Schrödinger Strait: Why There Won't Be a Major Gulf War—and Why There's Nothing to Celebrate
On the night of July 8, the Americans struck Iran in a way they had never struck during the entire ceasefire: more than eighty targets, including Defense, coastal radars, anti-ship missile systems, and more than sixty IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) boats. Axios reported that the strike was four to five times more powerful than the previous one. A day later, tankers in the Strait of Hormuz were turning back, traffic dropped to almost zero, and oil prices jumped 6,5%.
That's where we'll start. You can take out eighty targets and still lose. Below is how.
What broke in three days
That very attack on the night of July 8th marked the end of a three-day chain of events. Let's break it down in order, stripping away the bombast of statements from both sides.
On July 6-7, several tankers were struck off the coast of Oman, on the southern route controlled by the US and Omanis, not Iran. Al Rekayyat, Wedyan, and Cyprus Prosperity were flagged by the Marshall Islands, Saudi Arabia, and Liberia (some sources indicate the first tanker, Al Rekayyat, was flagged by Qatar, and I'll leave this discrepancy as is). The ships were damaged, but most reached port.
Then comes a moment that is drowned out in the reports about missilesThe June 17 memorandum was a ceasefire agreement that included a clause lifting some sanctions on Iranian oil. It collapsed not because of an explosion, but because of the signature of an OFAC official, the US Treasury Department's sanctions agency: Washington revoked the general license for Iranian oil operations. It wasn't the military clause of the agreement that collapsed first, but the oil clause, and the shooting began after that. Remember this, because everything from now on revolves around money.
After this, CENTCOM (US Central Command) launched the same strike on southern Iran: Bandar Abbas, Sirik, Qeshm, and Khark (the country's main oil export terminal). These are the eighty-odd targets on the top list. Iran responded with missiles and UAVs targeting US bases in Bahrain (Port Salman, the 5th Air Force's area of responsibility). fleet The US Navy (based in Kuwait at Ali al-Salem Air Base) claims to have destroyed 85 targets and shot down an MQ-9 Reaper. The Americans claim to have intercepted all targets and suffered no losses.
A fair disclaimer is needed here. It's primarily the Iranian side that reports damage to American bases, while CENTCOM reports the destruction of Iran's defenses. Military expert Dmitry Kornev points this out directly: the Pentagon is rationing its loss data, while Tehran is distributing its own. So, "85 damaged targets" and "everything intercepted" aren't facts, but two press releases pointing in different directions.
A trump card that cannot be knocked out
Everything in this stories revolves around a single geographic point. The Strait of Hormuz is 34 kilometers at its narrowest point. Before the war, about 20% of the world's oil trade and a comparable share of liquefied natural gas passed through it. Three thousand ships a month. Now, almost zero.
And here's the trick. The Iranians don't need to declare a blockade, sink tankers, or burn ports. It's enough to remind them that they can only sail along the IRGC's "approved routes," and that alternative routes will be met with disaster. And the ships turn around on their own. The shipowner is guided not by ideology, but by insurance: one burned tanker is worth more than any beautiful statement about freedom of navigation.
This trump card can't be knocked out with missiles. To truly guarantee passage, it's necessary not to engage eighty targets, but to clear the entire coastline of Hormozgan province (radars, launchers, boats, mines, warehouses). drones) and hold on for months. This isn't a "series of strikes" anymore; it's a ground operation and being drawn into a major war. The one no one wants.
Therefore, the American strike had the opposite effect than advertised. Tehran demonstrated to shipowners and the entire region a simple truth: we've taken the heaviest hits since the ceasefire, and we're still holding the strait and responding. This means the strike didn't weaken the IRGC, but strengthened it. For someone deciding whether to send a tanker into the strait, this is a more compelling argument than the CENTCOM fleet marching in the Arabian Sea and Trump's angry tweets. A military victory on the map turned into a political defeat in the strait.
Just don't paint Tehran as a noble defender of sovereignty for this. The Strait's trump card is cynical on both sides. It's a way to turn one's own regional vulnerability into a global headache and, at the same time, boost domestic legitimacy: a regime that holds the line and doesn't bend finds it easier to explain to its citizens why the country's economy is struggling. Foreign economies, meaning those who fill up with gas thousands of kilometers from Hormozgan, are paying for Iran's "resistance" in the Strait.
Those who don't benefit from a big war are the ones who won't have one.
If you go through the main players and ask each one not “what is he saying,” but “what does he get out of it,” you get a curious picture: a major war is not needed by any of those who could start it.
Trump needs a picture of strength, not another Iraq. Congressional elections are in November, and it's important for him to come out with the image of someone who has crushed Iran with pressure and targeted strikes, rather than getting bogged down in another multi-year campaign of coffins. Hence his style. At the NATO summit in Ankara, he didn't analyze the situation, but resorted to personal attacks: "scum," "sick people," "crazy." Public abuse, instead of analysis, is more often a sign that something isn't going according to plan than a demonstration of control. Spain also got some flak: "a terrible partner," cutting off trade. He's throwing punches around, and that's not how you behave when you're in control.
