Application of Rayleigh scattering to detect low-flying targets by acoustic emission

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Application of Rayleigh scattering to detect low-flying targets by acoustic emission


Acoustic detection of low-flying UAVs based on existing fiber-optic lines.



The concept of the low-flying aircraft detection system is described below. drones, using existing optical fibers as a distributed network of acoustic sensors. The method is based on Rayleigh scattering of light in the fiber.

Rayleigh scattering is the coherent (elastic) scattering of light without changing its wavelength by particles, inhomogeneities, or other objects smaller than the wavelength of the incident light. When applied to fiber-optic cables (FOCs), Rayleigh scattering enables the detection of laser radiation scattered by tiny inhomogeneities in the fiber structure (microcracks, bubbles, compactions), as well as, through changes in the phase of the backscattered signal, the detection of fiber deformations caused by acoustic vibrations (including the movement of individual sections of the FOC). This essentially transforms the fiber into a distributed acoustic sensor—a continuous chain of "virtual microphones."

In the Russian Federation, optical fibers have been laid along overhead power lines (hereinafter referred to as OPL) and along railway tracks to provide departmental and backbone communications. This means that the infrastructure necessary for creating a low-flying UAV acoustic detection system has already been established. To transform the OPL into a chain of virtual microphones, continuous-wave reflectometers must be connected to the communication nodes. According to the author, this does not disrupt the operation of the communication systems (this requires independent verification: distributed acoustic systems typically operate over dedicated fiber). In some cases, upgrading the communication systems may be necessary; this has the side effect of increasing the bandwidth of data transmission channels, but the upgrade itself entails additional costs and time.

According to calculations, a fiber-optic cable installed along overhead power line supports is capable of detecting acoustic vibrations along the entire line's length at a distance of up to 50 km from the reflectometer's connection point (this characteristic has only been confirmed in laboratory conditions, see below). The reflectometer itself is located at the substation where the overhead power line terminates and can operate on multiple lines extending from the substation, covering a transmission line of up to 100 km. To cover an overhead power line longer than 50 km, two reflectometers must be connected at both ends of the line.

The optical fiber's sensitivity was confirmed in laboratory conditions. The specialized scientific organization that evaluated the system recommended testing it in real-world conditions. Furthermore, the experts raised two questions.

1. Line swing, which can affect the operation of the virtual microphone in the FOC. The approaching or receding sound source is determined by the Doppler effect—that is, by changes in the frequency of the detected radiation. According to the author, this effect has already been observed in practice using a recording of the sound of a flying UAV (the location, the type of fiber—laboratory or linear—and the recording provider are not specified in the source data). It is assumed that rotation of the fiber optic cable or its displacement within two to three meters does not significantly affect the quality of the measurements. It should be noted, however, that fiber optic sway itself generates a parasitic Doppler shift, which is added to the UAV's target signal, and reliable separation of these signals remains subject to field testing. It should also be taken into account that vibration dampers are suspended on overhead power lines, and significant sway of the cable requires wind. The wind thresholds for swaying the cable and preventing flight of a light UAV vary and depend on the type of vehicle—this requires separate assessment.

2. Intentional destruction of power lines. The very fact of such damage should draw attention to the protected perimeter section: the reflectometer will not only show the location of the damage (according to the author, with an accuracy of up to a meter), but will also retain detection capabilities at least to the nearest intact support tower. With a two-way connection (from both ends of the overhead line), complete monitoring of the section will be maintained, since damage to a single span will not provide the minimum distance to the nearest intact supports necessary for reliable sound attenuation (the specific value of this distance is not provided in the material).

As for attacks on substations, they are already subject to attack, and these facilities require dedicated protection. Moreover, the infrastructure for deploying additional detection equipment (radars, directional microphones, etc.) and interception systems can be established near the substation, given the availability of power, communications, and access roads.

The equipment, including reflectometers and communication systems, according to the author, is mass-produced by Russian enterprises (it is advisable to check the nomenclature separately).

The main advantage of the proposed system is its rapid deployment compared to installing individual microphones, thanks to the availability of existing infrastructure, especially in hard-to-reach areas lacking roads, power, or communications systems. There is also no need for construction work to install towers, and installing the reflectometers does not require taking the power lines offline.

