New navigation systems for Iskander missiles

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New navigation systems for Iskander missiles
Iskander-M on the launch pad. Photo: Russian Ministry of Defense


Operational-tactical forces play a significant role in the current military operations. missile 9K720 Iskander-M missile systems. They are regularly upgraded based on combat experience. For example, Ukraine recently reported a possible upgrade to the 9M723 missile's guidance system. If confirmed, the new components could improve accuracy and resilience to external influences.



New Components


After each Russian strike, the enemy searches for and studies the remains of the weapons used. The results of this study are then used to improve defenses. Foreign specialists seeking to study Russian technology also gain access to the fragments.

In early July, after yet another massive strike, the Ukrainian side reported a new change. According to these reports, the Iskander-M was used with modified 9M723 missiles. Photographs of unclear origin were provided as confirmation.

According to Ukrainian and OSINT sources, the 9M723's control system now includes a new Kometa-M12R-VT satellite navigation device with 12 receiving elements, which is more than previous Kometa systems. Russian technical documentation and confirmed performance characteristics for this device are not publicly available, so the designation and configuration are more accurately considered a reconstruction based on OSINT data rather than established fact.

If we piece together the disparate publications, the following picture emerges. The changes primarily affected the rocket's nose cone: according to these data, a new 12-element digital antenna array has been added there, which receives global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) signals during the initial and mid-flight phases of flight. The aft section retains the Kometa-R8 (ARP-4T) module, familiar from previous launches—two heat-resistant four-element arrays, for a total of eight receiving elements; it replaced the previous Kometa-MR12. Thus, the authors describe the nose cone as fundamentally new. The Ukrainian authors interpret the "VT" index as "high-temperature," and for an antenna operating under aerodynamic heating, this is understandable. Again, all of this is compiled from open sources; no one has seen the manufacturer's data sheet.

The main goal of the upgrade is said to be increased resistance to jamming and signal spoofing. Improved targeting accuracy is also expected, but no specific figures are provided.

The Russian defense industry and the Ministry of Defense have not commented on these reports. As before, they are not disclosing technical details. However, the lack of official data does not mean the absence of the technology itself. weapons: updated missiles continue to be produced and used.


Kometa-R8 satellite signal receiver. Photo: Telegram / MilitaryRussia

9M723 missiles have long been used against Ukrainian targets. If the information about the Kometa-M12R-VT is accurate, the upgrade should improve the missile's jamming resistance, thereby maintaining its effectiveness in the face of growing countermeasures and preserving the 9M723's role as a key tool for the Russian army in engaging military targets.

In the process of development


The 9M723 is a quasi-ballistic solid-fuel missile designed to engage stationary targets with known coordinates. The missile can carry single-warhead and cluster warheads.

Its stated range is 500 km. However, this is more of a negotiated figure, tied to missile technology control regimes. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) sets a threshold of 300 km for a 500 kg warhead, and the stated characteristics are typically measured against this limit. The 500 km figure cannot be considered an instrumentally confirmed limit. Open sources vary in their estimates of the actual maximum range.

The missile is equipped with an autonomous guidance system. It receives target data from ground-based systems and controls the entire flight. During the boost phase, the system places the missile on a ballistic trajectory, and during the descent phase, the missile maneuvers and homes in on the target.

The control system utilizes satellite and inertial navigation devices. There has also been some discussion about the potential for incorporating an optoelectronic homing head.

There are no official figures on accuracy, only expert estimates. According to these, pure inertial navigation (INS) provides a circular error probable at maximum range of approximately 50 meters, while GLONASS correction improves this by approximately an order of magnitude, to approximately 5-7 meters. The figures vary in different publications, but the general pattern is the same: satellite correction provides the best accuracy.

The enemy understands this and applies it in his own Defense Electronic warfare systems. Missiles are misdirected by jamming or spoofing their navigation signals.


Launch of the 9M723 missile. Photo by the Russian Ministry of Defense.

The Russian defense industry is responding. Back in 2023–2024, Ukraine announced new satellite signal receivers, then called the Kometa-R8 devices with eight receiving elements.