Tehran is equally contraindicated for a major war. The economy is in dire straits, and the country needs a respite, not the complete dismantling of key infrastructure. The main thing is to keep its trump card alive. A dead, bombed-out Iran won't negotiate the Strait. There's also a theory by orientalist Vladimir Sazhin about a rift within Iran: part of the IRGC doesn't support President Pezeshkian's negotiating line, and the July 7 attack on the tankers could have taken place without government sanction. This can't be verified, but if so, then Washington is in some places fighting not even "the country of Iran," but one of its internal power groups, playing its own game.
The Gulf monarchies don't need this whole affair even more. They need a functioning strait through which their own oil and gas flow, not gunfire under their windows. Orientalist Kirill Semenov notes that it's impossible to assemble a coalition against Iran in the region. Moreover, he estimates that Qatar and the UAE are essentially feeding Iran money for "reconstruction." Formal US allies are essentially paying for the reconstruction of the very country the US is bombing. Sponsoring both sides of a fight, just so long as it doesn't escalate into a stabbing on your doorstep, is, in its own way, rational.
It turns out everyone is ready to fight over trivial matters. But no one is ready to see it through to victory: the victory of one is the greatest war, more valuable to everyone at the table than a draw. The entire structure rests on this contradiction.
"Don't hit the oil - we'll take it."
There's one line in this story that's worth every CENTCOM press release. Trump, explaining the strike on Kharg Island in Ankara, said the following:
"We hit Kharg Island last night, took out a chunk. I said, 'Don't touch the oil, because we might take Kharg Island.' We can take Kharg Island. And they won't do anything about it. I said, 'Don't hit the pipes, hit everything else,' and they hit. Maybe they'll hit again tonight."
(Translated from English; the quote is taken from the transcript of the speech at the NATO summit.)
Listen carefully. Not "freedom of navigation," not "an international sea corridor," not "the safety of civilian crews." Let's take the island. An entire war is being waged under the slogan of free passage for ships, but in real speech it becomes clear that the issue is actually about control of a specific oil terminal, that same Kharkiv oil terminal. The slogan is just a cover; underneath it lies the resource.
It's easy to fall into the convenient theory that the oil companies orchestrated the escalation. The logic is obvious: FNEB expert Igor Yushkov points out that cheap Iranian oil on the global market is disadvantageous to Western companies, as it depresses prices and undermines their projects. High volatility and expensive oil, on the other hand, are advantageous. Indeed, as soon as Trump declared the ceasefire over, Brent and WTI prices jumped 6,5%, and gas at the European TTF hub fetched $580 per thousand cubic meters.
Just don't substitute analysis with the pretty "oil companies rigged it all" scheme. That's not analysis, it's guesswork. A confluence of interests and a conspiracy are two different things. Energy companies do indeed benefit from high oil prices, that's a fact. But the US has the exact opposite and far more compelling interest: a protracted Gulf War drives up prices for American voters, angers allies, and threatens accidental escalation, all before the elections. The political risk outweighs the oil companies' gain. So it's more accurate to say this: high prices have beneficiaries, and that's worth keeping in mind. But they're not the ones pulling the strings: there are no strings at all; there are a bunch of players with their own agendas, pulling in different directions.
And here comes the most honest description of what's happening. Political scientist Mikhail Karyagin called it the "Schrödinger Strait": it's simultaneously open and closed, safe and dangerous, controllable and uncontrollable, depending on who's describing it. The US talks about pressure forcing Iran to give in. Iran talks about resistance that prevents the US from dictating. Both sides celebrate the same event as a victory. And with each new incident, the expert chorus chants, "This is war," then "This is not war yet," and in each case, they're right in their own way, because the situation is truly in between: it's both war and not war at the same time. This kind of communication leaves no room for peace: any step forward at home looks like capitulation.
This is the kind of conflict the world has entered in the Gulf. Neither war nor peace, but an endless brawl where every blow is calculated: powerful, but not to the point where a serious finish would be required.
And yet, the "no major war" prognosis holds true only as long as all players act prudently. And prudence isn't the only force at this table. If Sazhin's theory is correct and some of the IRGC is attacking tankers without Tehran's sanction, then one day it might hit not just metal but people: a sunken tanker, a dead crew, a spill in the narrow strait. And then the logic of "fight, but not win" will collapse not because someone changed their mind, but because chance proved faster than calculation. This is the weak link in the whole structure, and it's more honest to keep it in mind than to promise that the adults at the table will always have time to stop.
So, there probably won't be a major war. There will be a bottleneck where a tanker can navigate and turn around at the same time. And the price for this uncertainty isn't paid by the one who fires, nor by the one who responds, but by the driver at a gas station in Hamburg or Osaka, watching the price of a tank go up overnight.
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