After Chesma. The Fleet Base and Corsairism
In the previous article I described why Count A. G. Orlov failed to capture the island of Lemnos and establish a base fleet Near the Dardanelles Strait. There were two reasons for this: the lifting of the Dardanelles blockade, which was achieved through the actions of Rear Admiral D. Elphinstone, and the valor of the Algerian Admiral Hassan, who recruited a detachment of daredevils in Istanbul and risked landing troops on the island of Lemnos in support of the fortress of Pelari, besieged by Russian troops. Hassan transported the detachment of approximately 4000 men on rowboats.
Ultimately, the few Russian ground forces suffered defeat, and Count A. G. Orlov had no choice but to abandon the island. But the Russian fleet, of course, needed a base, and now the choice fell on the island of Paros. This island had two large bays suitable for anchoring large sailing ships. The local population on Paros numbered approximately 5, the overwhelming majority of whom were Orthodox Greeks engaged in grain cultivation, viticulture, and sheep herding. There was no Turkish administration or garrison on Paros at all.
Paros was smaller than Lemnos—its maximum length and width were 21 and 16 km, compared to 43 and 22 km, respectively. Furthermore, it was approximately 330 km from the Dardanelles, while Lemnos was approximately 75 km away. The distance from the Dardanelles was both Paros's advantage and its disadvantage.
Of course, organizing a permanent blockade of the Dardanelles Strait with a base more than 300 km away was hardly feasible. But on the other hand, the Turks also couldn't reach Paros by sea to attempt a repeat of their magnificent debut at Lemnos.
The problem was that even if A.G. Orlov had succeeded and the Russian fleet had established a base on Lemnos, its retention would have been highly questionable. Lemnos's long coastline prevented naval forces from controlling its approaches, while the distance from Lemnos to the mainland and the nearest islands was quite short. From Imbros to Lemnos was only 22 km, and from the exit of the Dardanelles to Imbros, even less, no more than 18 km. This meant that the Turks, had they had the resolve—and Admiral Hasan's actions demonstrated that they had it—could have, despite the blockade, transported troops at night on small rowboats, concentrated a large detachment on Imbros, and then, also at night, landed it on Lemnos.
Of course, Count A. G. Orlov's squadron had an overwhelming advantage in large ships and firepower. But given the sailing fleet's dependence on the wind, it was often unable to capitalize on this advantage even during the day. And at night, the natural limitations of sailing ships' maneuverability and speed were compounded by the problem of enemy detection.
Simply put, to defend the base on Lemnos, it was not enough to capture the Pelari fortress and completely neutralize the Turkish ground forces on the island. It was also necessary to seize the islands adjacent to Lemnos and maintain garrisons there. Unfortunately, defending a base in the immediate vicinity of the Dardanelles could not be ensured by naval forces alone—it required numerous ground forces, which Count A.G. Orlov lacked. And without them, the Turks always retained the ability to strike quickly by capturing the Russian naval base.
Interestingly, in the immediate vicinity of the Dardanelles Strait, danger threatened not only the Russian base on land but even ships at sea. In August 1771, Russian ships intercepted Ottoman shipping lanes, but they didn't limit themselves to intercepting merchant ships at sea; they also attacked Ottoman-held shores, landing troops, and seizing food and other supplies needed by Russian sailors.
As part of this operation, the trekater (a small sailing and rowing vessel) "Saint Michael" was dispatched with a company of soldiers and a detachment of Albanians to land on the island of Thassos—I presume behind the timber. However, the trekater encountered a calm between Lemnos and Mount Athos, closer to Lemnos. The Turks noticed this and attacked the "Saint Michael" with five galleys. The trekater endured a fierce four-hour battle and was able to fight back, inflicting heavy casualties on the Ottomans. Nevertheless, the fact of the attack speaks for itself.
Therefore, even having captured Lemnos, the Russian squadron had neither the guaranteed ability to intercept the Turkish landing force nor sufficient ground forces to defeat the landing force and retain the island. At the same time, mounting an expedition to Paros on light rowboats was virtually impossible. For starters, it would have been difficult for the Turks to discover exactly where Count A.G. Orlov had established his base. Even if they had, the expedition to Paros would have required a lengthy sea voyage through areas with very busy shipping routes for small Greek vessels. Therefore, it was to be expected that the Ottoman rowboat squadron's movements would be observed and reported to Russian military commanders. But in that case, the Ottoman squadron would have been intercepted and captured or destroyed, along with all its troops.
