Where did the enemy tanks go? On the cost of the Red Army General Staff's analytical work on the eve of the war.
End. Start here: Where Did the Tanks Go? The Price of Analytical Errors on the Eve of War
From data mining to data analysis
Indicative in this regard is the report of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, B. M. Shaposhnikov, to the People's Commissar of Defense, K. E. Voroshilov, on the most likely enemies of the USSR, dated March 24, 1938. The report appeared between the Anschluss of Austria by Nazi Germany (March 13) and the plebiscite of April 10, its legal consolidation.
In his assessment of the strength of the USSR's potential adversaries, Shaposhnikov includes five Finnish divisions, four Latvian, and ten Estonian brigades as forces of significant importance on the western border. However, he remains silent about the approximately six and a half Austrian divisions (some of which were understrength). Meanwhile, in March and April 1938, it was still completely unclear what would happen to the Austrian forces. Whether they would be integrated into the Wehrmacht entirely or reformed, whether they would remain in their original positions or be redeployed, what would happen to the officer corps, and how long it would take to bring them up to German standards.
There are no references to this detail in the note. It's tempting to date the author's awareness from this omission. Had the note been dated early March, it's clear that the Austrian addition to the Wehrmacht had not yet been established; had it been dated late April, Germany's potential had already been taken into account, even with the Austrians. However, the argument is subtle, and the conclusion shouldn't be made stronger than the premise. The lack of mention could be explained more simply: Shaposhnikov may not have considered these units combat-ready at that time.
Enemy tanks: numbers and reality
In March 1938, Shaposhnikov estimated tank the potential of a potential enemy is as follows:
- In total, Germany and Poland had 7250 tanks and tankettes, of which 6400 were against the USSR;
- Polish component - 1450 (1300 in the East);
- German component - 5800 (5100 in the East).
The text of the report is available at the link: A note from the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to the USSR People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union K.E. Voroshilov, on the most likely enemies of the USSR. March 24, 1938.
Here it is important to distinguish between two concepts that are mixed up in the note itself: assessment of the enemy's full potential и a group actually deployed against the USSRIn both 1938 and June 22, 1941, the Wehrmacht deployed significantly fewer tanks against the USSR than predicted. Approximately 800 units were captured Czech tanks, which the Soviet General Staff hadn't considered part of Germany's potential before the Sudetenland Crisis. In fact, the captured tanks weren't even completed tanks, but rather technology and established production. If we compare the predicted figure for 1938 with the actual deployment in 1941 (which are different entities and have different dates), the German component of the forecast turns out to be overestimated by more than half.
The principle of "better to overestimate the enemy's strength than your own" was a common international practice during the interwar period: both the French and British General Staffs were guilty of overestimating their forces. The question is different. What resources were other areas of defense missing due to the concentration of funding on specific areas of tank production—training drivers and tank commanders, producing tankers, and producing ammunition?
A telling example involves radio communications, which concerns not enemy assessments but rather priorities within the production itself. The production of radio-equipped T-26 tanks at Voroshilov Plant No. 174 looked like this:
- 1933 — 152;
- 1934 — 467;
- 1935 — 492;
- 1936 — 545;
- 1937 — 204 (decline due to repressions at the plant, problems with the armor of the Izhora plant and the transition to a conical turret);
- 1938 — 355;
- 1939 — 700;
- 1940 - 813.
At the same time, radio-equipped tanks accounted for only slightly more than a third of the total production of single-turret T-26s. Not every platoon of new T-26s had more than one tank equipped with a radio and antenna. The important thing was that the tank could drive and fire; crew coordination was secondary.
A marching column of Polish light tanks Vickers Mark E type B (single-turret) and A (twin-turret, in the background) on parade at a training ground during pre-war exercises.
Where did the Polish "fifteen hundred" come from?
Perhaps the information on Polish armored vehicles was more accurate? Within foreign intelligence, the Polish sector was the only one assigned to a separate "national" sector, meaning it was assigned to a specific country rather than a specific function. However, the information was inaccurate. By September 1, 1939, the Polish tank fleet consisted of:
- 38 British Vickers;
- about 132 of our own 7TPs, some of which were produced after Shaposhnikov’s report;
- about 102 French Renault FT-17s from the First World War (some of them training or used as obstacles).
