Tsushima's tragedy - known and unknown

Japanese propaganda represented the Russian sailors in the form of pirates. Russian destroyers sink a Japanese merchant ship. Illustration from the Japanese newspaper 1904 of the year

27 May marks the anniversary of our Tsushima shame. It would seem that a lot of literature was written about this event, what else can you tell? Indeed, many historians have dedicated their research to this event. The leader of the world proletariat, as the official propaganda of the Bolsheviks called Lenin, compared the Russian squadron with a herd of savages, and wrote in superlatives about the enemies: "The Japanese fleet, superbly armed and furnished with all the means of modern defense." These stereotypes have survived many historians. But if you look at the list of references to which these historians refer, then it is clear that there are no references to the Japanese archives. therefore story The Tsushima battle is still waiting for its true historical research. Here, in the framework of a newspaper article, I want to only outline the misconceptions that exist regarding this battle, as well as identify the reasons for the defeat of fleet. So, first, about the main misconceptions.

ERROR FIRST: ABOUT THE EXCELLENCE OF THE JAPANESE FLEET

There is an opinion that the Japanese shot at a greater distance than the Russian gunners. This is not so, since it is not confirmed by the course of the sea battles of this war. Both in the battle in the Yellow Sea, in the Korean, and in the Tsushima Straits, the main battle was fought at a distance of 20 – 40 cable. To shoot at long distances only occasionally tried both we and the Japanese. And unsuccessfully, which is quite natural, since perfect range-finders have not yet been created, which allowed the First World War to successfully shoot 60 – 90 cable.

There is an opinion that Russian artillery fired more slowly in combat than the Japanese. This was reported by the surviving officers of the 2 th Pacific Squadron. It would seem that the opinion is more than authoritative and therefore true, but the English observers, who were on the Japanese ships during the battle, wrote the opposite. What follows from this? And the fact that these are only subjective opinions of the participants. And how could they determine the rate of fire, if, in contrast to the First World War, Russian-Japanese ships were fired not by volleys, but by guns. Every second round shells that did not constitute any separate volleys fell around the ship, try counting the rate of fire here. If we turn to reports available on the battle (our officers and British observers) and look at the ammunition left on the ships after the battle, it turns out that the Russians spent it even more, which means they were fired more often. Although the Japanese are likely to just hide the true data, so as not to disclose its accuracy of fire. Again, need Japanese archives.

There is an opinion that Russian artillerymen were worse trained and could not shoot as accurately as their opponents. To determine the accuracy of shooting, you need to know the number of shells and the number of hits. And if the number of shots of Russian ships on the basis of disparate data can still be somehow obtained, then the number of hits without the Japanese archives is in any way. Now only the data of the British observers and the open part of the Japanese report are known, but according to these sources the final conclusion cannot be made. And, of course, it should be remembered that, thanks to the correct leadership of the battle, Admiral of Togo managed to cover the head of the Rozhestvensky wake column. Therefore, with the squadron of Togo 27 (14) in May for five hours, only five Russian battleships of the main battle were fighting. The ships of the 2 and 3 of the armored detachment of the Rozhdestvensky squadron, closing the column, fired from the 25 – 40 cable, that is, at the limit of effective shooting, while the entire Japanese fleet fired at the 1 armored detachment from the 15 –– distance 25 cable. In such a situation, the average accuracy of shooting Japanese artillery, of course, was higher. But is it the gunners who are to blame?

It is believed that the Russian ships were overloaded at the time of the battle, so their armor belts were under water, and instead of gradually sinking, they instantly turned over. Indeed, the Russian battleships (for example, take the newest type of Borodino) had a construction overload of 600 tons, but then it was a general misfortune for world shipbuilding. So, “Mikasa” had extra tons of 782, “Sikishima” - 510 tons. Was there an overload? Before entering the ships of the 2 Pacific Squadron, additional supplies were loaded, but little was left from it. The supernumerary ammunition was also loaded, but he was shot during training in Madagascar. The ships were often loaded with supernumerary and coal, but during the last bunkering of 23 (10) in May, on the eve of the battle, they did not. It is noteworthy that the investigative commission, which accused Rozhdestvensky of everything she could, did not impute an overload to him. Well, finally, there are photos of Russian battleships that surrendered to 28 (15) of May, which clearly shows that the Russian battleships had no significant overload during the battle.

