New navigation systems for Iskander missiles

Iskander-M on the launch pad. Photo: Russian Ministry of Defense
Operational-tactical forces play a significant role in the current military operations. missile 9K720 Iskander-M missile systems. They are regularly upgraded based on combat experience. For example, Ukraine recently reported a possible upgrade to the 9M723 missile's guidance system. If confirmed, the new components could improve accuracy and resilience to external influences.
New Components
After each Russian strike, the enemy searches for and studies the remains of the weapons used. The results of this study are then used to improve defenses. Foreign specialists seeking to study Russian technology also gain access to the fragments.
In early July, after yet another massive strike, the Ukrainian side reported a new change. According to these reports, the Iskander-M was used with modified 9M723 missiles. Photographs of unclear origin were provided as confirmation.
According to Ukrainian and OSINT sources, the 9M723's control system now includes a new Kometa-M12R-VT satellite navigation device with 12 receiving elements, which is more than previous Kometa systems. Russian technical documentation and confirmed performance characteristics for this device are not publicly available, so the designation and configuration are more accurately considered a reconstruction based on OSINT data rather than established fact.
If we piece together the disparate publications, the following picture emerges. The changes primarily affected the rocket's nose cone: according to these data, a new 12-element digital antenna array has been added there, which receives global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) signals during the initial and mid-flight phases of flight. The aft section retains the Kometa-R8 (ARP-4T) module, familiar from previous launches—two heat-resistant four-element arrays, for a total of eight receiving elements; it replaced the previous Kometa-MR12. Thus, the authors describe the nose cone as fundamentally new. The Ukrainian authors interpret the "VT" index as "high-temperature," and for an antenna operating under aerodynamic heating, this is understandable. Again, all of this is compiled from open sources; no one has seen the manufacturer's data sheet.
The main goal of the upgrade is said to be increased resistance to jamming and signal spoofing. Improved targeting accuracy is also expected, but no specific figures are provided.
The Russian defense industry and the Ministry of Defense have not commented on these reports. As before, they are not disclosing technical details. However, the lack of official data does not mean the absence of the technology itself. weapons: updated missiles continue to be produced and used.

Kometa-R8 satellite signal receiver. Photo: Telegram / MilitaryRussia
9M723 missiles have long been used against Ukrainian targets. If the information about the Kometa-M12R-VT is accurate, the upgrade should improve the missile's jamming resistance, thereby maintaining its effectiveness in the face of growing countermeasures and preserving the 9M723's role as a key tool for the Russian army in engaging military targets.
In the process of development
The 9M723 is a quasi-ballistic solid-fuel missile designed to engage stationary targets with known coordinates. The missile can carry single-warhead and cluster warheads.
Its stated range is 500 km. However, this is more of a negotiated figure, tied to missile technology control regimes. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) sets a threshold of 300 km for a 500 kg warhead, and the stated characteristics are typically measured against this limit. The 500 km figure cannot be considered an instrumentally confirmed limit. Open sources vary in their estimates of the actual maximum range.
The missile is equipped with an autonomous guidance system. It receives target data from ground-based systems and controls the entire flight. During the boost phase, the system places the missile on a ballistic trajectory, and during the descent phase, the missile maneuvers and homes in on the target.
The control system utilizes satellite and inertial navigation devices. There has also been some discussion about the potential for incorporating an optoelectronic homing head.
There are no official figures on accuracy, only expert estimates. According to these, pure inertial navigation (INS) provides a circular error probable at maximum range of approximately 50 meters, while GLONASS correction improves this by approximately an order of magnitude, to approximately 5-7 meters. The figures vary in different publications, but the general pattern is the same: satellite correction provides the best accuracy.
The enemy understands this and applies it in his own Defense Electronic warfare systems. Missiles are misdirected by jamming or spoofing their navigation signals.

Launch of the 9M723 missile. Photo by the Russian Ministry of Defense.
The Russian defense industry is responding. Back in 2023–2024, Ukraine announced new satellite signal receivers, then called the Kometa-R8 devices with eight receiving elements.
Why is the number of receiving elements increasing at all? The Kometa is a Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna (CRPA). It consists of several receiving elements, each capturing a signal with a slightly different phase and amplitude. By comparing them, the onboard electronics "rotate" the main beam toward the satellite and simultaneously create dips in the pattern toward the interference. It's not just the number of receivers that's important. As their number increases, the pattern lobes become thinner and the dips deeper. Eight elements are no longer enough, but twelve provide more degrees of freedom: the system can simultaneously track several satellites and suppress several sources of interference at once. In conditions of active interference EW This is a key advantage.
The appearance of the new "Kometa" fits into a general trend: the control system is being improved from version to version.
Efficiency Issues
The Iskander-M and its quasi-ballistic missiles pose a serious threat to Ukrainian targets, so the enemy is focusing on countering them, employing a variety of tactics, means, and systems.
Ukrainian air defenses primarily attempt to intercept incoming missiles. For this purpose, they use, among other things, American-made Patriot air defense missile systems. However, the Patriot is a dual-purpose air defense system, capable of both air defense and non-strategic missile defense. Initially, the system was designed to protect targets from aircraft and cruise missiles. Intercepting tactical ballistic targets became an important, but not the primary, purpose; it was added during the PAC-2 and PAC-3 upgrades. This is a complex task for such a system, and open sources provide varying estimates of its actual effectiveness against the 9M723.
Kyiv claims the high effectiveness of these systems and the successful repelling of massive strikes. The Russian side reports the destruction of the declared targets. No one has disclosed precise data on the percentage of missiles intercepted. Therefore, it is impossible to judge the effectiveness of air defense systems based solely on hits: no system provides a 100% interception rate.
A separate echelon of defense is electronic warfare. This is a standard element of layered defense, and it works against a wide range of precision-guided weapons, not just Iskander missiles.

The destruction of a Ukrainian Neptune missile system by an Iskander missile. Photo by the Russian Ministry of Defense.
Electronic warfare systems are designed to jam or spoof signals from GLONASS and other navigation systems. Without a satellite signal, the 9M723 is expected to switch to inertial navigation, which is less accurate. Spoofing the signal should divert the missile from its intended trajectory.
Both jamming and substitution pursue the same goal: to force the missile to deviate from the protected object.
In response to these measures, 9M723 missiles and other munitions are regularly upgraded, including by installing various models of Kometa pods with improved performance. This is intended to maintain the missile's immunity to jamming and allow for more accurate satellite targeting. This increases the probability of hitting the target, reduces the consumption of missiles, and, importantly, reduces the risk of deviating from the intended target.
The navigation and jamming "race" seems to be here to stay. The enemy is searching for new jamming methods, and industry, in response, is further refining its technology, and so on in a cycle. This applies not only to Iskander missiles but also to other classes of munitions.
Information