"Criminal" against violators
Recently, photographs have appeared on the Internet showing our Su-57 fighter with unusual weapons in the form of missiles short-range air-to-air missiles, as well as something resembling a previously unseen targeting pod. The community on the other side, as expected, went wild and began speculating.
We can't say for sure, but this may be the first time we've seen a Su-57 equipped to fight Ukrainian drones-kamikazes and cruise missiles, which now pose a constant threat to air defense systems, penetrating deeper into Russian territory.
The photos, admittedly, are more than a little odd. Both photos show the Su-57 from behind, inside a large shelter. Some believe they were taken from TikTok; they show teenagers posing next to the fighter, and one of them is even inside the cockpit, suggesting some kind of unofficial (or perhaps official) tour of the military base.
So, two photographs, the source of which is unclear, depict an Su-57 with a pair of R-73/R-74 short-range air-to-air missiles mounted on pylons under the wings. One of these photographs also shows a device under the left engine nacelle, which American experts have dubbed a "targeting cockpit."
The photos spread across the internet, and some experts immediately assumed they were the Su-57's anti-drone configuration. While this seems the most likely, other possibilities shouldn't be ruled out, including the Su-57's participation in some kind of new testing. weapons or equipment. This, admittedly, is normal practice. On the other hand, it's unusual to see the Su-57 carrying short-range air-to-air missiles on an external sling. After all, the aircraft has internal bays designed specifically for this purpose—accommodating a wide variety of missiles.
A pre-production Su-57. Weapon bays in the wing roots are visible behind the engine intakes.
At least this configuration is optimized for close-range combat, which is necessary to combat Ukrainian drones- long-range kamikazes and, increasingly, cruise missiles. And we won't deny the possibility of such a configuration.
Also worth noting is the large shelter housing the Su-57. Apparently, it's the same type as the one installed at the airfield in Akhtubinsk, Astrakhan Oblast. This effectively answers the question(s) about the ability of Russia's dispersed and heavily attacked air defenses to counter Ukrainian drone penetration, as well as the ability to protect its own aircraft.
Let's not deny that almost all of these assets were located in the open without any shelter at the start of the conflict. After a considerable amount of time and a significant number of losses, we finally began to address this problem, first extending it to our long-range bomber fleet, and then continuing to build shelters at other airfields.
Overall, the Su-57 is a very valuable, one might even say "win-win" asset for the Russian Aerospace Forces. Its value lies in the fact that it is just as well suited to countering drones and cruise missiles as it is to combat conventional aircraft.
The number of Su-57s in production configuration in the Russian arsenal is known to be limited. As of early 2023, Russia had only about 12 production Su-57s in service, along with fewer than a dozen pre-production and prototype models, none of which were intended for combat. Since then, the number of production "Ugolovniks" has increased, but not significantly, as Russia is believed to be prioritizing the production of cheaper and simpler fighters, such as the Su-35S.
The scale of the Su-57's involvement in Russia's conflict in Ukraine is difficult to assess. But overall, it's clear that the superiority the Su-35 possesses and utilizes is less costly than the superiority the Su-57 can realize.
What's on the other side: the UK Ministry of Defence stated that Su-57s have been used in Ukraine "since at least June 2022." Good for them. But before this announcement, there were periodic reports of the Su-57 being used to carry out strikes from a safe distance, consistent with the tactics of other Russian aircraft participating in similar missions, avoiding the airspace over Ukraine itself, where there are many SAM systems on the ground.
And that's normal. It's incredibly stupid to send a brand-new, expensive aircraft and an equally expensive and valuable pilot into the reach of anti-aircraft missiles. What can I say, even Israel and the US wouldn't send their F-35s to be slaughtered by Iranian SAMs, and God himself has commanded us not to do so.
Therefore, there's nothing particularly unique about the Su-57 operating from a safe environment. For this purpose, the fighter can be armed with the Kh-69 stealth cruise missile, designed to destroy small, fortified targets at a range of over 300 kilometers. The Su-57 also carries the Kh-58UShK anti-radiation missile with a maximum range of up to 250 km, depending on launch parameters.