In short, the landing on Lemnos was an act of desperate bravery—Admiral Hassan took a serious risk, but it was worth it. But an expedition to Paros on light rowboats would have been a desperate act, not of bravery, but of stupidity, which is why, of course, it was never undertaken.
Thus, Count A. G. Orlov, having chosen the island of Paros as the naval base, secured it from a sudden attack by the Turks, but at the same time he was forced to abandon the constant and tight siege of the Dardanelles Strait.
About the base on the island of Paros
It must be said that Count A. G. Orlov approached the establishment of the base with the utmost thoroughness. Sources of clean drinking water on the island were few, but they were found precisely in the area of Auza Bay: here, Russian sailors built both a water supply and a reservoir. However, Paros also had a second bay, Trio, which also had water, so our fleet used both.
The Russian squadron also acquired its own Admiralty on Paros, a building erected on the coast. But the building wasn't the only factor—many shipwrights were brought in from Russia, including the renowned A.S. Kasatonov. Of course, the Admiralty didn't build large ships, limiting itself to repairing existing ones, but small sailing and rowing vessels were launched and outfitted in large numbers.
Paros Island today
Many administrative and other buildings were also constructed, such as warehouses, spinning mills, and bakeries, as well as numerous barracks for both sailors and soldiers. Of course, the squadron's leadership was not forgotten either, with mansions built for them, some of them made of marble.
About the Archipelago Governorate and about the supply of the 1st Archipelago Expedition
Paros wasn't the only base for the Russian squadron. Beginning in January 1771, the squadron used another base on the island of Mykonos, located not far from Paros—the islands were less than 40 kilometers apart. However, neither Paros nor Mykonos, either separately or together, could, of course, satisfy the needs of the Russian expedition, which was gradually growing in size: the squadrons of Arf and Chichagov had arrived from the Baltic. Therefore, Count G. A. Orlov extended his authority over the 27 islands of the Archipelago, establishing a kind of governorate there and introducing taxation. A 10% tax was levied on wine, grain, timber, and other goods, with some of the tax collected in cash. On the other hand, our sailors purchased many goods from local residents for cash.
But one shouldn't think that our sailors only took from the local population. For example, a Greek gymnasium was established on the island of Naxia, attended by "students" not only from Naxia but also from other islands. After the war, these students were transported to Russia, to St. Petersburg—with the students' consent, of course. The provincial government was usually based on self-government, with the role of island governor being performed by Orthodox or Catholic priests (bishops).
Overall, Russian sailors established quite friendly relations with civilians, and the 1st Archipelago Expedition left behind good memories.
However, even 27 islands couldn't meet all the expedition's needs. Much of what it required was brought by sea, and reinforcements from Russia were acquired either in England or Italy. But significant resources were simply expropriated from the Ottomans.
On corsairism in the Archipelago in 1771–1774.
It must be said that piracy wasn't exactly legal in the Mediterranean back then, but it was widely practiced, and it flourished. That is, on the one hand, robbery was seemingly wrong, but since sea robbery had been practiced in the Eastern Mediterranean for centuries (one wonders when), pirates were viewed as respectable gentlemen engaged in a semi-legal trade.
So, it goes without saying that the Russian squadron, in intercepting Turkish shipping, acted legally—the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire were in a state of war. Our ships periodically sailed to the Dardanelles, blockading them for a time, and sailed along the Turkish coast, intercepting Turkish merchant ships and attacking coastal settlements. Sometimes, they inflicted great damage on the Turks, and sometimes they suffered it themselves.
For example, from November 1–5, 1771, our squadron, comprising six ships of the line, seven frigates, and two bombardiers, attacked the fortress of Metelena. They bombarded the fortress itself, landed troops, and pushed the Turks back into the fortifications, capturing the Admiralty warehouses and shipyards in the process. They burned two ships of the line and a galley under construction there, simultaneously capturing 20 small vessels in the harbor, taking them to Aouzou. The operation might have been a resounding success had two frigates not run aground on November 5, as the squadron was leaving. One was rescued, but the Santorini could not be saved; it was towed to shore, and most of the crew was captured by the Turks.
