figure out Bayan's booking scheme... It's one against one.

Quote: Jura 27

No, the calculation was made on the assumption that it was not a “pure” Krupp, but a KN.

Which you suggested was somewhere between the GN and the KS. It was most likely a variant of garveyed armor—and I took into account different types.

Quote: Jura 27

He couldn't get closer because he was inferior in maximum speed.

No matter how much you say "halva", your mouth will not become sweeter.

Quote: Jura 27

This is an afterthought.

So what? How did that prevent Bayan from getting within range of his AP shells?

[Dmitry24]

Still, the maximum speed is something theoretical... Looking at the number of boilers, VI, draft, etc. - there seems to be a difference in favor of the "Bayan"...

[Jura 27]

Quote: Dmitry24

Still, the maximum speed is something theoretical... Looking at the number of boilers, VI, draft, etc. - there seems to be a difference in favor of the "Bayan"...

The hydrodynamics of the hull and the efficiency of the propeller are our everything, or rather, English, but not French.

[unknown]

Read Soviet magazines. "Wings of the Motherland," 1974-1976. Series "Aircraft of World War II." The situation is similar: for some aircraft, the speeds are given as those of prototypes. For others, the speeds are significantly understated. Some models are not mentioned at all. However, in the same magazine, thirty years later, different data appeared. Real data.

[Jura 27]

And which slowest ship prevented the FOC from catching up on June 18, 1904? The Azuma? According to your chart, it had a speed of 18,6 knots without boosting its boilers. So why couldn't it catch up with the FOC, which was going at 16 knots with boost?

The distance was long and darkness was approaching. If we had met in the morning, like on August 1st, then...

I'm telling you, just get the Granit anti-ship missile system right away - and you won't have to chase the Bayan:)))

I'm taking your data - what's not to like?
There is data from the English firing range of the slab for the Japanese government, but you won't like it at all.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Jura 27

Great distance and the onset of darkness.

And—sooooooowly closing the distance, despite Kamimura's squad advancing at full speed. Kamimura was so unwilling to catch up that he fired at the whole world like a kopeck, even though the distance was clearly too far.

Quote: Jura 27

I'm taking your data.

According to my data, it's Harvey and K = 2100. Of course, I could be wrong, but the point is that there's a strange oddity: the British used Harvey for battleships, but for cruisers, for some reason, Krupp? Yakumo – yes, of course, the Azuma with Krupp already looks highly suspicious.

[Jura 27]

There is a strange oddity: the British used Harvey for battleships, but for cruisers, for some reason, Krupp?

Nothing strange for that time - in Russia, even on the same ship, different types of armor were often installed.

And - slooooowly reducing the distance

Squadron speed is determined by the slowest ship. They couldn't escape the Battle of Ulsan.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: Jura 27

They were unable to escape from the battle at Ulsan.

Maybe the Japanese carried out maintenance on the crane manipulator?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Jura 27

Nothing strange for that time.

Well, I wouldn’t say so – the customer purchases two types of armor at the same time.

Quote: Jura 27

Squadron speed by the slowest ship

Exactly. According to your chart, the slowest one is the Azuma, reaching 18.6 knots without afterburners. How come it couldn't close with the 16-knot squadron?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Completely forgot

Quote: Jura 27

There is data from the English firing range of the slab for the Japanese government, but you won't like it at all.

I actually like them, because this doesn't indicate any particular armor strength, but rather the poor armor-piercing qualities of Japanese shells. So, in a Bayan vs. Izumo confrontation, you can safely increase the Bayan's armor K, considering it was 2100 against good Russian AP.

[Jura 27]

poor armor-piercing qualities of Japanese shell blanks.

The shells weren't Japanese - they were at an English firing range.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Why? These were British shells fired by the Japanese.

[unknown]

The Japanese squadron's slow speed prevented them from catching up with the FOC. The Azuma was slowing them down as best it could. And they wouldn't have caught up without it. An alternative immediately comes to mind: instead of six Asamas, three or even two Fujis. Then the FOC would have encountered a squadron of one Fuji and two Italians. The speed would have been the same—15 knots. But the 305mm high-explosive shell would have been used. The damage to the Russian ships could have been more severe.

[Jura 27]

The low speed of the Japanese detachment prevented the VOK from catching up.

They caught up with the VOK several times during the battle at Ulsan and gave it a good beating.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: Jura 27

Iwata/Izumo didn't have the GN that was planned. It was either Krupp or KN, like on Mikasa.

You've completely confused me.

[Jura 27]

You've completely confused me.

What exactly are you confused about?

[unknown]

Speeds in 1902, before the decision to ban the use of forced ventilation in boiler rooms. Without this mode, and with the addition of Belleville boilers, which the British began to abandon during the "Boiler War," Japanese armored cruisers became what they were: slow-moving armored ships. No "fast" squadron, no battleships. And the Yakumo failed to support light forces during the Battle of the Yellow Sea: it lacked speed.

[unknown]

And the fact that the Admiralty in 1902 prohibited the use of this mode (forced blowing into boiler rooms) was not known?

[Jura 27]

Quote: ignoto

And the fact that the Admiralty in 1902 prohibited the use of this mode (forced blowing into boiler rooms) was not known?

Which Admiralty is Japanese?
Artificial draft was not used in the belleville - there were two operating modes: stokers for short periods of wear (burning about 140 kg of coal per unit of grate area) and stokers in a more gentle mode (burning about 100 kg of coal per unit of grate area).

[unknown]

None whatsoever. In 1902, the use of forced draft in boiler rooms was banned. And during the "boiler war," Belleville's boilers suffered terribly. It's enough to recall the Kent series. Ships in this series received three types of boilers. The displacement of the Kents was close to that of the Ases. They had less armor. Their armament was weaker. But they had speed. In practice, 30 hours at 21 knots. And during WWI, the slowest Kent reached 25 knots.

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Jura 27

Completely forgotten is the six-inch artillery, which is more numerous than that of the Bayan and which, at all real combat distances of the Russian Navy, easily penetrates the 60-mm casemates and belts of the Russian cruiser.

Please share any real-life examples of Japanese six-inch shells penetrating our armor. How often did this happen and what kind of damage did it cause? I'm genuinely interested.

Indeed, Iwate's continuous sea speed is 19 knots, which is 2 knots less than Bayan's.
But the battle can't last for days; there simply won't be enough ammunition. And Iwate has two other speed modes, including a maximum short-term speed of 22 (other data: 22,3) knots.

Yura, I previously posted comparative data on the speeds of Russian and Japanese (British-built) destroyers near Port Arthur during the Battle of February 26, 1904. According to the performance characteristics, the Japanese were absolutely crushing our ships. However, in real combat, our ships thrashed the Japanese as best they could. This is because the actual speed ratings were greatly inflated, while our ships maintained their speed as long as they were designed. So, if anyone has any information about where, when, and under what circumstances Iwate sailed at 21 knots in the Japanese fleet, please let me know. I may be wrong, and destroyers are one thing, while large ships are another.

[Jura 27]

Please share any real-life examples of Japanese six-inch shells penetrating our armor. How often did this happen and what kind of damage did it cause? I'm genuinely interested.

This was a theoretical battle. But in practice, even without a fully-fledged Japanese air defense system, the Russian fleet suffered an epic defeat.

I previously posted comparative data on the speeds of Russian and Japanese destroyers

It's good that it's not the details of the flight to the Moon.

