Port Arthur as a naval base in the Russo-Japanese War: its shortcomings and alternatives
"An error made in the initial concentration of forces can hardly be corrected during the course of a campaign." Moltke. "On Strategy".
Defense of the Far East and the choice of location for the naval base
The Russian Far East is significantly remote from the center of the country, and before the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the lack of roads made it difficult to transport troops there. For example, artillery The battery, which left Central Asia as an experiment in 1895, took almost a year to reach Primorye—a year minus 17 days (Oleg Airapetov, “On the Road to Collapse”).
Therefore, before the construction of the railway, Primorye was defended mainly fleet: the troops located here were transported and supplied by sea.
Due to the small number of Russian troops in Primorye, any attempt by Japan to occupy part of northern Chinese or Korean territory and transfer its army there threatened Russia with the loss of Primorye: reinforcements could not be brought in by land, and the navy would not be able to simultaneously defend the coast and prevent a landing.
In Japan, the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway was considered unacceptable, since after its completion, Russia's power in the Pacific Ocean, which had previously been very limited, would increase significantly according to calculations at that time.
The Russian fleet's mission was to prevent the Japanese army from landing on the mainland and disrupt its supply lines if it did. Therefore, the location of the naval base, which could theoretically be located in three places, was crucial.
Vladivostok
The railway construction options are shown: green along the Amur, blue – the Tsurunkhai-Blagoveshchensk option.
In the event of war, Japanese troops would have landed in Korea, which was separated from Japan by a narrow strait. Vladivostok was far from the possible landing sites, and the Russian fleet would have been unable to prevent it.
Japanese troops could also have landed in Dalny on the very first day of the war, which would have been faster than advancing through Korean territory. This is discussed in the article "Provided Our Fleet Doesn't Interfere with the Peaceful Sea Transport of the Japanese Landing Force" (link in the appendix)—which, incidentally, doesn't idealize Port Arthur.
Vladivostok froze in winter, and for four months of the year the fleet could only sail with the aid of an icebreaker. Following it in column, the squadron would have been deprived of freedom of maneuver and, near the point of reaching open water, risked being fired upon by an enemy squadron in an advantageous position. "stick over the T" (When enemy ships line up across the course of the departing column and fire with their entire broadsides, while the latter responds only with their forward guns.) To achieve this, the Japanese only needed to know the departure time in advance and ambush the squadron at that moment.
Here is what the British naval historian Sir Julian Corbett wrote about Vladivostok as a naval base:
"Vladivostok was out of the question. True, as a naval base, it had advantages that Port Arthur lacked. Its docking facilities were better, it was more spacious, and its two entrances made a blockade more difficult. However, this last consideration gave it no strategic significance beyond serving as a base for cruisers and raiders. The only reason for concentrating the fleet was to give it the opportunity to seek a decisive battle with superior force. Allowing the enemy to attempt to blockade the fleet was out of the question. If it were concentrated in Vladivostok, it would have to put to sea at the outbreak of war and immediately seek a solution. But even for a decisive battle, the northern port was a poor starting point for the obvious reason that it was located eccentrically [that is, off-center, away from the main combat area] relative to the vital theater of operations."
The phrase "immediately seek solutions" at that time meant "engaging the enemy in a decisive battle," which required the Russian fleet to have a superior force over the Japanese, as Corbett explicitly points out. If the Japanese fleet prevailed, the Russian fleet could only play a supporting role. The army would then have to shoulder the burden of defense, which became possible only after the Trans-Siberian Railway was completed and its capacity was increased (the second track, the Amur Line, was built in the mid-1910s).
The Trans-Siberian Railway's single track, with a gap at Lake Baikal that had not been closed by early 1904 (the Circum-Baikal Railway had not yet been completed, and cargo had to be shipped across the lake), prevented the rapid delivery of troops. Therefore, had the fleet been based in Vladivostok, events would likely have unfolded along the same lines as they did at Port Arthur: the Japanese, having landed, would have pushed back the small Russian forces and besieged the base itself—the siege of Vladivostok would have been little different from the siege of Port Arthur.
Moreover, when based in Port Arthur, the Russian fleet slowed down the deployment of the Japanese army, but if based in Primorye, it would not have been able to do this.
If based in Primorye, the best port would be Wrangel Bay:
- she hardly froze;
- was further from the border than Vladivostok;
- Nearby were the Suchan coal mines, individual layers of which were not inferior to the English cardiff.
In this case, the railway to Vladivostok had to be built through its own territory, otherwise it would be easy to cut and the naval base would be cut off.
But if Port Arthur had still belonged to China, a Japanese landing there would have meant war with China, from which China, considered a Russian ally, had in reality withdrawn. China would then have diverted part of the Japanese army, thereby aiding the Russian army.