At this point, the esteemed reader may wonder: where did a frigate named "Santorini" come from in Count A.G. Orlov's squadrons? It was the result of the Greco-Russian naval alliance, if indeed it could be called that.
There were three ways the First Archipelago Expedition interacted with the Greek ships. The most legal method was the acquisition of Greek ships by Count A.G. Orlov. Such ships were officially listed as part of the Russian squadron, their commanders became Russian officers, and the enlisted crew members, accordingly, became sailors and received pay in accordance with their rank.
Interestingly, the service of many Greek commanders did not end with the end of the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774. Many of them continued as officers in the Russian Imperial Navy, enjoying quite respectable careers. For example, Anton Pavlovich Alexiano rose to the rank of vice admiral, and Marko Ivanovich Voynovich, having entered Russian service as a midshipman, even rose to full admiral and managed to command the Black Sea Fleet, although this experience was quite unsuccessful.
The second group of Greek corsairs were ships that came into contact with the Russian squadron and expressed a desire to become Russian privateers. Their commanders remained completely independent and did not report to Count A.G. Orlov or our admirals. They simply engaged in corsair activities under the Russian flag—and not always, raising it only when they needed to. Such privateers operated at their own risk; their crews received neither rank nor pay, but they could count on Russian assistance in the form of provisions, ammunition, and, in some cases, even money.
For their part, such privateers were obliged to share their spoils and often brought captured ships to Count A. G. Orlov, thereby bolstering his squadron. In fact, this is how the frigate Santorini joined the ranks of the 1st Archipelago Expedition, along with the frigate Arkhipelag, Delos, Zeya, Milo, Naksia, Tino, Andro, Mikono, and Minerva.
And finally, the third group of Greek corsairs included those who might never have laid eyes on a single Russian ship in the Archipelago. But they were certainly aware of the Russian presence and weren't shy about raising the St. Andrew's flag when attacking any Turk. Most of these corsairs never raised the Russian flag at all, simply pirating for pleasure.
But not just the Greeks... In the Eastern Mediterranean, there were commanders from other nations willing to wage corsair war against the Turks. For example, a certain "Cavalier of Malta," Count Masini, pursued this noble cause at his own expense, and was so successful that he was promoted by Empress Catherine II to the rank of rear admiral "in addition to the rank." After the war, he was offered further service, transferring to Kronstadt, but Masini declined, receiving an honorable discharge and a lifetime pension.
In other words, Count A. G. Orlov certainly repeatedly dispatched the forces entrusted to his command on various raids and cruising expeditions, but the effectiveness of the Russian fleet against the Turks should not be judged solely by its actions. Before the Russians arrived in the Archipelago, the Ottomans, albeit poorly, still fought the pirates to protect their shipping. Then, when their fleet was defeated and destroyed at Chesma, they naturally had no time for this, while the Greeks, on the contrary, never missed an opportunity to plunder the hated Turks.
The appearance of a Russian squadron in the Aegean Sea, the defeat of the Turkish fleet, and the "Archipelago Governorate," which acted both as a base and as a buyer of expropriated assets—all of this, of course, significantly increased the Greek influence on Turkish maritime communications. To appreciate the scale of Greek involvement, it should be remembered that the Russian Empire, with four squadrons (the fifth arrived after the war), sent less than 50 ships and transport vessels to the Archipelago, while the number of Greek corsairs, according to some estimates, reached as many as 500.
Turkish counteraction
The Ottomans, of course, could not accept the Russian squadron's dominance in the Archipelago, but after Chesma, they had few resources left to resist. Nevertheless, Count A.G. Orlov managed to learn that the Turks were preparing to take revenge.
A truce was established between the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire in March 1772. Catherine II believed that as a result of the Russian victories achieved on land and at sea weapons He would be able to extract the most important thing from Istanbul—recognition of Crimea's independence, after which, of course, Crimea would very quickly become Russian. However, the Turks did not yet feel so defeated as to surrender Crimea, which is why hostilities resumed in 1773.