If you have any information about where, when, and under what circumstances Iwate sailed in the Japanese fleet at 21 knots, please let me know.

Please 20,8 knots July 3, 1902 (35 - 7 - 3):

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Jura 27

This is a theoretical fight.

In practice, even without a fully-fledged Japanese air defense system, the Russian fleet suffered an epic defeat.

Definitely not because of "armor penetration".
Let me just remind you: the Russian fleet fought all its battles while outnumbered. This doesn't excuse the gunners' poor training, but still.

It's good that it's not the details of the flight to the Moon.

Hamite, boy?

Please 20,8 knots July 3, 1902 (35 - 7 - 3):

The Iwata issue has been resolved. Questions remain about other ships, including Mikasa and the Garibaldians.

[Jura 27]

There are still questions about other ships, including Mikasa and the Garibaldians.

They are in the same table above and below Iwate/Izumo.

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Jura 27

They are in the same table above and below Iwate/Izumo.

I saw it. That's why I wrote it. Mikasa - 15,6, Nissin/Kassuga - 17,9. More than two knots difference for new ships. Other Asamoids too - roughly around 19 knots.

[bayard]

Quote: Trapper7

Other asamoids too - conditionally around 19 knots.

But this gives a 1-knot advantage, and that matters. So does the weather (waves), since the Asamid ships are less seaworthy. So the Bayan has a chance of disengaging from the battle, but winning is vanishingly small. And for a simple reason: the battle and approach begin at medium range, where only high-explosive shells will be used. The Asamid's main and secondary guns are almost twice as large. Furthermore, following Japanese custom, they stored a reserve of shells (excluding propellant charges) in the turrets and casemates, which gave them the ability to fire at maximum intensity for about the first 20 minutes of combat. This means that the rate of fire per barrel of the Bayan and Asamid will be approximately the same for the first 15-20 minutes.
What will they give?
Now would be a good time to remember that the Japanese gunners' accuracy (real, practical, documented) was three times higher than that of the Russian gunners of the 1st Squadron. Now let's summarize this data for the first 15-20 minutes of the battle.
Main battery - 2 (turret guns) x 3 (documented Japanese gunners' firing efficiency) = 6!! Japanese main battery shells will hit the Bayan 6 times more often than the Bayan will hit its enemy. That's a lot, a lot. But that's not all; there's also the secondary battery.
SK: 1,75 x 3 = 5,25 - this is how many times the 6" Asamid shells will hit it more often than the Bayan shells.
Remember these numbers, because that's not all. The most interesting part is yet to come. And ahead of us is the high, UNARMORED side of the "Bayan," which will receive all these high-explosive shells. Even if they explode on an obstacle (and that's exactly the kind of fuse they have), all the force of the explosion will go inside the ship. Causing destruction, fires, damage to the crew, and concussions. I hope you understand what a concussion is and how it reduces the combat effectiveness of even the most courageous and persistent crew. You can read about this in the history of the Battle of Tsushima, although I think you already know. I know what it's like for people after a concussion from the example of some of my friends; we've been at war for a long time.
And what else do we get at the start of the battle and as the ships approach the firing range of armor-piercing shells?
What we get is a practically undamaged Asamoid (unless a "golden shot" happens, which not only doesn't happen in every battle, but doesn't even happen in every engagement) and a Bayan, badly battered by high-explosive shells (let's go straight back to the comparative firepower figures of these ships with the REAL gunners' calculations). That is, the blazing Bayan most likely closes in on the enemy, within range of its armor-piercing shells.
What's the state of his gunners at this point? After all, the Japanese's hit rate isn't decreasing, even taking into account the reduced rate of fire of their artillery due to the speed of the shell feed. Besides... what's the state of their artillery? After all, at this range, a hit to the turret, or God forbid, to the gun of the Bayan, immediately loses half its main battery. And it's highly doubtful that even from 16-20 cables, the Bayan will be able to inflict critical damage on the enemy. Again, the ONLY hope is for a "golden shot." But the Bayan's unarmored side will deal with increasing effectiveness—it's its own fault.
That's why such a fight would never have happened in practice, and all these fantasies are nothing more than an owl on the Spanish Globe. On the Spanish Globe because he's ashamed that they treated him like that. He honestly didn't deserve it.
Do you even realize how many shells the Asamid will fire from close range, already armor-piercing, into the unarmored side of our Scout? And what will they do inside?
But Kolobov has no idea. He's already published a whole series of notes and essays on this topic. And he's not letting up.
Such a battle would never have happened. In the best-case scenario, the "Bayan," having accepted it in time, would have escaped pursuit at speed. Because they would have been chasing HIM, not the other way around. And that would have been the right decision. For a Scout is supposed to reconnoiter. And having reconnoitred, to report. That's why it was designed that way—for a specific task.
I would never have returned to this (useless and pointless) topic if I hadn't dropped in out of curiosity a few days after the publication of our economist's latest paper. Nothing new or interesting, and the comments were just another defense of Sova at the Globe against yet another Don Quixote. I think it's much more productive to beat a dead horse.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Dmitry, if anything in bayard's comment seemed worth your attention, please let me know and I'll respond.

[Dmitry24]

In bayarda's comment, I liked the Spanish globe (in keeping with the upcoming final), and also the genuine enthusiasm that showed concern).
Overall, he's right – the Japanese are objectively stronger. No more, no less – in the sense that who knows what would happen in a duel (Pushkin was probably a better shot than Dantes)...
Among the details, there is a point about the "single-barrel turrets" dear to my heart, in which bayard is unfortunately right.
The sore point: they have an Achilles' heel of Oedipal proportions—if any crap happens to the primitive mechanics of a complex system, not only will one gun go silent, but the entire complex of structures, including the ammunition magazine, all the armor protection, and other loads, including the provisions of a considerable portion of the crew, will go down the drain because of some nut or spring. Two guns are a chance to continue the fight...
I have only one complaint about the Bayan: it needs about three hundred tons of coal to be completely happy in the Far Eastern theater of operations (it'll do for the Baltic). If this is a cruiser attached to a squadron, not designed for squadron combat, then it's a "gofer," and given its increased fuel consumption at full steam, it should have a significantly greater range than the battleships it escorts. It'll do just fine with the Poltavas and Borodinets, but if it's with the Pobedas, Tsesars, and Retvizans, and somewhere far away, then this "scout," with your permission, will have to be towed back to its home port.

[Dmitry24]

Oh, by the way, when listing the advantages of the "Bayan" over the "Izumo", you forgot to mention boarding – our guys are bigger)

[Dmitry24]

If we return to the comment of "bayarda", then perhaps we can reproach him for excessive trust and passion for arithmetic - all these numbers, on the one hand, are indeed objective, but they should not be used with greater caution

[Dmitry24]

Here)
Some people even need to be careful with letters.
Describing reality with mathematics is a so-so option. I remember being taught that the most accurate formulas depend on correction factors, some of which are obtained empirically in each individual case.
The good old analogy method rules. There's the Novinka vs. Tsushima battle, for example—why not?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Dmitry24

The good old analogy method rules. There's the Novinka vs. Tsushima battle, for example—why not?