On the other side of the Tsushima Strait: Port Arthur or Dalniy
These ports had the advantage over Vladivostok of being ice-free. The Russian naval plan for the war with Japan, drawn up with the fleet based in Port Arthur in mind, stated the following:
“It is impossible to prevent the landing of the Japanese army on the east coast of Korea with our naval forces, given its proximity to Japan and its possession of a strong and convenient base - the Fusan-Tsushima-Sasebo-Kure barrier, since 1) Port Arthur is 600 miles from the east coast, while only 100 miles from Japan and 2) the initiative ... of offensive actions at sea will be on the side of Japan.”
The only way to prevent a landing anywhere was to be in the Tsushima Strait, but to do that, a base was needed there. The fleet couldn't remain at sea permanently: while coal and food supplies could still be delivered, the machinery would require repairs, and the fleet would be forced to return to Port Arthur.
If, however, part of the fleet were kept in the strait and periodically replaced, then the enemy would defeat the Russian fleet piecemeal.
In his report on practical exercises in strategy, “The War between Russia and Japan in 1905,” N. L. Klado mentioned the task of capturing the port of Mozampo in the south of Korea to support the combat operations of the Russian fleet (see map).
Admiral Fyodor Dubasov, commander of the Pacific Squadron in 1897–1899, gave the following assessment of Port Arthur in a note to the head of the Naval Ministry, P. P. Tyrtov, in 1895:
“Port Arthur is completely inadequate, being five hundred and fifty miles from the middle of the Korean Strait, the junction of communications between Siberia, China, Korea and Japan, and does not provide the opportunity to observe, much less command, these communications.
Then, being away from our natural line of defense along the coast of the Sea of Japan, and being at a distance from it of from six hundred to a thousand miles, it cannot serve as a support for our naval operations along that coast, leaving it completely open to enemy attack.
In particular, the entire southeastern coast of Korea, with the Japanese outpost of Fusan existing there, remains open to capture with impunity.
And, located six hundred to twelve hundred miles from the northern ports of our main enemy, Japan, our fleet at Port Arthur would be completely unable to hinder or even threaten a Japanese fleet advance toward the Korean or our coast. This base doesn't even cover the western coast of Korea or the approaches to Seoul...
Finally, being located at a distance of one thousand eighty miles from our main base - Vladivostok, Port Arthur remains, as it were, completely cut off from it, since the line of communication, on the one hand, has no intermediate strongholds, and on the other, is exposed along its entire length to attack by the Japanese fleet.
The connection of Port Arthur with the Siberian Railway will not eliminate these inconveniences...
On the peninsula itself, this connection, due to its insignificant width, can always be destroyed by an attack from the sea by an enterprising enemy.”
Then, being away from our natural line of defense along the coast of the Sea of Japan, and being at a distance from it of from six hundred to a thousand miles, it cannot serve as a support for our naval operations along that coast, leaving it completely open to enemy attack.
In particular, the entire southeastern coast of Korea, with the Japanese outpost of Fusan existing there, remains open to capture with impunity.
And, located six hundred to twelve hundred miles from the northern ports of our main enemy, Japan, our fleet at Port Arthur would be completely unable to hinder or even threaten a Japanese fleet advance toward the Korean or our coast. This base doesn't even cover the western coast of Korea or the approaches to Seoul...
Finally, being located at a distance of one thousand eighty miles from our main base - Vladivostok, Port Arthur remains, as it were, completely cut off from it, since the line of communication, on the one hand, has no intermediate strongholds, and on the other, is exposed along its entire length to attack by the Japanese fleet.
The connection of Port Arthur with the Siberian Railway will not eliminate these inconveniences...
On the peninsula itself, this connection, due to its insignificant width, can always be destroyed by an attack from the sea by an enterprising enemy.”
(Quote from Galenin's book "Tsushima as a sign of the end of Russian stories. ")
The addressee of the note, Admiral P. P. Tyrtov, head of the Naval Ministry, agreed with Dubasov:
“Port Arthur is… important for our influence on Northern China, but… for our influence on Japan, its strategic importance… is insignificant… both due to its distance from Japan and due to the existence of magnificent bays in the south of Korea, which would allow the enemy fleet to establish itself there firmly and stop all communication between Vladivostok and Port Arthur…”
(From Oleg Airapetov's article "Port Arthur. On the Creation of a Naval Base and Fortress.")
Admiral Makarov wrote in his note “Opinion on the Organization of the Defense of Port Arthur” in 1900:
"Japan will occupy Korea first, and our fleet, far from their bases, will be unable to prevent the Japanese from landing anywhere. Having occupied Korea, the Japanese will move toward the Kwantung Peninsula and concentrate more forces there than we do... The fall of Port Arthur will be a terrible blow."
(Quoted from Shirokorad's book "The Fall of Port Arthur." From here on, my emphasis.)
