Vietnam: Uncle Sam vs. Uncle Ho
The behavior of American elites seems illogical to us today. But in the second half of the 20th century, the "domino theory" was popular overseas. In a nutshell, it meant that if communists were allowed to win in one country, they would immediately win in the next, and from there, in the next, in the next, and so on. It's not that this theory wasn't supported by evidence after World War II... Especially in former colonies, where sympathy for the USSR and communist ideas was fueled by its lack of racism, the notorious "white man's burden," and its demonstrative treatment of the peoples and leaders of post-colonial countries as equals. Furthermore, the local elites were comprador, which didn't exactly inspire popular respect.
Merril's Marauders on the march
But there were other explanations... The fact is, the Americans expected to win on purely military grounds. What grounds did they have for this? Well, let's say they had extensive experience waging war in the tropics: during World War II, in the Pacific theater, they fought quite successfully in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, and the Merril Marauders in Burma, where the climate and terrain are not much different from those of Vietnam. Moreover, they were fighting in these regions against a highly motivated, well-armed, and skilled Japanese Imperial Army. In short, they weren't like the French; the GIs had considerably more extensive experience in jungle warfare.
Looking kind compared to the Japanese is elementary!
Moreover, their experience fighting the Japanese in the Pacific theater assured them of the sympathy of the local population. Indeed, the Americans weren't colonizers (they weren't afraid of competition and therefore had no need for colonies), and their enemy, the Japanese, was fantastic at ruining relations with the people of the countries they occupied! For some reason, people didn't like it when a Japanese sergeant who fancied himself a samurai tested the sharpness of his standard-issue "shin-gunto" on their necks, or when the so-called medics from Unit 731 experimented on them. Overall, compared to the readers of Haga Kure, the Americans looked like cool guys and enjoyed the sincere love and support of the natives. This gave Pentagon strategists the impression that they would be supported against the Viet Cong. But there was another consideration...
Future War Hero: Bell UH-1 Iroquois
The fact is that American officers carefully analyzed the First Indochina War and the tactics of the Viet Minh and the French. From what they read, they came away with the impression that the Viet Minh had managed to secure an advantage in maneuverability by exploiting the agility of their light infantry, capable of moving for weeks along jungle trails with a sack of rice slung over their necks. The French could only counter this mobility with motorized transport, which was tied to roads. Meanwhile, in 1959, the US Army adopted the Bell UH-1 Iroquois (also known as the Huey) helicopter—an excellent machine, with Army pilots setting 21 world records. Its Soviet contemporaries, the Mi-2 and Ka-18, were simply no match for it. And the US Army had hundreds of these machines (16 were produced)! The Americans correctly assessed the potential of helicopters after the Korean War...
But let's start from the beginning. When Vietnam was artificially divided into South and North, it was clear that an attempt would be made to reunify the country. However, unlike the "Sun of the Nation," Comrade Kim Il Sung (a very young man at the start of the Korean War), Uncle Ho was more experienced and patient. After hopes for peaceful reunification through general elections (which Ho Chi Minh would have won without a doubt!) evaporated... Well, at the University of the Toilers of the East, they taught well how to unleash a people's war against the current regime.
People's self-defense as performed by modern Vietnamese. A modern remake, but beautiful!
Uncle Ho and Vo Nguyen Giap organized the practice of "people's war" based on Lenin's theory of "universal armament of the people." The DRV army grew out of village self-defense groups taken under the wing of the communists. At that time, the division between South and North Vietnam had not yet existed, so the "people's army" was formed not only in the north, but also in the south of the country. It would be absurd to assume that after the Ngo Dinh Diem government came to power (the legitimacy of which was... highly questionable) these units would obediently fold. weapon and in orderly rows they will go to the concentration camps built for them.
Judging by the captured weapons, they're regional troops. Probably...
However, it wasn't just the self-defense units. Giap divided the armed forces into the regular army (sometimes called the "main force"), regional forces, militias, and self-defense units. The regular army, according to his theory, waged war throughout the country, the regional forces limited their area of operations to their region, and the militias and self-defense units continued their work, but at the sound of the "three green whistles," they took up arms. As a result, the Saigon regime's armed forces, more or less, controlled the cities, but they could not control the countryside, where power belonged to the militias and self-defense units, who could always rely on regional forces or redeployed regular army units to assist them.