It's bad for many reasons, but it's also good in some ways - the Japanese needed 11 or more hits to knock out the Novik, while the Novik needed one shell to knock out the Tsushima.
This is something to keep in mind when reading how Bayard describes the terrible 3 to 1 hit ratio.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Dmitry24

All these figures, on the one hand, are truly objective

Exactly - no:))))

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Dmitry24

You missed the boarding consideration - our guys are bigger)

I will definitely refer to this in the next article:)))))

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Dmitry24

Among the details, there is a point about the "single-barrel turrets" dear to my heart, in which bayard is unfortunately right.

(shrugging) - there's a historical fact: Japanese armored cruisers fired an average of 34 8-inch shells per cruiser in the Battle of Port Arthur on January 27, 1904, while the Bayan fired 28 shells of the same caliber. There's a nuance here, in that the Bayan likely fired slightly longer, but for part of the battle, only its forward turret could fire, while Kamimura, lying on the battle turret, could fire from both, so the factors balance out. The Military Ops statistics are also very telling.
I understand that it is very difficult to accept the fact that 4 guns can have a slightly greater firepower than 2, but this is an objective, albeit inconvenient, reality.

Quote: Dmitry24

The sore point: they have an Achilles' heel of Oedipal proportions—if any crap happens to the primitive mechanics of a complex system, not only will one gun go silent, but the entire complex of structures, including the ammunition magazine, all the armor protection, and other loads, including the provisions of a considerable portion of the crew, will go down the drain because of some nut or spring. Two guns are a chance to continue the fight...

I don't get it here:))) The Japanese turret wasn't any more resilient than ours—the only difference is that if a shrapnel or shell shatters the barrel of one gun, the other can still fight, that's true. But such a capability doesn't guarantee victory.

Quote: Dmitry24

Overall, he is right - the Japanese are objectively stronger.

Of course. However, the bayard has three mistakes.
1) He talks about a threefold superiority in accuracy, forgetting that this is the result of crews out of training after more than six months of standing. At the beginning of 1904, the Japanese did not have this advantage.
2) His calculations

Main battery - 2 (guns in the turret) x 3 (the documented firing efficiency of Japanese gunners) = 6!! Japanese main battery shells will hit the "Bayan" 6 times more often.

For the reasons stated above, they are no good - considering that 2x2 guns will fire 20-25% more shells than the Bayan turrets and considering that our gunners are better trained than in ZhM - the Bayan will be hit by not 6, but at most 3 times more shells at close range.
3) Bayard, unfortunately, is completely inept with numbers—he doesn't like them and doesn't understand them. In a battle with a Japanese cruiser, the Izumo expended 255 8-inch shells in nearly five hours, or 51 shells per hour. Let's say in a hypothetical battle the approach takes place over the 20 minutes he's depicted. It's easy to calculate that during this approach, the Izumo will fire 17 shells, or even 20. And even if we assume its accuracy is 15%, something Japanese cruisers never achieved, the Izumo will still score hits with as many as three shells. An unbearable hailstorm that would tear the Bayan to pieces, indeed.
4) Bayard completely fails to understand that in battle the unarmored spaces of the cruiser are empty, the crew goes behind the armor, which is why, in fact, the losses on armored cruisers were not exorbitant.
5) Bayard doesn't understand the difference between a warship and a tank, and he doesn't know how to verify his assumptions about the many shell-shocked. Meanwhile, according to Jesseen's report, "On the 1st rank cruiser Rossiya, the following were killed: Senior Officer, Captain 2nd Rank Berlinsky 2nd and 43 lower ranks; 3 lower ranks were mortally wounded and died after the battle. Severely wounded: Lieutenant Petrov, Warrant Officers Dombrovsky, Baron Aminov and 16 lower ranks. Slightly wounded and out of action: Lieutenant Ivanov 11th, Warrant Officers Kolokolov and Lehman and 140 lower ranks. Shell-shocked: Lieutenant Molas, Warrant Officer Orlov and Junior Engineer-Mechanic Martynov."
That is, the ship, which had endured a heavy battle, received 30-35 hits and had 47 killed (including mortally wounded) and 164 seriously and lightly wounded people, had on board... as many as 3 shell-shocked people:))))))
6) And of course, Bayard was too lazy to look at the consequences of real combat damage received by the Bayan and study the consequences of Japanese hits on Russian ships.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

However, the bayard has three mistakes

I wanted to write only about the first three, then I couldn’t resist and started listing the rest:))))))))))))

[Dmitry24]

The weak point of the "single-barreled turret" is not so much in possible damage from the outside, but in failures and breakdowns from the inside - in the gun itself, in the need for maintenance after a certain number of shots... Well, roughly speaking, it is better to go out against a bear with a double-barreled shotgun.

[Dmitry24]

But I personally prefer the "single-barrel turret" due to the potential for weight savings.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Dmitry24

The weak point of the "single-barrel turret" is not so much in possible damage from the outside, but in failures and breakdowns from the inside - in the gun itself, in the need for maintenance after a certain number of shots.

:)))) Still, we mostly had problems with the six-inch guns; I can't recall any offhand references to the eight-inch guns, much less the turrets. And, by the way, the twin-gun mount, being more complex, is potentially more fragile. Maintenance is performed outside of combat; in combat, the gun could easily burn through its entire ammunition supply.

[Dmitry24]

You quite rightly reproached bayarda for being overly partial to figures about the Japanese accuracy, which in fact is essentially an "isolated case", but then we must just as strictly evaluate the possibility of failures and breakdowns during firing of single-gun turrets - well, if they did not happen in real life, then this is also an "isolated case", and if it did happen - immediately 50% of the main guns and, by the way, ammo simply disappear ... Simply because it jammed - such troubles cannot be ignored.
Practice is the criterion of truth...
Single-barrel turrets did not die out in the navies, but they were greatly supplanted in the end

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Dmitry24

You quite rightly reproached bayarda for being overly partial to figures about the Japanese accuracy, which in fact is essentially a "special case", but then we must just as strictly evaluate the possibility of failures and breakdowns during firing of single-gun turrets - well, they did not exist in reality, so this is also a "special case",

Nope:)))) It works a little differently.
Numbers are great, and when analyzing the possible consequences of a fight between Izumo and Bayan, I take into account the existing statistics on hits and their consequences. It's quite obvious that the Japanese would score a much higher number of hits in such a situation, and quite likely many times higher. But statistics also show that Russian hits often caused very serious damage due to their ability to penetrate armor and explode inside the hull, casemates, and turrets. Therefore, my conclusion—that the Japanese will certainly score more hits, but Russian shells have a higher chance of causing serious damage when they hit—is based on statistics. And it is precisely these statistics that suggest that a short battle with Izumo is not a one-way ticket for Bayan.
And turret damage—if Bayan's turret is damaged due to a malfunction, it will lose 50% of its main battery's firepower. If Izumo's turret is damaged, it'll be the same—it will also lose 50% of its main battery.
For your factor to come into play, it's not the turret that needs to be disabled, but a separate 8-inch gun. And that's so rare that I can't even remember if it ever happened.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Dmitry24

You quite rightly reproached bayarda for being overly partial to figures about the Japanese accuracy, which in fact is essentially a "special case", but then we must just as strictly evaluate the possibility of failures and breakdowns during firing of single-gun turrets - well, they did not exist in reality, so this is also a "special case",

Nope:)))) It works a little differently.
Numbers are great, and when analyzing the possible consequences of a fight between Izumo and Bayan, I take into account the existing statistics on hits and their consequences. It's quite obvious that the Japanese would score a much higher number of hits in such a situation, and quite likely many times higher. But statistics also show that Russian hits often caused very serious damage due to their ability to penetrate armor and explode inside the hull, casemates, and turrets. Therefore, my conclusion—that the Japanese will certainly score more hits, but Russian shells have a higher chance of causing serious damage when they hit—is based on statistics. And it is precisely these statistics that suggest that a short battle with Izumo is not a one-way ticket for Bayan.
And turret damage—if Bayan's turret is damaged due to a malfunction, it will lose 50% of its main battery's firepower. If Izumo's turret is damaged, it'll be the same—it will also lose 50% of its main battery.
For your factor to come into play, it's not the turret that needs to be disabled, but a separate 8-inch gun. And that's so rare that I can't even remember if it ever happened.

