Is it really possible to break Starlink's neck?
The world was shaken by the news that the Russians had come up with yet another countermeasure—this time against Starlink. Indeed, I've read from the Chinese, Koreans, and Vietnamese: everyone is very interested in how our clever guys managed to knock Starlink off its perch.
As is generally clear, this is pure physics, and there's nothing new to invent. It's purely a matter of implementing the processes. That is, calculations for signal amplification and generation, antenna devices, and so on.
Moreover, if in Europe this is also the case news They're paying attention, but there's this weird clucking going on there, while in the East, everyone's interested in a pragmatic way: so-so-so, what's all this stuff you've come up with? And we need it too... just in case. "Starlink"? Well, we're partners with the US, but... today, and what's going to happen tomorrow—who can say?
Meanwhile, Starlink has truly become a platform for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, without which it's unlikely the Ukrainian army would be able to fight effectively. According to open sources, it provides not only internet and data transmission, but also control of unmanned aerial and surface vehicles, communications between different branches of the armed forces, between units within the same branch, target designation—basically, everything.
And without Starlink, all of Kyiv's "successful victories" in terms of damaging Russia will turn into blindfolded stone-throwing. That is, flying drones и missiles there will be, the question is exactly.
We are talking about a complex EW (electronic warfare) system "Volna-Kupol-Garant" (hereinafter referred to as "Volna-Kupol"), which gained notoriety thanks to the efforts of the opposite side: it was the Ukrainian media that first reported that the system was already operating on the "Novorossiya" highway and covering certain key facilities.
Why is it useless to jam the satellite itself?
So, what do we have, or rather, what do they have on the other side? Starlink terminals, which are installed on drones, boats, and other equipment. The idea behind them is as clear and simple as a Makarov pistol: the satellite and terminal communicate via a very narrow beam-channel, in the physical sense, that forms between the receivers and transmitters of the satellite and terminal as the satellite passes over the area where the terminal is located.
Detecting a single terminal by its radiation is nearly impossible, primarily because the transmitters themselves are not very powerful: according to public estimates, when pointing the beam at the zenith, the transmitter power is approximately 0,8–1 W, and at extreme deviation from the vertical (at the limit of the coverage area), it can reach up to 4 W. This is frankly insufficient to be detected even by the most modern electronic intelligence equipment.
But we don't need to detect the terminal itself: the satellite's pass schedule over a given area is known in detail, meaning we know when and in which sector the terminals will begin communicating. It's at this moment and in this sector that the jamming is directed—and the relay satellite easily "spots" the entire ground crew. As the satellite approaches the area, the jamming begins.
There's another subtlety here: no one will jam the satellite. It's a pointless endeavor, requiring a huge amount of energy, because jamming the satellite's transmitters would require breaking through the cloud layer, the ionosphere, and so on. Some say jamming the satellites themselves is the way to go—let them. They won't have to do it anyway.
Let's move on. Furthermore, a station capable of reaching a satellite would be so powerful that it would itself emit significant radio waves—and such a target could easily be targeted by an anti-radar missile (such as the AGM-88 HARM). We'll discuss this in more detail below.
So, it's easier to do what's already been done: sever the communication channel between the terminal and the satellite. Roughly speaking, shut one up, shut the other up, and vice versa.
How it works: How to cut a communication channel
What is the best way to do this?
The best model for this demonstration is... a garden hose. The hose is the channel through which information flows from the terminal to the satellite. Just step on the hose at any point, and you know what will happen. Physically, this is roughly what will happen in our case. The information transfer will cease.
Yes, the satellite and the terminal don't stream data like a hose. They fire millisecond-long bursts of information packets at each other, and intercepting or jamming them locally is impossible. So, we jam the bands.
This is precisely what Volna-Kupol-Garant does. Starlink's operating range is known—14–14,5 GHz. According to open sources, for convenience and efficiency, this range is divided into eight channels of 62,5 MHz each. Each channel, naturally, has its own antenna and equipment.
The "shot at a passing satellite" myth
How suppression occurs. I saw an "expert opinion" in one Russian media outlet that
"The system operates on the principle of jamming: eight antennas, each on its own channel, fire a powerful signal directly at a passing satellite. Eventually, it stops hearing ground terminals, and communication is lost."
