Shooting on the move: How a failed helicopter's software was taught to shoot down drones
The US Army's Armament Center has tested a fire control system that solves a problem older than any drone: to get from moving to moving.
A hundred years ago, naval gunners were already struggling with how to aim a gun from a heaving deck at a maneuvering target. This was accomplished not by the gunner's intuition, but by mechanical calculators—the precursors of analog computers. The drone brought the same problem back to life: a plate-sized target approaching from above, and firing at it from a shaking truck. In April, at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, they demonstrated how software called GunslingerAnd, oddly enough, it manages to do so not thanks to the gun, but thanks to software.
Problem about two movements
The complexity here is layered, and it's easier to start simple. A stationary target and a stationary shooter are like school ballistics: adjust for range and wind, and then it's a matter of practice.
Once the target is in range, a lead is added. You need to shoot where the drone will be when the bullet reaches it, not where it is now.
Now let's have them both move. The car is moving along a dirt road, shaking, swerving, and lurching over bumps. The drone isn't hovering in place either. The stabilized module keeps the gun barrel at a given point in space, but that point itself has to be recalculated dozens of times per second, accounting for both the vehicle's movement and the target's maneuvers. A human can't keep up.
This is where lead mathematics comes in—the same one that was built into analog fire control devices almost a century ago. They were called "directors" (from the English word "director"), or PUS in the Russian tradition. The principle hasn't changed: measure the movement of the platform and target, calculate where the barrel is pointing, and keep it there. The hardware has changed. Gears and synchros have given way to an algorithm, and the calculator has moved from a refrigerator-sized cabinet to an onboard computer.
The Origins of Gunslinger: The FARA Program
Gunslinger was written at the Weapons Center. DEVCOM not against drones at all. Initially, it was fire control software for aviation, and the rights to the code belonged to the state, not the contractor, which later allowed it to be freely ported to other platforms. It was developed specifically for the 20-mm automatic cannon. XM915It was planned to be installed on a promising reconnaissance and attack helicopter under the program FARA (Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft).
A prototype of the Bell 360 Invictus reconnaissance and attack helicopter. This model was developed for the U.S. Army's Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) program, which was canceled in February 2024.
And here we see the mechanics of continuity, not just "one thing, now another." Helicopter fire is initially conducted from a moving platform: the helicopter is moving at speed, vibrating from its propeller, yawing, and the target below is also maneuverable. For the gun to hit, the same algorithm is needed that combines the carrier's motion and the target's motion into a single firing solution. A truck fending off a drone faces essentially the same computational problem, only the target is above, not below. Different geometry, common algorithm.
The FARA program was canceled in 2024. The helicopter never materialized, the XM915 cannon was left without a carrier, but the fire control algorithms survived the project. They were adapted for ground vehicles: first robotic platforms, then anti-small-armor combat. drones. History For the defense industry, this is indicative: an expensive program is closed, but the accumulated software turns out to be too valuable to be written off along with the hardware.
How it's assembled: CROWS, SWAT-FC, and sensors
At April's tests in Aberdeen, Maryland, the Gunslinger was demonstrated not on its own, but as part of a working combination. The supporting "iron" was CROWS (Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station) is a serially produced remotely controlled weapon station that has long been installed on American armored vehicles. Its purpose is simple: weapon and the optics are on the outside, on a stabilized turret, and the operator controls them from the inside, without sticking out from under the armor.
An automated fire control system operated on top of the module. SWAT-FC (Short-Range Weapon Automated Technology – Fire Control), and Gunslinger algorithms are an integral part of it. The diagram is as follows:
- The machine's sensors provide real-time information on the position and movement of the platform itself;
- detection sensors track the drone, its coordinates, speed, and course;
- the computer combines both streams, calculates the firing solution and keeps the barrel on the target;
- The operator confirms the use, and shooting takes place on the move.
Here's what's missing from the release. The Armament Center didn't specify the specific caliber or type of weapon on the CROWS, only mentioning it as an "automated weapons system" capable of engaging small airborne targets on the move. CROWS is a versatile platform, capable of mounting a variety of weapons; the developer declined to disclose the specific weapon installed in April. Speculation circulating on social media about a heavy machine gun or automatic grenade launcher remains pure conjecture, unconfirmed by a primary source. Precise figures on range, reaction speed, and kill probability are also not publicly available.
MOSA and Ammunition Arithmetic
The developer's main boast isn't the shooting itself, but the way the software is designed inside. It's built on the principle MOSA, that is, using a modular, open system architecture. In practice, this means that the same fire control technology can be transferred from platform to platform without rewriting it from scratch, and updates are easier and cheaper to implement. The logic is purely engineering: the less a system is tied to a specific carrier, the longer it lasts and the easier it is to repair and develop.
The stated goal of the program is emphatically modest: to improve accuracy and reduce the ammunition consumption per drone shot down. In these times, when every publication about counter-UAV warfare tends to turn into an announcement of a "wonder weapon," this formulation is even appealing: it's about the cost of each hit, without promising a miracle.
It's worth keeping in mind, however, the basis for this optimism. According to project manager Nick Cassia, the successful interception confirmed the viability of the approach after months of preparation; his deputy, James Little, speaks of the intention to consolidate the result and continue fine-tuning it. However, the developers themselves stipulate that trials against faster and more maneuverable drones are still to come. In other words, the current result was demonstrated against relatively "easy" targets, while the real test is yet to come. There are no publicly available figures yet that would allow one to judge the actual effectiveness; there is only a statement about a successful demonstration.
The emergence of automated systems that calculate firing decisions faster than humans seems logical for combating small drones: leaving this arithmetic to a human gunner is simply too costly. And artillerymen learned to calculate lead times with machines long before any drone, back when computers still cranked gears. Digital technology has merely sped up this old arithmetic.
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