The proposed system, of course, is not a universal solution. It is primarily a means of covering various hard-to-reach areas used by the enemy to bypass key nodes with a detection system. Defense, complementing and expanding the capabilities of existing air reconnaissance systems.
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  1. +2
    26 June 2026 04: 49
    An interesting idea, I remembered it from the distant past - “living creativity of the masses”!
    Have a nice day, everyone!!!
    1. 0
      27 June 2026 14: 10
      The last paragraph of the article once again proves the need for an INTEGRATED approach. That is, we need to combine radar, optical, and acoustic methods.
  2. +1
    26 June 2026 05: 13
    In general, the VOK costs pennies; if the design works, it can be specially stretched, duplicating it for reliability and combat stability.
    Also, the presence of two parallel "threads" stretched side by side will most likely allow for high-quality filtering of noise and interference.
    1. 0
      26 June 2026 08: 23
      A fiber optic cable on supports costs quite a bit, but you can stretch it specially.
      1. 0
        26 June 2026 09: 13
        Compared to full-fledged air defense radars, which simply do not exist, they are all occupied.
        1. +2
          26 June 2026 10: 13
          Radars have a drawback: a lower detection limit, or minimum detection altitude. For long-range radars, this limit is high enough for a UAV to fly beneath it. Radars with a minimum detection altitude have a short range or require high-altitude installation. These are the "loopholes" the Palantir people boasted about, telling the Ukrainians where to direct their farts.
          And compared to the SAM radar, the price tag for the VOK is indeed not high, but it cannot replace the radar, it can only fill gaps in the terrain.
  3. +5
    26 June 2026 05: 31
    As long as this and similar ideas are implemented by current managers... I don’t even want to think about it.
    1. +4
      26 June 2026 08: 23
      The problem is convincing managers to at least try.
      1. +1
        26 June 2026 18: 42
        Quote: uber
        The problem is convincing managers to at least try.

        Try contacting VO author Maxim Klimov (Mina). He's currently working on drones. Perhaps he can help you pitch your idea.
        If your idea works, it could seriously complicate the work of drones.
        1. 0
          29 June 2026 08: 18
          I know about Maxim Klimov, but I've already approached governors, and everyone says it's very difficult to organize. This is at the level of Rosaviatsiya, the government, and the Ministry of Defense. And perhaps if 992 out of 1000 are shot down, this system is unnecessary, since the problem isn't detection, but the number of combat-ready launchers and missiles.
  4. +5
    26 June 2026 06: 07
    Bistatic location based on cell towers was already being promoted as a panacea for covering the entire country with radar coverage at a low cost. Full-scale experiments with light and ultra-light aircraft were conducted, and serious guys earned degrees. Where is that "Rubezh" or "Barrier"? Where are those base stations equipped on an industrial scale?
    1. +2
      26 June 2026 07: 39
      There's a lack of political will. The task of retrofitting cell towers can be delegated to operators. The main thing is to prepare the equipment for installation on the towers. And a data collection and processing center is needed. But as far as I understand, there's still plenty to do...
    2. +2
      26 June 2026 08: 28
      The problem is that decisions about financial support are made at the personal level of a high-ranking official, and there:
      1. The decision maker simply doesn't have the time to figure things out, and often there's no one to assign to figure things out properly, or there's already an "ambush" with a charged body that will provide the necessary conclusion.
      2. The decision maker simply doesn't understand the topic, but is being pressured, so he begins to "roll" the topic to absolve himself of responsibility.
      3. The decision maker has a personal stake in "solving the issue." Of course, it couldn't be otherwise.
      Sometimes a hasty decision has already been made, and funding a parallel project, even if it's a hundred times better, is simply not going to happen. Rumor has it that the border has been covered in some kind of acoustic sensors, but so "smartly" that they can't determine the direction of movement or distinguish friend from foe. But this is all based on comments in the negotogram.
  5. +1
    26 June 2026 12: 04
    This technology has long been used to track submarine movements. Our Murmansk is probably entangled in such enemy underwater optical cables. It wouldn't be a bad idea for us to also entangle the Black Sea with such cables for early detection of UAVs. Although, judging by the decline in UAV attacks, I hope this has already been done.
    1. +1
      26 June 2026 14: 40
      And not just submarines, because everything is mass-produced, everything is domestic, but civilian. Laying cables out to sea isn't a problem either. I don't know if the navy is aware of it :)
      1. +1
        27 June 2026 00: 02
        There are also civil applications. For example, optics are lowered into a well along with production pipes to determine the depth and noise range of gas escaping from the formation.
        1. 0
          29 June 2026 08: 19
          There are many civilian applications. This system distinguishes the steps of a human from those of an ostrich.
  6. 0
    26 June 2026 12: 44
    scattering
    Is it just me who thinks that there is no such word in Russian?
    1. +2
      26 June 2026 13: 51
      Слово звучит противоестественно, однако: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A0%D1%8D%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%B5%D0%B2%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B5_%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B5%D1%8F%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5?ysclid=mqut85qe52169752450
      1. 0
        26 June 2026 14: 07
        Quote: uber
        but

        Aha
      2. +1
        26 June 2026 15: 33
        Live power lines themselves are a source of acoustic interference due to the potential for corona discharge. As a child, I walked under power lines many times and heard a rather loud crackling sound. Corona is being combated because it causes losses, but I don't know the current state of things.
        1. 0
          27 June 2026 11: 21
          Quote: Sensor
          Live power lines themselves are a source of acoustic interference due to the potential for corona discharge. As a child, I walked under power lines many times and heard a rather loud clicking sound.

