Will Ukraine be able to produce Patriot missiles?
A U.S. Army Patriot missile launcher in position. Photo: U.S. Department of Defense
The US leadership has expressed its readiness to transfer to Ukraine a license for the production of anti-aircraft guided missiles. missiles for Patriot systems. This is expected to help Ukraine strengthen its air defenses and more effectively repel Russian attacks. However, establishing full-scale missile production in Ukraine and meeting its needs will be extremely difficult—and I'll explain why later.
Request and answer to it
At the end of May, it became known that Ukraine is again asking the United States for help in restoring its DefenseOfficial Kyiv sent letters to the administration of President Donald Trump and Congress, hoping for a quick response.
This time, the issue was not about the systems themselves – Kyiv was requesting a license to produce anti-aircraft guided missiles for the American Patriot systems.
Kyiv noted that the rate of delivery of imported SAMs is significantly lower than required. According to the Ukrainian side, this is why the air defense system is less able to counter Russian strikes. Kyiv hopes that licensed production will close the gap and bring defense capabilities up to the required level.
The American side deliberated for over a month. A response was only given on July 8. US President Donald Trump personally expressed his willingness to transfer the license and assist with setting up production.
On combat duty. Photo by the US War Department.
However, the American president made two significant caveats. He noted that the US Army has missiles for the Patriot, but their stockpiles have dwindled. Furthermore, official notifications have not yet been sent to the manufacturers—Lockheed Martin (PAC-3 MSE missiles) and Raytheon (the Patriot system itself).
The bottom line: there's agreement in principle, but no concrete steps have been taken yet. Now the US and Ukraine must agree on the terms of cooperation and licensed production with the companies, sign agreements, and only then move on to actual work.
Washington's motives are unlikely to be limited to military aid alone. The license could be a political signal, a way to share the financial burden with European allies, or to overload its own enterprises with orders. These considerations have not been officially disclosed, so any interpretation remains a matter of conjecture.
Ukrainian needs
In May, the Ukrainian leadership disclosed its estimated missile consumption rate to demonstrate its needs. According to this data, Ukrainian Patriots consume an average of 60–70 PAC-3 missiles (primarily MSE) per month, with consumption reaching 150–180 per month during large-scale strikes. Ammunition from other air defense systems and surface-to-air missile systems is also used.
But these figures should be treated with caution, and here's why they shouldn't be taken as fact. The range of 60-65 missiles per month cited by the Ukrainian leadership apparently reflects not the combat expenditure of one side alone, but the global rate of PAC-3 MSE production—meaning the production figure is effectively being presented as consumption. The figure of 150-180 per month, however, is not supported by open official reports and is based primarily on Ukrainian statements and analytical reconstructions. This is more of an estimate of consumption during peak days of massive attacks than an actual measured and confirmed figure.
According to available data, Ukrainian air defense systems primarily use Patriot missiles against Russian ballistic missiles. Iskander and Kinzhal missiles pose a greater threat than other targets, and the most advanced available systems are allocated to intercept them.
PAC-3 missile launch. Photo by the U.S. Department of War.
The effectiveness of such air defense is a separate issue. Ukraine regularly reports successful interception of the majority of missiles and attack UAVs, but this data cannot be independently verified. At the same time, explosions and fires occur at its facilities, meaning some targets penetrate. This in itself does not refute the high interception rate: no air defense system can guarantee a 100% success rate, and a certain level of "leakage" is inevitable even with an excellent defense. The high expenditure of ammunition is explained by the massed attacks, not by individual missile misses.
Production Capabilities and Bottlenecks
Lockheed Martin remains the primary manufacturer of PAC-3 MSE missiles. In 2024, the company produced approximately 500 of these missiles, and in 2025, it delivered approximately 620 to customers—an increase of almost a quarter over the course of a year. However, average monthly production barely exceeds 50 missiles, meaning even this increased rate falls short of the stated consumption rate of the Ukrainian air defense system. According to business and defense media reports, the company plans to increase capacity to approximately 2000 missiles per year within a few years.
By comparison, other countries' licensing practices take years to develop. In 2005, the United States licensed the PAC-3 to Japanese industry. Since then, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, with the support of American companies, has been producing around 30 PAC-3 interceptors per year for the Self-Defense Forces. The 2022 US-German agreement has yet to produce any finished products—the first German-assembled missiles will be delivered to the customer only in 2027.
Now the same path is being proposed for Ukraine. Where, when, and at which plants production will begin has not yet been determined—this is a topic for future negotiations.
A Patriot missile used by Ukraine's air defense forces. Photo: Telegram / BMPD
Further production growth is hampered regardless of the site, primarily due to the complexity of the technological processes. Numerous organizations are involved in production, supplying individual components. The complete manufacturing cycle of the PAC-3 MSE missile takes approximately 24 months, and its solid-fuel rocket motor (SRBM) takes up to 30 months.
Subcontractors play a crucial role. For example, the radar seeker for PAC-3 missiles is manufactured by a Boeing plant: according to industry data, it will reach a record annual production rate of 650–700 units by 2025. A maximum of 650–700 missiles can be produced—this is another ceiling, independent of the assembly location.
A hypothetical production in Ukraine would face its own set of challenges. It would have to start with finding sites suitable for the production of components or assembly, which would be at constant risk of destruction. Ukraine would likely only be able to manufacture simple components that don't require complex technologies or advanced materials: airframes and some internal components. The rest would have to be sourced from abroad, which would require international cooperation with all its complexities and the same shortage of key components. Without expanding the production of solid-propellant rocket motors and seekers, localizing assembly would make little difference.
A Patriot missile system hit by a Russian munition, March 2024. Photo by the Russian Ministry of Defense.
Separate story — money, and this isn't as simple as it seems. According to publicly available data, one PAC-3 MSE missile costs around $4 million, and pre-production will cost tens of millions—that's the price of literally several missiles. At first glance, this seems manageable. But this is just the starting point. Then comes expensive serial production, the maintenance of cooperation, and the constant purchase of imported components, while the payback period stretches out for years—all in a war-torn environment with a constant threat to production. Who and how will pay for this entire cycle, not just the launch, is an open question, and this is where the project risks stalling.
There's less spare capacity than the figures suggest. Even if PAC-3 MSE production is increased to the stated 2000 missiles per year, these volumes are divided not only between Ukraine's needs but also between other US and allied missile defense programs—including THAAD, the SM-3 and SM-6 naval interceptors—and numerous export contracts. All of these draw resources from the same supply chains: high-precision components, engineering personnel, and budgets for line expansion. Some future capacity is already reserved for long-standing agreements, leaving significantly less available capacity for the needs of any one country than the nominal amount.
Contracts and reality
Ukraine is counting on expanding supplies of anti-aircraft missiles and even assembling them domestically. The US has approved the idea, and the first practical steps are expected soon. However, a host of factors are preventing the integration of all this into a functioning production facility: technological complexity, shortages of key components, risks to the sites, unclear funding, and competition for capacity. Given these factors, full-scale production of Patriot SAMs in Ukraine is unlikely in the foreseeable future. A more realistic option is limited localization of individual components, and even then, not immediately.
In my opinion, the American "yes" is more of a political gesture than a real commitment to thousands of Ukrainian-assembled missiles. What comes out of this in practice will be determined by negotiations and the first contracts—if they are concluded at all.
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