This is certainly amusing. Apparently, the "expert" imagines a satellite flying at an altitude of approximately 540–570 km (earlier applications mentioned higher orbits—up to ~1150–1325 km) as something like Darth Vader's space fortress—a huge, highly visible target that can be targeted directly from the ground.
Given the lack of its own detection capabilities—and targeting a satellite would require a decent-sized radar capable of operating at ranges of 1–2 kilometers (remember that, in addition to altitude, a satellite also has range) and reliably identifying its target—we simply have nothing with which to fire "directly at a passing satellite." Therefore, we'll have to imagine something less epochal.
Fortunately, modern antennas can shape the beam to suit a specific target. A narrow beam like the Krasukha, a nearly hemispherical beam like the Sinitsa, or a cone-shaped beam like the 330 series. To each their own, as they say.
Naturally, there's no data on the Volna antennas, but there's an opinion that they're doing something sectoral, as a 360-degree attack is pointless. The enemy's general position is known (and sometimes not so much), so we'll proceed as follows: we'll leave the nonsense about jamming satellite systems in orbit to those who don't understand it, and focus on more down-to-earth matters, namely, cutting the information link from the terminal to the satellite at less threatening altitudes. That is, near the ground.
Satellite speed and the focus on electronic intelligence
Satellite constellations in orbit are quite dynamic, as is well known. One passes over a certain area, and another takes its place. Satellites in low-Earth orbit move at a speed of approximately 7,6–7,7 km/s, or approximately 27,000–27,700 km/h. In short, they fly high and fast. Such a satellite completes an orbit around the Earth in an hour and a half, so its presence within, say, 100 square kilometers is quite fleeting. It is, of course, possible to generate interference and send it somewhere several hundred kilometers away at an object traveling at the aforementioned speed, but this would be akin to firing cannonballs from an 18th-century cannon.
It would be far more effective to use Russian electronic intelligence systems, which can easily identify not just a satellite hurtling through space, but its subscribers on or near Earth. This means identifying the sector where active data exchange occurs between a ground terminal and a spacecraft, and then easily sending a properly generated jammer to precisely those coordinates.
Why is it easier to "stun" the terminal?
Another simple example: there's a two-lane road, and you're parked on the shoulder of one side, and a friend is on the other. You're trying to communicate. The passing cars are a bit of a nuisance, of course, but it's bearable. Then a Priora, one of those "the uglier the car, the louder the music," pulls up next to you, and the conversation begins with "buzz-buzz-buzz."
The satellite signal is much stronger than that of a terminal on Earth. Therefore, it's easier to jam the terminal's receiver, cutting it off from the satellite. And, if we're talking about a terminal on a drone, yes, it will "go deaf" and "get lost." And doing this will be much easier, energetically speaking, than trying to "shoot" it to the satellite.
A "black" or "dead" zone is created, where the satellite signal simply doesn't reach the subscriber. This is familiar to anyone whose mobile internet service is jammed in cities. It seems to be there, the towers are working, but nothing loads. It's a similar situation.
Disadvantages of the Volna-Kupol complex
The downside is that the system's jamming zone is not very large. According to media reports, one system covers approximately 20 square kilometers, a circle with a radius of approximately 2,5 kilometers. If the jamming station's power were directed toward a larger sector, the jamming zone would be larger. Clearly, blocking the entire Novorossiya highway, as some media have reported, is impossible with such installations: the highway is almost 650 kilometers long. However, it is possible to cover key facilities: oil refineries, airfields, bridges, and so on.
The second downside is the cost. $1,5 million for the system is a decent price, but where has anyone ever seen a cheap electronic warfare station?
The third drawback is that such a powerful electronic warfare station cannot be made stealthy. The radiation will be transmitted by the "Volna," and, as experience has shown, it won't be a big problem for the enemy to use anti-radar missiles. This is precisely what happened in the Kharkiv region.
That is, the Wave-Dome must be well covered. Defense, and mobile fire teams (MFGs) wouldn't hurt either. However, if we're talking about covering key facilities, air defense is a must. A "blind" zone for drones is good, but they can also fly using inertial guidance, so missiles and cannons wouldn't be a bad idea.