Why is the number of receiving elements increasing at all? The Kometa is a Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna (CRPA). It consists of several receiving elements, each capturing a signal with a slightly different phase and amplitude. By comparing them, the onboard electronics "rotate" the main beam toward the satellite and simultaneously create dips in the pattern toward the interference. It's not just the number of receivers that's important. As their number increases, the pattern lobes become thinner and the dips deeper. Eight elements are no longer enough, but twelve provide more degrees of freedom: the system can simultaneously track several satellites and suppress several sources of interference at once. In conditions of active interference EW This is a key advantage.

The appearance of the new "Kometa" fits into a general trend: the control system is being improved from version to version.

Efficiency Issues


The Iskander-M and its quasi-ballistic missiles pose a serious threat to Ukrainian targets, so the enemy is focusing on countering them, employing a variety of tactics, means, and systems.

Ukrainian air defenses primarily attempt to intercept incoming missiles. For this purpose, they use, among other things, American-made Patriot air defense missile systems. However, the Patriot is a dual-purpose air defense system, capable of both air defense and non-strategic missile defense. Initially, the system was designed to protect targets from aircraft and cruise missiles. Intercepting tactical ballistic targets became an important, but not the primary, purpose; it was added during the PAC-2 and PAC-3 upgrades. This is a complex task for such a system, and open sources provide varying estimates of its actual effectiveness against the 9M723.

Kyiv claims the high effectiveness of these systems and the successful repelling of massive strikes. The Russian side reports the destruction of the declared targets. No one has disclosed precise data on the percentage of missiles intercepted. Therefore, it is impossible to judge the effectiveness of air defense systems based solely on hits: no system provides a 100% interception rate.

A separate echelon of defense is electronic warfare. This is a standard element of layered defense, and it works against a wide range of precision-guided weapons, not just Iskander missiles.


The destruction of a Ukrainian Neptune missile system by an Iskander missile. Photo by the Russian Ministry of Defense.

Electronic warfare systems are designed to jam or spoof signals from GLONASS and other navigation systems. Without a satellite signal, the 9M723 is expected to switch to inertial navigation, which is less accurate. Spoofing the signal should divert the missile from its intended trajectory.

Both jamming and substitution pursue the same goal: to force the missile to deviate from the protected object.

In response to these measures, 9M723 missiles and other munitions are regularly upgraded, including by installing various models of Kometa pods with improved performance. This is intended to maintain the missile's immunity to jamming and allow for more accurate satellite targeting. This increases the probability of hitting the target, reduces the consumption of missiles, and, importantly, reduces the risk of deviating from the intended target.

The navigation and jamming "race" seems to be here to stay. The enemy is searching for new jamming methods, and industry, in response, is further refining its technology, and so on in a cycle. This applies not only to Iskander missiles but also to other classes of munitions.
23 comments
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  1. 0
    8 July 2026 08: 24
    Currently, the Iskander-M is a fire weapon that can quickly hit even a small target.
  2. +3
    8 July 2026 09: 16
    We need an intermediate missile with similar characteristics but a shorter range and warhead. For example, based on the Tornado-S MLRS. It would have a range of 300 km, but be quasi-ballistic, fast, and maneuverable. The engine needs to be improved. A 250 kg warhead would be suitable – HE, penetrating, or OFZ. This would allow for mass production and operation from the Tornado-S. They could also be adapted for air launch, which would further increase the range. A seeker for engaging moving targets and a specialized seeker for engaging radar and other radar-based targets would also be an option.
    1. +1
      8 July 2026 10: 37
      Quote: rosomaha
      We need an intermediate missile with similar characteristics but a shorter range and warhead. For example, based on the Tornado-S MLRS. It should have a range of 300 km, but be quasi-ballistic, fast, and maneuverable. The engine should be improved. A 250 kg warhead would be suitable: HE, Pronivayuschaya, or OFZ. This would allow for mass production and operation from the Tornado-S.

