What's dead may never die. About Russia's newest combat trainer, the Yak-130M.
It must be said that online publications dedicated to the Yak-130 and its modernized variant, the Yak-130M, are overwhelmingly full of praise for these aircraft. "Small but mighty!" they say, extolling the versatility of these aircraft, which, according to the authors, can serve as trainers, light attack aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, and even light fighters. Comments on such articles usually boil down to the Russian Aerospace Forces urgently needing a huge number of these aircraft—preferably yesterday.
But alas, upon closer inspection, it turns out the Yak-130 is a very niche aircraft, and its creation should be viewed more as a mistake than an achievement. And the Yak-130M, in my opinion, is a complete waste of money. In other words, a complete waste of money.
History The development of the Yak-130 began in the early 1990s, and it can be assumed that the mistakes made in the development of the Yak-130 combat trainer were largely due to the turbulent "wild 90s" that plunged our country into. Moreover, these mistakes were made already at the conceptual level, during the development of the technical specifications for the future trainer of the Russian Air Force.
It all started well...
The Soviet Air Force had a very streamlined and clear system for training air force pilots. A cadet's first steps in the air were on a basic training aircraft, which in the USSR was the Yak-52.
He then transferred to a jet trainer. In the USSR, this was the Czech Aero L-39 Albatros.
And finally, after all this, I underwent in-depth training on a dual-control combat vehicle.
Interestingly, the Defense The USSR had its own opinion on this issue: its leadership did not consider initial training on the Yak-52 necessary, so here cadets began flying directly on the Albatrosses.
The problem was that by 1990, the Albatrosses were already significantly outdated. After all, the aircraft had made its maiden flight in November 1968, and by the end of the 20th century, it was simply incapable of performing a number of maneuvers required for training cadets who would eventually pilot the MiG-29 and Su-27 and their derivatives. Furthermore, according to estimates at the time, the service life of most Albatrosses would soon be exhausted. In short, the country's Air Force and Air Defense forces needed a new trainer, and quickly. Therefore, in October 1990, the technical specifications for a new trainer were formulated. While they were entirely adequate, the seeds of future troubles could already be seen in these specifications, namely:
1. The training center had to be twin-engine. This was justified by the fact that virtually all Russian Air Force aircraft were twin-engine, and it would be better for cadets to immediately become accustomed to piloting twin-engine aircraft;
2. It was mandatory to have a system for reprogramming the aircraft's stability and controllability characteristics on the training device.
The goal, again, was good - since this aircraft will become uniform for all types of combat aviation, it would be reasonable to have the opportunity to impart to him the characteristics of piloting a fighter, attack aircraft, or interceptor at the discretion of the instructors in order to bring the training as close as possible to piloting a combat aircraft.
...but then trouble started
In January 1991, design bureaus submitted a number of projects, but for various reasons, they failed to satisfy the Air Force. Furthermore, while the preliminary designs were being reviewed, the USSR collapsed, forcing many of the production facilities needed for the future trainer to move abroad. For example, the AI-25 engines the MiG design bureau had planned for installation on the trainer suddenly became foreign-made. All of this, of course, inevitably led to a revision of the technical specifications, but another complication arose.
Since the USSR collapsed, there was no money in the Russian budget or in the design bureaus to develop the training system. And it's pointless to complain about "something like that should have been found," because, thanks to the efforts of our would-be reformers, there was absolutely no money in the budget for anything.
The necessary funds could only be found abroad, and to do so, a European power had to be interested in the prospects of joint development. MiG managed to attract the French, and Yak, the Italian firm Aermacchi. It must be said that MiG ultimately managed to develop a very interesting MiG-AT model, but it seems the Yak's victory was a foregone conclusion. Simply put, the Air Force leadership at the time was concerned about preserving domestic design bureaus. As bad as things were for MiG and Sukhoi, their existing contracts for the development of new aircraft and the modernization of existing aircraft allowed them to survive. The Yak, however, had nothing, so farming out a trainer aircraft to it saved the design bureau from certain demise.
At the same time, collaboration with the Italians bore fruit—both positive and negative. Positive was the Italian funding, which made it possible to develop the Yak-130. Negative was the fact that the Yakovlev designers and the Italians essentially needed two different aircraft.
The Russian Air Force wanted a trainer, and rightly so. But the Italians, concerned about the export potential of the aircraft they were developing, wanted not a trainer, but a combat-capable trainer. Russia needed a "flying desk," while the Italians needed a light combat aircraft capable of competing with similar aircraft like the Hawk light attack aircraft.
And, it must be said, significant changes were required to transform the trainer into a combat trainer. First, the speed had to be increased from 850 km/h to at least 1050 km/h to compete with the Hawk. Second, the payload had to be increased to 1,5–2 tons, which was completely excessive for a trainer. And third, the aircraft had to be capable of operating from Class III airfields with runways no longer than one kilometer.
