British submarines in the 1982 Falklands conflict. The sinking of the cruiser General Belgrano.
CL-46 Phoenix at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, with burning ships in the background.
Of particular interest to us is the ARA General Belgrano. This Brooklyn-class light cruiser was built in 1938 at an American shipyard and commissioned into the US Navy as the CL-46 Phoenix. The ship actively participated in the Pacific Ocean campaign against Japan, and in 1951, under the military aid program, was sold to Argentina for $7,8 million. Since 1969, the cruiser has served as the flagship of the Argentine Navy. fleet.
Main performance characteristics of the cruiser ARA General Belgrano (1982)
Full displacement, t — 12
Maximum length, m - 185,4
Width is the greatest, m - 18,8
Draft at full displacement, m - approx. 6,5
GTZA power: 4 x 25,000 hp.
Speed, knots - 32,5
Fuel capacity, t — 2200
Cruising range (15 knots) - 7800
Crew: 1138 (on May 2, 1982, there were 1093 people on board, including three civilians)
Reservations, mm:
side belt - 127
deck - 44,5-51,0
barbettes of the main caliber turrets - 152
main caliber turrets: 165 - front, 51 - roof, 76-38 - sides
conning tower - 127
weaponry artillery:
5 × 3 - 152 mm / 47
8 × 1 - 127 mm / 25
14 x 2 - 40 mm
8 x 2 - 20 mm
weaponry rocket:
2 x 4 — Sea Cat air defense missile systems
weaponry aviation:
2 Aérospatiale Alouette-III helicopters.
As we can see, the General Belgrano was by no means a “toothless old ship that posed no threat to the British task force,” as many media outlets and all sorts of political and military “experts” like to portray it, but it posed a real threat.
Its artillery firepower exceeded that of the British combined. A pair of its 152mm shells could, with great certainty, sink any of the Type 21 or 22 frigates, built to cost-cutting standards and characterized by extremely low survivability, as was later demonstrated by Argentine aircraft. The cruiser's armor made it possible to significantly resist Exocet missiles or small-caliber bombs, which the British Sea Harriers could use, while its weapons Defense They were highly likely to repel attacks by British aircraft. The only real threat to the ship was submarine torpedoes, which was further exacerbated by the lack of structural anti-torpedo protection on the Brooklyn-class cruisers.
ARA General Belgrano
ARA General Belgrano, helicopters visible at the stern
One of the main caliber turrets of the ARA General Belgrano
Sea Cat air defense missile system
On the night of April 30, HMS Conqueror's sonar detected propeller noises approximately 100 miles off Isla de los Estados (Staten Island), presumably from the cruiser General Belgrano and two destroyers (the ARA Piedra Buena and ARA Bouchard). Approaching and waiting until dawn, the submarine's commander visually confirmed the correct identification. At the time, the cruiser was receiving fuel from the tanker Puerto Rosales. While bunkering, an air raid alarm was sounded, the hoses were disconnected, and the cruiser prepared to repel an air attack. However, the alarm turned out to be false—it was an Argentine aircraft whose IFF system had failed. The Argentine ships were located approximately 40 miles southwest of the TEZ.
HMS Conqueror was commissioned into the Royal Navy in 1971 and belonged to the Churchill-class submarine.
HMS Conqueror
HMS Conqueror emblem
Main performance characteristics of the submarine HMS Conqueror
Surface/submerged displacement, t — 4900/5400
Maximum length, m - 86,9
Width, m — 10,1
Draft, m - 8,2
Power point:
1 Rolls-Royce PWR nuclear reactor
GTZA - 1 x 20,000 hp.
Underwater speed, knots - 28
Torpedo armament:
6 x 533 mm TA
Mk8 Mod 4 and Mk24 Tigerfish torpedoes
Electronic weapons:
Kelvin Type 1008 radar
GAS Type 2020 and Type 2026
Crew, pers. - 103.
Main performance characteristics of British submarine torpedoes (Falklands conflict)
British torpedoes
On the morning of May 2, at a meeting of the British War Cabinet, after a heated debate, ministers unanimously decided to sink the Argentine cruiser. Britain was thus making clear that it was prepared to resort to the most drastic measures to regain its territory.
Opponents of this decision claimed that the General Belgrano posed no threat to British forces and that its sinking was completely unprovoked. It was only in December 2003 that the media first reported that Margaret Thatcher had received information from GCHQ, the secret radio interception center in Cheltenham, that the commander of Task Force 79.3 had received orders to attack British forces on May 1.