However, in 1772, under cover of a truce, the Turks planned a surprise attack to destroy the Russian fleet and seize its base on Paros. To this end, they prepared the following forces:
1. Ships stationed in the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus, including a certain special Algerian squadron;
2. The Tunisian squadron (also known as the Barbary squadron), according to E. V. Tarle, consisted of 6 30-gun frigates and the same number of xebecs with 3000 soldiers on them;
3. And finally, perhaps the most important asset in this scenario—the Dulcinio squadron, named for its location—the Albanian port of Dulcinio on the Adriatic. This squadron, according to our data, included up to 47 armed ships (no larger than frigates) and had a landing force of 8000 soldiers. It was assumed that this squadron, upon setting out to sea, would pick up another 4000 soldiers from the garrisons of the Morea.
Count A. G. Orlov, in any case, would not have allowed this, but his commanders, M. T. Konyaev and A. P. Alexiano, distinguished themselves here. I've already written about Alexiano above. As for Mikhail Timofeevich Konyaev, he arrived in the Archipelago as commander of one of the battleships of the Fourth Baltic Squadron. Once there, he assumed command of a small detachment, the backbone of which consisted of two battleships.
Having received news from Count A. G. Orlov, both brave commanders did not wait for further orders and set out in search of the enemy. A. P. Alexiano, with only the frigate "Saint Paul" and one pole-ship at his disposal, was the first to reach the Ottomans. He discovered a Turkish detachment near the Egyptian fortress of Damietta and attacked it on October 21, 1772. The Turks prepared for battle, but again, not at sea, but at anchor, allowing the pole-ship to capture a small merchant vessel moored nearby. Alexiano, in his frigate, positioned himself between two large Turkish ships and fought for two hours, ultimately destroying both, while the pole-ship captured several more small vessels.
J. F. Hackert. "Battle of the Russian Fleet with the Turkish Fleet at the Fortress of Damietta"
A. P. Alexiano then stood out of range of the Turkish fortress guns and waited to see if anyone else would appear, lowering the Russian flag just in case. The following day, October 22, 1772, a Turkish ship was spotted approaching the fortress. A. P. Alexiano waited until it came very close, then, raising his flag, opened fire. The Turkish commander was so shocked by this unexpected turn of events that he immediately surrendered. Selim Bey, who was supposed to take command of the squadron, was on board the ship. "with the three chief agas, various other officers and servants, of whom there were 120 Turks left in all", as well as a large number of weapons.
Selim Bey's ship departed from Alexandria, and, according to Count A. G. Orlov, the Alexandria commandant, upon hearing of the detachment's defeat at Damietta, was terribly afraid of the arrival of the Russian squadron. He therefore burned the ships moored in the Alexandria harbor and used all their troops to defend the fortress and port. Thus, the threat to Paros from that direction was completely averted.
Almost simultaneously, just a few days later, M. T. Konyaev's detachment discovered the main force of the Dulciniot squadron off Patras. Konyaev had two ships of the line at his disposal—the 74-gun Chesma and the 66-gun Graf Orlov—two frigates "newly acquired" from the Greeks—the 26-gun Svyatoy Nikolay and the 16-gun Slava—as well as one 18-gun xebec, the Zabiyaka, and two 12-gun poles—the Auza and the Modon. According to our data, the Turks had nine 30-gun frigates and 16 xebecs.
M. T. Konyaev entered the battle on October 26, 1772, and it soon became clear that his squadron maneuvered far better than the Ottomans. He managed to cut off one frigate and two xebecs from the main Turkish force, which were destroyed, but the main Ottoman squadron fled into the Gulf of Lepanto. The following day, the wind was unfavorable for a resumption of the battle, but on October 28, Konyaev bravely attacked the enemy, defended by the fortresses of Lepanto and Patras. The victor of the battle was determined that same day, and by October 29, Konyaev was essentially finishing off the Turkish squadron, which had been almost completely destroyed.
After these events, the war continued for another year and eight months, but the Turks were so intimidated that they did not even plan any significant attacks on the Russian fleet in the Archipelago - the latter, however, did everything it wanted and considered necessary until the very end of the war.
Well, it only remains for me to consider the political consequences of the 1st Archipelago Expedition and its influence on the general course of the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774.
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