Tower on tower: how self-propelled guns are being trained to fend off drones

4 276 20
Tower on tower: how self-propelled guns are being trained to fend off drones
The US Army is testing the LP-CROWS system on M109A7 Paladin howitzers to provide protection for artillery crews against drones and close combat threats


On June 24, 2026, the US Army announced testing of the LP-CROWS combat module on the M109A7 Paladin self-propelled howitzer. The objective is simple: to enable the crew to fend off drones and close-in threats without opening the hatches. News It passed as a note about another piece of hardware, although it is interesting not for the module itself, but for what is behind it. Artillery admits that he is now fighting in conditions where the gun must be protected not so much from an enemy gun, but from a cheap flying hunter.



It used to take hours to find a battery. Now it takes minutes.


The Msta-S crew carries out a fire mission and leaves its position faster than a kettle boils. It's not a matter of training: otherwise, the crew simply wouldn't survive to see the next mission.

The logic of artillery engagement was reversed. The classic scenario was a duel of guns: a counter-battery radar (a radar that detects a gun by its shell's trajectory) would detect a salvo, calculate the coordinates, and return fire would arrive after a significant delay. The crew had a reserve. Soviet regulations allowed for holding a position for 10–15 minutes, and this was considered an acceptable risk.

Now a spotter drone hovers over the position, and the reserve is gone. According to CAST experts, who have summarized their combat experience, the time before the enemy opens return fire has shrunk to 1,5–3 minutes. The self-propelled gun's "fire-departure" cycle is now 2–3 minutes: deploy, fire a quick salvo of three or four shells, roll up, and depart. Three minutes is less than it takes to carefully read a couple of paragraphs of this article, and it now covers the entire combat episode of the gun.

Towed systems like the D-30 and Msta-B have become "roving guns": they don't remain stationary in an exposed position. Survival standards require leaving the firing point within 3-5 minutes after the first shot. A delay of more than seven minutes, according to the same estimates, increases the probability of a hit to levels that would necessitate the weapon's write-off. During the current war, the crew's survival has become a matter of seconds: if they manage to hunker down, they survive; if they hesitate for a minute or two, they're hit.

A turret on a turret: a gun acting as its own anti-aircraft defense


Previous versions of the CROWS module were not installed on the Paladin. The reason was technical: the dimensions didn't meet transportation requirements, and the design couldn't withstand the fire of a 155mm gun. A howitzer fires up to four rounds per minute, and each round generates recoil, vibration, and shock waves. Martin Velasquez, head of the Yuma Proving Ground test team, explained that the old module could fail after repeated firings. This stemmed from a simple platform requirement: what works well on an armored vehicle disintegrates on a howitzer under its own main caliber.

The LP-CROWS (low-profile variant) has been redesigned: its profile has been reduced, its structure has been strengthened, and the gyrostabilization and integrated fire control system (FCS, which calculates aiming and lead) have been retained. Its stated function is to engage close-in targets and small drones without opening the hatches, in countermeasure mode. drones (C-sUAS). The module is planned to be equipped with a UAV detection radar, which will deploy itself weapon towards the threat.

Regarding the characteristics, sources cite the 12,7mm M2 machine gun as the primary option, a range of about 1.5 kilometers against small drones, and a radar capable of detecting targets at 3-5 kilometers. These figures should be considered estimates, as they are not confirmed in official test reports. The stated range against drones also appears optimistic, as the effectiveness of the 12,7mm machine gun against small, moving targets drops sharply at 1.5 kilometers.

It's not the design itself that's interesting, but the pace and logic behind it. The journey from concept to prototype took about a year, with development conducted internally by a network of Army agencies (the PM HS Ordnance Directorate and DEVCOM Research Center), bypassing an external prime contractor. Testing at Yuma Proving Ground was conducted by soldiers from the 4th Battalion, 1st Field Artillery Regiment, based at Fort Bliss; the range was designated as an interagency counter-UAV site after the establishment of a dedicated task force (JIATF 401) in August 2025. The Army, which had been building procurement on long-term contracts for years, was forced to accelerate.

And here's what's curious. The CROWS module was marketed as a universal platform, capable of mounting on any vehicle. It wasn't mounted on their own self-propelled howitzer for years, until the changing nature of combat forced a complete redesign. The Americans are realizing what has long been common sense on other fronts: a gun must be able to fight back on its own.

An old duel in a new setting


The reduction in the life of a firing position is a long-standing process, and it repeats itself according to the same mechanics: reconnaissance means become more accurate and faster, and the safe operating time of the gun shrinks along with them.

