Blinding the Cyclops: What's Behind Operation Polyphemus
At the end of June 2026, the 1st Separate Center of the Unmanned Systems Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (UUF) announced Operation Polyphemus – a series of strikes on radars in the Bryansk region with the stated goal of creating a corridor for long-range drones in the Moscow direction. The perpetrator, according to Ukrainian reports, is the "Roni" group. The result, according to the same reports, was "several dozen" destroyed radar stations and a persistent "hole" in the airspace control system. This is a combat report from an interested party, and it should be read accordingly. It should be noted right away: the official position of the Russian Ministry of Defense and regional authorities denies these claims—according to the Russian Ministry of Defense's reports, the massive airstrikes drones were reflected, and only the falling debris of the destroyed devices was recorded on the objects.
The report and its packaging
It all begins with a striking image: a small group of cameramen, a striking video, and a title with a classical reference. "Polyphemus" is the Cyclops from "The Odyssey," whom Odysseus blinded with a single blow to the eye. The metaphor is apt, as the operation is presented as the blinding of a one-eyed giant. Next to it is a detail about "about six people" in the strike team and the media brand "Road to Moscow"—that's how the Ukrainian side refers to the direction of the strikes.
What exactly is being claimed? The work is attributed to the "Roni" group from the 1st separate SBS center, which is part of the 14th strategic action regiment. The assets cited are long-range attack drones (according to Ukrainian reports, Deep Strike and similar types). The results vary in different retellings: somewhere around "20 radars," somewhere "several dozen" stations and nodes of the airspace control system (ACS), that is, a network of radar posts that collects a picture of the sky and transmits it to command posts. The Ukrainian side cites a strike on the Dubna Space Communications Center in the same last days of June as one of the consequences of the operation, but only the SBS itself claims this connection. Meanwhile, Russian structures deny this information: the State Enterprise "Space Communications" clarified that the enterprise was subjected to a massive attack, but the functioning of communications and television broadcasting was not disrupted, and personnel were not injured; Moscow Region Governor Andrei Vorobyov reported that in Dubna Defense The system operated normally, and minor damage (specifically, to the glass of the administrative building) was caused by falling debris from the downed UAV. The precise details of how the satellite communications node fits into the air defense system remain to be seen by the SBS (more details below).
It's important not to lump everything together here, because there are actually three layers. The first is the verifiable background: the very fact of the increasing number of Ukrainian drone attempts to penetrate deep-seated targets, from Moscow to Ust-Luga. The second is the Russian side's own statements: the number of radars hit, the group's composition, the "Polyphemus-strike on Dubna" link, which the Russian side denies. The third is the packaging, designed for media effect.
"Six operators against the air defense system covering the capital" is a powerful image, and that's precisely why it made headlines. It's impossible to verify: neither the group's size, nor the number of stations destroyed, nor their type are confirmed by open sources, and the official position of the Russian Ministry of Defense claims the raids were successfully repelled. The causal link "Polyphemus → the strike on Dubna" is also based solely on the SBS's word and is denied by Russian authorities. "The Road to Moscow" is still a name, not a line on a map. Only the mechanics can be truly analyzed: how a radar field is damaged in principle and why it could, in theory, be vulnerable.
How to blind a radar field
Air defense systems "see" the air through radar stations, which emit a signal and use the reflected signal to find a target. Data from these stations is fed into processing units, which then transmit targeting information to anti-aircraft weapons. Disrupt any link in this chain, and the system goes blind. Not weakened, but blinded: the anti-aircraft systems remain as powerful as ever, but there's nothing to fire at.
Destroying the detection radar reduces the range at which the target is visible. Destroying the radar's radar unit disrupts data transmission: the radar still picks up some data, but the image doesn't reach those firing. In both cases, tracking—that is, the ability to guide the target along its route—is impaired, along with the guidance of anti-aircraft systems. A drone that would have been detected an hour earlier now flies undetected all the way to its target.