Then why did the Russian battleships roll over? Yes, because they received such damage, in which, according to the experience of the First and Second World War, it is simply impossible not to roll over. Four torpedoes hit the Navarin and Suvorov, and all were on the same side. Borodino died as a result of an explosion of a kruyte-chamber of an average 152-mm tower located below the waterline. That is, "Navarin", "Suvorov" and "Borodino" turned upside down due to strong asymmetrical flooding. Oslyabya received for 40 minutes about 100 high-explosive shells in caliber 305 – 152 mm. Almost all the shells hit the unarmored nose, and both of the nasal compartments turned to mush. The requirements for the unsinkability of warships of the beginning of the 20th century allowed the death of a ship when two compartments were flooded. Therefore, having lost two compartments, the battleship began to sink with its nose and turned over the same way as half a century later - Novorossiysk.

Guards battleship "Emperor Alexander III" during the battle received a huge number of hits (roughly more than 120 shells caliber 305 – 152 mm). At the time of the death of the battleship was all engulfed in flames. The unarmored freeboard was broken, water poured into the hull through it, the spardek was burning, but the remaining guns were firing! The Guards battleship was dying the way the Guardship of the Russian Imperial Navy should die - all the 867 Guardsmen were killed in their combat positions. With such damage, it is not surprising that the ship overturned. For example, having received an exorbitant number of hits, the German ships also turned over: the armored cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in the battle of the Falkland Islands, the Blucher at Dogger-banks.

ERECTION TWO: ABOUT TECHNICAL PROBLEMS ON RUSSIAN SHIPS

There is an opinion that the mechanisms of the ships of the 2 Pacific squadron were worn out as a result of a long journey, and this was fatally affected in battle. Indeed, the squadron of Rozhestvensky passed 19 220 miles, but then Admiral Togo did not stand still. Until mid-December 1904, the entire Japanese fleet blocked Port Arthur, and then the Japanese had only five months to repair the machines and clean the boilers. It is difficult to say how the Japanese coped with this task during the development of shipbuilding at that time, but in the Tsushima battle of Togo, even at a decisive turning point, there was only an 15-knot junction, although at that moment each additional node brought the Japanese closer to victory. And in the Yellow Sea, catching up with the 1 Pacific Squadron, the Japanese were able to develop only 16 nodes. And where are the vaunted 18,5 nodes? It turns out that in a real battle, the Japanese battleships could give only 86% of the declared speed. Here you have the perfect state of Japanese mechanisms.

And what about us? According to the mechanics of the 2 and 3 of the armored units, their battleships could go at a speed of 13 nodes, that is, the same 86 – 87% of the full turn. The Emerald 28 (15) of May, breaking through to Vladivostok, was able to develop the course into the 21 node, that is, the 87,5% of the full turn obtained in the tests. It turns out that the wear of the main mechanisms was, but it was the same both in us and the Japanese, and therefore could not lead to defeat in battle. Not detected on the Russian ships during the battle and failures of auxiliary mechanisms, as well as drives weapons.

It is believed that the 2-I Pacific Squadron was formed from various types of ship personnel, and this was one of the reasons for the defeat of the Russian fleet. The fact that heterogeneity is bad, no one argues, but the heterogeneity of heterogeneity is different. In order to make a single combat line out of ships, they must have similar speeds and firing ranges. If all ships meet these requirements, then none of them will be a burden, and everyone will be able to contribute to the victory. On the Russian ships all the main-caliber guns could fire at a distance of 50 cable. I remind you that the battle was fought at a distance of 15 – 35 cable. Consequently, all ships were fit for artillery combat.

The Japanese squadron of Admiral Togo in Tsushima could squeeze the maximum 15 nodes. We - 13 – 13,5 nodes, could no longer give the battleships of coastal defense. During the battle in the Yellow Sea, the situation was the same: the Russian squadron was 13-th units, the Japanese - 16-th, and Admiral Togo did not have enough speed to cover the Russian column. And if it were not for the drama on the "Cesarevich", Rear Admiral Wilhelm Witgeft, who is the senior flagship and commander of the 1 Pacific Squadron, could possibly break through to Vladivostok. As we see, the diversity of the Russian squadron could not lead to defeat in the Tsushima battle.