At the strategic naval games at the Nikolaev Academy, the following response was given:
"...the forced assignment of Kwantung, due to its weakness, as the primary objective of the enemy's operations forces our fleet to defend a land fortress; and, as it is not suited to it, this task can only be accomplished to a limited extent. For the same reason, the fleet is diverted from its primary missions and finds itself in a very unfavorable starting position for naval operations."
Kuropatkin, a poor commander but former chief of staff to Skobelev, in a note entitled “On the advisability of Russia’s occupation of Northern Manchuria” in November 1903, listed some of the shortcomings of Port Arthur and proposed exchanging it for any territory in Northern Manchuria.
Our contemporary, Sergei Vasiliev, in his article “The Port Arthur Tragedy as an Example of Domestic Corruption” writes:
"The process of creating the Russian fortress of Port Arthur resembles a game of poker, which Britain won against Russia by desperately bluffing: 'If you don't take it, we will!'" It was necessary to prevent Nicholas II from strengthening Russia's position in the Pacific Ocean, which was brilliantly accomplished, for Port Arthur did not strengthen, but rather weakened, those positions.
Shirokorad believes that the crucial matter of choosing a naval base fell into the hands of two Russian naval amateurs. I disagree: the true "professional" here was British envoy Nicholas O'Connor, who pitched the idea, lucrative for London, to occupy this godforsaken location.
If you look at the map, it is easy to see that the Liaodong Peninsula, located in the depths of the Yellow Sea, cannot control any ocean communications at all, but can effectively divert resources and disperse Russia's forces along the entire coastline, which now stretches for thousands of kilometers."
Shirokorad believes that the crucial matter of choosing a naval base fell into the hands of two Russian naval amateurs. I disagree: the true "professional" here was British envoy Nicholas O'Connor, who pitched the idea, lucrative for London, to occupy this godforsaken location.
If you look at the map, it is easy to see that the Liaodong Peninsula, located in the depths of the Yellow Sea, cannot control any ocean communications at all, but can effectively divert resources and disperse Russia's forces along the entire coastline, which now stretches for thousands of kilometers."
The author of the article cites the opinion of army specialists who did not find any military significance for Port Arthur:
"...If Port Arthur is important to Russia as a stronghold and the head of a railway route, it will only be if this route has global transit significance. Protecting the southern branch of the East China Railway, which is primarily of local importance, with such an expensive asset as Port Arthur, with its fortifications, navy, and 30-strong garrison, is completely unnecessary for Russia, economically speaking."
When discussing Port Arthur, two of its most important features are often omitted:
- due to its size, it could not accommodate all the ships of the Pacific squadron;
- It was only possible to pass between the inner and outer roadsteads during high tide, during which 8-9 large ships, that is, only part of a large squadron, managed to pass through - for which Admiral Chikhachev called Port Arthur a trap.
Pay attention to the inscriptions on the map: “dry place at low tide” and “drying place”.
Therefore, during the Japanese attack, the fleet was located in the unprotected outer roadstead, which led to the destruction of the most powerful ships during the Japanese mine attack.
Soviet military theorist M. A. Petrov writes:
"The fleet received a port... which, by its very nature, was quite inconvenient. Port Arthur had only one outlet to the sea, accessible to ships only at high tide. Its outer roadstead was completely open. This alone made it unsuitable as a base during wartime, or else necessitated the enormous expense of deepening and digging a second outlet."
Thus, basing in Port Arthur, given its remoteness from Korea, was not suitable for preventing an enemy landing on the mainland, and given the restrictions on entry and exit, it was not suitable for a decisive struggle for supremacy at sea.
Although Port Arthur was connected to the country's territory by a railway line, Admiral Birilev, in a note to Bilderling, called it "a colony cut off from the country."
In 1900, three-quarters of the railway was destroyed by the Boxer Rebels. Lukoyanov writes: "In 1900, the CER was guarded by 11 men, with guns, armored trains, and gunboats, and it was planned to increase their number to 16." Shirokorad cites a guard of 25 in 1903, when the Boxer Rebels were no longer in existence, but the Honghuzi remained, operating even on Russian territory.
If the Japanese landing in Korea wasn't prevented, this railway route would be cut. Sea transport was cheaper and allowed for the transfer of larger quantities of cargo, so in peacetime, Port Arthur was supplied by sea.
Our contemporaries sometimes write about the possible occupation of Port Arthur by England and the creation of "armies of Chinese sepoys" against Russia. But after the two Opium Wars, the Chinese saw Russia as a lesser evil than England, and there was a strong movement among them against any Europeans, which led to the Boxer Rebellion. For the English, arming those who hated them would have been an act "to their own detriment."
As for the Indian sepoys, "the Anglo-Indian army could not send more than 35 people outside India, as the war with the Boers proved" (Ayrapetov, "On the Road to Collapse"); English power there was not firm, and some Indians pinned their hopes for liberation on the Russians.