All this required much more powerful engines, a higher thrust-to-weight ratio, and a heavier aircraft than was required for a training aircraft. For example, the initial MiG-AT design, submitted under the 1990 specifications, had two 1470 kgf engines each, while the Yak-130 had two 2500 kgf engines.
Of course, in full accordance with the ancient Russian proverb, "whoever dines with the girl, gets to dance with her," the Yakovlev team had no choice but to accommodate the investor's wishes. The Air Force, too, had no other choice, and so the technical specifications for the training aircraft were revised in favor of the combat training aircraft.
And again, if the Air Force had stood firm then, perhaps the leadership would have been able to defend the training center. But the problem was that the Air Force leadership itself found itself in an extremely difficult position.
On the one hand, funding for the armed forces was drastically insufficient, and maintaining the normal flight hours of combat pilots... or half of the normal flight hours... or even a quarter was utterly impossible. On the other hand, the Russian Federation was then conducting counterterrorism operations, for which the MiG-29 and Su-27 were, in essence, excessive. Therefore, the Air Force leadership was also tempted to acquire not a training aircraft, but a combat aircraft.
Although significantly more expensive than the trainer in terms of acquisition and operating costs, the UBS remained significantly cheaper than multirole fighters in these respects. And in a situation where the combat potential of Russian aviation was being drastically reduced, the introduction of the UBS could at least somehow, albeit minimally, improve the situation.
Predictable Consequences
So, the technical specifications for the training aircraft were formulated, the aircraft was developed and delivered, and in 2009, the first production Yak-130 ordered for the Russian Air Force made its maiden flight. It's an achievement that makes you wonder whether to cry or to be proud of the Russian aviation industry.
Because the aircraft, within the specifications, turned out very well. It implemented everything the Air Force wanted. The Yak-130 truly allows for 80% of the entire pilot training program to be completed, and it can be reprogrammed to simulate flight on various Russian Air Force combat aircraft. Moreover, the Yakovlev team created not just an airplane, but a unified pilot training system that includes, in addition to the Yak-130, ground-based simulators and much more.
And despite all this, the plane can easily be branded as "made in our country," since it contains virtually no imported components.
In general, everything about the Yak-130 is great, except for one thing: despite all its merits, it is completely unsuitable for solving the problem for which it was createdThis aircraft cannot, and never will, replace the L39 Albatross.
The L39 is a light aircraft, with an empty weight of 3395 kg. It has a single engine producing 1720 kgf of thrust. Theoretically, it can fight, but its maximum payload is two 100-kilogram OFAB-100 rockets under its wings.
Of course, this aircraft is long outdated. But the US Air Force still trains its cadets on the Northrop T-38 Talon.
The empty weight of the Talon, oh, sorry, Talon, is 3270 kg and two engines with a thrust of 1295–1407 kgf each, depending on the modification.
But we, of course, are not some shameful poverty from those incomprehensible states, so our cadets must begin their training on the Yak-130, which has an empty weight of 4600 kg with two engines with a thrust of 2500 kgf each.
Of course, an hour of flight on a Yak-130 costs the country considerably less than a MiG-29, Su-30, or Su-35. But it also costs significantly more than an hour of flight on a conventional training aircraft, and no budget can support such an expense. Including a Russian one, which is why the Yak-130 is completely unsuitable as a "flying desk." That's why our cadets still (!) fly old Albatrosses.
One might even wonder: how is it possible that the L39s were expected to reach the end of their service life in the early 1990s, yet they're still flying today? The answer is simple: since the Soviet era, the number of flight schools has been reduced slightly by a factor of four, and before the 2011–2020 State Armament Program (SAP), the armed forces were funded on a residual basis, meaning that cadets completed most of their flight hours by flying in their sleep. The existing Albatross fleet is still sufficient.
Don't need a Yak-130?
Not quite so. The country still needs the Yak-130, just in very limited quantities.
As mentioned earlier, in the USSR, and even today in the US, training is essentially a three-stage process. First, a student acquires basic piloting skills (in the USSR, this was the Yak-52; in the US, it was the Raytheon T-6 Texan II).
Then he transfers to a training aircraft and then undergoes in-depth training on aircraft that differ from combat aircraft only in that they have dual controls—the second is for the instructor.
So, this scheme is good for everything, except that the operation of two-seat combat training aircraft is very expensive.
And here, some of the advanced training tasks can be taken on by the Yak-130, since, when loaded with the appropriate software, it can simulate the flight of either a multirole fighter or an attack aircraft.
That said, the Yak-130 is certainly not omnipotent in this regard and cannot completely replace training missions on combat aircraft. However, practicing even some of these tasks is possible, both for cadets beginning advanced training and for combat pilots maintaining combat readiness. And using the Yak-130 for this purpose will significantly reduce the costs of such training.