ERROR THREE: ABOUT RUSSIA'S OCCUPATION IN SHIPBUILDING

There is an opinion that Russian shipbuilding could not build ships equivalent to the battleships and armored cruisers that were built for the Japanese fleet by advanced maritime powers - Britain, Italy, Germany and France. It is clear where the legs of this legend grow from. 70 years told us about Lapotnaya Russia. But even now there are historians who write the following: “The military-technical shortcomings of the Russian squadron are related to the backwardness of Russia in the field of military shipbuilding as a whole: ships lost in squadron speed, booking, artillery and projectile quality, logging construction, range finder accuracy, radio communication reliability and even in the coloring of the ships (black with yellow pipes). "

Let's see. The battleship Borodino had a full speed of the 17,8 node, and the Mikasa 18,6. The difference in one knot is insignificant. The somewhat slower speed of the Russian battleships was a consequence of their shorter length, and not the quality of the mechanisms.

Russian newest battleships had a smaller relative area of ​​the armored side: 48% versus 67% in Mikasy and 58 – 59% in the rest of Japanese battleships. Less was the maximum thickness of armor: 194 mm (Borodino), 229 mm (Mikasa). But it's not about the backwardness of the domestic industry. Borodino had a larger freeboard than the Japanese battleships, and, as a result, a smaller relative booking area. But the high board provided the best seaworthiness. What is better - greater security or the ability to use weapons with greater excitement - is an open question to this day. And a smaller thickness of armor can not be reproached domestic shipbuilders. Armor is needed to hold the projectile, and what armor-piercing projectile could hold 229-mm armor at a distance of the 15 – 35 cable shot? Only 152-mm and below, but also true for 194-mm armor. It turns out that a little more than the thickness of the armor of the Japanese battleships did not give tangible advantages.

Talk about the backwardness of the Russian artillery, in comparison with the Japanese (English), have no basis. Russian naval artillery absorbed all the best of French, German and Russian military-technical thought. Neither in range, nor in the rate of fire, nor in the energy of a shot, were the Russian cannons inferior to English. They even surpassed them, which can be found evidence in many domestic publications devoted to naval artillery. As for the quality of domestic shells, this requires a special conversation, and we will discuss this later.
Russian ships were indeed painted with darker paint. But the darker color better hid the ships at night, protecting torpedoes from the destroyers. Of course, the lighter gray coloring of the Japanese ships was better in the daytime artillery battle, but at those combat distances at which the Tsushima battle was fought, this was not decisive.

We have reasons for pride. The placement of medium caliber in the towers allowed Borodino to have large sectors of shelling. The placement of the average caliber on the "Mikas" can not be considered successful. From 14 152-mm guns 10 was on the bottom of the battery deck, which made it impossible to use them in fresh weather, when firing against the waves. Another drawback of the design of the Japanese (English) battleships was the presence of doors in watertight bulkheads, down to the second bottom. While on Russian battleships and on modern warships, the doors in the watertight bulkheads were only above the main deck (bulkhead decks).

But, of course, do not think that the Russian battleships had no flaws. The one who does not build is not mistaken. The Achilles' heel of the Russian battleships were their battle cuttings. Here we must recognize the complete superiority of the Japanese (English) battleships. No less sad was the towers of medium caliber. Their design, thoughtlessly adopted by the French fleet, turned out to be worse than that used earlier in the Russian fleet. New towers jammed from falling under the fragments.

So, we have considered the main misconceptions associated with the Tsushima tragedy. Now consider its real causes. There are four of them. We will consider in ascending order, from lesser evil to greater.

The stern flag of the Aurora cruiser after the Battle of Tsushima is evidence of the valor and glory of Russian sailors

CAUSES OF INFECTION OF OUR SQUADS

The first reason - "myopia." Russian-Japanese relations were slowly but surely slipping into war. Japan built a fleet in European shipyards, and no need to be Nostradamus to understand why she did it. But the military-political leadership of the Russian Empire, not believing that Japan would dare to start a war, did not notice this. They realized only in 1899, and, as a result, they were two years late with the completion of the shipbuilding program. Therefore, the newest battleships of the Borodino type had to be brought into battle, without waiting for the completion of the acceptance tests, with all the ensuing consequences.

The second reason is mistakes in planning a war. The military planning of the Russian Empire of the late XIX - early XX centuries was, to put it mildly, not up to par. The main naval headquarters (GMSh) still considered England to be the main adversary. Therefore, in the framework of the seven-year shipbuilding program adopted in 1895, three “raiders” are laid out - armored cruisers of the “Peresvet” type, designed to fight in English communications, and not for a decisive squadron battle. It is completely incomprehensible where they would be based during the war with England, and it is also unclear how three raiders could inflict significant damage on British shipping? But it is quite obvious that the construction of three battleships-cruisers, instead of three squadron battleships, weakened the linear forces of the Russian fleet.