Finally, protecting the port from British capture didn't require its long-term occupation—the very occupation Russia actually achieved by bribing Chinese officials and threatening military force. Moreover, it wasn't necessary to make Port Arthur a major naval base.
South of the Korean Peninsula
“If Russia were to take possession of a port on the Korean coast that would simultaneously oversee two seas—the Korean and Japanese—and command the straits, then it would become the mistress of the eastern seas.” Elisée Reclus, geographer and historian.
Soviet naval theorist and historian M. A. Petrov writes in his book “Overview of the Major Campaigns and Battles of the Steam Fleet”:
"Such an inconvenient location of the Russian naval bases has more than once given rise to the desire to seize bases in the Korean Strait itself - either in Mozampo (Fusan), or on Tsushima Island, which lies in the middle of the Korean Strait (incidentally, Tsushima Island was given to the Russians under the Treaty of Beijing, but our short-sighted strategists and politicians considered it possible to renounce it under pressure from England)... But these projects were never realized."
A fleet permanently stationed in the Tsushima Strait would have prevented a Japanese landing anywhere in Korea. Japan would have needed a decisive victory in a decisive naval battle to achieve a landing.
The fleet's deployment in the strait had a limitation: according to the findings of the first strategic naval game, "War with Japan," it required the Russian fleet to be equal in strength to the Japanese. The feasibility of this requirement will be discussed below.
Even in this case, the Russian fleet would have been in a worse position - due to the backlog in repairs for battle damage and due to the more developed network of convenient Japanese naval bases.
Therefore, Admiral Makarov believed that Japan's greater repair capacity in the Pacific required compensation from a stronger Russian fleet.
Having a base in the strait did not prevent the establishment of a second base in Primorye, since one base was not enough for the fleet:
“The Japanese fleet had the following bases that could serve as a support for the conduct of the war: the first-class military port of Sasebo (in the Korea Strait), Takeshiki, Shimonoseki, Nagasaki, and the equipped ports of Maizuru, Tsuruga, Hakodate, Kure, Kobe, Osaka, Saigo, Uraga, Yokosuka (a first-class port), Yokohama, and Tokyo,” writes M.A. Petrov.
In this case, Port Arthur would remain in Chinese hands. If Japan achieved naval superiority, the navy's main base would become Wrangel Bay (or Vladivostok), and the base in the strait would become a forward base, constraining the enemy's actions like a fortress, requiring the diversion of its forces.
Moreover, only this base prevented the exit from Russian Primorye to the Pacific Ocean (the Kuril Islands belonged to Japan).
The supporters of a naval base in the Tsushima Strait were: Admiral Ivan Fedorovich Likhachev, who occupied Tsushima in 1861, the Minister of the Navy A. B. Lobanov-Rostovsky (1895), the Minister of War Vannovsky (1895), and admirals Dubasov, Makarov, Gildebrandt, and Alekseev in 1897 (Galenin, “Tsushima as a Sign of the End of Russian History”).
Suitable bases in the strait were Fusan (modern-day Busan), chosen by Makarov, and Mozampo (modern-day Masan), with the island of Kargodo, which protected it and was called Eastern Gibraltar (modern-day Kojedo). Fusan and Mozampo are different ports in southern Korea; in the plan cited above, they were mistakenly identified.
Dubasov wrote in 1897:
"Our occupation of the Kargodo Archipelago, with its bay and port of Mozampo, which I have just thoroughly examined, fully resolves the issue of Russia's strategic consolidation on the shores of the Pacific Ocean. This will give us a base commanding Korea's communications with Northern China and Japan... I can fully occupy and hold them, mining the secondary passages and protecting the main ones with a squadron..."
However, on the same day the emperor issued an order to occupy Port Arthur.
Unlike Port Arthur, whose single, narrow entrance could be sealed off with fireships and which battleships could only navigate at high tide, Kargodo Bay had two entrances. The main one was 5 kilometers wide and approximately 20 meters deep, making it impossible to block. It was clearly visible from the heights of Kargodo and could be penetrated by coastal artillery, preventing the penetration of enemy minesweepers, which were impossible to attack here.
The inner bay of Kargodø Island has a depth of about 17 meters, which would allow the deployment of battleships with a draft of 8,5 meters, and its size would allow the deployment of a fleet larger than the entire Russian fleet.
Even with this basing option, for security reasons, the Trans-Siberian Railway would have to be built on its own territory—or the Tsurukhaituy-Blagoveshchensk option would have to be adopted, with the annexation of the surrounding territory.
The possibility of having a fleet on the ocean by 1904 that was not inferior to the Japanese one, and the comparative combat effectiveness of the fleets
As we see, in order to successfully combat the Japanese fleet, the Russian fleet—regardless of the location of its base—had to be equal in strength.
