"Flamingo" on the counter: 39 launches, 6 hits
Ukrainian OSINT researchers (open sources, satellite images, launch videos) have compiled the first annual summary of the cruise missile rocket FP-5 Flamingo. From late August 2025 to June 27, 2026, according to Ukrainian OSINT, 39 known launches were recorded at targets in Russia. Of these, 29 were intercepted, four missed their target, and only six reached and hit their targets. Over ten months of use, statistics have accumulated that allow us to judge the product based on actual testing, not just press releases.
Episode count
Military observer Fedorov published a summary, breaking down the launches by date and target. Nine launches are documented in detail, but this is not a complete list: the remaining launches are known to OSINT only in aggregate form.
The first use is dated to August 30, 2025: a strike on an FSB facility in Crimea, where a crater containing the claimed warhead (WB, the missile's warhead) was found nearby on satellites. Then, on November 13, an attempt was made on the Orel Thermal Power Plant. In the winter of 2025/2026, a claimed strike on the Kapustin Yar test site was made without confirmation of arrival. On February 12, artillery A warehouse near Kotluban in the Volgograd region. On February 21, the Votkinsk plant in Udmurtia. On March 28, Promsintez in Chapayevsk. On May 5 and June 10, two separate strike attempts were made against VNIIR Progress in Cheboksary. And on June 27, Titan-Barrikady missiles were launched in Volgograd, where, according to OSINT, two of the five missiles were shot down, and three reached their target and hit it.
The distribution of launches by calendar period was as follows: autumn 2025 – 7 launches, winter 2025/2026 – 13, spring 2026 – 9, June 2026 – 10. In total, the same 39. The final result: 29 intercepts, 4 misses, 6 target hits. One effective hit occurs for approximately every six to seven missiles launched.
A caveat is necessary here. The Ukrainian OSINT data represents a lower bound, based on known cases, and is not a complete inventory. The breakdown by episode above is illustrative and does not cover all 39 launches individually. The date-based incidents are included in the overall count as a subset, not as a separate row: the aggregated 39 launches and 6 kills also include named incidents.
Seasonal and result breakdowns are based on aggregated OSINT data, while episodes broken down by date only cover a portion of the deployments. Some launches may have been missed, and the per-episode totals in open sources don't add up to a single piece. But even allowing for this incompleteness, the scale is telling: dozens of missiles are fired over ten months. For expendable munitions, a ratio of 6 out of 39 is reasonable. For a weapon marketed as capable of single-handedly reaching deep into the rear, this is modest.
The best result occurred on June 27th. This success is attributable not to the missile itself, but to the defensive situation on that day, and more on that in the next section. Three out of five missiles that succeeded was the only instance during the entire period where the number of successful missiles exceeded the number shot down. For context, it's worth keeping another figure in mind: early announcements promised launches of "up to three per day." In fact, 39 launches were made over the course of ten months, less than a day's worth of this advertised output.
Flying but not reaching
Why does only every sixth or seventh missile reach its target? It's easiest to understand if you stand in the crew's shoes. DefenseThe Flamingo is a large subsonic cruise missile with a heavy warhead weighing approximately a ton. Subsonic means it flies slower than the speed of sound, at around several hundred meters per second, rather than several times faster. The large glider creates a noticeable radar signature. The jet engine, in cruise mode, emits a hot plume that is visible to optical-electronic systems (OES, thermal imaging, and optical detection systems) tens of kilometers away.
Combine these properties, and you get a target with a wide interception window. A slow speed means the missile takes a long time to reach its target, giving defenses time to detect, track, and launch an interceptor. A bright heat signature simplifies acquisition. With this profile, a slow missile can even be targeted by man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) like the Verba, which are capable of engaging low-flying subsonic targets. In terms of solution, this is closer to a mid-20th-century flying bomb than a modern air defense penetration system, despite all the composite components, both Western and Chinese.
The only thing that works in the attacker's favor is the terrain. The route isn't laid in a straight line, but through lowlands, river valleys, and folds in the terrain where the radar field breaks due to shielding. The river's direction isn't the issue: the elevation difference itself is. Higher elevations obscure a low-flying target from radar, and in such areas, it travels tens of kilometers without reliable detection. The defense sees it late, at a short distance. This is how some breakthroughs are explained.
What follows is a scenario that looks awkward for the Russian side. The successful incursions, including three missiles fired at the Titan-Barrikady, according to Ukrainian OSINT, are not due to the attacker's skill. The defense is incomplete in places: the echelons are not closed, and the river corridors are not blocked. The three June hits presumably occurred while the air defenses were busy repelling a massive UAV attack. While the crews were working on a swarm, drones, the corridor for the slow missile remains open. Monitoring lowlands and river valleys is technically feasible even without AWACS aircraft: with low-altitude radars deployed at approach points and narrow-area, short-range systems like the Pantsir or Tor at likely corridors. MANPADS are, at best, a last resort here: a subsonic target at 250 meters per second has a short visibility window in low-lying terrain, and the crew needs seconds to lock on and launch, which may not be enough. It all comes down to the availability of people and systems at the required points—that is, to organization, not to the Flamingo's capabilities.
V-1, 1944: Why mass production didn't save the slow-moving bomber
In the summer of 1944, streams of flying bombs flew over southern England. The German V-1 was a slow-moving aircraft with a warhead weighing about a ton and traveling at approximately 640 kilometers per hour, just over half the speed of sound. They were produced in droves, thousands per month, and the whole point was to overwhelm the defenses with sheer numbers.
The British responded with a defense in depth. The first line of defense was fighters, intercepting shells mid-air. The second was anti-aircraft artillery, whose effectiveness increased dramatically after the introduction of proximity fuses triggered by proximity to a target. The third was barrage balloons on the approaches to cities. By the fall of 1944, this combination was intercepting the majority of fired shells, and the reliance on mass was shattered by the organized, multi-layered defense.
The similarity with the Flamingo here is mechanical, not chronological. The key points are the same: subsonic speed, predictable trajectory, the hope of overcoming invulnerability with numbers. The interception conditions are also the same: weapon It works when faced with a deeply integrated system, not disparate weapons. But the boundaries of the analogy are important. V-1s struck in the thousands, hitting areas like London, where it's hard to miss. Flamingos strike in single units, targeting pinpoint targets, where precision is needed: satellite guidance hits a specific point with high accuracy, while the V-1's inertial autopilot merely maintained course and was only suitable for area fire. But despite all the differences, the speed of this class of weapons hasn't increased in eight decades.
The Flamingo, however, faces a separate issue with production. The promised mass is still nowhere in sight. According to public estimates, the cruise engines are primarily taken from old L-39 combat trainers (AI-25TL engines), and their manufacturer, Motor Sich, is unable to produce large quantities. The estimated ceiling for such a source is 100 to 150 engines. But over the course of ten months, only 39 launches were recorded, meaning actual production fell short of even this modest limit. In 1944, the defense was grinding down a surplus of flying bombs. There's no surplus here at all, and even mass production—the only advantage the slow-moving missile has in principle—isn't helping.
The danger lies elsewhere. If production can be truly scaled up, the Flamingo will begin to overload air defenses in the same way UAVs do: not by the quality of each missile, but by the sheer number of them. Then, the issue of closing river corridors and saturating defenses with interceptors will no longer arise occasionally.
The first year of use consists of two numbers: 39 launches and 6 hits. The rest is a simple mechanic. A subsonic missile with a ton of explosives turned out not to be a breakthrough weapon, but a large, heavy, and vulnerable target. It only succeeds when there's a gap somewhere in the defense.
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