But the “adventure” with “Peresvet” is not the main puncture of the GMG. By the beginning of the war, Russia had 11 squadron battleships (excluding the forces closed to the Russian ships of the Black Sea), but only seven of them managed to become part of the 1 of the Pacific squadron. Of course, for various reasons, it was impossible to collect all the battleships in Port Arthur by the beginning of the war, but this does not in the least justify the GMG. 1-I Pacific squadron was preparing not for war, but to demonstrate the force that was supposed to keep Tokyo from the war. And for this, according to the General Staff, seven battleships and four armored cruisers were enough. That was the mistake. Instead of keeping the entire fleet in the Baltic in readiness for the march to the Far East, they began to frighten Japan with a weaker squadron than its fleet. If the GMG had left the fleet in the Baltic and waited for all five new battleships to enter, and then gave time to prepare the squadron, then it could leave Libava approximately at the beginning of 1905 of the year and arrive in Tsushima in late May. Then Rozhestvensky would have 16 squadron battleships and five armored cruisers against six battleships and eight armored cruisers of the Japanese fleet. That is, Rozhestvensky would have overwhelming superiority. To break the Russian fleet in parts, and also, using for its own benefit the insufficient carrying capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway, to beat in parts and the Russian army — that was the Japanese plan of war. Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to say that if the Russian fleet in full force were in the Baltic Sea 1904, then Japan would not dare to start a war.

The third reason - mistakes in the leadership of the battle. The above errors deprived Rozhdestvensky of the ability to break up Togo, but did not rule out the possibility of a breakthrough to Vladivostok. It was only necessary to have a squadron course of 13 nodes, and then Togo, which had only 2 extra nodes, would not have been able, as before, in the Yellow Sea, to cover the Russian squadron. But instead, Rozhdestvensky takes with him transports, reducing the squadron’s move by four knots, condemning the squadron to defeat. Although it would be logical after the last bunkering to send transports to neutral Manila. Why didn't he do that? The supply of Vladivostok for the basement of the 2 Pacific squadron there was insufficient. The squadron would have to stand idle in Vladivostok, increasing its combat capability as supplies progressed. And so, in order not to “wait for the weather by the sea,” Rozhestvensky decided to take with him supplies. What is better - to stand in Vladivostok or sink in Tsushima? The answer, perhaps, is obvious.

The fourth reason and the main - shells. Through the efforts of Vice-Admiral Stepan Makarov, an armor-piercing cap invented by him appeared on Russian armor-piercing shells. The cap, on average, increased the armor penetration rate of the projectile by 14% (at a distance of 30 cable), and this is the merit of Makarov. But on this superiority of the Russian projectile ended. About Makarov usually accepted to write either well or very well. But this approach is not true. We will not understand the role of Makarov in the death of "Petropavlovsk", we will talk about the shells.

Russian shells are rightly blamed for underweight. Indeed, they were lighter than any foreign projectile of equal caliber. But at the same time, they somehow forget that Makarov was the ideologue of "relief", remaining until the end of his days a supporter of the "light" projectile. Before 1892, Russian shells were among the heaviest. For example, the Russian 305-mm armor-piercing projectile weighed 454 kg (versus 385 kg of English), and became the lightest, the same Russian 305-mm projectile began to weigh 332 kg. A light projectile has a more flat trajectory, which increases the accuracy of shooting at a distance to 15 cable. And it was relevant for the end of the XIX century, but by the beginning of the Russian-Japanese war optical scopes appeared, and the firing range increased at least twice. At a distance of 30 cable "light" shells have already lost their superiority. However, Makarov and the Marine Technical Committee (MTC) remained true to the concept of a “light” projectile. The price of relief was a reduction in BB. In the Russian 305-mm "light" armor-piercing projectile contained only 4,3 kg of explosives, and in the old "heavy" - 9 kg. And this situation was with all Russian shells, they were all "light."

Such an important indicator as a high-explosive fragmentation impact was simply not given due attention. For example, in the Russian fleet there were no real high-explosive shells, that is, shells with an instantaneous fuse. Even 75-mm projectiles were only armor-piercing. A high-explosive projectile is effective against unarmored targets, that is, destroyers, therefore, it was mine artillery that suffered from their absence in the first place.

