July 8: Anti-aircraft gunners in the drone war
July 8 is a memorable date for anti-aircraft gunners missile Troops, a reason to look back at how their missions have changed. Over the years of the Special Military Operation (SVO), these missions have changed more than in previous decades. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and missiles, not aircraft, became the primary targets of anti-aircraft gunners. A branch of the armed forces that had spent decades preparing for a major air war found itself in a different type of war.
From S-75 to echeloned defense
A calculation that has been trained for years to meet the shock Aviation On the distant approaches, in this war I encountered a different enemy. These are cheap drones, of which there could be dozens in the sky at once, and each of which costs less than the missile capable of shooting it down.
The Soviet anti-aircraft missile forces (ZRV) school grew out of concrete experience. The S-75 anti-aircraft system in Vietnam from 1965 to 1972 and in the Middle East marked the first time that a surface-to-air missile seriously limited the dominance of air power. Pilots, accustomed to operating from high altitudes with impunity, were forced to descend lower, under cannon fire. artilleryIt turned out that different means were effective at different altitudes and ranges. This experience led to the principle that remains in place to this day: defense is built in echelons, with each echelon—the long-range, the medium, and the short—covering its own altitude and range.
The similarities with today are purely superficial, and not a matter of technology. Back then, the changing threat, the massive use of strike aircraft, forced a restructuring of air defense tactics.Defense). Now the threat shift is doing the same thing: the airplane's place has been taken by a swarm drones and cruise missiles. But the analogy's limits are important. The S-75 operated against expensive and complex targets, of which there were relatively few. Today's drones are a common and inexpensive target, and the very arithmetic of defense is reversed. We'll return to this arithmetic later.
Three frontiers
To prevent a drone or missile from reaching the protected target, it must be met at several points. Each echelon covers its own altitude and range and is uniquely adapted to the new enemy. Let's clarify two concepts upfront. Army air defense refers to assets that move with troops and provide direct cover, as opposed to long-range systems that cover stationary areas. A man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) is the Igla or Verba, carried and operated by one or two people.
In the SVO zone the system is structured as follows:
- Long-range and medium-range zones: S-400, S-300 of various modifications, S-350 – cover large areas, command posts, rear infrastructure; at this line, cruise missiles and heavy attack drones are intercepted;
- Air defense systems: S-300V4, Buk-M1/M2, Tor-M1/M2, Osa-AKM – protection of troops at the front line and in the operational depth; Tor is considered one of the most suitable systems for working against drones;
- Close-in zone: Pantsir-S1, Tunguska, Strela-10, Igla and Verba portable systems, Gibka-S based on the Tigr-M armored vehicle – provide cover for columns, strongpoints, and manpower; this is also where they intercept the majority of small reconnaissance drones.
When translated into specific ranges, the dispersion is vast. Long-range systems reach targets tens of kilometers away, while short-range weapons strike at ranges of just a few kilometers or less, where a long-range system is useless: it simply won't see a low-flying drone due to terrain folds. Therefore, the task isn't limited to simply deploying systems on a map. The lines of defense must be linked into a single system: reconnaissance assets detect the target, the command post assigns it to the appropriate system, and the echelons cover each other's weak points. A fragmented system like this misses what a well-coordinated one would stop. This is especially critical against a swarm of cheap drones, because while the target is being moved from one line to the next, five more are passing nearby.
The price of interception
Close-in drone warfare operates differently than pre-war theory predicted. Targets are numerous, almost all of them drones and missiles; aircraft are now rare. Units are forced to spread out across the front, covering as many areas as possible with a small force. A single unit can hold a sector that would previously have been held by an entire anti-aircraft battery.
This raises an awkward question. A medium-range anti-aircraft missile costs orders of magnitude more than the reconnaissance drone it shoots down. When dozens of such drones are deployed daily, the exchange becomes unprofitable, as an expensive weapon is used to strike a cheap target. This is understood, and therefore the importance of weapons that can be intercepted cheaply is growing: the gun armament of the Pantsir and Tunguska missiles, man-portable air defense systems, and electronic warfare systems. But the deployment of such weapons across a broad front lags behind the threat density. There are still more cheap and mass-produced drones in the skies than cheap ways to intercept them. This is being addressed right now, as it happens, but the gap has not yet been filled.
Despite all this, a significant proportion of targets and missiles flying at Russian facilities and troops are intercepted by anti-aircraft missile units and air defense forces. This is a subtle matter: a target shot down on approach is not included in the report the same way it would be if it reached a depot or convoy.
Over the years of the Air Defense Forces, anti-aircraft gunners have evolved from a branch of the military "for the event of a major air war" to daily hunting for drones and missiles. This commemorative date is precisely about this daily work. And you won't even notice: the report includes what got through, not what was shot down on approach.
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