According to the 1899 shipbuilding program, Russia was supposed to have a fleet comparable to Japan's in the Pacific Ocean by 1905. Russia was late compared to Japan, as Finance Minister Witte convinced the Tsar that, according to his own sources, the Japanese fleet would not be ready for war until 1905.
Russia had every opportunity to build a fleet simultaneously with the Japanese:
- the inevitability of war became known already in 1895;
- the state of Russian finances was much better than Japanese ones;
- Russia itself built warships of all types, while Japan by 1904 could only build light cruisers;
- Russia, like Japan, could build ships abroad.
Some argue that the Japanese navy was so superior in quality that it would have won in any case. However, this view is not shared by the 1930s military theorist and historian M. A. Petrov, a captain of the second rank before the revolution who graduated from the naval cadet corps in 1905—thus a living witness of the era, having formed as an officer during the war itself. Nor is it shared by the historian V. L. Kofman, who is convinced of the approximate qualitative equality of the fleets; and the canal. naval-manual, who compared the combat training of both fleets.
But in almost all combat engagements, the Japanese fleet was superior in numbers, which allowed it to win and accumulate experience. By Tsushima, it had accumulated a year's worth of warfare, while the 2nd Pacific Squadron lacked it. However, it wasn't this that proved decisive in the battle, but rather its superiority in numbers and speed.
The Japanese fleet gained numerical superiority in 1901, after Chukhnin's detachment left for the Baltic. After the commissioning of the armored cruisers of the class Garibaldi (Nissin и Kasuga) this superiority increased by slightly more than a third—and this superiority was precisely what was considered a prerequisite for victory at the time. The initial, unexpected Japanese strike was also of great significance.
Supply and defense of the naval base in Kargod
Kargodo (Mozampo) becomes the naval base if the Russian fleet is equal in strength to the Japanese. If the Japanese fleet is superior, the Russian fleet will be based in Primorye, and Kargodo, as a naval fortress, must be prepared to withstand a year-long siege, during which time relief will arrive from the Baltic.
Supply of the Pacific Fleet based in Kargod
The railway line across Korea has been under construction since 1895, and a branch line from Vladivostok could be built to the intersection. It would be no longer than the South Manchuria Railway, which is unnecessary in this scenario. However, this line was not operational until after the outbreak of hostilities, so this option remains for the future.
The naval fortress could receive provisions from southern Korea, and coal and ammunition via guarded convoys from Vladivostok. (In reality, the coal was delivered by British merchant ships.)
The sea route had advantages over the railway:
- sea vessels carried more cargo than railways, so it would be enough to conduct convoys once every few months;
- In order to intercept the convoy, the enemy would have to, without knowing the exact route, first organize a search at sea, and then manage to catch up with the convoy;
- Unlike the railway route, the sea route is invulnerable to sabotage.
Auxiliary cruisers with a speed of 19,5 knots and high seaworthiness could serve as supply transports. "Lena", "Angara", Rion, which most Japanese cruisers would not have been able to catch, as this required a speed of more than 20 knots.
To intercept the convoy, it was necessary to be located between Vladivostok and Mozampo. The Japanese naval bases listed by M.A. Petrov were located as follows:
- 4 on the east coast (Tokyo, Yokohama, Yokosuka, Uraga);
- 3 in the Inland Sea of Japan (Kure, Kobe, Osaka);
- 5 in the Korea Strait (Sasebo, Takeshiki, Shimonoseki, Nagasaki, Saigo);
- 2 north of the Tsushima Strait, on the Japanese coast of the Sea of Japan - that is, on the route of the Russian convoy from Vladivostok (Maizuru and Tsuruga);
- 1 opposite Vladivostok (Hakodate).
The Hakodate base was out of the question: if it was used, the Japanese would also face the issue of supply, and while there, their fleet would have to catch up with the Russian convoy, which would be impossible given the great distance between Hakodate and Vladivostok.
It's not worth counting on knowing the convoy's departure date in advance and intercepting it in advance: reconnaissance might fail or fail to transmit the data in time, the Japanese fleet might not have time to use it, and the data itself might change later.
Only two ports remain for basing, allowing the interception of Russian convoys: Maizuru and Tsuruga, located along the convoy’s route.
But Kargodo, as a naval fortress, needed to have provisions for a year of siege, and the fleet needed several peacetime ammunition supplies. Given this, the fleet at Kargodo could avoid worrying about supplies for six months.
However, with the Japanese fleet based in Maizuru or Tsuruga, Japan's most important trade routes, all of which ran beyond the Tsushima Strait in the south and southeast of the country, would remain defenseless. In this case, nothing would prevent the Russian fleet from sailing south and raiding Japanese ports. This would be far more painful than stopping nominally neutral ships carrying contraband at sea (which would result in protests and pressure from their host countries), whereas attacking enemy ports is a legitimate objective in war.