The Poles did indeed possess several hundred TK-3 and TKS tankettes. But where does the figure of 1450 come from? It comes from adding almost 600 tankettes, old armored cars (wz.28, wz.29, wz.34), and training vehicles to the actual tanks (including the French R-35s (approximately 49-53 vehicles), and a total of about 310-320).
In other words, the planning was based not on an estimate of a full-fledged tank fleet, but on a gross figure of "all armored vehicles," which obscures the true combat value of the Polish forces. This indicates either an error in the calculation methodology or an uncritical use of inflated intelligence data, which, apparently, had not been revised for several years. At the turn of 1937–1938, Soviet intelligence services were more preoccupied with other matters: the kidnapping of the White émigré General E. Miller and the liquidation of defectors and the leader of Ukrainian nationalists, E. Konovalets, abroad.
A 7TP light tank with a 37mm gun captured by the Wehrmacht during the Polish campaign.
General Staff analysis: the cart is before the horse
The General Staff's own analytical work deserves special attention, regardless of intelligence information. The memorandum was preceded by a plan for the development of the Red Army for the third five-year plan, submitted to Stalin in November 1937 and jointly signed by Voroshilov and Shaposhnikov. The order of events is noteworthy. The Red Army leadership first outlined the areas for upgrading the army and outlined the tasks of the military-industrial complex, including the tank industry. Only several months later did it begin assessing the potential of the potential adversaries against whom these measures would be directed. The cart had gotten before the horse.
Formally, this arrangement wasn't an anomaly for the 1930s: military planning at that time was often iterative and based primarily on the internal capabilities of industry. But in this case, the problem lay elsewhere. When Voroshilov presented the plan to Stalin, he didn't yet know the specific "goals" for which it was intended, and so there was nothing to compare the scale of the rearmament to.
Among the armored vehicle development measures, the People's Commissar and the head of the General Staff planned to form nine heavy tank brigades of the General Command Reserve, using multi-turreted T-28 or T-35 tanks, by 1942, replacing the four existing ones. According to the organization chart, each brigade was to have either 94 T-35s or 136 T-28s.
Meanwhile, during the previous five-year plan, by the end of 1937, the tank industry had produced 44 T-35s and approximately 270 T-28s. In 1937, their production fell by half: factories were halfway behind plan and were also wasting resources on repairing previously produced vehicles. This equipment was sufficient for less than 2,5 heavy brigades, and the shortage of existing units was approximately 40%. By May 1940, when Voroshilov handed over his post to Timoshenko, the number of heavy brigades had not increased, only the manning of the existing ones.
Did Voroshilov and Shaposhnikov (by then, Khalepsky, Tukhachevsky, and Eideman were all dead) understand that industry wouldn't be able to fulfill these plans without ceasing production of other models, like the T-26? And why so many old tanks in such a short time, if already in March 1938, Shaposhnikov assessed the Soviet advantage in tanks as "unconditional"?
A Soviet T-35 tank abandoned due to a malfunction in the village of Ozhydiv, Busk district, Lviv region.
Quality vs. Quantity
The latter conclusion, reached in 1938, two years before the T-34's appearance, could be disputed, at least in terms of quality. On the battlefield, Soviet tankers only truly appreciated the potential of the machine-gun-equipped Pz.Kpfw.I, which they encountered in Spain—the very same one that Guderian characterized as a training vehicle and never intended for combat use. Development of the Pz.Kpfw.III and Pz.Kpfw.IV had begun shortly before, and the BT-7 and T-28 were nominally not significantly inferior to early German tanks in armament and mobility.
What Soviet analysts failed to take into account, given their data on the "Three" and "Four" tanks (which intelligence had been using as early as 1935), was perhaps the most important thing. The German models had a huge potential for modernization, allowing them to become the Wehrmacht's most widely produced tanks. The similar potential of the BT and T-28, not to mention the T-26 and T-35, was virtually exhausted by 1938.