During World War I, batteries were located using sound and instrumental reconnaissance, based on the sound of gunfire and flash, with calculations on paper, and spotting them took tens of minutes. In the second half of the 20th century, artillery radars arrived, and spotting time shrank to mere minutes: counter-battery duels became truly rapid. Then came the advent of satellites and drones. Every step took the crew time to fire and retreat.

But then the analogy begins to falter. Previously, the count was in tens of minutes, and the hunter was an expensive, rare system—radar, aviation, a high-precision projectile. Today, minutes count, and the reaction time of a spotter drone is measured in seconds; meanwhile, the hunter itself has become mass-produced and inexpensive: a thousand-dollar copter can target, while an FPV drone can finish the job for a few hundred. The old duel of guns hasn't gone away, but now a weapon more often kills not a system of equal class, but a home-built device costing hundreds or thousands of dollars.

LP-CROWS on the Paladin, "wandering" D-30s, and mounted grilles on turrets—these are all different responses to the same mechanics. The idea that a gun should protect itself is nothing new, but it used to be an option, and now the gun simply can't function without it.

It's not the metal that matters anymore, but the crew's organization: speed, camouflage, cover, and the ability to fight back at close range. The cost of a shot isn't just the shell itself; it also includes whether the crew manages to escape alive. Those who realize this first pay less.
20 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. +3
    2 July 2026 04: 55
    Damn it, Clinton! Every time I read articles like this, only one thought comes to mind: why don't we see anti-drone modules like these on our self-propelled guns, tanks, and other vehicles?! This could radically change the course of military operations!
    1. +1
      5 July 2026 23: 31
      It's possible, but why? It's a quote, by the way. The guys are doing just fine.
  2. 0
    2 July 2026 07: 17
    One barrel won't save such a huge thing, small ones fly from different sides almost on the ground, you need shot and not 12.7, just haven't encountered this yet
    1. 0
      2 July 2026 07: 50
      Quote: Vadim S
      One barrel won't save such a huge thing, small ones fly from different sides almost on the ground, you need shot and not 12.7, just haven't encountered this yet

      Previously, there were 30mm ME (multi-element) shells for aircraft cannons, loaded with 28 9mm bullets from the PM... you just need to reduce the expansion distance; they were designed for a distance of a little more than a kilometer...
    2. +1
      6 July 2026 02: 27
      These are just details. It's important to at least start moving in the right direction. There shouldn't be just one barrel; there should be many of them: shot, buckshot, electronic warfare, and fighter drones in the sky. This is the only way to save the lives of our guys!
  3. +1
    2 July 2026 07: 41
    The classic scheme looked like a duel of guns: a counter-battery radar (a radar station that detects a gun by the trajectory of its projectile) catches a salvo, calculates the coordinates, and return fire comes after a noticeable time.

    The duel took place in WWI. The classic counter-battery strategy of WWI was different. A reconnaissance aircraft would visually locate a position or detect a battery by the smoke trail from a cannon salvo, transmit the coordinates, and direct attack aircraft or bombers to the battery. Since long-range artillery batteries were positioned at a range that typically ensured the forward edge was within reach, the batteries were usually inaccessible for counter-battery fire. Heavy artillery was brought up to the long-range artillery base only for artillery preparation before the offensive. Although now, as in WWI, aircraft are unable to fly beyond the long-range artillery base.
    But our General Staff is our General Staff... On June 22, 41, they decided to position units and formations in close proximity to the border and received an artillery attack...
    1. +1
      2 July 2026 11: 58
      Quote: Konnick
      Since long-range artillery batteries were positioned at a range that generally ensured the forward edge was within reach, and the batteries were usually inaccessible for counter-battery fire, heavy artillery was brought up to the LBS only for artillery preparation before the offensive.