But this is not all the troubles. Russian shells were supplied with Brink's double-caps fuses. It is clear that the fuse is a very important element of the projectile, but, despite this evidence, there was no proper attention from the ITC. The funds of the Russian State Archive of the Navy have an interesting correspondence relating to the year 1904. In it, the director of a state-owned plant producing fuses complains to the chief inspector of naval artillery about the violation of production technology. And instead of clearly stating its position, MTC simply keeps silent. Looking through the MTC magazines, one can quite often find examples of fuse failures. Thus, during the 16 of February on the 1904 of the year at the artillery firing range, of the eight new 152-mm armor-piercing shells launched, five did not explode due to the fault of the fuses.

The British naval attache in Tokyo, Captain William Pekinham, who was on the battleship Asahi during the Tsushima battle, reports that every third Russian projectile did not explode.

MARINE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE: BAD, VERY BAD

Unfortunately, this is not all. At that time, in all foreign armor-piercing shells, gunpowder was used, since the other explosives were not suitable, since they detonated in contact with the armor. The Russian armor-piercing projectile was loaded with pyroxylin, and so that it did not detonate when penetrating the armor, it was moistened with 30 – 35%. Undermining such a moistened pyroxylin is in itself a difficult matter, and here it is also the moistening of the fuse itself. Fuse because in the armor-piercing shell bottom. When fired, the water that had moistened pyroxylin was collected in the bottom part of the projectile, the fuse was moistened and not detonated at full strength, due to which moist pyroxylin could not detonate. So, during the Gull incident, an 75-mm projectile hit the Aurora cruiser, and the shell was only torn off the bottom, otherwise it remained intact. That is, the fuse worked, but not explosives. After the end of the war, the MTC fought off the press, defending the honor of the uniform and wet pyroxylin. In the 1906 year, hastily and almost secretly reloaded shells for smokeless powder, and in the second half of the year they already poured TNT (tol).

There is a more terrible testimony in the journal MTC. 18 – 20 of September 1906 of the year at the artillery range was subjected to comparative testing of armor-piercing shells with moistened pyroxylin and gunpowder. And then a terrible thing opened up: shells with gunpowder were given 3 – 4 times more fragments than with pyroxylin. In the margins of the test report, there were records in pencil opposite the data on the breaks in pyroxylin shells: “bad” and “very bad”. Very correct, but, unfortunately, already too late evaluation. So you think what Sir Packinham meant when he wrote that two-thirds of the Russian shells still exploded. But if they were torn in the same way as in the Gull incident or as in the course of testing, then it would be the same as they did not. So try to fight with such shells.

It's a shame, because we correctly did that we only fired at armored vessels with armor-piercing shells, while the Japanese, according to the English military regulations, used only high-explosive shells. In the Tsushima battle, in order to sink the battleship, it took more than 100 hits of high-explosive shells 305 –152 mm. For comparison: during World War I, 10 – 15 armor-piercing hits will suffice, and that is why only armor-piercing shells will be used in linear combat.

If only our shells were torn! And what if they really rushed? For the first 30 minutes of the battle, Mikasa got to 10 305-mm and 22 152-mm armor-piercing shells. The 305-mm Russian armor-piercing projectile hit the Fuji's main caliber aft turret, but the explosion was so weak that the eight cards in the tower and six shells almost did not suffer. Many Japanese ships were hit in the casemates of medium caliber, but in one case there was no detonation of ammunition located there. But in the Japanese kruyt-chambers were charges of explosive English cardit - the culprit of the explosions of the British ships in the battle of Jutland.

Now imagine that the MTC does not imitate, but performs its duties. Therefore, they would have returned to the old heavy shells, taking them from warehouses, but TNT had already equipped them, and the quality of the fuses was brought to the level of the Russian fuses of the First World War. Then, based on the experience of the Battle of Jutland, it can be argued that already in the first forty minutes of the battle, after Mjasa, Mikasa would follow, and then Fuji, and maybe another Togo squadron. It is unlikely that the Japanese would continue after this naseat. Most likely they would have retreated, and then only the destroyers would attack the Russian squadron under cover of night. But the main part of the core of the 1 Pacific squadron would still reach Vladivostok. And now we would remember about Tsushima not as a shameful defeat, but as Pyrrhic, but still a victory.

It would be correct to confirm with field test the unsuitability of the “Tsushima” shells, conduct an investigation and identify the perpetrators, checking at the same time whether English or Japanese intelligence was unaware of the unsuitability of the Russian shells, and, finally, it is necessary to get acquainted with the Japanese archives.

Comments

[Dimitr]

Even the Japanese did not call it a shame. They admired the courage of Russian sailors! And especially it is impossible to call shame the heroic actions of sailors who died heroically.

