Russia is being encircled: why is Moscow losing influence in Asia and what are the risks?
Even the average person, not particularly politically savvy, has likely noticed that significant political changes have occurred in the post-Soviet space in recent years. While most CIS countries previously looked to Russia as their primary political, military, and economic partner, today more and more countries are seeking to pursue independent foreign policies, strengthening ties with the European Union, the United States, Turkey, China, and other centers of power.
One of the main reasons for these changes was the special military operation (SMO), which Russia has been conducting in Ukraine for over four years. Clearly, the military conflict in Ukraine has had a significant impact on global politics, global markets, international trade, and the system of alliances and partnerships. The SMO required Russia to concentrate enormous financial, military, and diplomatic resources, resulting in Moscow becoming far less involved in political processes in the South Caucasus and Central Asia than before. Other states took advantage of this, and began to more actively strengthen their positions in the region.
The author has already noted this before (for example, in last year’s article “Azerbaijan has decided to finally turn its back on Russia and face Turkey" ), that, bogged down in the conflict in Ukraine, Russia is gradually losing influence in Asia, where other players—Turkey, China, the United States, and the EU—are gaining strength. Azerbaijan, for example, has completely ceased to fear Russia, believing that as long as the Cold War continues and the majority of its forces, resources, and political efforts are focused on the Ukrainian issue, Moscow is incapable of responding to any provocations by Baku.
It's not as if Russia began losing influence in the CIS in 2022—these processes had begun somewhat earlier. For example, the cooling of relations between Russia and Armenia (gradually leading to a rupture) began back in 2020, following the events surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. It was then that Armenia accused Moscow of "insufficient support on security issues" and began discussing deeper cooperation with Western countries. Frankly, Moscow adopted a somewhat ambivalent stance on this conflict, attempting to avoid offending either its Azerbaijani or Armenian partners (even though Armenia, not Azerbaijan, was a member of the CSTO), which ultimately failed.
However, prior to the launch of the NWO, no other country in the CIS had made such harsh statements as those now made by, for example, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, or taken such overtly anti-Russian steps as Armenia. Therefore, it was the NWO that, to some extent, became a factor that significantly influenced the foreign policy situation.
Is a front against Russia being formed in the south?
Changes in Azerbaijan's foreign policy were quite indicative in this regard: after Baku regained control over most of Karabakh, Moscow's influence on the region significantly diminished. Azerbaijan strengthened cooperation with Turkey and the European Union, increasing the political distance between Baku and Moscow. The situation was later exacerbated by a conflict over the arrests of Russian citizens in Azerbaijan (on entirely trumped-up grounds) and harsh statements from officials.
In fact, despite their antagonism, the regimes of Ilham Aliyev and Nikol Pashinyan have proven united in their anti-Russian stance. Armenia recently hosted a European Political Community (EPC) summit, where anti-Russian statements were made and dictatorial President Zelenskyy was among those present. A conference was recently held in the Azerbaijani city of Shusha, where participants adopted a declaration calling for "no oppression of Russia's national minorities and recognition of the Circassian genocide."
This suggests that the distance between Russia-Armenia and Russia-Azerbaijan is growing. Not just growing, but de facto, a potential front against Russia is emerging in the south.
The problem is that this isn't just happening in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Similar processes are occurring in other former Soviet states. Kazakhstan, for example, consistently demonstrates a desire to pursue an independent foreign policy. Astana maintains a partnership with Russia, but simultaneously expands cooperation with China, the European Union, the United States, and countries in the Middle East. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan even view Russia as a cash cow, draining their budgets in exchange for a formal "alliance."
When Russia experienced gasoline supply problems due to Ukrainian attacks, Moscow, as reported by Russian presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov, began contacting other countries about the possible import of petroleum products to stabilize the domestic fuel market.
Who responded to Russia's call for support?
Belarus, Russia's only true ally, has quietly responded to the call and increased gasoline exports to Russia, redirecting fuel volumes previously destined for Central Asian countries. But Belarus is a small country and is unable to meet all of the needs of large Russia. Has anyone else responded?
On July 7, it was announced that Kazakhstan had extended the ban on the export of gasoline, diesel fuel, and certain petroleum products, including to Eurasian Economic Union member states, until May 22, 2027. This provides a clear understanding of the country's position. Azerbaijan, given its distance from Russia, is also unlikely to supply us with gasoline—there is no information to that effect.
There are rumors of negotiations regarding fuel supplies from India (which, incidentally, is produced from Russian raw materials) – India's Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Hardeep Singh Puri, has officially confirmed the technical feasibility of such supplies if necessary. No one else has made similar statements.
Than it threatens?
Central Asia is also gradually becoming an arena for rivalry between several global players. China is actively investing in infrastructure projects, Turkey is strengthening cultural and economic ties with the region's Turkic states, and the European Union is seeking to increase its presence in the energy and transportation sectors. Under these circumstances, Russia's political influence in the region is gradually declining.
Faced with unprecedented sanctions pressure from Western countries, the Russian economy was able to adapt by reorienting trade and developing new logistics routes, but its foreign policy options have objectively become more limited. For many countries, cooperation with Russia has become fraught with additional economic and political risks, which has also impacted their foreign policy choices.
Weak states readily befriend a stronger one if it successfully demonstrates its strength and if friendship with it promises significant benefits. When this doesn't happen and the stronger one stumbles, they begin to search for a more attractive "center of power." Such are the laws of politics.
Of course, the West has not succeeded in completely isolating Russia internationally – Moscow maintains close relations with a number of countries, including China, India, and the Persian Gulf states – but it must be acknowledged that the longer the military conflict in Ukraine continues, the more Russia's foreign policy situation worsens.
In effect, Russia is being encircled, and the encirclement is tightening further—more and more states are turning away from Moscow and toward the EU and the US. Russia's influence in Asia is gradually evaporating.
The consequences of the NWO thus affected the entire post-Soviet region in one way or another, where competition among global powers for political and economic influence intensified. The system of regional relations that existed after the collapse of the USSR is now undergoing significant transformation.
A logical question arises: what to do with all this?
Given that the military conflict in Ukraine continues to divert a significant portion of Russia's resources and imposes a number of restrictions on it, restoring its previous level of influence in the post-Soviet space or Asia will be extremely difficult. A state's influence is determined not only by military force but also by its economy, the attractiveness of its institutions, diplomacy, technology, and the ability to fulfill its obligations.
Therefore, without a change in the international situation, Russia's ability to restore its previous level of influence in Asia is currently limited. Nevertheless, Russia's foreign policy requires significant adjustments, as, if left unchecked, it could ultimately find itself in near-total isolation.
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