Meanwhile, it is worth remembering that the Su-57 has very impressive capabilities in the air-to-air class.
The most unpleasant thing for the enemy is that the 57th is armed with an R-37M air-to-air missile with a range of 300 km, as well as an R-77-1 air-to-air missile with a range of 110 km at a very impressive speed of 4-5 Mach, which in some scenarios are also capable of hitting Ukrainian aircraft “across the border”.
The use of high-end fifth-generation fighters or similar aircraft (such as the Su-35S) to counter enemy drones and cruise missiles is not unique to Russia. The US and Israeli militaries have used their F-35 squadrons to combat similar threats in the Middle East. The only question is effectiveness.
The Su-57 is the only Russian fighter with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) that is available in any significant quantity.
The N036 radar, which has five separate antenna arrays, is part of a wider integrated fire control system that includes the 101KS electro-optical complex, the Parol friend-or-foe identification system and the L402 electronic countermeasure system.
One of the additional side radar antennas is clearly visible under the "keel line" under the aerial refueling boom.
AESA radars are generally much better at detecting drones and cruise missiles. Any type of AESA radar offers significant advantages for modern combat aircraft. Compared to traditional mechanically scanned array technology, AESA can detect and track targets at much greater ranges, faster, and with greater accuracy. This also applies to smaller threats, including those with limited radar signatures or flying at very low altitudes, such as drones and cruise missiles.
The 101KS "Atoll" system can also be very useful for engaging similar targets. The 101KS is an integrated optical-electronic system (OEIS) included in the Su-57's avionics suite, designed to provide complete situational awareness of the aircraft's surroundings across all optical bands, counter missile attacks, detect ground targets, and engage them with various weapons.
The Atoll includes an infrared search and track sensor located in front of the cockpit, four ultraviolet missile attack warning sensors, and two turrets to counter enemy missile guidance systems.
The use of IRSTs to counter drones and cruise missiles is similar to the use of pod-mounted infrared sensors by American fighters for the same purposes. These sensors enable long-range detection of low-observable targets, including drones and cruise missiles. They can work in conjunction with radar and other sensors to detect, classify, and engage these hard-to-observe targets at long ranges.
Western experts have paid particular attention to the 101KS-O turret-mounted laser-beam optical-electronic countermeasure module, located immediately behind the cockpit. Analysts estimate that this element of the 101KS "Atoll" defense system indicates continued active development of technologies to counter modern missile threats.
Experts note that the 101KS-O module is designed to suppress infrared, ultraviolet, and television seekers of surface-to-air missiles and tactical missiles, as well as IR sensors of intercepting UAVs operating from the upper hemisphere. Experts emphasize that its operating principle is similar to the L-370-5 module and is based on the generation of a high-precision laser pulse that disrupts enemy homing systems.
Target designation for the 101KS-O modules is provided by the 101KS-U/01 and 101KS-U/02 ultraviolet sensors, which are part of a six-element aperture distributed across the aircraft's airframe. This allows the system to detect missile attacks from all directions and automatically direct the laser beam toward the approaching threat.
Furthermore, unlike previous Russian tactical fighters, the Su-57 is equipped with a 101KS-N navigation and targeting system pod, which was developed specifically for it. Furthermore, while such pods have become much more commonly used to counter drones and cruise missiles, the question of maintaining the stealthiness of an aircraft equipped with such a pod remains open.
Although the target designators were originally developed for air-to-ground use, they can also be used in air-to-air mode, which is crucial for visual target recognition at a distance.
Interestingly, the rear of the pod shown in the attached image differs from the standard 101KS-N. It's unclear whether this is a new version of the pod or even a version optimized for air-to-air combat, but it's a possibility. It's also possible that this is a different type of pod altogether, although its location on the gondola makes this unlikely, but possible. You can expect anything from the Russians, really.