[Reddragon]

For centuries, Japan was a sea power and knew a lot about building ships. You can’t lose shamefully to someone who is stronger than you.
Those who made shells worked poorly: some Japanese ships were riddled, but remained afloat (they still have a monument ship with a couple of dozen holes).

[rexby63]

of pokon centuries was a sea power

Japan became a sea power in 50 years or almost fifty. Before the Meiji revolution, no one looked at it.

[anomalocaris]

Interesting, from which such "from time immemorial"? For reference: Tokugawa forbade the building of seagoing ships in the XNUMXth century and up to the middle of the XNUMXth century, the Japanese amused themselves only by coasting. But then the Americans came ... Accordingly, the Meiji revolution began.
So the Japanese Navy at the time of the attack on Russia was not yet 50 years old.
Yet the Japanese are a serious, stubborn, calculating and cruel enemy. That then the "civilized" Anglo-Saxons felt on their own skin.

[VADIMKRSK]

Anglo-Saxons felt ... Already threw a couple of atomic. Forced to peace. And our Manchuria was further released with great blood. On the question of the islands, but should we demand Okinawa ... ???

[anomalocaris]

Not so relatively large. But only due to overwhelming superiority both in quantity and quality of equipment, and, most importantly, superiority in the experience of modern land warfare for everyone. From a soldier to a commander.
Although the Japanese, where they could, rested to the last.
Eternal memory to the fallen!

[Iraclius]

Japan? Sea power? Do not tell my yatra.

[Drednout]

Quote: Iraclius

Japan? Sea power?

Andrei, in general, none of the allies have put together such a "boat". Even amers and Nazis with their gigantomania.
As for the result and other things - this is another song, here it is more than shame for Tsushima that heaped upon them.
And in 1904-05, the Japanese navy, undoubtedly fattened and weaned by the "nice" British, unfortunately confirmed their right to be called a sea power.

[Iraclius]

You see, to build the largest battleship in the history of mankind is not a sign that the power is marine.
It would seem that the island state simply has to be "the great sea, blah blah blah," the sovereign of the seas "... But everything is not so simple. The long policy of isolation and attempts at authorization, the absolutely fierce period of Zengogu Jidai turned Japan into a country, Naturally, there is no need to talk about any technical progress here.Look at all these Seiro-bune centuries that way 16-17. While quite seaworthy European caravels made transoceanic campaigns, shipbuilding was rapidly developing and means of navigation, the "great sea" Japanese flopped on their ugly rowing troughs along the coast of the archipelago. And that’s it.
Another thing is that after the Bosin war, Europeanization began and thanks to the alliance with Britain and the help of other European states, the maritime business began to develop rapidly. We had Sinop, Chesma, Gangut, Grengam, the Battle of Navarino, the capture of Corfu ... What did the Japanese - "great sailors" have?

[albert]

We should also recall the Imjin war of the Japanese against Korea and Admiral Lee Songsin, who defeated the Japanese fleet of five hundred ships with thirty ships without losing a single one.

[Drednout]

I agree. Just this.

[revnagan]

Quote: Drednout

And in 1904-05, the Japanese fleet, undoubtedly fattened and weaned by the "nice" British

Well, suppose, not only the Britons sponsored the posting of the Japanese fleet. America also made infusions. And the Russian government also paid the Yapas 400 million silver for leaving the Kwantung Peninsula. At that time, the construction of an ekadrenny battleship cost about 10 million rubles. how many ships Russia allowed the yapam to build. Well, the truth is, the Japanese really "thanked" the Democratic benefactors in 1941, and this is good news.

[Artem Popov]

The fleet was built on the reparation of China, and Russia partially repaid the Chinese debt for a bunch of territorial concessions, leaving the Japanese in the cold (they themselves got into trouble on the Liaodong Peninsula).

[Alex]

As Taras Bulba said: "And what, son, did your Poles help you?" These two monsters really died ingloriously, without taking a single Amer battleship with them to Neptune. And you can build almost anything for the sea: the Archimedes law has not yet been canceled, and they learned how to use it masterly for calculating ships already at the end of the 18th century. So, as one song sang, "size doesn't always matter", and common sense should not be replaced with gintomania.

[prophet190]

Okay, good joke.

[Alex]

Absolutely ALL Japanese officers, including Togo, were "first generation" sailors. And the fact that they used to catch herring in the ocean before ... So we have had seafood since centuries.

[Alex]

I agree, sailors and many officers have honorably fulfilled their duty. Eternal glory to the heroes!