      We shouldn't invent our own unique path; we should look around. For 40 years now, a single chassis with a frame for a transport and launch kit (TPK) and a selection of transport and launch kits with different missiles has become the standard. Take the Chinese PHL-191, for example, which can carry 300mm missiles with a range of 140 km, 370mm missiles with a range of 300 km, and ballistic missiles with a range of up to 600 km.
      But no, TPKs are expensive, TPKs are heavy, TPKs are replaced entirely, and we need to replenish the ammunition stocks one missile at a time... sad
      1. -1
        8 July 2026 14: 06
        Quote: Alexey RA
        You don't need to invent your own unique path; you need to look around. For 40 years now, the standard has been a single chassis with a frame for a TPK—and a set of TPKs with different RS.

        Are you suggesting that we now begin developing a unified transport and launch system (and, accordingly, change the Iskander missiles, MLRS missiles, and whatever else can be unified for it)?
        A very timely offer, I tell you...
        1. +1
          8 July 2026 15: 46
          Quote: Bookeer
          Are you suggesting that we now begin developing a unified transport and launch system (and, accordingly, change the Iskander missiles, MLRS missiles, and whatever else can be unified for it)?

          IMHO, this is better than trying to squeeze a quasi-ballistic maneuverable missile with a range of 300 km into a 300mm caliber:
          Quote: rosomaha
          An intermediate missile with similar characteristics but a shorter range and warhead is needed. For example, based on the Tornado-S MLRS missiles. With a range of 300 km, but quasi-ballistic, fast, and maneuverable.


          And yes, why develop it? A basic "heavy" MLRS with a TPK was already developed in the 10s—and successfully rejected by the Ministry of Defense.


          Yes, this is the first version of the Sarma MLRS - with a TPK for 6 RS.
          1. 0
            8 July 2026 19: 54
            Moreover, given the current conflict and ammunition consumption, it would be possible to immediately take the caliber of the Chinese missile and produce a licensed missile (with a national seeker). This would allow the ammunition to be supplied to/received by allies.
          2. -1
            9 July 2026 02: 48
            Quote: Alexey RA
            was developed in the 10s and successfully rejected by the Ministry of Defense.

            It seems to have already been adopted and is already being used. In a slightly modified form.
            1. 0
              9 July 2026 10: 45
              Quote: bayard
              It seems to have already been adopted and is already being used. In a slightly modified form.

              The second model went into production - with a launcher similar to the Smerch.

              Which needs to be recharged at will.
              1. 0
                9 July 2026 13: 30
                This has likely been deemed more rational based on combat experience. Changing the magazines may be somewhat faster, but it's also much more expensive, and the spent magazines themselves need to be reloaded. We have a well-developed field reloading technology, and reloading six barrels is much faster than 12 (on the Smerch). So I don't think we've lost much in this case, and we've gained in caliber and range. The question now is how many of these vehicles we have on the front lines.
                I think they abandoned the replacement packages because of the need to lug around a heavy truck crane. A package with six modernized Smerch missiles is not the same as a package with Hymars missiles—the caliber and combined weight are completely different. Here, the standard boom of the loading vehicle can handle it. So I wouldn't hold it against them, since they tried replacing them in packages and found it irrational.
                1. 0
                  9 July 2026 15: 45
                  Quote: bayard
                  This is probably considered more rational based on combat practice.

                  Rather, based on financial considerations, tubular PU is cheaper than TPK.
                  Quote: bayard
                  Changing bags may be a bit faster, but it is also much more expensive, and you also have to recharge the used bags themselves.

                  Reloading a TPK is like a factory. At best, it's army or district level.
                  Quote: bayard
                  I think I refused to use replacement bags because I had to carry a heavy truck crane.