[Dmitry24]

I can’t object to anything - you press with facts like Zheglov with a Bayard pistol, I only have assumptions about the possible consequences of breakdowns that did not happen.

[27091965]

Good afternoon.

Bayard doesn't understand at all that in battle the cruiser's unarmored spaces are empty, the crew goes behind the armor, which is why, in fact, the losses on armored cruisers were not prohibitive.

Dear Andrey, it won't be long before we get to S.O. Makarov's "armorless" ships.
But seriously, the French conducted rate-of-fire tests on single- and twin-gun turret mounts. This applies to medium-caliber guns, though, and the firing was conducted at a range of 2000 meters. The results were not in favor of the single-gun turret mount.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: 27091965i

Dear Andrey, it won't be long before we get to S.O. Makarov's "armorless" ships.

No way! :)))) Because on an armored ship, the crew was protected by armor, so the unarmored compartments were empty. There were, of course, people who monitored for damage, and if necessary, they went into those compartments to carry out emergency repairs, extinguish fires, and so on. But the majority of the crew was behind the armor, and what else would they be doing on an unarmored ship? Only for "maybe" and the life-giving cross!

Quote: 27091965i

But seriously, the French conducted rate-of-fire tests on single- and twin-gun turret mounts. This applies to medium-caliber guns, though, and the firings were conducted at a range of 2000 meters.

You'll agree that such tests are highly dependent on the turret design. And I can immediately name the factors that slowed the rate of fire of Japanese 8-inch twin-gun turrets, but which didn't affect medium-caliber turrets.
The most important proof is the fight,

"Will convince any judge,
Even a regiment of selected judges,
Dazzlingly harsh
The Truth of Turret Guns"

:)))))))
And the battle showed a very moderate rate of fire of the Japanese turrets

[Dmitry24]

Well, damn...
Don't repeat the mistakes of your opponents - a particular fight (even if more than one) is a special kind of chance...
Well, let's imagine that the Japanese, for example, suspected something about the special sensitivity of their high-explosive shells and artificially slowed down the maximum rate of fire or the order was to conserve ammunition.
The double-barreled shotgun definitely wins in rate of fire and just as definitely loses in weight and dimensions, everything else depends on the circumstances of the battle, the training of the personnel and the bowman (where would we be without him)

[Dmitry24]

And the fact that they used fewer shells...
Well, a Japanese armored cruiser isn't a Makhnovist armored train -- they probably started and stopped firing strictly on orders... We're unlikely to read the Asamoids' logbooks -- primary sources are a complete disaster.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Dmitry24

It's unlikely we'll be able to read the Asamoids' logbooks - the primary sources are a complete disaster.

Why? They exist, they just need to be translated from Japanese, and you can't just pull them out of Jacar. The site is just throwing me off guard.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Dmitry24

Don't repeat the mistakes of your opponents - a particular fight (even if more than one) is a special kind of chance...

"Once is an accident, twice is an accident, God forbid, when is there a pattern?!" (free translation by Suvorov)

Quote: Dmitry24

Well, let's imagine that the Japanese, for example, suspected something about the special sensitivity of their high-explosive shells and artificially slowed down the maximum rate of fire

This means that they will also slow down the rate of fire in the fight between Izumo and Bayan.

Quote: Dmitry24

The double-barreled shotgun definitely wins in rate of fire.

The fact is, the Japanese fired relatively rarely in combat. There's a reasonable explanation for this: the rather unfortunate turret design, with a single elevator for two guns, a tedious loading procedure with shells positioned at the rear of the turret, crowded conditions within the turret, and so on.
Why should I ignore this?

[Dmitry24]

No... They shouldn't.
So far, no one has proven otherwise. Judging by the information you've provided, it's possible. But it can't be considered a proven fact either. Logic dictates that a single-barrel shotgun fires slightly faster and is slightly more accurate than a single double-barrel shotgun. Without documentation, we'll rely on facts; for now, the evidence is yours.

[Dmitry24]

Nevertheless, it was the French who held on to single-barrel shotguns almost to the last, arguing for better controllability and (perhaps, it should be clarified) greater accuracy of fire directly from the axis of rotation.

[27091965]

Quote: Dmitry24

Nevertheless, it was the French who held on to single-barrel shotguns almost to the last, arguing for better controllability and (perhaps, it should be clarified) greater accuracy of fire directly from the axis of rotation.

The 1890 shipbuilding program called for the construction of ironclads and armored cruisers using various technical and design solutions. The goal was to develop a unified type of ironclad and armored cruiser by 1900. For this reason, guns were mounted in single- and twin-gun turrets for large- and medium-caliber artillery. Casemate mounting was also used for medium-caliber artillery.

[Ragnar]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Bayard, unfortunately, is completely unable to work with numbers - he doesn’t like them and doesn’t understand them.

He doesn't really like anything anymore except Sharapov and Crump... Although he declined my offer to discuss the latter...

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Ragnar

He doesn't love anything else except Sharapov.

But how he loves Sharapov!

[Dmitry24]

It's common practice to personalize responsibility. Witte, Nikolai, and the other Kuropatkins lost the war soundly, and Papa-Tsar and Sharapov had nothing to do with it. There are rumors that with Tukhachevsky and Yegorov, the Red Army would have ended the war in 1941 on the shores of the English Channel.

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Dmitry, if anything in bayard's comment seemed worth your attention, please let me know and I'll respond.

Well, I didn't really have any questions for him. I talked to Yuri.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Trapper7

Well, actually, I didn’t have any questions for him.

I thought so, but you never know:))))))

[unknown]

High rated speeds were achieved using forced-blast boiler room ventilation. In 1902, the Admiralty banned this mode due to numerous boiler failures. The speeds of Japanese cruisers and battleships plummeted.

[unknown]

A fabrication? Or an omission? The Asama-class cruisers were designed for two purposes: squadron combat alongside battleships, and a "fast" outflanking force. The first was armor and armament. The second was speed. This was within a limited displacement. The emphasis was on the first, overloading the ships with armor and armament. A solution existed for the second, and it was actively used: artificial supercharging. However, this had a downside: damage and failure of steam boilers. An attempt was made to fix this by introducing Belleville water-tube boilers. It didn't work. The new "promising" Belleville water-tube boilers proved to be very sensitive to this operating mode and failed. Yet such boilers were eventually installed on battleships, such as the Canopuses. A new solution had to be found. And it was found. In two stages. In the first stage, in 1902 (!), the Admiralty abandoned this boiler operating mode, based on the conclusions of the Boiler Committee. In the second stage, the so-called "boiler war," a search began for more efficient and reliable water-tube boiler designs.
During the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese armored cruisers and battleships, which demonstrated high rated speeds during acceptance trials using the mode discontinued in 1902, did not achieve such high speeds. Two British pairs briefly reached 18 knots. The "Nemets" briefly reached 17 knots. The "Frantsuz" briefly reached 16 knots from the spring of 1904. The "fastest" of the battleships during acceptance trials, the "Fuji," reached 15 knots.