      Not quite so. One of the roles of heavy artillery on both sides was to engage the rear and engage in counter-battery fire. So the guns not only fired at the front line but also partially at the rear, which pushed their positions closer to the front line.
      The ultimate example of such a situation is a blockade, during which enemy batteries had to fire at targets in a city 20-25 kilometers across. On the other side, the defenders had a highly mobile heavy artillery brigade, whose guns could deploy and leave their positions in minutes, as well as an extensive air defense system, including a horizontal-base multispectral photo-rangefinder on high-rise buildings with a base of several kilometers (the navy tried to move coastal defenses onshore).
      As a result, both sides were forced to develop complex schemes to divert and suppress each other's counter-battery and counter-counter-battery fire, in which several batteries were used to ensure that one gun could fire at a target.
      The state of the Stoerkampfgruppe after the end of the air raid can best be described with only one word: pogrom. In one fell swoop, the group lost twelve light bombers. Eight He-46s (W.Nr. 261, 323, 327, 404, 706, 755, 1154, 1227) and four Arados (W.Nr. 279, 1005, 1223, 1227) were lost.
      (…)
      ...the attack on the German airfield took place from 4:10 a.m. to 4:16 a.m. on April 10, 1943. The operation followed a standard pattern: one 180-mm artillery unit fired at the airfield, while a second launched a diversionary attack on the town of Krasnoye Selo. Four 130-mm batteries fired warning shots at German artillery positions.
      © Roman Larintsev, Alexander Zablotsky. The best ace of the Baltic Fleet.
      1. 0
        2 July 2026 12: 29
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Quote: Konnick
        Since long-range artillery batteries were positioned at a range that generally ensured the forward edge was within reach, and the batteries were usually inaccessible for counter-battery fire, heavy artillery was brought up to the LBS only for artillery preparation before the offensive.

        Not quite so. One of the roles of heavy artillery on both sides was to engage the rear and engage in counter-battery fire. So the guns not only fired at the front line but also partially at the rear, which pushed their positions closer to the front line.
        The ultimate example of such a situation is a blockade, during which enemy batteries had to fire at targets in a city 20-25 kilometers across. On the other side, the defenders had a highly mobile heavy artillery brigade, whose guns could deploy and leave their positions in minutes, as well as an extensive air defense system, including a horizontal-base multispectral photo-rangefinder on high-rise buildings with a base of several kilometers (the navy tried to move coastal defenses onshore).
        As a result, both sides were forced to develop complex schemes to divert and suppress each other's counter-battery and counter-counter-battery fire, in which several batteries were used to ensure that one gun could fire at a target.
        The state of the Stoerkampfgruppe after the end of the air raid can best be described with only one word: pogrom. In one fell swoop, the group lost twelve light bombers. Eight He-46s (W.Nr. 261, 323, 327, 404, 706, 755, 1154, 1227) and four Arados (W.Nr. 279, 1005, 1223, 1227) were lost.
        (…)
        ...the attack on the German airfield took place from 4:10 a.m. to 4:16 a.m. on April 10, 1943. The operation followed a standard pattern: one 180-mm artillery unit fired at the airfield, while a second launched a diversionary attack on the town of Krasnoye Selo. Four 130-mm batteries fired warning shots at German artillery positions.
        © Roman Larintsev, Alexander Zablotsky. The best ace of the Baltic Fleet.

        I'm talking about regular batteries, not mobile railway units. They're the same as self-propelled guns. Especially since in '43, there were practically no German air forces near Leningrad other than reconnaissance and spotting missions. Write about the battleship Marat's artillery in counter-battery fire when there was still German air power near Leningrad. I wrote what should have been, not what someone felt like doing...
        And since when did the He-46 and Arado crop dusters become bombers?
        1. The comment was deleted.
        2. 0
          4 July 2026 17: 13
          Quote: Konnick
          I'm talking about regular batteries, not mobile railway installations.

          For conventional heavy artillery batteries, one of their primary targets is enemy artillery. They survive through counter-battery fire.
          And the main way of obtaining information about enemy artillery in WWII is not aviation, which is always not there and not then, and AIR.
          Artillery instrumental reconnaissance consists of topographic, sound, photogrammetric and optical reconnaissance and meteorological service.
          © Actions of Artillery Units in the Great Patriotic War. Collection 1. Combat Examples. — Moscow: Voenizdat MVS USSR, 1947
          Quote: Konnick
          Write more about the artillery of the battleship Marat in counter-battery combat when German aviation was still present near Leningrad.

          It's better to talk about the Krasnaya Gorka artillery, which survived despite being completely stationary, located outside the city and base's air defense umbrella, and half of its 12-inch mounts being open-topped.
          Or about the open 180-mm battery No. 470 (4 guns with shield cover), which fought throughout the Siege and survived, being located a couple of kilometers from the front line (below is a German photo of the open battery in 1943). smile
          Quote: Konnick
          And since when did the He-46 and Arado crop dusters become bombers?