          Interference can also occur due to wind resistance—when the wind "hums through the wires." I understand that this is now being addressed by installing vibration dampers, as the author rightly noted. The question is, won't these vibration dampers also suppress the signal useful to the reflectometer?
          1. +1
            27 June 2026 13: 08
            The question is, won't these vibration dampers also suppress the signal that is useful for the reflectometer?

            The article describes the theoretical prerequisites, and to test feasibility, a prototype is usually constructed on the fly, taking into account the expected parameters. Only when the signal-to-noise ratio exceeds three sigma can one move forward; otherwise, there's a high risk of following the well-trodden path of the inertial motion controller's inventors. See "Criticism" in https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%AE%D0%B1%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%B9%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B9_(%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9_%D0%B0%D0%BF%D0%BF%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%82)
            1. 0
              27 June 2026 13: 28
              It's strange that this gravitsapa wasn't tested in the temporary weightlessness created during aircraft flight. The costs would have been an order of magnitude lower, and the satellite space would have been freed up for a more viable experiment.
          2. +1
            29 June 2026 08: 16
            They won't, the frequencies are too different.
            1. 0
              29 June 2026 18: 38
              Quote: uber
              They won't, the frequencies are too different.

              The target frequencies are different, and the vibration damper separates them?
              1. 0
                29 June 2026 19: 46
                It will not dampen the sound frequencies of the engine and propeller; the damper's job is to dampen the swaying of the wire in the wind, where the vibrations are clearly less than a hertz.
                1. 0
                  29 June 2026 19: 51
                  Quote: uber
                  It will not dampen the sound frequencies of the engine and propeller; the damper's job is to dampen the swaying of the wire in the wind, where the vibrations are clearly less than a hertz.

                  Is "sway" a term that describes the hum of a wire in the wind? If not, then a vibration damper won't dampen that hum.
                  However, the hum of the wires may be close to the sound of the screws.
                  1. 0
                    29 June 2026 20: 06
                    The hum of wires is very different from the sound of a hole without a muffler and an air propeller.
                    1. 0
                      29 June 2026 21: 01
                      Quote: uber
                      The hum of wires is very different from the sound of a hole without a muffler and an air propeller.

                      In terms of frequency? Well, if the wire itself is humming, then the signal will definitely be an order of magnitude stronger than the one induced from outside.
                      1. +1
                        30 June 2026 08: 57
                        This system distinguishes the footsteps of an ostrich from those of a human with 100% accuracy! Both are bipedal! It can even distinguish the low-frequency sound of an internal combustion engine and propeller. This requires testing to train the neural network. Moreover, electrical wires hum at a frequency at the lower limit of audibility. The fiber optic cable is either run along a ground wire or made self-supporting – an OKSN. They are noticeably thinner and lighter, and the hum there should be significantly less than on electrical wires.
                      2. 0
                        30 June 2026 09: 05
                        Quote: uber
                        For this, testing is needed to train the neural network.

                        Yes I think so
        2. +1
          29 June 2026 08: 15
          The chirping has different frequencies and doesn't have the Doppler effect since it's not moving. Moreover, a corona is a loss, which is something we try to avoid, and a flying fart will definitely drown out all other sounds.
          1. 0
            29 June 2026 14: 38
            The chirping has different frequencies

            The chatter is a set of random short pulses, the combined noise is close to white noise.
            no Doppler effect,

            The Doppler effect is a change in the wavelength of radiation emitted at the receiving point by an approaching or receding emitting object. If the frequency of the radiation is unknown, it is of little use. If the reception is at separate point receivers, you can play with phase shifts.
            What's stopping me from just throwing together an interferometer to test the method's functionality? One arm has an optical fiber irradiated by sound, the other an acoustically insulated optical fiber. However, I foresee this project failing due to unforeseen variable deformations of the optical channels.
            1. 0
              29 June 2026 19: 45
              A fiber optic cable is a microphone chain; it records at a certain interval and processes spaced point receivers. What kind of distortion, what kind of channels? The microphones on the masts sway quite a bit in the wind. But they work.
    2. +1
      26 June 2026 15: 19
      scattering
      Is it just me who thinks that there is no such word in Russian?