[Rurikovich]

Quote: Jura 27

Fortune telling on coffee grounds will be more accurate!

So go ahead! Draft your analysis as an article, and we'll read it...and evaluate it...

[Jura 27]

Quote: Rurikovich

Quote: Jura 27

Fortune telling on coffee grounds will be more accurate!

So go ahead! Draft your analysis as an article, and we'll read it...and evaluate it...

Fortune telling is not my profession, and there is not enough data for a more or less normal article.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Jura 27

little data

I wouldn't say that the expenditure of 6-inch shells by phases of 3 ships out of 12 participating is not enough.

[Jura 27]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Quote: Jura 27

little data

I wouldn't say that the expenditure of 6-inch shells by phases of 3 ships out of 12 participating is not enough.

In practice, the Japanese had better shooting accuracy at all ranges, and Iwate had almost twice as many guns on board as Bayan.
But for a theoretical battle, the number of guns on board is important, assuming that the firing accuracy is the same.

[Machito]

I read it with pleasure.
Andrey thanks for the article.
We look forward to the continuation of the cycle.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Bearded

Andrey thanks for the article.

You're welcome!

[Ragnar]

+ Thank you so much... I'm starting to stop hating Mondays...

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

My pleasure:))))

Quote: Ragnar

I'm starting to stop hating Mondays...

I think you can only stop when you retire:)))))

[dragon772]

It turns out that the Japanese shot more accurately and used the rangefinder more effectively.

[belost79]

Thanks to the author for interesting material.
The Russian squadron, with 23 large-caliber guns, scored 19 hits. The Japanese, with 17 254-305 mm guns, scored 58 hits. This is a disgrace! Of course, Ksenia Kseshinskaya and the bureaucrats are to blame for everything.
On the other hand, if we compare it to the current situation in the Black Sea, it wasn't such amateurs who sailed under the St. Andrew's flag back then. The Black Sea Fleet lost tens of thousands of tons of tonnage, despite having no enemy at sea.

[Ragnar]

Quote: belost79

The Russian squadron, having 23 large-caliber guns

22... There was one non-working barrel each on the Retvizan and Sevastopol...

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: belost79

This is such a disgrace! Of course, Ksenia Kseshinskaya and the bureaucrats are to blame for everything.

The primary reason was the lack of live-fire practice during the siege. Data from the very first battle at Port Arthur on January 28, 1904, has already been cited—the difference in heavy shells was very small.

[belost79]

Well, the Japanese didn't have time to get their bearings there, IMHO.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: belost79

Well, the Japanese didn't have time to get their bearings there, IMHO.

In 40 minutes?

[belost79]

Well, this is the first day of the war, they are not gods.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: belost79

Well, this is the first day of the war, they are not gods.

Then there was the incident on February 12, when Togo's main force of 12 ships attacked three of our cruisers in the outer roadstead and engaged them for half an hour at a range of about 40 cables. Our cruisers suffered virtually no damage, with the exception of a damaged gun on the Askold.

[Ragnar]

That's right, sir... Matusevich should have been appointed Chief of the Squadron...

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Then there was the incident on February 12, when Togo's main force of 12 ships attacked three of our cruisers in the outer roadstead and engaged them for half an hour at a range of about 40 cables. Our cruisers suffered virtually no damage, with the exception of a damaged gun on the Askold.
Reply
Quote

oh so sir... Matusevich should have been appointed as the Commander of the Squadron...

[Ragnar]

Now we should see what kind of crap these Japanese are made of...

[Senior seaman]

Quote: Ragnar

Matusevich should have been appointed Chief of the Squadron.

It won't work. He just got eagles on his epaulets. He's the youngest in seniority.
It took the deaths of Makarov and Vitgeft and the lost battle in the ZhM to elevate a former corporal over the distinguished but less-than-stellar admirals. And even then, Viren was chosen...

[Ragnar]

He got Orlov, but Viren not so much...

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: belost79

The Russian squadron, with 23 large-caliber guns, scored 19 hits. The Japanese, with 17 254-305 mm guns, scored 58 hits.

A little less, but that's not the point.

Quote: belost79

Of course, Ksenia Kseshinskaya and the bureaucrats are to blame for everything.

Objectively, the Japanese had better rangefinders and, crucially, optical sights. The 1TOE had no optics, and iron sights at combat ranges where a 20-kbt battleship would measure 18 mm on a scale raised 50 cm from the eye—well, that's not the point when you have to shoot at 40-60 kbt or even further.
Plus, it's easier to correct the firing of Japanese shells - they exploded on the water and it was clear that they had hit the ship.

[belost79]

Yes, there were objective reasons. Another possibility was the results of poor shooting—the possibly appalling quality of the shells themselves. Different weights, offset centers of gravity, etc. The same could be said for the ammunition. Corruption in the Russian Empire was rampant, and defects could be widespread.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: belost79

Different weight, shifted center of gravity, etc.

Excuse me, where did you get this information?

[belost79]

I rely on extensive personal experience in accepting products from the Russian industry)))

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: belost79

I rely on extensive personal experience in accepting products from the Russian industry)))

And no, it's not. Russian industry then and today are two very different industries, not to the benefit of today.

[belost79]

But I disagree here. We can now produce highly complex and technologically advanced machines and equipment; not all the competencies were lost during the golden years of the 90s and the period of recovery. We have a lot to offer the global market. We have many universities that train engineers.
What could the Russian Empire offer? Rolling bearings hadn't been properly mastered in production. Internal combustion engines were assembled piecemeal. Entire industries simply didn't exist. And how was the quality of those industrial products that were assembled in the Russian Empire better than today? Was it because of constant strikes and the lack of education among the majority of the population?
Of course, we have quality issues too, due to chaos and corruption. But the Russian Empire was a generally backward country.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: belost79

What could the Russian Empire offer? Rolling bearings hadn't been properly developed for production. Internal combustion engines were assembled piecemeal. Entire industries simply didn't exist.

It's exactly the same in today's Russia. The machine tool industry is almost destroyed, robotics is practically nonexistent, and it's best not to even think about computing...

Quote: belost79

And why is the quality of those industrial products that were assembled in the Russian Empire better than it is today? Is it due to constant strikes and the lack of education among the majority of the population?

Because industry is currently losing expertise at an alarming rate. And what's been done for decades is no longer done with quality—there are countless examples of this, even where I've personally encountered it. We get a 400-atm cylinder, but it doesn't even pass the geometry test, let alone the pressure test. We get electric motors for a submarine unit—if I remember correctly, two out of four die on the test bench within two hours...
To wrap things up, the shells' quality was tested by firing, firing tables were compiled, and no abnormal shell dispersion was observed. Their strength was tested by firing at armor, from each batch. So everything was normal, both with the center of gravity and the weights. And the logic of "if they couldn't make a rolling bearing, they couldn't make anything"... It's not logic. The Japanese can't make nuclear submarines, so what, they can't do anything? We can't make modern processors, so we can't do anything either?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: belost79

What could the Russian Empire offer? Rolling bearings hadn't been properly developed for production. Internal combustion engines were assembled piecemeal. Entire industries simply didn't exist.