Two years later, the USSR officially acquired the Pz.Kpfw.III from Germany. The Germans, even as they prepared for an attack, sold it to their potential enemy without apparent regret. This was one of the last "troikas" still armed with a short-barreled 50mm gun, less advanced than the later Pz.IIIs with long-barreled L/42 = KwK 38, L/60 = KwK 39, which would attack the Soviet border a year later. The Soviet leadership clearly underestimated the rapid improvement of enemy vehicles. Against this backdrop, the production of hundreds of T-28s in 1938–1940 appears unpromising, and the many thousands of T-26s (production at Leningrad factories peaked in 1940, already with the T-34 and KV) appear strategically questionable.
To be fair, there were objective reasons for continuing production of the T-26 and T-28: established production capacity, trained personnel, and the need to have at least some equipment before mass-producing the T-34 and KV tanks. The problem was not only the inflated enemy data but also the inertia of well-established production. Nevertheless, relying on mass production of obsolete models proved costly in 1941.
KV-1 heavy tanks pass through Pushkin Square in Moscow after a military parade, heading to the front.
From 1938 to 1940: the same pattern
A logical question arises: how could officials who underestimated the capabilities of their own tank industry make reliable forecasts of enemy forces? The documents signed by Shaposhnikov are not the only example.
In September 1940, a report similar to the March 1938 one was written to Stalin by People's Commissar of Defense S. Timoshenko, who replaced Voroshilov after the Finnish campaign, and the new Chief of the General Staff, K. Meretskov. The figure of 10,000 German tanks, announced at the end of 1940, was also exaggerated by almost three times. According to the author, this figure is calculated by adding hypothetical captured Czech, Polish, and French tanks, as well as domestic German production over the previous two and a half years, to the 5800 units from the 1938 report. This is a reconstruction, not an established fact: it seems the analysts were working from a well-worn template.
What's inexplicable is something else. Having assessed the Hungarian and Romanian tanks, Timoshenko and Meretskov left the Finnish tanks in the "tanks" column blank. They count Hungarian, Romanian, and Finnish divisions, specifically 250 Romanian and 300 Hungarian tanks. The estimate of Finnish potential, compared to 1938, has increased from 5 to 15-18 divisions, yet the "tanks" column remains blank.
Meanwhile, as early as 1941, up to a hundred Finnish tanks would attack the Soviet border from Finland. And these vehicles weren't purchased from the Swedes or Germans. They were refurbished captured Soviet T-26, T-28, T-37, and T-38 tanks, as well as a smaller number of previously purchased Vickers tanks with turrets and guns from captured Soviet donor tanks.
Finnish tanks: a figure that could be calculated
What did Timoshenko need to avoid leaving a blank in the "Finnish tanks" column? Neither modern hindsight nor even intelligence assistance. To assess Finland's armored potential, two steps were sufficient: counting its own tank losses in the recent conflict and subtracting the vehicles evacuated to the rear and the wrecks accounted for in liberated territory. The remainder is a figure close to the actual force.
Let's be clear: the computability of the data doesn't necessarily mean the General Staff had a streamlined procedure for such recalculation at the right moment. Still, the arithmetic was manageable. In 1939–1940, Finnish repair shops (Panssarikeskuskorjaamo in Varkaus) received up to 130 units of damaged Soviet equipment. Eighty-six of these, after repairs and "cannibalization" (assembling a single serviceable vehicle from several damaged ones), replenished Finnish units, while the rest became spare parts donors. This is not a figure that can be dismissed as insignificant: Timoshenko estimates Romanian and Hungarian tanks to be multiples of fifty, meaning anything over fifty is significant for him. Essentially, the Finnish campaign turned into an operation for the USSR to arm a small neighboring country on the eve of the main battle.
This raises another question. Why didn't the Red Army leadership insist on including a separate clause in the Moscow Peace Treaty of 1940 requiring the Finnish side to return captured Soviet equipment, just as prisoners of war were returned? Or at least document the locations of the lost vehicles through bilateral commissions, with photographs? This equipment required the labor of thousands of Soviet workers.
Finnish tank crews pose for a photo on the armor of a captured T-28 tank.
Hanko: Tanks with nowhere to advance
Another "tank" illustration of the Soviet Union's attitude toward resources. Following the Finnish campaign, the USSR leased the Hanko Peninsula and established a naval base there. Its main objective was to control the passage to the Gulf of Finland, which was over 70 kilometers wide. After Finland was defeated again in 1944, the base was moved from Hanko to Porkkala, almost 100 kilometers closer to Leningrad and Helsinki, where the gulf was 20 kilometers narrower. This indirectly acknowledged the less-than-ideal initial choice.