At this time, Argentine Task Force 79.3 was approaching the southern boundary of the TEZ, where the shallow Burdwood Bank lay, which would have hampered the British submarine's operations. Therefore, the Conqueror's commander decided to attack the cruiser before it could enter the shallows.
Commanding Officer of HMS Conqueror Christopher Louis Wreford-Brown
However, at 05:30 on May 2, the commander of the ARA General Belgrano (as well as Task Force 79.3) received orders to reverse course and proceed to the holding area off Isla de los Estados. According to one theory, this was because the aircraft carrier 25 de Mayo, the core of the northern part of the pincer movement—Task Force 79.1—had experienced engine problems and was forced to return to base.
On May 2 at 15:13 (local time), the commanding officer of HMS Conqueror makes the following entry in the logbook:
In position 55 23.1S 61 21.0W. I am on the port quarter of TG 79.3 and my target, the Cruiser G BELGRANO, is on the left wing. My intention is to close to a position such that I can fire a salvo of 3 x Mk 8 Mod 4's from 1800 yards on a Torpedo Track Angle of 100° and a zero gyro angle. I shall then evade to the SE leaving the datum between me and the destroyers for as long as possible to assist my escape.
(I am positioned at 55 23.1S 61 21.0W. I am in the port quarter of TG 79.3 and my target, the cruiser G BELGRANO, is on her port wing. I intend to close and fire a salvo of three Mk8 Mod4 torpedoes from 1800 yards.... I will then begin an evasive action to the SE, trying to maintain maximum separation from the destroyers to facilitate my escape.)
(I am positioned at 55 23.1S 61 21.0W. I am in the port quarter of TG 79.3 and my target, the cruiser G BELGRANO, is on her port wing. I intend to close and fire a salvo of three Mk8 Mod4 torpedoes from 1800 yards.... I will then begin an evasive action to the SE, trying to maintain maximum separation from the destroyers to facilitate my escape.)
15:51. The Conqueror rises to periscope depth and spots the General Belgrano, sailing at 11 knots on a course of 290°, within torpedo range. The commander orders torpedo tubes 1, 2, and 6, loaded with Mk8 torpedoes (the others are Mk24 Tigerfish), to be prepared for firing.
15:54. Control observation through the periscope.
15:57. The submarine fires a three-torpedo salvo at 3-second intervals from a range of 1400 yards (1280 meters). The cruiser's coordinates are 55°24′S, 61°32′W.
The first torpedo missed the cruiser, struck the destroyer ARA Bouchard glancingly, but failed to detonate. The second exploded in the cruiser's bow between frames 12 and 15, near the chain locker, 6 meters below the waterline. The explosion tore off 15-20 meters of the bow, but there were no casualties.
The consequences of the third torpedo's explosion, which occurred under the keel near the bulkhead separating the aft engine room from the living and public spaces, as well as various storage areas (frame 106, located 60 meters from the stern and 120 meters from the bow), were catastrophic. A 20-meter-long hole was created, and damage affected five decks above, including two armored decks.
As a result, the ship lost power and was unable to move. According to Argentine estimates, the torpedo killed 274 people, including two civilians.
Just five minutes after the torpedoes hit, the ship had a 15-degree list to port. Power was lost, internal communications were almost completely disabled, and orientation was hampered by heavy smoke in the compartments. Deeming the fight for survival futile, the commander gave the order to abandon ship at 16:24. At 17:01, the General Belgrano sank at coordinates 54°24' S; 61°32' W.
The cruiser had 72 life rafts, 62 of which could accommodate the entire crew, while the rest were spares. By 16:40 PM, the surviving crew members had abandoned ship in an orderly manner and boarded the life rafts. The last to leave were Commander Hector Elias Bonso and the petty officer accompanying him. By this time, the list had already reached 50 degrees.
30-year-old Lieutenant Martin Sgut, having taken command of one of the life rafts and launched it with 11 crew members, managed to take a series of photographs of the last minutes of the cruiser’s demise.
The final minutes of ARA General Belgrano
The wind soon increased to 60 km/h, wave heights reached 4 meters, and the seawater and air temperature was only 3 degrees Celsius, leading to the deaths of some sailors due to hypothermia. During the night, wind speeds reached 100 km/h, scattering the rafts over a wide area, greatly complicating their search.
The escort destroyers did not bother rescuing the cruiser's crew (according to the official version, "they lost contact with the cruiser in heavy fog") and, having dropped several depth charges at random, quickly went west, probably fearing a submarine attack.