This is precisely what I was talking about at the beginning of this article. The Yak-130 does have its niche in Aerospace Forces pilot training, but it's very small, and it doesn't require many aircraft. It's even safe to assume that the existing Yak-130 deliveries have not only met but exceeded the needs of this niche, and the Aerospace Forces don't need to continue producing the Yak-130. What they need is a replacement for the L39 Albatross, which has been obsolete since the last century, but for the reasons stated above, the Yak-130 is completely unsuitable for this role.
About the Yak-130M
So, given the above, the Yak-130 turned out to be excessively large, powerful, and expensive for a trainer. This was due to objective factors:
1. The demands of the Italians, without whose participation the aircraft could not have been created;
2. The dire situation of the Air Force in the 90s, when the leadership came to the conclusion that it was better to have the opportunity to fly at least occasionally and bomb someone a little in a light attack aircraft than not to fly and not bomb at all.
Today, none of these factors are in effect, meaning the Yak-130 concept has lost much of its relevance. Sad as it is to admit, our Aerospace Forces don't really need the Yak-130, and certainly not in any significant numbers.
But this conclusion has a consequence: the Yakovlev Design Bureau has lost the source of income it could have derived from Yak-130 production. The question that tormented old Chernyshevsky arises: "What to do?"
It's perfectly clear that converting the Yak-130 into a cheap trainer won't work. It would require different engines, a complete redesign... In short, it would be simpler and cheaper to design a new aircraft. So, what's left to do? The right thing to do is enhance its combat capabilities. Meet the Yak-130M!
Of course, many dear readers of this news They were delighted. Of course, since the design bureau had transformed the Yak-130M into a fully-fledged light combat aircraft. The problem was, the Yak-130's combat capabilities were quite limited. The aircraft lacked a standard radar; if you really needed one, you had to mount a pod, thereby reducing the combat load. It also lacked an optical location system or an onboard defense system. A training aircraft didn't need any of these—its control system could display on LCD screens data supposedly received from the radar, optical location system, and other instruments found on multirole fighters but lacking on the Yak-130—which was sufficient for training cadets.
Well, the Yak-130M has all this. Hurray?
Conclusions
The Yak-130M's strength is that it's a very capable light combat aircraft. Its weakness is that, despite its beauty, no one really needs it.
As a training aircraft, it is a complete failure compared to the Yak-130. As has already been demonstrated above, even the Yak-130 is too expensive to be used as a training aircraft on any scale. And there's absolutely no point in upgrading it to the even more, much more expensive Yak-130M, which is loaded with a ton of expensive equipment that's unnecessary for training.
At the same time, using the Yak-130M as a combat aircraft for our Aerospace Forces would be something like if our infantrymen going to fight in the North Caucasus Military District were issued Stechkin automatic pistols instead of Kalashnikovs.
I must admit, I am extremely far from a shooter weapons, but I've heard from those in the know that in certain very specific combat situations, the Stechkin can be more useful than the Kalashnikov. Not for the average soldier, but it could be. I can't assess the accuracy of this assertion, but I'm willing to admit that in some very specific cases, using the Yak-130M could be more practical than, say, the Su-30.
However, it's perfectly clear that in the vast majority of combat situations, a fighter armed with a submachine gun or an assault rifle chambered for intermediate cartridges won't leave a soldier armed with an automatic pistol a single chance. The same can be said for a Yak-130M pilot who must somehow fight against the enemy's layered air defenses or, God forbid, their multirole fighters.
Yes, in some police operations, against gangs that don't even have MANPADS, using the Yak-130M might be rational. But for a country that's been waging war in Ukraine for five years and is preparing to repel a NATO attack, spending money on such specialized aircraft would be a state crime.
So, the Russian Aerospace Forces don't need the Yak-130M. But perhaps it has significant export potential?
Unfortunately, no. Fewer than 90 Yak-130s were sold abroad, and even then, one of the largest buyers, Bangladesh, purchased them with a loan from the Russian Federation.
One could argue until one is hoarse, discussing the potential market capacity of light combat aircraft and the place the Yak-130M could occupy within it thanks to its undeniable advantages—and the aircraft certainly has them. But the truth is that the US is currently doing everything possible to hinder Russian arms exports by imposing sanctions on countries that purchase them. Very few people in the world are willing to quarrel with the US over the Yak-130M.
Currently, the export potential is estimated at a mere 40 aircraft, a negligible amount. Furthermore, it's possible that some countries that purchased the Yak-130 will pay for its modernization to the Yak-130M. Moreover, the export potential estimates publicly announced are likely overstated, and the willingness to invest in modernization will be even fewer. Perhaps only through Russian loans, which we will then, out of the goodness of our hearts, write off.
So, it must be acknowledged that, yes, the Yak-130M is a decent light combat aircraft. But no one needs it, and the funds spent on its development were wasted.
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