This means the Japanese fleet must be based south of the Russian base at Kargodo, otherwise it will be unable to intercept the fast Russian cruisers heading south. But then the likelihood of intercepting Russian convoys becomes negligible.
For the Japanese fleet, even basing on Tsushima is questionable: it is justified for blockading the significantly weaker Russian fleet, but if the forces are equal, it will allow Russian cruisers to go south, to the developed trade routes and ports of Japan.
To conduct a convoy, a Russian escort detachment could leave Mozampo, reach Vladivostok, pick up already loaded transports and return back.
To intercept a convoy, the Japanese must know its departure date in advance, freely pass by the Russian base (which is only possible if the Russian fleet is completely passive), and be able to meet the convoy at sea.
There are few Japanese cruisers capable of catching ships at 19,5 knots. Most Japanese armored cruisers can travel at 20 knots, and given their poor seaworthiness, they would be slower, meaning they would be unable to catch the convoy.
This can be done by 4 armored cruisers of the 3rd detachment and, possibly, Otova, which entered service in September 1904. But they do not have the strength to interfere with a well-guarded convoy.
Another four cruisers have a speed rating of 20 knots, which isn't fast enough to catch Russian transports during daylight hours, and at night they can easily outrun a faster pursuer. However, they have no real speed advantage: like armored cruisers, they are unseaworthy due to their heavy artillery load.
A rare case may arise when the Japanese come directly towards the convoy, and in order to break through, it will have to accept a fight - for which armored cruisers are needed.
Japanese armored cruisers, according to their creator F. Watts, were small battleships, for which they, like large battleships, paid with worse seaworthiness.
This means that Russian armored cruisers must either be equal to them in strength or have numerical superiority, and it is advisable to conduct the convoy in rough seas, when it will gain an advantage in speed and combat capability due to its better seaworthiness.
During the passage of the convoy, the main forces of the Russian fleet must send reconnaissance to the Tsushima Strait and, in the event of detection of Japanese forces moving in the direction of the convoy, act according to the circumstances.
At night, the convoy could be attacked by destroyers, meaning the fleet must have fast cruisers armed with 120mm artillery. The 152mm caliber is significantly less suitable for counter-torpedo warfare: one 152mm gun weighs the same as two 120mm guns, has a lower rate of fire and ammunition capacity, and takes longer to turn.
Thus, a fleet with a strong cruiser component is needed—such as the fleet plans of Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich (1895) and Admiral Alekseyev (1897). This differs sharply from both the actual fleet composition and the one planned for 1904, as cited by N. L. Klado in his report on practical exercises in strategy, "Russia's War with Japan in 1905."
If circumstances unfold unfavorably, the Russian fleet will retreat to Primorye—the route there is half as short as the route from Port Arthur, which ran past Japanese naval bases (by traveling along this route, the Russian squadron could not avoid a battle with the Japanese). Gunboats and slow-moving ships operating near the fortress will remain at the base, and the Japanese will be forced to blockade it and likely storm it, diverting their troops.
Defense of the naval base in Kargod
At the time, references to Mozampo and Kargodo often meant both, due to their proximity. It would be better to locate the naval base directly on the island:
- An assault on the island is difficult, as crossing a water obstacle is the most complex operation. It would be impossible if a small Russian squadron were stationed in the bay, and the entrances were defended by shore batteries. Since a gun on land has better support than the same gun on a rocking ship, it was believed that "a gun on the shore is worth a ship at sea." Even if the Japanese fleet broke into the strait, it would suffer serious losses, giving the Russian fleet the opportunity to fight for naval supremacy.
- the island does not require a large garrison, whereas at Port Arthur the garrison consisted of two divisions and a regiment of infantry - more than 42,000 men, who were confined to the fortress due to the general shortage of Russian ground forces;
- the island will allow for settling away from the local population, among whom there will be many Japanese agents;
- In any case, the island of Kargodo must be defended and fortified, since if the enemy occupies it, the fleet in Mozampo will be blockaded.
The inner bay of Kargodø is blocked on one side by the heights of this island and on the other by a smaller island. Even if the port were besieged, the enemy would not be able to see the ships' moorings. The German 11-inch mortars that actually fired upon the ships in Port Arthur harbor would not have had the range (7800 meters) to reach the island's inner bay; that would have required a range of 15,000 meters. Furthermore, mortars are ineffective for firing over vast areas or at ships without constraints.
Torpedoing the fleet anchored in Mozampo or the inner Kargodo Bay is impossible: at night, without lights, even with a pilot, a destroyer doesn't know where it will end up in the vast bay. But it must be spotted from observation posts on the Kargodo heights opposite the strait, illuminated by searchlights, and fired upon by batteries—thus signaling the fleet. To reach the fleet, the destroyers would not only have to break through the fire but also travel at least another 20 minutes, during which time the fleet would be ready to repel the attack, giving it no chance of success.