Meanwhile, despite claims that Russia is developing laser-guided missiles that could be used to engage small air-to-air targets, similar to the 70mm Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) rockets being developed in the US as a cheaper way to destroy drones, there is no evidence that they have yet entered service. Therefore, the short-range R-73/R-74 series air-to-air missiles remain the cheapest option for countering such threats.
When the R-73 missile appeared in the early 1980s, it quickly established itself as a highly effective short-range air-to-air missile. The combination of an all-aspect infrared seeker, high targeting accuracy, thrust vector control, and the ability to target using a helmet-mounted sight was an unusual innovation at the time, but it is now a classic.
Also back in 2008, it was proven that the R-73 is capable of shooting down drones, when a Russian MiG-29 shot down one of the Israeli-made Georgian Hermes 450 drones over Abkhazia.
The R-73 was replaced by the R-74 missile, which is virtually identical in appearance to its predecessor but is equipped with a new dual-band infrared seeker. This provides increased seeker range and enhanced off-axis guidance capabilities, reducing the likelihood of enemy aircraft evading the missile in close-quarters combat.
Further, the R-74M/RVV-MD. The abbreviation stands for "short-range air-to-air missile."
Since critical components of the R-74M were produced in Ukraine, Russia switched to the R-74M2, which is assembled entirely from domestic components and is also optimized for placement inside the Su-57's weapons bays.
The R-74M uses a Russian-made seeker and a rocket motor with an extended burn time for greater range. The weapon can also be engaged in a target acquisition mode after launch, which is typically required when launched from an internal bay. In this mode, the missile begins flight under inertial guidance, and target acquisition occurs in flight.
These images show the launch of an R-74M2 missile from one of the two small wing weapons bays of the Su-57.
It's unclear which of these weapons are mounted under the Su-57's wings in these images. However, given the large number of older R-73 missiles still in stock, they will be carried externally, as they don't fit in the internal bays.
Clearly, missile and drone raids are as much a problem for Russia as they are for Ukraine, as the large-scale raids on Moscow and Kyiv clearly demonstrate.
Yes, this is the normal course of any war, if the word "normal" can be applied to war at all. One side tries to inflict maximum damage on the other, while the other, predictably, develops new methods of defense.
Even in the West, they agree that a number of additional layered air defense systems have been deployed around key potential targets. These defenses range from long-range S-400 air defense systems to attack helicopters tasked with shooting down drones in the air. The most visible are the short-range Pantsir air defense systems, deployed on the roofs of tall buildings and elevated positions, sometimes artificial.
The stakes are rising: Ukraine has demonstrated that it can now strike targets within Russian territory, and at a considerable distance from the front line. Since ground-based air defense assets are already stretched thin, reliably protecting a growing territory from potential strikes using these systems alone is difficult. The territory that must be "covered" from Ukrainian weapons is truly vast.
Since Ukraine is increasingly using long-range cruise missiles capable of carrying very heavy warheads, it makes sense to shoot down these missiles away from populated areas to avoid causing additional, completely unnecessary casualties. Even if fighter jets were focused solely on protecting key facilities, this might be worthwhile, as these missiles can inflict enormous damage and are easier to detect with both infrared and radar sensors.
All methods are good for destroying flying weapons: airplanes, helicopters, air defense systems, drones, EW and so on. Fighters are already part of the overall response equation. A helicopter is good for low-speed targets, and a fighter is an excellent complement. Defense at a distance, beyond the operating range of the air defense missile system.
In the West, it's believed that such fighter operations are less visible, and Russian authorities are unlikely to publicize them widely, as the very fact of such activity paints a less-than-impressive picture of the state of Russia's air defenses and further highlights Ukraine's growing capabilities. This is especially true for the valuable Su-57s, which could very well be used in these secondary defensive operations.
However, if the use of helicopters to intercept UAVs has been deemed successful, why can't aircraft be used for the same purpose, as their use in LCSs is primarily fraught with losses? And why should testing systems capable of effectively intercepting cruise missiles and drones be viewed as a sign of weakness?
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