                  Instead of a crane, you have to carry a heavy TZM. smile

                  I wonder if the KAMAZ crane equivalent from the "300" system would be enough to reload the Sarma? If I remember correctly, it can lift two TPKs at once on the "300."
                  1. 0
                    9 July 2026 21: 06
                    Financial considerations, of course, but lugging refill packs to the factory... that's heresy and definitely not our thing. stop The "Paket-NK" naval system, which was invented to replace the light classic torpedo tubes, is sufficient for us. It's a complete disaster. In terms of reloading at sea, it's completely impossible.
                    A TZM instead of a crane? So the reloading ramp requires the same TZM, but a different design. It's not like a regular truck can carry such a heavy load. So a TZM is a very good option in our case – the Sarma definitely won't have to fire in rapid bursts, so there'll always be time to reload, and the reloading process itself is quite familiar and well-established.
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    I wonder if the equivalent of the KamAZ crane from the "three hundredth" complex would be enough to reload the "Sarma"?

                    I don't think so. Just do the math: if a single missile has a standard 200 kg warhead, the entire missile weighs at least a ton: 6 tons of missiles, plus the weight of the package with launch tubes, another 2-3 tons at least. That's 8-9 tons in total (I'm too lazy to look up the exact weights, this is an estimate), so it's unlikely a crane could handle a 300-ton missile. And what's the point of all this fuss about disposable packages? You're talking about the cost of all these procedures, the equipment, the packages themselves, and the cost/time to reload them. But this is simply a lighter chassis that can handle soft terrain, 6 missiles in launch tubes, and simple, familiar reloading in the field. It's possible to build far more of these TPUs than the heavy Smerch missiles. They can be used more flexibly, dispersing them before impact, and they can be reloaded twice as fast, since there are only six missiles. It all seems logical to me.
                    Honestly, the idea of ​​replacing/reloading with ready-made packages has irked me from the start—it's too complicated and expensive. And missiles are already expensive, they're rarely fired, and it only makes sense to use guided/corrected rockets. If that's the case, they'll fire even less frequently, but they'll be accurate and targeted, targeting specific targets rather than over large areas. And in this case, the classic reloading system is optimal.
                    1. 0
                      10 July 2026 16: 19
                      Quote: bayard
                      Financial considerations, of course, but lugging refill packs to the factory... that's heresy and definitely not our thing.

                      So, it's okay to haul ammunition containers back to the factory for reloading, but not the transport and launch container?
                      Think of the TPK as a large plastic box containing PC. smile
                      Quote: bayard
                      The "Paket-NK" naval system, which was invented to replace the light classic torpedo tubes, is sufficient for us. It's a complete disaster. In terms of reloading at sea, it's completely impossible.

                      The "Package" turned out to be a mess because the developer deliberately chose a launch scheme that produces a heavy TPK, and refused to replace the TPK with a launcher at sea.
                      If the developer had made a lightweight TPK and installed a system for replacing the TPK with the PU (a lift from the cellar and a hoist for transporting and installing it on the PU), then the lightweight TA would not have been particularly needed.
                      This is the fleet - there is a task there.move an object weighing more than a ton several tens of meters horizontally and vertically" has been solved for more than a century. smile
                      Quote: bayard
                      A TZM instead of a crane? So, to reload the cargo, you need the same TZM, but a different design. Surely, you can't transport such a heavy load in a regular truck.