The Impact of Baltic Aid
The important question is when we can expect assistance from the Baltic and what kind it will be. If it's a squadron of older, mixed-species ships, its assembly and preparation for the voyage will take a significant amount of time, while a larger squadron will move slowly.
If these are only new ships, they will be able to reach their target within two months. Their higher speed will make them more difficult to intercept and engage.
If the Russian fleet, which is equally powerful, becomes active, the Japanese fleet will not be able to devote half its forces to searching for and destroying the Baltic detachment. At the final stage of the campaign, the Pacific Fleet must move out to meet the detachment.
Once the Baltic squadron joins the fleet, the balance of power will shift to Russia, which will determine the victory of the war. If this squadron arrives in the Far East less than six months after the start of the war, the difficulties in conducting convoys will disappear, as the Japanese fleet will then be forced to go on the defensive.
Mistakes of the Russian command
The main mistake was that for the fleet The initial goal was not to gain supremacy at sea, and this gave the initiative to the enemy.
This explains the calm attitude towards the issue of maintaining an advantage in forces over the enemy, as the channel writes naval-manual:
"A relaxed attitude toward maintaining superiority over the enemy was expressed, in particular, in the decision to send Chukhnin's detachment to the Baltic at the end of 1901—after which the question of Japanese superiority was… finally resolved. If the goal had been naval supremacy, then no sacrifice of the advantage we had initially enjoyed in 1895 would have seemed acceptable… In the spring of 1895, the question of superiority in forces was raised—our admirals wanted to field 150,000 tons against the Japanese 126,000 tons. However, the lack of a focus on fighting for naval supremacy made superiority in forces… desirable, but not necessary."
But, as the military proverb goes, “a fortress that only defends itself is doomed to fall”: a passive strategy sooner or later leads to defeat.
Not intending to fight for supremacy at sea, the Russian command believed that it could get by with fewer forces without allowing itself to be defeated, and was not concerned that the Japanese fleet outnumbered it—a factor that was facilitated by the lagging Russian shipbuilding program and its reduction for the sake of economy.
Russia failed to seize the opportunity to launch a preemptive strike against the Japanese fleet, which Admiral Dubasov requested in 1897. Later, Admiral Alekseyev, now in worse circumstances, requested the same permission.
There was also an underestimation of the enemy's preparations - this had grounds several years before the war, before the start of intensive training of the Japanese fleet in 1903.
The most complex type of battleship was chosen, despite the General-Admiral's acknowledgement that medium-caliber turrets would not offer any significant advantages at the time, but were "promising in the future." At the time, their advantages were outweighed by their disadvantages, but it was the choice of this more complex type of battleship that delayed the construction of the Russian fleet, which entered service piecemeal.
Even the actual navy, having been built by the start of the war, prevented a Japanese attack: Japan was prepared to call off its intervention if the Russian fleet had 10 battleships in the Pacific Ocean or if new battleships were completed by 1904. But in that case, it could have postponed the war until later.
To guarantee the prevention of war, it was necessary to fulfill Admiral Makarov's condition, and to do this, to increase the fleet's displacement. This was possible, since the question of purchasing ready-made ships abroad (two battleships of the type) arose twice. "Swiftshur" and five Chinese cruisers) and there was a willingness to allocate money for this.
Moreover, the cost of maintaining the fleet could be reduced by optimizing the naval department's spending, as Admiral Makarov wrote in his "Note on the Shipbuilding Program of 1903": he claimed that, following the example of foreign fleets, it would be possible to achieve savings of 20%.
One could say, as Alexander III once did: "the entire treasury for the war." And besides the treasury, there were also the imperial family's personal funds, which could also be used for the navy.
At this time, not only Japan but also Germany was rapidly expanding its navies—they needed a navy there, too. It was already reasonable to begin creating a Murmansk (Northern) Fleet, as Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich wrote about in 1895 in his memo "On the Desired Composition of the Fleet."
And if the fleet had not served in the Pacific Ocean, it could have served in Europe - if not in battle, then by the very fact of its existence, as a “fleet as a factor of influence” (fleet in existence): even without entering into battle, he would force the enemy to hold his forces against him.
In reality, Russia, despite spending a great deal of money, built too few ships, a situation fueled by naval corruption. It was no wonder that the admiral-general was said to have "stolen more than the Japanese sank," and before the war, to have "wasted one battleship a year on ballerinas."
There were also expenditures on deepening Port Arthur's inner roadstead, which, had the work been fully completed, would have been enough to build a detachment of battleships; on Dalny; on the South Manchurian Railway, which would have been useless without Port Arthur (and a kilometer of the CER and this road cost twice as much as building it on our own lands); and on battleships of the most expensive type.