It's exactly the same in today's Russia. The machine tool industry is almost destroyed, robotics is practically nonexistent, and it's best not to even think about computing...

Quote: belost79

And why is the quality of those industrial products that were assembled in the Russian Empire better than it is today? Is it due to constant strikes and the lack of education among the majority of the population?

Because industry is currently losing expertise at an alarming rate. And what's been done for decades is no longer done with quality—there are countless examples of this, even where I've personally encountered it. We get a 400-atm cylinder, but it doesn't even pass the geometry test, let alone the pressure test. We get electric motors for a submarine unit—if I remember correctly, two out of four die on the test bench within two hours...
To wrap things up, the shells' quality was tested by firing, firing tables were compiled, and no abnormal shell dispersion was observed. Their strength was tested by firing at armor, from each batch. So everything was normal, both with the center of gravity and the weights. And the logic of "if they couldn't make a rolling bearing, they couldn't make anything"... It's not logic. The Japanese can't make nuclear submarines, so what, they can't do anything? We can't make modern processors, so we can't do anything either?

[belost79]

Well, my God. I understand it's wartime and there's no gasoline, everything's gone stale. But one can certainly guess that the talk about projectiles with a displaced center of gravity is trolling. I've long believed that the only people to blame for the defeat at sea during the Russo-Japanese War were the Russian sailors themselves, admirals, and officers of all ranks. They should have been focusing on combat training, not drinking wine in the mess hall and punching sailors in the face. But you're arguing that there were technical problems. Of course there were, but they're not the main reasons for gunnery performance four times worse than the Japanese! Technical problems aren't to blame for the crew's escape from the cruiser Boyarin!
As for the comparison between pre-revolutionary industry and today's, we could debate it until we're blue in the face. But at least it exists now.
Don't remind me about machine tool manufacturing; I witnessed the destruction of the Sverdlov plant. The company survived the 1990s, was profitable, and had a large portfolio of orders abroad. It was liquidated in the 2000s, under Putin, Russia's savior.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: belost79

You're arguing that there were technical problems. Of course there were, but they weren't the main reasons for their shooting being four times worse than the Japanese!

You see, you are simplifying things to the extreme.

Quote: belost79

We should have been doing combat training, not drinking wine in the mess halls and slapping sailors in the face.

After the Russo-Japanese War, it was discovered that breaks in combat training dramatically reduced firing accuracy. The armored cruiser Pamyat Merkuria, after only three weeks in active reserve, suffered a nearly 1,6-fold decrease in firing accuracy—and that would have been fine for just one ship. However, a sharp drop in accuracy, "almost halved," turned out to be common among all "reserved" ships. But that was only three weeks, and what about the 1st TOE?
First, they don't let us complete the 1903 training program because it's Alekseyev's birthday. Then, just before the war, they lock the squadron into reserve for two and a half months. What does this have to do with the sailors? They can't cancel either their birthday or their reserve status by their own will.
So, I've immediately given you two reasons that had a profound impact on the 1TOE's firing accuracy, but it has nothing to do with the sailors. Then there's demobilization; the majority of long-serving servicemen are sent into the reserves at the end of 1903. That means those who had been trained for many years, including how to shoot, are gone. Could the sailors have cancelled demobilization? Obviously not; only the Emperor could have done such a thing. Who exposed the squadron to torpedo fire? Again, not the sailors; Stark asked for the ships to be withdrawn to the interior. As it was, without a retvizan or ces, they sat for six months without going anywhere—a complete lack of training. This is, of course, a question for the sailors, but who? Stark knew from the start that he would be laid off. Makarov, the only one who constantly dragged ships out to sea for exercises (he just never got around to artillery preparation), soon died. Well, and Vitgeft... well, Vitgeft, alas.

[Ragnar]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Next comes demobilization, the majority of the long-serving soldiers leaving for the reserves at the end of 1903. That is, those who had been trained for many years, including how to shoot, are gone.

Andrey, demobilization is of course inevitable... But who stopped you from pulling the best specialists back to the squadron upon mobilization???

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Ragnar

But who stopped them from pulling the best specialists back to the mobilization squadron???

So, no general mobilization was announced:)))))

[Ragnar]

So there is no need for a general one, a specific one is enough...

[Senior seaman]

Quote: belost79

The only people to blame for the defeat at sea during the Russo-Japanese War were the Russian sailors themselves, admirals and officers of all ranks.

Well, yes, well, yes... and the Tsar and his ministers are all "holy men who were unlucky with the people."

[belost79]

In 1914, the Tsar and his ministers were still the same "saints..." But that didn't stop the navy from becoming completely different. So it's not just the rulers who are at fault.
The country is now run by people smarter than Nicholas and his friends. And our navy is from 1904.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: belost79

In 1914, the Tsar and his ministers were still the same "saints..." But that didn't stop the navy from becoming completely different.

No. First and foremost, it was the approach to naval financing that changed. Previously, combat training was financed on a residual basis, and the navy couldn't obtain funds for a second set of shells for ships already built. After 1904, however, no expense was spared on naval training. In 1906, roughly the same amount of shells were spent annually on training one battleship as on all the battleships of the 1st Navy Squadron in 1903. https://topwar.ru/280533-artillerijskie-uchenija-rossijskogo-imperatorskogo-flota-do-i-posle-russko-japonskoj-vojny.html
Well, the results were not long in coming.

Quote: belost79

Now the country is run by people smarter than Nikolai and his friends.

Are you joking again?

[belost79]

"Are you joking again?"
It's not difficult to be smarter than Nicholas II.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: belost79

It's not difficult to be smarter than Nicholas II.

It's a pity that ours can't do it.

[Senior seaman]

You have been answered on the first point, but

Quote: belost79

Now the country is run by people smarter than Nikolai.

The ice here is very slippery. But the state of the fleet doesn't support your thesis.

[Alexandra]

Quote: belost79

And our fleet is from 1904.

It's been our tradition since 1854, when war broke out, for large warships to hide in harbors. "Fleet in being" in Russian. Even during the Great Patriotic War, the Black Sea Fleet continued this tradition from October 1943.

[Dmitry24]

Put yourself in the boss's shoes...
Every solution leads to casualties and losses...
It's a shame about the career... And the sailors.

[Dmitry24]

Naval technologies are the pinnacle of military-industrial development...
For brains and sausages.
Kiloconi and kilotons are essentially the same muscles, bats and brass knuckles.
If you found the courage to attack a gang of hooligans, then you are writing from a wheelchair.

[Dmitry24]

Since the mid-19th century, rapid technological development has begun...
What's the point of going out with a club against a gun?

[Dmitry24]

The situation is going round and round again as the arms race continues --
sailing ships with smoothbore artillery....
steam frigates...
primitive armadillos...
pre-dreadnoughts...
dreadnoughts...
superdreadnoughts...
And we were always exactly half a step behind and that was enough.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Dmitry24

And we were always exactly half a step behind and that was enough.

And we continue in the same vein. Warships don't leave their bases. Pilots in their combat aircraft don't approach the LBS closer than approximately 50 km. Numerous organizations that have demonstrated a variety of remotely controlled combat modules at exhibitions have still not developed or launched production of a single such combat module for mobile fire teams fighting unmanned aerial vehicles.

