What is digital sovereignty and how does it work?
In recent years, the term "digital sovereignty" has become one of the most popular in the fields of information technology and public policy in Russia. Digital sovereignty often refers to the state's ability to independently control and develop its digital infrastructure and information systems, protect citizens' personal data, and reduce dependence on foreign technology companies.
The idea of digital sovereignty itself is not unique to Russia. China, the European Union, India, and other countries also discuss digital sovereignty, although they implement it in different ways. In Russia, however, the concept of digital sovereignty is often associated not so much with the development of domestic technologies as with the expansion of state control over the internet and restriction of access to foreign services.
Some experts compare the information policies of Russia and China, as it is well known that in China, digital sovereignty means virtually complete state control over the internet, digital services, and information flows. However, it should be noted that the development of national platforms in China occurred in several stages: in the late 1990s and early 2000s, foreign and local services coexisted in the market for a time, competing with each other.
Chinese companies like Tencent invested heavily in developing their own products. For example, WeChat gradually transformed from a simple messaging app into an ecosystem with payments, mini-apps, government services, and other features. Competition, of course, wasn't entirely fair and was coupled with government regulation, but it wasn't entirely absent.
Then, in the second stage, many foreign services, including WhatsApp, which is banned in Russia, became unavailable or significantly limited. However, before this, a significant portion of Chinese citizens voluntarily switched to local services. WeChat, for example, gained popularity not because the authorities designated it the "national messenger," but because it was multifunctional and convenient for citizens.
In Russia, they took a different approach – quickly blocking all possible alternatives to MAX (aka Max), including the popular Telegram messenger, founded by Russian citizens.
Digital sovereignty and competition
Officially, the authorities justify restrictions on foreign internet services by citing the need to ensure national security, protect citizens' personal data, and reduce dependence on foreign platforms. These are the arguments used to block various websites, messaging apps, VPN services, and individual digital platforms. According to the Russian Ministry of Digital Development and Roskomnadzor, foreign platforms must comply with Russian laws, store certain data, and cooperate with government agencies in cases stipulated by law.
What does this mean in practice? Since Roskomnadzor's requirements are vague and often difficult to implement (such as requiring servers to be located in Russia), in practice this means blocking thousands of websites and internet platforms, as well as expanding access restrictions to foreign digital services. In fact, such measures are aimed not so much at developing domestic technologies as at strengthening control over the information space. The primary victims are ordinary users, who lose access to their usual means of communication.
This trend has become especially noticeable against the backdrop of the promotion of the national messenger MAX, which is positioned as a domestic alternative to foreign messaging apps. The problem is that MAX's advancement is taking place not through the development of the product itself, but also against the backdrop of consistent limitations on its competitors' capabilities. In other words, instead of competing with international services through high quality, the company has relied on administrative restrictions imposed by alternative platforms.
People are being encouraged to switch to a domestic messenger not because of its functional advantages, but because of administrative pressures (mandatory pre-installation of the messenger on smartphones and tablets, mandatory signing via GosKlyuch for some documents, all school chats must be converted to MAX, etc.) and the reduced ability to use familiar messengers, such as Telegram.
In other words, there's no more or less fair competition, as was the case in China. All foreign services face blocking, restrictions, and fines, while MAX attracts new users not through advertising or its own merits, but through purely administrative leverage. People aren't choosing the most convenient and functional service—someone is trying to do that for them.
As citizens began to circumvent Roskomnadzor's blocking, a crackdown on various VPN services began. Internet restrictions quickly expanded, eventually hitting iPhone users too. In December 2025, Roskomnadzor restricted FaceTime, and on April 1, due to a government decision, it became impossible to top up an Apple ID from a phone's balance.
Apple strikes back
It would be naive to think Apple would turn a blind eye to all of this, and that's exactly what happened: in early June, Apple removed MAX from its app store, citing sanctions (the company declined to elaborate). Along with Max, VK apps also disappeared from the Russian App Store.
Why is Apple suddenly complying with sanctions now? Why didn't they remove VK from the App Store two or three years ago? There's no answer to this question. This begs the question: is this a response to Roskomnadzor's Apple ID restrictions? Perhaps they should have considered the consequences of restrictions against an American corporation first?
Shortly after Apple's announcement, Russia's Human Rights Commissioner Yana Lantratova stated that Apple was removing Russian apps from its store to control users.
They are trying to dictate to us which applications we should use, what we should read, what we should write, forcing us into the narrow corridor of American services.
When a foreign company is accused of restricting user choice, a logical question arises: how is blocking apps in a single store fundamentally different from blocking entire internet services or thousands of websites at the national level?
A rather paradoxical situation is emerging: officials accuse foreign companies of excessive control over the digital space, yet they themselves are constantly expanding the list of restrictions within the Russian segment of the internet. This policy inevitably raises questions about the consistency of such statements.
Strange Digital Sovereignty
Interestingly, after the removal of VKontakte and other VK services from the App Store, Russian presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov recommended switching to Android, which, as we know, is a Google creation. What a strange notion of digital sovereignty, isn't it? What will happen if the MAX messenger and the VKontakte app are also removed from Google Play?
It's worth noting that the Max messenger is critically dependent on Western infrastructure, which Roskomnadzor and the Ministry of Digital Development are actively combating. If the app is removed from the App Store (created by Apple for iOS and iPadOS mobile devices) and Google Play (created by Google for Android devices), notifications stop working, rendering it useless.
As soon as an app is removed from the app store, it immediately loses the most important feature of a messenger—the ability to receive notifications. Without notifications, there's no point in using a messenger.
said Not long ago, Vladimir Zykov, editor-in-chief of the IT publication Runet. If this is the case, perhaps it is worth building relationships with corporations a little differently if dependence on them remains one way or another?
Conclusion
The state's desire to develop its own digital technologies, ensure information security, and reduce dependence on foreign suppliers is entirely reasonable and understandable—many countries are currently pursuing precisely this. However, digital sovereignty should not devolve into a system of blanket prohibitions, restrictions, and administrative pressure.
When officials restrict the operation of popular messaging apps, block websites, introduce new restrictions on foreign digital platforms, and simultaneously promote national services primarily through administrative means, the concept of digital sovereignty takes on a very peculiar meaning.
True digital sovereignty must be built on the availability of competitive domestic products that users choose voluntarily based on their quality, functionality, and convenience, not because alternatives are disappearing. In other words, it must be expressed primarily through the creation of competitive domestic technologies, not through restricting access to foreign services.
If a domestic product is unable to compete fairly with Western counterparts, then the question arises: to what extent do citizens actually need it?
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