[Atlon]

I only know about Tsushima from the book of Novikov-Surf. Therefore, some of the data presented in the article was previously unknown to me. However, I would like to know about the sources used by the author.

[Andy]

Novikov-surf is still that liar. And although he was a witness to the battle, one cannot completely believe his words. And as for the witness, there is also a question - what could he see while sitting in the hold in the infirmary? only from the words of others.

[Artem Popov]

He is not that a liar, he is a communist, so he perverted the interpretation of all events, the motivation of the characters, their images towards the class struggle, selectively chose what to cover and what to leave behind the scenes. So, as a serious historical work, perceiving his novel is not worth it.

[CrazyMishka]

As always, the negligence of cabinet ...

[cdrt]

Makarov was not a cabinet ...
Tsushima simply showed that the RI Fleet was inferior as a whole organism (a combination of naval commanders, ships, strategy, equipment) to the Japanese, created with the help of the British. And the rest are details describing this fact.

[fenix57]

With regards to the novel "Tsushima" by Novikovo-Surf, in my opinion, it describes the relationship between the command of warships and ordinary sailors to a greater extent than about the battle itself.
"Cruiser" by V. Pikul - here is a novel about courage! and heroism! Russian sailors, despite the miscalculations (to put it mildly) of the Russian military leadership of that time

[Iraclius]

Novikov himself served as a battalion soldier on the EBR Oryol, so he described the technical details of the battle even more accurately than in the novel "Reckoning" it was done by the officer of the Rozhdestvensky Semyonov headquarters.

[VADIMKRSK]

A novel about people! I reread it a couple of years ago. I'm talking about Tsushima. But I have not read Pikul, I will.

[sevtrash]

About Tsushima, apart from Novikov-Priboy, there is a book by "engineer Vasiliev" - Kostenko, in my opinion "On the Orel in Tsushima". I recommend, the view is slightly different, the presentation is also.
Now you can talk a lot about the causes of the defeat and rank them. The equipment was worse, the same Novikov-Priboy writes a lot about shells. And most importantly, it seems to me, the level of training, including admirals. The Gull incident showed that its level was absolutely insufficient, in fact, this is what Novikov-Priboy writes.

[Andy]

Novikov-surf writes about the officers as scum, driving the sailors (whose revolutionary consciousness awakens) by force to the slaughterhouse. Well, he could not know what and how Rozhestvensky was planning. What was the stake. His book is more fictional than documentary, an example is the chapter about Navarin. All died except for three, and he is, well, from their words. or the death of Borodino with one survivor - did the author question all of them or wrote from himself?

still misunderstandings with officers "Sidorov" and "Vasiliev". for what?

[Iraclius]

Og. But what about the commander of the EDB Ushakov? Scum too? And the commanders of some destroyers? I will not tell all of the commanders offhand. But if the commander or senior officer is scum, then why should Novikov write well with him?

[Andy]

it's a bad thing when a fact is adjusted to a political one. rejection of revolutionary sentiments, immediately to the black list. and as a military expert novikov is not interested, all the officers are stupid. except for Miklukha-Maklai and “Vasilyev” and “Sidorov” he showed no one positively. Well, the great naval commander-BATALER knows better. A demanding officer in his eyes is a tyrant of sailors. Solzhenitsin of those times.

[Iraclius]

Demanding? Any such exactingness, if the vast majority of experienced officers were Marsoflots and did not understand a damn thing in the latest technical innovations at that time?
As for the discipline - "peaches" I do not refer to that. And most of the commanders and senior officers, and the rest of the members of the sailors' wardrooms, beat them for nothing. What, should we be silent about this? Now, blzhad, the poor soldier, even if he is stupid and lazy to the point of disgrace, touch your finger - no, no! And in the Russian-Japanese - you are always welcome. And the fall in discipline was a consequence, not a cause. No need to substitute facts.

[Pilat2009]

Quote: Iraclius

sailor companies were beaten for nothing.

By the way, the contingent there was still that half of the fines and with disciplinary sanctions. According to Novikov, they wrote off the entire unreliable contingent. Yes, and the facts of outright sabotage were like shavings in cylinders

[VADIMKRSK]

I do not know + or - ... Political order, but it cannot be all a lie.