      Physical Encyclopedia edited by A. M. Prokhorov
      It is precisely because of this scattering that the sky has a blue color.
  7. 0
    26 June 2026 12: 46
    Well, you can do this using cellular communications. Mount a camera with a microphone on a rotating platform on towers and pipes. Information and control are transmitted via cellular or cellular control channels. Something lights up, so I point the camera remotely and take a look. The better the camera (with a thermal imager, for example) and microphone (adjustable and directional), the better the results. Unless, of course, these channels are disabled during a raid. wink
    1. +1
      26 June 2026 13: 54
      Yeah, considering they jam cell phone service during drone strikes, not to mention the minor detail that where there are no subscribers, there's no service either. For example, when you're traveling by train to Bryansk, there's no service at all over large stretches. The Ukrainians exploit these "gaps," finding them with palantir.
      1. 0
        26 June 2026 14: 11
        I agree. Where there isn't, there isn't. There are hundreds of projects. God forbid they bring at least one to life.
        1. 0
          26 June 2026 14: 30
          By the way, they're not jamming cell phone service, they're just shutting it down. Control channels are still working. And all populated areas, some closer, some further away, are covered by cell phone lines.
          1. +2
            26 June 2026 14: 38
            And then we read about the fallen debris. It's necessary to detect and shoot down the aircraft as far away from observation posts and infrastructure as possible! Preferably over lakes, rivers, swamps, and fields. Moreover, acoustics in the NM are significantly less effective due to background noise, which is much less in the wilderness. Few seagulls can outscream a drone's noise. :)
            1. 0
              26 June 2026 14: 57
              That's not what I'm talking about. As we approach large cities, there will be hundreds of small settlements with cell service. Right from the border. A properly installed "observation and listening post," let's call it that, will cover 30 to 50 km in front and to the sides. There are video cameras in case a seagull appears. I turned and looked. By the way, the sound of a drone is distinctive, and doesn't sound like a seagull. Motorcycles can interfere with acoustics. They're even banned in Crimea; if they've been heard, they interfere with listening, and they don't know what they're listening with. I moved to another tower to check. However, all this is pure fantasy, just like your "wired radars" mentioned in the article. It's not yet clear how this effect will work over 1000 km runs and what equipment it requires. Moreover, coverage of power lines by wires is relative, given the complex structure of daily air traffic flows.
            2. +1
              26 June 2026 15: 06
              I see a mutually exclusive situation here. Mobile communications are "clutched" near the settlements and infrastructure, while the proposal is to install sensors further away. The only places further away are high-voltage masts and utility poles along the roads.
              1. 0
                26 June 2026 15: 30
                I see. Of course, you can put anything you want on high-voltage towers, as long as you have the money and the will.
                1. 0
                  29 June 2026 08: 11
                  You can't put anything there.
  8. 0
    26 June 2026 18: 43
    In principle, it would be possible to try using inductors to detect UAVs. Flying objects passing between the conductors should change the inductance.
  9. 0
    27 June 2026 00: 51
    It's already good that someone is already in their fifth year of acoustic direction finding...
    But it would have been possible a long time ago to create an acoustic network monitoring the air at virtually all altitudes over distances of tens of kilometers using ordinary sensors that can even detect the rubber balls children wear at parties... Technically, the problem is solvable. The main difficulty is software for optimally selecting the target signal from extraneous noise. That's the job of programmers. Inviting talented people—the task itself is very interesting and necessary. And who should make the request—the Ministry of Defense, or better yet, Mishustin? The government will contact the Academy, they'll leisurely whip up an estimate, etc., etc. Maybe in six months, something will start to happen... We need to find proactive and ambitious people...
    1. 0
      29 June 2026 08: 13
      All the requests have already been sent, and the answer is, "We have everything." Basically, if it's true that only seven out of 1000 far-fetched missiles make it, then the issue isn't detection, but the number of launchers and missiles.
  10. 0
    30 July 2026 04: 51
    They keep coming up with ideas, but drones are still flying. It's easier to use airships to deploy radars; ten radars at a safe distance from the front can completely cover the line from the Black Sea to the Baltic. Sport planes and helicopters can be used as interceptors in addition to anti-aircraft missiles, and that's it. No need for A-50s. An airship made of radar-absorbing materials will be far more effective and stealthier than an airplane, and even a mouse on the ground will be able to detect movement. We're constantly being told nonsense about drones flying 2000 km, claiming they fly below radar detection. Just raise the radar to a higher altitude and you'll see everything.