ARA Piedra Buena
Only 28 hours after the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano did Argentine aircraft spot the first rafts, and ships were dispatched to help. The destroyers ARA Piedra Buena and ARA Bouchard, the corvette ARA Gurruchaga, and the hospital ship ARA Bahía Paraíso participated in the rescue operation. They recovered 793 people, 23 of whom were dead.
The General Belgrano's raft alongside the rescue ship
Of the 1093 people on board the ARA General Belgrano, 323 died.
Monument in memory of the Argentines who died fighting for the Islas Malvinas (Falkland Islands). Plaza San Martín, Buenos Aires
What caused the cruiser's demise, and so quickly? In my opinion, it was primarily the traditional carelessness of Latin Americans (I'm not talking about Cubans—God forbid), and considering that a significant portion of Argentines are of Italian descent, that number can easily be doubled.
The commander of Task Force 79.3, Héctor Elias Bonso, clearly ignored the underwater threat, even though the presence of British submarines in the area had already been widely publicized worldwide. Bonso believed that the primary threat was British Sea Harrier aircraft, so he kept his anti-aircraft defenses on alert, but took no active anti-submarine defense measures. After Task Force 79.3 departed the Sea Harriers' range at 10:00 a.m. on May 2, the ships' combat readiness was reduced to "3X." This also meant that most of the watertight doors, hatches, and hatches were exposed, which fatally compromised the ship's buoyancy and fire protection.
It is completely unclear whether the escort destroyers were conducting hydroacoustic surveillance if the Conqueror maneuvered completely unhindered, periodically surfacing under the periscope, less than a mile from the cruiser!
Undoubtedly, the fact that 30% of the cruiser’s personnel were 18-19 year-old conscripts going to sea for the first time also played a certain negative role.
The sinking of the Argentine cruiser outside the TEZ sparked much debate about its legality, to the point that the Argentines demanded it be recognized as a war crime. However, in 1994, the Argentine Ministry of Defense recognized the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano as a "legitimate military act," and its former commander, Héctor Bonso, made a similar statement.
The sinking of the ARA General Belgrano dealt a serious psychological blow to the Argentine military and political leadership. From that moment on, the Armada de Republica's large warships never left the 12-mile limit of their territorial waters.
The submarine Splendide continued patrolling the Argentine border for some time in the hope of catching the elusive aircraft carrier 25 de Mayo, but it did not risk going out to sea.
The submarine's crew soon faced a serious test. Technical problems arose, requiring the nuclear reactor to be shut down and power supplied by the emergency diesel generator. Repairs took eight days, and during the nuclear reactor's initialization, a severe storm struck, rendering the diesel generator's operation impossible. The initialization was continued using batteries, which were almost completely discharged by the time the reactor reached operating mode.
The Conqueror also had its share of troubles. While still off South Georgia, the retractable radio antenna was damaged. In a severe storm, the sub was forced to surface to repair the malfunction, risking lives. The radio problems didn't end there. All three towed radio antennas on board failed. On May 21, one of them became entangled in the propeller, limiting the sub's speed to 7 knots. A storm raging on the surface prevented the diver from lowering the antenna. Only two days later did the weather clear the propeller, and the diver cleared it.
Subsequently, due to the lack of surface targets, British submarines served as forward patrols. Positioned off the Argentine coast along enemy air routes to the Falklands, they used electronic and visual surveillance to provide early warning of air raids.
Here, the submarine Spartan found itself in an interesting situation: it became entangled in a huge cluster of giant kelp, which it was only able to free by repeatedly changing its diving depth. How different it sounds from "Island of Lost Ships" by the famous science fiction writer Belyaev!
HMS Conqueror returns to her home base under the Jolly Roger, a symbol of victory.
Because the diesel submarine HMS Onyx couldn't travel as fast as its nuclear-powered sisters, it arrived in the Falkland Islands area only on May 31 (or, according to other sources, May 28). Its first mission was Operation Kettledrum. The submarine was to land a group of six SBS troops on the Argentine coast near the Puerto Deseado airbase, from which Super Etendard aircraft armed with Exocet anti-ship missiles were believed to be operating. After reaching shore in a Gemini inflatable boat and carefully camouflaged, the special forces were to observe the airbase and, if possible, destroy the aircraft. After completing their mission, the troops would return to Onyx in their submarine. However, on June 3, the operation was cancelled.
SBS emblem
The target of Operation Kettledrum was the air base in Puerto Deseado (now defunct, shown on the map as Extinta Base Aeronaval Puerto Deseado).