One gets the feeling that further technological development has led to the spread of the tradition of staying "half a step behind" the enemy in technology, which was formed in our Navy at the beginning of the century, to all other branches of the Armed Forces.

[Dmitry24]

You have formulated the objective reality quite clearly.
We are repeatedly forced to play on "someone else's field," by "someone else's rules," under the watchful eye of biased judges. In medieval Mesoamerica, similar practices existed: the supreme Inca Toltec (or whatever his name was) would decree war between the metropolis and one of the provinces, with the provincials required to fight with blunt weapons. They were spared and forgiven for this, but some captives were executed according to celebratory rituals.
This is all disgusting, but how do you imagine an alternative?

[belost79]

So when did the fleet ever hide? The Crimean Black Sea Fleet had no prospects after Sinop, only complete defeat. It actively fought in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, and what a disaster it was. What about the Russo-Japanese War? Tell that to the Vladivostok detachment and the 2nd Pacific Fleet. During World War I, the Black Sea Fleet actively pursued the Goeben, even before dreadnoughts were commissioned, using battleships. In the Baltic, there were four dreadnoughts against approximately 16. It would be a sin not to hide behind mine positions.
By October 43, the Black Sea Fleet was reduced to mere hulls and legs. Prior to that, it had played an active role in the defense of Sevastopol—without its ships, the city wouldn't have held out for long. And Manstein's army would have stormed not the Black Sea Fleet base in June, but the eastern shore of Lake Ladoga, finally blockading Leningrad.
The sailors can't be accused of cowardice and inaction. But poor training, weak discipline, and an unfounded sense of "elitism" compared to all sorts of "boots"—yes, plenty of that.

[Dmitry24]

If it's addressed to me, then I'll say the same thing - they didn't hide or act cowardly, but did what was really possible in that situation.

[Alexandra]

Quote: belost79

So when did the fleet hide? The Crimean Black Sea Fleet had no prospects after Sinop, only complete defeat.

https://george-rooke.livejournal.com/422736.html

"Now let's talk about this.
Nicholas's plans for a landing on the Bosphorus, first with a 40-strong expeditionary force, and then with a 70-strong force, were announced on December 15, 1852. On January 7, 1853, the plans took shape and took shape.
Thus, Russia had a year (from January 7, 1853 to January 3, 1854) to resolve the Straits issue. If we also take into account the theoretical possibility that the Allies had already entered the Black Sea, then until March 26, 1854 (that is, until the Allies declared war on Russia)—that's a year and three months.
And yes.
Now imagine you don't have hindsight. And that you receive data in real time, just as described. And you won't be able to predict any threat to Sevastopol before July 1854. Because the Allies came up with this idea precisely at the end of July 1854.
And finally, doesn't this description give you the feeling of a "fight between the crooked and the slanted"?
Some are afraid to put to sea, God forbid they hit an enemy that has already declared war, even the Tiger—it perishes simply because it runs aground. Others wander aimlessly around the Black Sea, unsure of what to do, and only at the end of July do they find some purpose.

Tell this to the Vladivostok detachment and the 2nd Pacific.

I can tell you that Makarov, eager for action, "forgot" about the Vladivostok detachment, and it remained in the base. However, this information was already given to me.

https://naval-manual.livejournal.com/2569.html

Did Makarov have other forces and resources? He did. First and foremost, the Vladivostok cruiser detachment, which was ideally suited to the task in point 1. Two important events occurred during Makarov's command: the 1st and 2nd Squadrons of the United Fleet moved from the Palgupo roadstead (in the southwestern corner of Korea) to Haeju Bay, after which they were no longer able to provide any support to the forces of the 3rd Squadron, which was guarding the communications in the Korea Strait. At the same time, the Japanese were busy transporting the main forces of the 1st Army (including the army headquarters, the 2nd and Guards Infantry Divisions, and the 1st Artillery Brigade) from Japan to Tsinnampo.

This was the moment when the Vladivostok detachment could have achieved its greatest success, yet it remained at base. This was partly because Makarov misunderstood the situation (he didn't know that the Japanese were busy transporting troops to Tsingnampo and, therefore, were physically unable to organize a landing at Yingkou). It was also partly because Makarov had assumed the responsibilities of not only the fleet commander but also the squadron commander (Stark had left due to illness, and Makarov had requested that no new commander be appointed). This violation of the naval command structure naturally led to Makarov, overwhelmed with his duties in Port Arthur, "forgetting" about the Vladivostok detachment.

During the First World War, the Black Sea Fleet actively used the Goeben even before the dreadnoughts entered service, along with battleships.

Apparently you meant to write "I didn't actively catch up with the Goeben"? I never managed to catch up with the Goeben. Even after the dreadnoughts were commissioned. Dreadnoughts were not of the same type.

In the Baltic, there are 4 dreadnoughts against approximately 16. It would be a sin not to sit behind mine positions.

Could you please indicate the dates on which, after August 1, 1914, and until October 1917, there were "approximately 16" German dreadnoughts in the Baltic?

And where were these 16 German dreadnoughts when the Russian cruisers were unable to sink the 2,5 thousand ton minelayer "Albatross" with their artillery fire?

https://seawarpeace.com/deutsch/kreuzer/01_main/06_albatross.html

"Already on July 24, 1915, the Albatross was refloated by the Swedes and towed to Farösund. On September 30, it was transferred to Oskarshamn, where minimal repairs were carried out. There it remained as an interned ship until the end of the war, when it was transferred to Karlskrona, handed over to a German crew, and on December 30, 1918, the ship set sail for home, to its home port of Danzig."

By October 43, the Black Sea Fleet was reduced to just horns and legs.

List of large surface combat ships of the Black Sea Fleet as of the end of October 1943: battleship Sevastopol. Cruisers Voroshilov, Molotov, Krasny Kavkaz, and Krasny Krym. Destroyers: Boykiy, Bodry, Soobrazitelnyy, Nezamozhnik, Zheleznyakov, and Letuchy.

After October 6, 1943, the battleships, cruisers and destroyers of the Black Sea Fleet did not carry out a single combat mission, artillery shelling or raid operation until the very end of the war.

The sailors can't be accused of cowardice and inaction. But poor training, weak discipline, and an unfounded sense of "elitism" compared to all sorts of "boots"—yes, plenty of that.

So, is our sailors' tendency to sit in bases during wartime due to their unfounded sense of "elitism"?

They think highly of themselves in peacetime, but are completely at a loss when it comes to being active during combat operations? As a result, they're so active that it would be better if they sat in their bases doing nothing?

Decisions to hold such positions have been made repeatedly in the history of the Russian Navy, both based on an assessment of the balance of power and on the results of previous activities.

[Dmitry24]

Well, yes, a detachment of Black Sea destroyers came out one day...
You're right, it would have been better if he hadn't come out...
And that explains a lot.

[belost79]

One might think that the death of the leader and two destroyers was some unique case in the naval war of 1939-1945.

[Dmitry24]

In its own way, this is truly a unique case, like a light cavalry charge, but unlike the British at Balaclava, there were 100% casualties—something that wasn't even seen at Tsushima. One can understand and even justify these and other unlisted instances of equipment and personnel losses (war is war), but to make the same mistake twice—you'll agree, it's too much.