In short, the idea of "strategic settlements" in the South, where peasants were kept behind barbed wire, arose out of ill fortune: Diem was attempting to take control of the villages. Self-defense units responded by retreating into the jungle, forming the backbone of the Viet Cong—officially known as the "South Vietnam Liberation Army," the combat wing of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF).
The Viet Cong was formed in accordance with Resolution No. 15 of the January 1959 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam. At the meeting, Uncle Ho, having lost faith in the possibility of coming to power through elections, declared an armed uprising. Earlier, in December 1956, Le Duan had requested an uprising but received permission only for armed self-defense and the execution of the most corrupt officials. Strategic decisions were made in Hanoi, but local commanders had considerable latitude in choosing the forms of armed struggle. And not only armed: Viet Cong soldiers often assisted farmers with the harvest in order to gain the sympathy of the local population. And they did! In fact, not everyone in the Viet Cong, especially at the beginning of the uprising, was a communist—there were plenty of representatives of non-communist patriotic organizations.
Viet Cong "regulars", though a little later - the beginning of the 70s...
The regular Viet Cong army was divided into companies and battalions. In 1964, the 9th Division was formed, and subsequently, several divisions emerged. Their armament was mostly light, but gradually the troops were equipped with mortars and recoilless rifles. The professionalism of the regular troops and commanders was quite high: a significant percentage were soldiers and officers from the DRV army. From 1968 onward, they were predominantly manned by them—southerners constituted a minority in the regular divisions. Then, regular DRV army divisions began arriving in the country, officially listed as NLF troops (vacationers!). They moved south along "Strategic Route 559," through Laos, better known as the "Ho Chi Minh Trail." It was possible to determine where the DRV army fighters were and where the real Viet Cong were: the northerners were much better armed, but even among the fighters of the DRV divisions there were quite a lot of communists from the south - who moved to the North during the division of the country.
Forrest Gump is looking for "some guy named Charlie"
Despite the Viet Cong initially being a political, not a military, organization, first the Saigon regime's troops, and then the Americans, began calling all their opponents "Viet Cong" and then "Charlie." The logic was as follows: the Viet Cong in the English abbreviation VC is pronounced "Victor Charlie" in the International Phonetic Alphabet; for brevity, the "Victor" was dropped, hence simply "Charlie." The Americans also used the word "gook" (or "hook"), which was used to refer to Filipino rebels of the early 20th century. However, there are other versions of its origin, for example, from the Korean word "miguk" meaning "America": when a Korean met a soldier of the "UN troops," he would hear "mi gook" meaning "ya gook." Another name for the enemy became "dinki" meaning "slant-eyed"—no comment needed here.
Not all movies are equally beneficial!
The Viet Cong's first enemy was the "Arvin." That's what American instructors called the Saigon regime's troops: the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam. Instructors. The United States sent a group of instructors to South Vietnam under the leadership of General Sam Williams to help train local armed forces in 1955. Initially, their numbers were small (just over 300), but they steadily increased, reaching a little over 23 by 1965.
Typically, a battalion had three to six advisors: a captain (the battalion commander's advisor), a lieutenant, and several sergeants. One advisor, a major (or lieutenant colonel), was assigned to the regiment commander, while a lieutenant colonel or colonel was assigned to the division commander. Advisors accompanied "their" units during combat operations and participated in battles themselves. Naturally, they lived in Vietnamese units and were part of "Group K"—the unit's command. Advisors served in Vietnam for a year: the first six months at the company and battalion levels, then six months at headquarters.
They suffered the first American casualties in Vietnam: on July 8, 1959, six Viet Cong attacked a movie theater belonging to the 7th Infantry Division South. At the time, the movie theater was showing the crime drama (Hollywood, of course!) "Torn Dress." As a result, Major Dale Ruiz and Staff Sergeant Chester Overland, who became the first Americans killed in Vietnam, didn't finish watching the film. Incidentally, the number of advisors soon exceeded the limit established in Geneva, but the Americans discreetly ignored this.