                      There won't be a similar TZM there. It will be a regular transporter for cargo weighing 10 tons.
                      1. 0
                        10 July 2026 22: 06
                        In any case, the decision has already been made and implemented. A lighter and more maneuverable TPU, faster reloading, greater flexibility in delivering ammunition to the combat zone, lower costs, less hassle, a lower innovation factor, and therefore higher reliability. In a military conflict, this solution is more rational. The most important thing now is scaling up production, including the guided/corrected RS for the Sarma.
  3. +1
    8 July 2026 14: 38
    The control system utilizes satellite and inertial navigation devices. There has also been some discussion about the potential for incorporating an optoelectronic homing head.
    An optical seeker has been developed for the Iskander tactical missile system. (See photo.) However, it is expensive and therefore used against very important combat centers such as the Arsenal RO or SBP, KP, etc.
    The general pattern is the same for everyone: satellite correction provides the best accuracy.
    The best accuracy is provided by the seeker, in this case the OLS. It is about 3-5 m.
    Missiles are thrown off course by directional jamming or by replacing the navigation signal.
    Filling a receiving channel with 12 receivers? It's probably possible, but very difficult. Signal substitution isn't suitable for OTR because it's encrypted, using random frequency and code marker order changes, and, again, time constraints.
    1. 0
      8 July 2026 15: 54
      Filling up a 12-channel receiving channel? It's probably possible, but very difficult.
      + + + +
      In general, it's not difficult with a broadband megawatt noisemaker. But! Within a radius of ten kilometers from the target. And if the missile has already aimed 15 kilometers back, selected its impact point, and is flying with its brain off...
  4. -1
    8 July 2026 16: 15
    Just recently, Flamingos tried to reach the Iskander manufacturing plant...They didn't make it!
  5. -1
    8 July 2026 19: 06
    Quote: Alexey RA
    And yes, why develop it? A basic "heavy" MLRS with a TPK was already developed in the 10s—and successfully rejected by the Ministry of Defense.
    Yes, this is the first version of the Sarma MLRS - with a TPK for 6 RS.

    So, they seem to be using Sarma. Was the rejected one better than it? Is it a non-universal transport and launch vehicle, or is there no missile system for it?
    1. +1
      8 July 2026 19: 58
      Just the American approach with the TPK.
      I don't know how this compares to conventional loading. But storage/transportation, changing the package, and, most importantly, changing the ammunition caliber are a big advantage.
      I won’t even mention that the TPK, if approached with imagination, can contain cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, anti-ship missiles, and anti-aircraft missiles.
    2. +1
      9 July 2026 10: 36
      Quote: Bookeer
      This is how they use "Sarma" it seems.

      Yes. But now they're developing a second model, with rechargeable single-shot launchers like the Smerch.
      Quote: Bookeer
      Was what was rejected better than her?

      When the TPK was abandoned, the main thing was low cost. The rechargeable launcher itself was cheaper, and the TZMs were available.
      The TPK wins over the reloadable PU when it comes to reload speed. It's one thing introduce slowly smile The second method is to remove the old TPK from the frame and use a crane to hoist a new one onto it, with six MLRS at a time. Reloading MLRS using the first method is currently only possible deep in the rear.
      The second advantage of the MLRS with a TPK is its multi-caliber capability. This means that the same basic vehicle, depending on the mission, can fire standard MLRS, long-range MLRS (more like mini-ORR), and full-fledged ORR. Furthermore, the unified MLRS/ORR launcher is very effective in terms of concealment and survivability: instead of an easily identifiable special chassis for ORR, dozens of standard MLRS chassis are deployed in the rear, each capable of launching an ORR if necessary.
  6. +1
    8 July 2026 23: 04
    Back in 1972, an 8K14 missile was fired at a target 270 km away during a training exercise at the Emba test site. The range deviation was 300 meters. The missile was liquid-fueled, with an inertial guidance system and an analog computer. Hasn't the accuracy of gyroscopes and other sensors improved in this day and age? Especially since the guidance system is now digital and includes satellite navigation. If the bulk of the flight path is guided by satellite and the final part by inertial navigation, then the accuracy should be acceptable, especially when the warhead is armed with a nuclear warhead.
    1. +1
      10 July 2026 20: 46
      Thanks, comrade. Fortunately, everyone makes mistakes with the dimensions here. It's immediately obvious that they're not participants.
  7. 0
    13 July 2026 01: 38
    Quote: Alexey Lantukh
    If the main part of the path is on a satellite, and the final part is on an inertial system, then the accuracy should be acceptable, especially when equipping the warhead with a nuclear charge.

    Let's say they fired on your instructions. Just answer: what specific target should such a strike be launched at? What, in your opinion, will follow in response? I'm referring to a) NATO's reaction and b) the reaction of countries considered to be on our side, such as Belarus and China?
    What is your prediction?
  8. 0
    20 July 2026 13: 56
    Interesting article.
    Хорошо, что так много делают, для упреждения противодействия украинским средствам РЭБ.