In 1941, the base included a separate tank battalion attached to the 8th Separate Rifle Brigade of Colonel N.P. Simonyak, with approximately 47 serviceable vehicles as of June 1941. These were primarily light T-26 tanks (including radio-equipped and twin-turreted tanks), several amphibious T-37A/T-38 tanks, and armored cars. This is comparable to the entire actual Finnish tank force of 1941 and certainly greater than the zero estimated by Timoshenko.
Tanks were of no use in controlling the entrance to the bay, except during the coldest winters on thick ice. They were also a mediocre means of land defense: no better than a 45mm anti-tank gun, which, while performing a comparable firepower, weighs much less (the T-26 weighs about 10 tons versus the gun's half-ton). The tanks' standard role was to support infantry in an offensive. But the 2,3-kilometer width of the isthmus severely limited their offensive maneuverability on Hanko. The battalion's deployment also had a justifying rationale: an isolated base needed mobile fire support in the event of an amphibious landing, and tanks could have been conceived as precisely that. Yet, the purpose of amphibious reconnaissance tanks remains unclear. Regardless, the equipment took up space in hangars, time in workshops, and tonnage on the Baltic Fleet's transport vessels. During the evacuation in the autumn of 1941, 26 vehicles were taken back to Kronstadt and Leningrad, probably along with ammunition and fuel.
Finnish tank crews service captured Soviet HT-133 and T-26 tanks.
Where did the enemy tanks go?
The question posed in the title didn't remain unanswered for long. The Sovinformburo's summary of the two months of war was prepared on the evening of August 22, 1941, and on August 23, it was published in major newspapers—Pravda, Izvestia, and Krasnaya Zvezda. Refuting German propaganda about Soviet losses, the summary stated:
“German propaganda cites such fantastic figures for our losses: 14,000 tanks, 14,000 guns... In fact, in two months of war... the German fascist troops lost more than 8000 tanks, about 10,000 guns and over 7200 aircraft.”
Eight thousand German tanks—twice as many as crossed the Soviet border in June. On June 22, 1941, the entire Wehrmacht, including reserves and tanks in Europe, had approximately 5200–5600 vehicles, including light Pz.I and Pz.II tanks. The loss figure, therefore, was purely propaganda.
Wartime propaganda exaggerations and peacetime analytical miscalculations are phenomena of different natures: the former is intentional, the latter is not. But they share one thing: the ease with which the system operates on unverifiable large numbers without encountering internal resistance. After all, the USSR had a favorable starting point: about a two-year head start from the development of Carden-Lloyd technology, and an even longer one from the start of mass tank production. This head start was unencumbered by the pacifist restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles and was fueled by the transfer of resources, including from agriculture. And yet, by the end of 1939, the country found itself playing catch-up. The breakthrough in Soviet tank production came on the very eve of the "war of motors," when there was almost no time left to catch up.
What was systemic and what was opportunistic
Here it is worth separating the two layers. System problem — the lack of well-established procedures for verifying intelligence data and comparing it with actual capabilities: inflated figures were included in planning and were not revised for years. The conjuncture component — the personnel situation of the late 1930s and the inertia of the well-established production of obsolete models, which prevented a shift to new ones.
At the same time, the emphasis on mass production during the war also played a positive role. A proper methodology is crucial here: a head-to-head comparison of "50 T-34s versus 15 German medium tanks" is inaccurate, as it confuses different periods and classes of vehicles. Comparing the entire class of medium vehicles—tanks plus self-propelled guns produced between 1941 and 1945—reveals a different picture:
- USSR: T-34-76, T-34-85, SU-85, SU-100, SU-122 - about 64 thousand units;
- Germany: Pz.III, Pz.IV, StuG III/IV, Panthers, Jagdpanzer – about 37 thousand on all fronts.
There was real superiority, but it was achieved at a high price. Against this backdrop, preparation for war can hardly be considered a strength of Soviet leadership: the head start the country had gained in the interwar period had been largely squandered by 1941.
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