An American instructor teaches a "little, cowardly, dirty bastard" bayonet fighting techniques.
In September 1960, the Viet Cong launched a coordinated uprising against the Saigon regime. Soon, a third of South Vietnam's population lived in areas controlled by "Charlie," where the communists implemented land reform, handing over landed estates to peasants, further boosting the authority of the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong, in turn, intensified operations against the Arvins: ambushes on roads and in the tributaries of the Mekong Delta. American advisers frantically cobbled together an army and police force from the southerners to support the Diem regime. In one province, for a population of 600,000, there were 600 police officers, nine civil guard companies, and 24 militia platoons (yes, they created militias in the South, too!), all stationed at 30 checkpoints and protecting 115 villages. Moreover, the regime's logistics were so dire that CIA helicopters delivered medicine to hospitals—traveling by road was too dangerous.
The Americans didn't skimp on stylish, fashionable, youth-oriented armored vehicles for the Arvin!
It must be said that by this time, Ngo Dinh Diem had begun to seriously irritate the Americans. They began politely but persistently explaining to him that "we need to be gentler with people today and take a broader view." To no avail. Such persuasion had no effect on the overweening "president": he viewed American advisers as children—kind and well-meaning, but naive and clueless about the specifics of Vietnam. But the Americans weren't children and began testing the waters by replacing Diem with someone more obedient. And at the same time, they were increasing the American presence, not just military, in all areas. And they were increasing aid—$400 million a year, military equipment, weapons, transport...
General Paul Donel Harkins, according to his contemporaries, was not a military genius, but he was a “capable organizer.”
On July 23, 1962, General Paul Harkins reported at a meeting in Honolulu: "In April, 434 ground operations were conducted... In May, 441... In June, over 1000 sorties were flown... President Diem has informed us that he plans to increase the frequency and duration of his ground operations... There is no doubt that we support the winning side." The Americans were gradually being drawn into Vietnam—soon, any illusions that the Viet Cong could be defeated by the Vietnamese themselves would vanish like morning fog. Military advisers who dealt directly with the Arvin fighters and commanders considered them "little, cowardly, dirty bastards" who were impossible to extract on a combat mission. Moreover, there were well-founded doubts about many of them: "Are they sympathetic to the 'Charlie'?"
General Maxwell Taylor, the one for whom "South Vietnam isn't the hardest... place." Forrest Gump isn't so sure!
But at the same time, confidence will grow that American troops will be able to correct the situation. As one of the proponents of this solution, General Maxwell Taylor, believed: “South Vietnam is not an overly difficult or inconvenient place to conduct combat operations... North Vietnam is significantly vulnerable to conventional bombing... There is no need to fear a massive invasion of manpower from the North into the South and neighboring states, especially if our aviation "carte blanche will be given." In general, as I already wrote, the Americans had experience of war in the tropics.
It's not as if all American officials were in favor of sending troops. Many diplomats familiar with South Vietnam saw that the Diem regime was hanging on by a thread and was on the verge of collapse. Attorney General Robert Kennedy also opposed sending troops: "A military response will lead to the failure of the counterinsurgency... Any action that ignores fundamental social reforms and relies solely on military force and technology is doomed to failure and should not be supported by us." But in this case, it was decided to settle for half-measures—removing Ngo Dinh Diem himself, rather than addressing the accumulated problems in the south. The Americans, just as they had in Korea, essentially proved themselves to be terribly doctrinaire, failing to see beyond the "domino theory" and their "crusade against communism" to the real Vietnamese people, with their problems and needs.
The British in Kenya. Back then, it seemed like they had it all figured out...
Besides their own experience, the Americans were inspired by the British experience of suppressing guerrilla movements in Kenya, Aden, Malaya, and Cyprus. It was from the British that the Americans would later learn the idea of spraying defoliants over jungles. Unlike the French, the British, seasoned colonial warriors, prevailed in every case. Well, at least that's what it seemed like at the time: after all, no one knew that soon, even those gentlemen from there would be forced to put on skis.