          So this is a Stoerkampfgruppe—a combined "harassment" group of night bombers. The Germans created these squadrons and groups based on our Po-2-based night bomber squadrons and armed them with every type of "night slowflyer" they could find: He.45, He.46, He.50, Hs.126, Fw.189, Fokker CV, Fokker CX, Ar.66, Bü.131, Go.145, Fw.58, Si.204, W.34. In short, it was quite a hodgepodge.
          Specifically, Stoerkampfgruppe Luftflotte 1 (later Nachtschlachtgruppe 1), whose 4th Staffel was based in Gatchina, was armed with Ar-66, Go-145, He-45, He-46 and W.34.
    2. 0
      16 July 2026 12: 39
      Aha! Naneshna! At the beginning of WWII, the Germans discovered that the sound reconnaissance division didn't exist in peacetime, but was only created during mobilization. And it couldn't immediately produce good results. If you don't believe me, ask the surviving Nazi soldiers! And since their memoirs are long dead, read them. In 1980, the USSR allowed them to be translated and published.
  4. -1
    2 July 2026 07: 50
    Such things will soon be installed on most equipment + programmable ammunition or shrapnel.
    1. -1
      2 July 2026 08: 04
      Have you decided to program a 12,7mm round? The probability of hitting a small drone with this cannon is equal to the error margin. It's a crutch for the legless, a complacency.
      1. IVZ
        +2
        2 July 2026 11: 03
        It's a crutch for the legless, self-satisfaction.
        Against FPV missiles, yes, absolutely. But against something like the Lancet, it's already suitable. And not just air defense.
  5. +2
    2 July 2026 08: 02
    If this microradar detects an FP drone from even a kilometer away, it would be surprising, and hitting it is completely impossible, except by accident. I watched a video of a Pantsir trying to shoot one down with cannons, from 500 meters away, but they missed. Eventually, the crew got fed up and hit it with a missile, and that was at a training ground.
  6. 0
    2 July 2026 08: 20
    I've written about a certain military-technical paradox in the comments more than once! Somewhere around the end of the last century, a tank-based active protection system (APS) against ATGMs was developed in England. It was a module mounted on a tank turret (main battle tank). The module consisted of a turret housing: 1) two radars (detection and tracking); 2) a twin 7,62mm machine gun mount; 3) a ballistic computer (BCS). This APS was quickly criticized by military experts "all over the world"! But if we consider this "under-APS" in the spirit of anti-drone defense, it may be just what the doctor ordered! By the way, I once read that the turrets of the Ukrainian T-64 were equipped with "sockets" for installing various modules, for example, 23-mm cannons... That is, if armored vehicles were equipped in advance with such installation "points" ("sockets"), then it might turn out to be entirely appropriate to use "nedoKAZ" similar to the English one!
  7. 0
    2 July 2026 09: 26
    The idea is in the air.
    Yesterday there was an article about something similar in America, Europe, and Ukraine.

    The important thing is that they developed it themselves within the army within a year.
  8. 0
    2 July 2026 10: 51
    How effective is a machine gun like that on the roof of a self-propelled gun? A direct hit is required.
  9. 0
    2 July 2026 11: 26
    The logic of artillery engagement was reversed. The classic scenario was a duel of guns: a counter-battery radar (a radar that detects a gun by its shell's trajectory) would detect a salvo, calculate the coordinates, and return fire would arrive after a significant delay. The crew had a reserve. Soviet regulations allowed for holding a position for 10–15 minutes, and this was considered an acceptable risk.

    Meanwhile, on the other side of the gunsight, judging by data published in the Western Military District, at the end of the Cold War, the maximum time spent at a defensive position was considered to be 5-6 minutes. Or even less, judging by the struggle for rate of fire that unfolded in the first two minutes. It was believed that a firing platoon could fire 4-5 volleys from one position, after which it had to fold up and move to the next.
    And the AIR radar was only one of the means of reconnaissance of the artillery OP in the RUSSIAN FEDERATION in the 80s. Imperialist aggressors They built complex systems that combined data from various systems for detecting firing weapons, as well as aerial reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and missile defense systems, into a single center that provided target designation for appropriate weapons.
  10. +1
    2 July 2026 12: 47
    Towed systems such as the D-30 and Msta-B have been converted into "roving guns"

    The author is about three years behind the times in terms of artillery tactics... Frankly, I can't imagine a towed gun as a mobile firearm in modern conditions.
    The Americans are coming to the conclusion that on other fronts it has long been a matter of routine: a weapon must be able to fight back on its own.

    It would be very interesting to see the development of this author's idea - on what fronts and thanks to what technical solutions did the ability of a weapon to "snap back on its own" become "the everyday life of the crew"?
  11. -1
    17 July 2026 14: 40
    Quote: Konnick
    Previously, there were 30mm ME (multi-element) shells for aircraft cannons, loaded with 28 9mm bullets from the PM...

    PM bullets? What for? Are they magic? Or are there so many of them that there's nowhere to put them?