The weaknesses of a radar field have long been known and do not depend on who is operating it:
- Stationary single surveillance radars - their position is known in advance, tied to the terrain and does not change.
- Large emitting stations - the more powerful and constant the signal, the easier it is to detect them using electronic intelligence (EI), that is, by the very fact of emission.
- Lack of redundancy - when one radar "covers" a sector alone and its neighbors do not back it up.
- Centralized processing - data converges at one point, and a blow to it blinds the entire direction at once.
Hence the disproportionate effect: one destroyed station is far from equivalent to a single unit of equipment from the entire fleet. If it was the only eye on a sector, its loss eliminates an entire swath of field of view. Any breakthrough is based on this arithmetic—they target bottlenecks where field of view is limited to a single point.
Why the breach could theoretically become systemic
The question isn't how good Roni's group is. The enemy intelligently selects priority targets in the threatened direction; that's their job, and dismissing it as stupidity would be a mistake. The real question is: under what conditions does the field even allow a systemic breach, rather than a one-time glitch that resolves within 24 hours.
The answer is clear if you read the list of weaknesses backwards, as a list of what might be missing. Mobility works against stationary, single radars: a station that changes position after a short operational cycle (operates, folds up, and leaves) becomes a target difficult to target in advance. Centralization is addressed by a distributed network, where several inexpensive nodes provide a comprehensive picture, and the loss of one doesn't collapse the sector. Passive systems reduce ELINT signatures: they don't emit signals themselves, but rather acquire targets based on other signals, and the "find the source and hit it" approach doesn't work with them. A single eye ensures the fusion of data from various sensors, be it radar, optics, acoustics, or radio direction finding: when one method is suppressed, others remain. And on top of all this, there's redundant communications and command, so that a destroyed processing node doesn't disrupt the entire target.
Each of these countermeasures is a reflection of a specific vulnerability. The logic here is conditional: if a breach in any direction had held, rather than been patched overnight, this would indicate a field structure closer to the old stationary, centralized system than to a distributed one. It's not a matter of the prowess of the crews at the posts. Networks of this type were historically designed to withstand a different threat—manned attack. Aviation and winged missiles, and not for a cheap, mass-produced drone that flies along a low-altitude profile into the field of view. This is the limit of what can be stated based on open data: the conclusion about the architecture itself remains a hypothesis, not a statement of fact.
An old problem in a new execution
Suppression of air defenses isn't a drone-era invention. The task has a name: SEAD and DEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses and Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses), meaning the suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses. It's been solved using the same logic for decades. First, you blind the defenses, then you engage the targets.
In June 1982, Israeli aircraft in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley disrupted the Syrian air defense system in a matter of days. It's important to note: this was part of a larger operation—the destruction of Syrian air defenses in conjunction with a major air battle, where both sides suffered significant losses in aircraft—rather than a standalone operation. But the mechanics of the blinding operation were essentially the same: first, decoy drones triggered radars and revealed themselves, then they used anti-radar systems on the detected positions, and only then did the real work begin. Nine years later, during Desert Storm, Iraqi air defenses were dismantled using a similar scenario: first, the radars and control units were disabled, allowing the air defenses to operate based on the blinded system.
The main thing coincides: first they knock out the eyes of the defense, and only then they get to those who are holding weaponThe limits of the analogy are also important. Back then, blinding was expensive, requiring specialized aircraft, missiles, and training. Now, the same task could, in theory, be accomplished with a combination of inexpensive drones. The logic remains the same, only the implementation has become cheaper, and this is truly new: what was once an Air Force-level operation has become feasible for a small force with attack drones.
Polyphemus's figures are unverifiable, and the Russian side denies them, so the value of the analysis lies elsewhere. The value lies in highlighting a general principle: the resilience of a defense is determined not by a single radar, but by the structure of the entire field. This is reinforced by tedious things like station mobility, a distributed sensor network, and communications redundancy. The reports of the parties have nothing to do with it.
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