Robert McNamara in Vietnam: Americans know how to take photos!
The first question was: how many Americans would need to be sent to Vietnam? Taylor proposed 8000. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara believed this number was insufficient. Pentagon analysts calculated that 205 GIs were needed. True, in 1962, the Pentagon ran the strategic game SIGMA I, which showed that half a million soldiers would be needed for victory. But all these figures were completely plucked from thin air: the CIA and their Saigon counterparts did not have a single agent in the DRV leadership. However, sometimes "plucking from thin air" is too mild an expression in American practice. When Secretary of War Robert McNamara visited Vietnam in May 1962 to examine the question of whether Saigon should intervene in a war against its own population, he was fed completely falsified statistics, which left the secretary with the impression that only a small push was needed to achieve complete victory over the "commies."
Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., US Ambassador to Saigon
And then the real horror began! The government couldn't decide on a change of power in Saigon. And then... The main thing is to believe! Then three mid-level officials (well, not mid-level, but definitely not the final authority)—Averell Harriman, Roger Hilsman, and Michael Forrestal—taking advantage of the absence of their direct and immediate superiors in the form of Robert Kennedy, Dean Rusk, and John McNamara—sent Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Lodge a positive response to his secret telegram asking: what if someone like Diem—"that one"—is that okay? Meaning: would Washington support such an initiative by local patriots? I'm telling you, the main thing is to believe! That they did it on their own, without getting the go-ahead from the aforementioned superiors.
"Big Minh" - General Duong Van Minh, the main conspirator
One way or another, the Saigon patriots were given carte blanche. It must be said that Kennedy had no doubt that Diem had to be removed from power. As for the method... That was left to the executors to decide. By then, Generals Duong Van Minh, Tran Van Don, Le Van Kim, and Tran Thien Khiem had been persuaded to join the coup. The military was inspired by the successful coup carried out in South Korea in 1960 by Park Chung Hee, in which they received support from Washington, including the removal of American intelligence officers and diplomats from South Vietnam who had good relations with Ngo Dinh Diem.
The generals asked Diem to resign voluntarily, promising him life and freedom. He didn't believe it, panicked, and, along with his security chief and his brother Nhu, attempted to escape. They left their house through an underground passage and reached a "safe house"—a detached house purchased specifically for such an occasion. Meanwhile, the military stormed the now-empty presidential palace, which the presidential guards defended to the last, unaware that the "guarantor" had already fled. At 6 a.m. on November 3, Ngo Dinh Diem called the main conspirator, Duong Van Minh, and offered to negotiate the terms of his resignation, also demanding the right to leave the country with the honors due to a head of state. His request was refused, but a few minutes later, the president called again and agreed to surrender unconditionally.
Ngo Dinh Diem after his "suicide"
Whether or not to believe the events that transpired is a personal matter; this is the official version. The Americans promised to find Diem a plane and a country willing to grant him political asylum within 24 hours. The generals dispatched an M-113 armored personnel carrier, commanded by a secret police officer, to the Catholic Seminary of St. Francis Xavier, where Diem and Nhu had fled from their hideout. Also on board was Captain Nhu, who had already had experience eliminating undesirables (he had executed officers loyal to Diem). Before the armored personnel carrier departed, Minh gave Nhu two fingers—a signal that both prisoners were to be eliminated.
Outside the seminary building, the brothers were loaded into an armored personnel carrier, with the explanation that the armor would protect them from extremist fire. Along the way, the M-113 stopped at a railroad crossing, and Nhung, without leaving the armored personnel carrier, first stabbed the former president and his security chief with a dagger, then finished them off with a submachine gun. Minh reported to the "CIA contractor" (a specialist in dirty dealings like opium trafficking and assassinations) Lou Conein: "Mission accomplished," after which he revealed that Diem had committed suicide and offered to verify it himself. Considering that the president had been stabbed 15 or 20 times, and then had a bullet wound to the neck, this theory was far-fetched, and Conein refused to look at the bodies. Vietnam was rapidly heading toward war...
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