A Super Etendard aircraft of the Argentine Navy
There is information about the Onyx's participation in another planned SAS sabotage operation against the Argentine airbase in Rio Grande, Tierra del Fuego. This is described, in particular, with reference to the participants, in the book by David Reynolds. Task Force: The Illustrated History of the Falklands War (Sutton Publishing Ltd, 2002).
According to the plan, two dozen SAS troops were to be transported by Onyx to the coast of Tierra del Fuego and then landed on the shore in Gemini rubber dinghies.
They were then to reach the Rio Grande and destroy the Exocets and Super Etendards with anti-tank missiles and explosive charges, and kill the pilots in their quarters.
The SAS conducted a rehearsal of the operation in San Carlos Water, on the west coast of East Falkland, supported by the Royal Marines SBS.
HMS Onyx in San Carlos Water
One of the participants recalled:
We were supposed to be dropped off at night a few miles from the shore and then taken to the shore in rubber inflatable boats. There was a lot of equipment and weaponsThe plan was worked out down to the last detail, and we were all confident we could carry it out... There was no plan to rescue us. We simply needed to get to Chile and contact our people there.
Fortunately, the Argentine garrison on the Falkland Islands surrendered before the operation took place. What the British didn't know was that the Argentines had reinforced security around the Rio Grande with three battalions of marines. An SAS attack would likely have ended in disaster.
HMS Onyx's primary roles were reconnaissance and beach landings for SBS and SAS units, aided by her small size and draught, which allowed her to operate in shallow water.
One such operation was the landing of an SBS group on Weddell Island, the third largest in the archipelago. The British suspected that an Argentine air traffic controller was operating there, directing air strikes. The first landing attempt ended in failure—the submarine, traveling at a depth of 46 meters, collided with an uncharted underwater rock. The breakwaters of two bow torpedo tubes were damaged, and a damaged torpedo remained in one of the tubes. Specialists, with great care, were able to retrieve it only after the submarine returned to base. The next attempt was postponed due to stormy weather, but when the SBS finally landed, no trace of the Argentines was found.
There's a story floating around the internet, including Wikipedia, that the Onyx was damaged not by a collision with a rock, but by an attack by an Argentine S-2E Tracker anti-submarine aircraft on May 5-6. But at that time, the submarine was still in the UK!
Onyx Commander Andrew P. Johnson at the periscope
RFA Sir Galahad after an Argentine air raid
After the end of hostilities, Onyx was involved in the sinking of the landing ship RFA Sir Galahad, which had been damaged by Argentine aircraft. Two Mk 24 Tigerfish torpedoes fired failed to detonate, forcing the navy to resort to the older, but reliable Mk 8. The submarine only returned home on August 18.
HMS Onyx returns to its home base. The dagger on its Jolly Roger signifies the boat's role supporting the SBS and SAS.
Sources of
1. Woodward S. One Hundred Days. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1997
2. Foster S. Hit The Beach. Cassel Military Classics, London, 1998
3. History of The Royal Navy in The 20th Century. Bison Books Ltd, London, 1987
4. Fighting Ships of The World. Hamlyn Publishing Group Ltd, 1980
5. The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of The World 1995. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1995
6. Barker N. Beyond Endurance. An Epic of Whitehall and the South Atlantic Conflict. Leo Cooper, Barnsley, 2002
7. Crucero General Belgrano. http://www.ara.mil.ar/malv_accbelicas_belgrano.asp
8. Reynolds, David. Task Force: The Illustrated History of the Falklands War. Sutton Publishing Ltd, 2002
9. Matías Bauso. Una explosión, silencio y caos: así se vivió desde adentro el hundimiento del Ara General Belgrano.
10. Malvinas 44 años: el hundimiento del ARA General Belgrano. Ministerio de Defensa. https://www.argentina.gob.ar/
11. JR Potts. HMS Conqueror (S48). www.MilitaryFactory.com
12. El hundimiento del Crucero ARA General Belgrano.
13. https://www.navalgazing.net/Submarines-in-the-Falklands-Part-1
14. https://www.navalgazing.net/Submarines-in-the-Falklands-Part-2
15. https://www.navalgazing.net/Submarines-in-the-Falklands-Part-3
16. Steven R. Harper. Submarine Operations During the Falklands War. Naval War College Newport, RI, 1994
17. Hastings M., Jenkins S. Battle of the Falklands. Moscow, 2014
18. Internet
Information