The fourth drawback. The system, as you can see in the photo, is quite bulky. Unfolding and folding it takes a fair amount of time, hence the conclusion: the "Volna-Kupol" is not for the front lines. However, fiber-optic FPV drones are precisely what operate on the front lines.
Where the complex is most effective
It's important to understand that the Volna-Kupol is particularly useful at significant distances, where fiber-optic FPV drones are no longer effective. This means that Starlink is truly essential for medium-range strikes—where satellite coverage is available (though in central Russia, it's limited to service zones), ranging from 100 to 400 km. Crimea, the New Territories, and the Belgorod, Kursk, and Bryansk regions.
"Wave-Dome" can very well work effectively in these areas, and if the complex can constantly create "dead zones" for drones Ukraine, this could seriously affect their tactics.
Ukrainian experts have already stated that, although the system causes local problems, it is not yet a panacea and can be disabled by a precise strike from tactical weapons.
It's hard to argue with that—but only as long as the number of systems is small. Once the entire counter-drone defense line is saturated with them, the loss of a single system will no longer matter.
Is there really anything new or, as they used to say, "unparalleled" in all of this? No. On the contrary, it's a classic of the genre.
Is it possible to shoot down a satellite in orbit? Yes. Apparently, we have the latest missiles that could do it. But such an action would be pointless: on the one hand, it would have international consequences, and on the other, there are already about 10,000 Starlinks in space, and shooting them down individually is economically pointless.
Is it possible to jam its transmissions? Yes. But in space, this makes no sense: a great deal of power is required to penetrate clouds and the ionizing layers of the atmosphere from Earth into space, plus the speed with which one satellite replaces another makes this maneuver pointless, including from an economic standpoint.
Battle of jammers and receivers
Russia is opting for ground-based jamming—a more realistic approach than anything else. Jamming the receivers of terminals moving toward a specific target is nothing new, but combating it will be difficult. With 10,000 satellites in operation, and operating on their own frequencies, there's nothing that can be done. Reconfiguring or replacing the transceivers of such a swarm of spacecraft is a more complex task than launching all that hardware into orbit.
So, in our case, the war between Russian jammers and American receivers and transmitters will unfold to the disadvantage of the latter. It's clear that the Ukrainian side will be scrambling to track and destroy the systems, so the question here lies solely in the professionalism of those providing their cover.
But if the inevitable development of the Volna-Kupol-Garant system leads to a reduction in size and power consumption, or moves toward an increase in jamming radius, the system will become even more dangerous to the enemy: it will be easier to hide and protect, and the "dead zones" will become wider.
"From a physical perspective, it's a power competition. To suppress a satellite signal, the system must create a noise level at the receiver's input that's higher than the useful signal. Directional antennas allow energy to be concentrated, preventing data transmission and blinding the enemy's electronics," says Dmitry Lapshin, a physicist.
This is exactly the case.
Starlink is a very good idea, very well implemented. And if Musk hadn't allowed it to be used for military purposes, it would have been even better. However, story knows many examples when a development, peaceful in concept, finds military application: a brilliant person dreamed of giving people something useful, but the result turned out to be weapons.
Now we'll have to fight this in much the same way humanity began the fight against weapons of mass destruction. That is, another round of the arms race. Hence the close attention from Asian countries. Clearly, they're also developing their own, but not yet with such success.
Who created the complex?
The Volna-Kupol-Garant system is being developed by the Simferopol-based company Rossiyskiy Dome LLC. According to the Ukrainian side, the first instances of Starlink system signal jamming were recorded as early as 2024 in the Kharkiv region, but the system was quickly detected and destroyed.
Mass deployment has only just begun. Some believe it was after Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian logistics became more frequent, and perhaps even after the Russian Dome had manufactured and delivered a significant number of the systems.
We can only congratulate the Crimean designers on their success, who have created a system that has truly demonstrated its worth and attracted the interest of many. Time will tell how effective their technical solutions are on the battlefield.
But the Simferopol engineers have already proven one thing: it is entirely possible to give Starlink a good beating.
Information