[Macsen_wledig]

Quote: Dmitry24

Well, yes, a detachment of Black Sea destroyers came out one day...

This "defect" has a clearly defined full name - Captain 2 V.G. Negoda, division commander.

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: AlexanderA

Thus, Russia had a year (from January 7, 1853 to January 3, 1854) to resolve the Straits issue. If we also take into account the theoretical possibility that the Allies had already entered the Black Sea, then until March 26, 1854 (that is, until the Allies declared war on Russia)—that's a year and three months.

Of course, if our fleet had launched this operation, the Allies wouldn't have given us such a head start. But then again, we didn't need it that much anyway. The plan was to occupy the Bosphorus itself, if I remember correctly, within a few days, and then the Dardanelles. If successful there, the Allies would have had nothing left to pursue. ANZAC won't let me lie.

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: belost79

The Crimean Black Sea Fleet had no prospects after Sinop, only complete defeat.

Here, too, it would have been possible to try at least raiding operations by light forces and raiders against supply ships.
IMHO the Black Sea Fleet has become too "locked in" in Sevastopol.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: Trapper7

IMHO the Black Sea Fleet has become too "locked in" in Sevastopol.

Here's the thing: If they hadn't sunk the ships (and there was no military sense in doing so), a unique situation would have developed after the Great Storm.
The allied fleet was scattered across the sea. A significant portion of it was washed ashore... And then Nakhimov, all dressed in white, came out to sea!
Here is a real bifurcation point without any time travelers!

[Trapperxnumx]

Well. Thank you very much, Comrade Menshikov, for our happy childhood.

[Ragnar]

Quote: Senior Sailor

And then Nakhimov comes out to sea, all dressed in white!

Then Kornilov, Nakhimov's position led to the situation it led to...

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: belost79

But the Russian Empire was a generally backward country.

Marine diesel engines were produced before WWI, and they were among the first to install oil-fired boilers on large warships. A lot was done, actually. Although there were more than a few problems.
IMHO, regarding “totally backward”, you’ve certainly gone too far.

[Michael F]

Thanks for the interesting material. In fact, the outcome of the battle and the war itself was decided not by "rivets," but by the ability to shoot faster and more accurately—in other words, by crew training.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Mikhail F

In fact, the outcome of the battle and the war itself were not decided by "rivets",

Overall, yes. However, the rivets were still significantly in the Japanese favor—better rangefinders, the presence of optical sights, shells whose explosions on the water and upon impact with a ship were clearly visible... All this made sighting and effective fire easier.

[27091965]

Good afternoon.
Dear Andrey, this is an interesting consideration, as they say, "there is no dispute."

As the distance decreased, the effectiveness of Russian and Japanese 10-12-inch caliber guns remained virtually unchanged—in both phases, for every 3 Japanese hits with shells of the indicated calibers, there was one Russian hit.

The increase in the number of hits with 6-inch shells is explained primarily by the increase in the number of 6-inch shells expended in the 2nd phase, compared to the 1st.

It is clear that this is a post-battle consideration, but in my opinion, the principle is "what we expected and what we got" would have given a more complete answer as to how future battles were envisioned and what actual results were achieved.

Therefore, I will present a collection of excerpts from German tactical views of 1898;

" Modern devices can accurately determine the distance to an enemy at ranges of up to 2000 meters. As firing ranges increase, accurate distance measurement becomes critical for successful firing. This requires reliable devices capable of functioning in any conditions.

At a range of 7000 meters, using secondary weapons is impractical. Our heavy guns fire at wide intervals, leading to unpredictable range variations. The number of large-caliber guns is limited, and the likelihood of an accurate hit at such ranges is extremely low.

If the range drops to 5000–6000 meters, opening fire with medium-caliber guns becomes possible. However, firing with these weapons is difficult due to the unstable range estimation, which can change unpredictably. The first shots will be fired far from the target, making it difficult to predict a precise hit. It is necessary to act cautiously and continue firing, taking into account possible changes in range.

As the enemy maneuvers, a certain amount of time will pass before the first hits are received, and the fire situation will change."

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Good afternoon, dear Igor, I'm glad to welcome you "to the feed":))))))

Quote: 27091965i

But in my opinion, the principle of “what was expected and what was received” would have given a more complete answer to how future battles were imagined and what actual results were obtained.

Unfortunately, I have too little data to write such a story about the Japanese. From what I have, it can be concluded that neither the Japanese nor the Russian fleets planned for a battle in the JM.
The Japanese trained at 30 kbt before the war—the data isn't entirely reliable; it was somewhere in British reports. Ours, moreover, had no intention of fighting at such distances before the war. And anyway, I don't think anyone in the Russian Imperial Navy planned to lead the squadron into battle after more than six months of reserve/standstill, especially with veterans discharged into the reserves.

[27091965]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Good afternoon, dear Igor, I'm glad to welcome you "to the feed":))))))

I love you the same way.

Unfortunately, I have too little data to write such a thing about the Japanese.

In principle, the same could be said about the Russian Navy. Somewhere in my "archive clutter" I have a French publication called, I think, "Ideas of the Russian Navy before 1904." It's based on the works of S.O. Makarov and N.L. Klado; there's another author, but I haven't looked for his work. The "picture" isn't very informative, and, in my opinion, it's out of touch with the realities of the time.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: 27091965i

"Ideas of the Russian fleet before 1904." It is based on the works of S.O. Makarova and N.L. Klado

The whole issue there is that we seemed to have ideas from individual admirals, rather than a unified concept of combat.

[27091965]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

The whole issue there is that we seemed to have ideas from individual admirals, rather than a unified concept of combat.

Yes, that's true, but the fact is that S.O. Makarov expressed his thoughts and ideas. Vice-Amiral N.I. Kaznakov promoted these ideas, convening meetings and initiating discussions on tactical and strategic issues for the fleet. But the so-called "sailing men," who were the majority in the "high ranks," considered most of these ideas unacceptable. They were also supported by some younger officers, so these initiatives fizzled out.

[Ragnar]

Andrey... What is your favorite ship from the Russo-Japanese War? I dare say the Peresvet.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Ragnar

What is your favorite ship from the Russo-Japanese War???

In terms of "you can't command the heart," it's "Pobeda." In terms of its suitability for its intended purpose, it's probably "Bayan."

[Ragnar]

https://only-paper.ru/_fr/264/71701244.jpg Красивый корабль, и построен хорошо...

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

It's extremely difficult to make things out of paper in general. I once tried my hand at plastic modeling, but I completely destroyed myself and it turned out so-so... Although Lezhnev later praised it - it was a first attempt :))))))

[Ragnar]

What do you think? If the First Squadron had two Pobedas instead of two Poltavas, would they have broken through to Vladik?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Let's put it this way: with a squadron speed of 15 knots, the chances of such a breakthrough would have been much greater. In fact, they would have existed at all, unlike the 1TOE.

[Ragnar]

It's not "Pobeda" of course... But I've never seen anything like this before...

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Thank you, sir, I haven't had anything like that:)))

[Dmitry24]

From a patriotic point of view, again, "Pobeda" was built by ourselves.

[Grim Reaper]

that the Japanese shooting accuracy from 6-8 inch caliber guns was only 1,98%!
****.
I'm still preparing for the big fight called "Accuracy, officers' composure, or just luck." Unfortunately, I haven't been able to write anything in a week. The topic is very deep.