One could even suggest that Russia was deliberately led to defeat, and that Count Witte, who had connections with international financial circles, played a major role in this: he delayed the shipbuilding program, achieved its reduction, placed warships in "armed reserve," and built the only strategic road through foreign territory.
One might assume that in the scenario considered, Japan would have taken out more loans, and its navy would have become even stronger. But Japan wasn't given the money irrevocably: it took the loans as long as it could repay them, and made no commitment to use them. And if England used Japan against Russia, it was only to the extent that Japan itself considered it consistent with its interests. It had a clear estimate of the size of the Russian fleet, at which point the attack would be called off.
Blog author naval-manual In the entry "Russo-Japanese. Local Difficulties," he writes: "The strain on Japanese forces during the creation of the 6-6 fleet was similar to the strain on Russia's forces if Russia had tried to create a fleet equal to the British during the same period."
This means that the Japanese fleet could hardly have become stronger than it actually was by 1904, unlike the Russian fleet.
In the event of the occupation of the base in the Tsushima Strait, the passive Russian strategy would probably inevitably be transformed into a more aggressive option.
Opposition to the conclusion of an alliance between Japan and England and the English threat
One way to combat an enemy is to isolate it, that is, to destroy its alliances and prevent it from forming new ones. For Russia, this would mean an alliance with Germany in the Pacific—an alliance that would not conflict with the existing alliance with France in Europe.
Oleg Airapetov writes:
"The Kaiser had high hopes for the development of Russian-French-German cooperation in the Pacific. He… shared… his conviction that Japan would not pose a threat to the combined forces of Germany and Russia."
These wishes were expressed to the Russian ambassador in Berlin, which means that an official response was expected.
Had this agreement been concluded before 1902 and contained specific provisions for military support, it would have complicated the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. After all, it was one thing for England to threaten to prevent Russia's allies from entering the war, and quite another to enter a war itself for someone else's interests, something it had never done in its entire history.
It was advantageous for Russia to maintain good relations with both France and Germany; and since England was its main adversary, the best option would have been to form an alliance with these states against England—each of which had historical scores to settle and friction with it.
In the event of a direct war between Russia and England, the latter would not have limited itself to the Tsushima Strait or the Pacific Ocean. England reacted very sensitively to the strengthening of Russian forces in Turkestan, concerned about its own India, and considered this threat real.
Moreover, England had two areas that required more effort and attention than the Pacific Ocean: the English Channel and the Mediterranean. To threaten the Russian base in the Tsushima Strait, England needed to weaken these areas and establish a naval base in the immediate vicinity of the strait.
Since the Russian naval base at Kargod would be adjacent to the mainland, it would be impossible to blockade it with the fleet alone. A railway line from south to north was already being built in Korea, and it was only a matter of time to connect it to Vladivostok—instead of building the South Manchurian Railway.
In Europe, France was Russia's ally. The goal of Russian diplomacy had to be to ensure that Germany, which had already firmly decided that its future lay in the oceans and colonies, became such an ally, at least in the Pacific.
Used materials
- "On the Need to Strengthen Our Strategic Position in the Far East." A Secret Note from Prince A. M. Volkonsky (the importance of Korea and Kargodo and why they cannot be given to Japan).
- Strategic naval games at the Nikolaev Naval Academy on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905.
- Klado N. L. "The War between Russia and Japan in 1905." Report on Practical Classes in Strategy
- M. A. Petrov. "Overview of the Major Campaigns and Battles of the Steam Fleet." Chapters X-XII (on Port Arthur and southern Korea—Chapter XI, "Preparing the Theater").
- Airapetov. "Port Arthur. On the Creation of a Naval Base and Fortress."
- Airapetov. "On the Road to Collapse. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. Military-political history."
- Galenin. "Tsushima as a Sign of the End of Russian History."
- Vasiliev. "The Port Arthur Tragedy as an Example of Domestic Corruption"
- From the most humble note of Adjutant General A. N. Kuropatkin (Some of Port Arthur's shortcomings are listed, which indicates that they were known before the war, even to the ground command).
- "Provided that our fleet does not interfere with the smooth transport of the Japanese landing force by sea." (about the disadvantages of basing in Vladivostok; there is a mention of the “Port Arthur trap”).
- “We are striving to transplant the order of the metropolis to a new colony cut off from the country…” From a note by A. A. Birilev to A. A. Bilderling
- Lukoyanov. "Keeping up with the powers."
- V. Kofman. "Tsushima: Analysis versus Myths."
- Afanasyev's video lecture "Tomorrow Was the Russo-Japanese War"
And also articles from the channel naval-manual:
- "Colomb coefficient".
- "Russo-Japanese: Intuitive Defeat and Theoretical Victory."
- "Blonde's Fortune, Brunette's Misfortune: A Brief Revision of the Russo-Japanese War."
Information