[Pilat2009]

Quote: Iraclius

But if the commander or senior officer is scum

In fairness, I must say that he did not speak badly about all the officers. He considered his old-timer and commander to be quite sane. Well, there were different people among the other officers, as now

[Pilat2009]

Quote: Andy

pushing sailors (who have a revolutionary consciousness) to the slaughter by force

and the army is generally not a do-it-yourself and no one will ask the desire of each sailor

[Alex]

Of all the documents available to me, I don’t understand,

what and how he planned Christmas. what was the stake.

It would seem that it’s easier - the brave admiral himself remained alive, even testifying in court. But I did not see a coherent plan and the goals of his battle. Nowhere.

[Iraclius]

Combat training was practically absent at the 2 Pacific.
In Nossi-Be, firing and combat coordination were carried out. After firing the entire squadron raised their shields - there were no hits. They maneuvered disgustingly. Battleships of the "Borodino" type were constantly rolling out of the wake, and when they were worried, it was simply not childish for them. From the author, by his entreaties, these EBRs received the mythical "magnificent seaworthiness".

[Andy]

again past. the latest ebras and aurora passed through a hurricane. Borodino type less than lying around than others - the source of the newcomers

[Iraclius]

The author writes funny figures. Only at the main Borodino construction overload amounted to about 2000 tons! According to the 3 project, 513 tons, but actually exceeded 14000 tons. After the last bunkering, the displacement of the battleship exceeded 15 thousand tons. Some researchers even talk about figures around 17 thousand tons! The EBR has turned into a crappy monitor, and the author lulls readers' attention with ridiculous figures of Mikaza's overload. The dimensions of the armadillo are known and it is not difficult to calculate how much the lower armor belt will go under water. He will go there almost completely.

[Hemp]

Nothing changes - both then and now the Serdyukovs are everywhere ...

[omsbon]

The courage of Russian sailors always hit enemies.
You can not rely on courage without the proper equipment of the fleet, it was and is so.

[anomalocaris]

I do not remember who said: "The heroism of subordinates begins where the competence of the commander ends."

[VADIMKRSK]

The phrase is Russian, but admiral ... Remember who said - please tell me ...

[rexby63]

Good article. I like it.

[Leksander]

Solid verbiage. Minus.

[Knucklehead]

The ships were defeated, the commander surrendered! After Tsushima, the Russian-Soviet fleet did not sink a single heavy ship above the destroyer class !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! All heavy ships were sunk by shaving!

[Sokol peruna]

Knucklehead
After Tsushima, the Russian-Soviet fleet did not sink a single heavy ship above the destroyer class !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

German armored cruiser "Friedrich Karl", Ottoman armored cruiser "Medzhidie".

All heavy ships were sunk by shaving!

The Italians, for example, sank the Austro-Hungarian battleship Saint-Istvan.

[Pilat2009]

Quote: Knucklhead

Russian-Soviet fleet did not sink a single heavy ship above the destroyer class

\
So there were no squadron battles - in the Baltic Sea, the KR and destroyers fought in the 1st war. Glory fired a little ... Again Magdeburg was driven to the rocks.
In the 2nd war, the Baltic Fleet was locked up with mines, and the Germans did not have large ships on the Black Sea. Question: How can one sink?

[tlauicol]

Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, Scheer, Hipper in the north, Gneisenau, Lutzov, Schleswig-Holstein, Schlesien in the Baltic (these are all in terrible technical condition) - this is only the Second World War

[Pilat2009]

Quote: Tlauicol

Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, Scheer, Hipper in the north, Gneisenau, Lutz, Schleswig-Holstein, Schlesien in the Baltic

What are you going to drown them with? Yes, even Niobe was sunk at the end of the war

[tlauicol]

267 submarines what were you doing? sunk 126 transports? and cruisers, destroyers? could not even the seedy cruiser or destroyer sink?
Niobe was the same age as Aurora from the Nth time. We have not had great victories since 1853.

[Pilat2009]

Quote: Tlauicol

seedy cruiser or destroyer sink?

I tell you once again that the cruiser was a rare guest in our waters and the destroyer with its size and speed in general to sink a boat is problematic, if only with acoustic torpedoes
although in World War I a lot of them were thrown to the bottom, where most of the mines exploded

[tlauicol]

what did our destroyer cruisers do? torpedo-artillery fire on enemy ships was ONE time during the entire war. And German raiders reached the mouth of the Ob freely

[Alex]

From N - this is from what? "Niobe" was ukantrapupuyu the first time, but that's only ironically by mistake, and by aviation, not the navy. They hunted for "Weinemäinin", and "Niobe" got caught in the hand, because from the battleship has been redone. But the Finnish battleship survived - the Finns hid it great, so during the whole war it never even fired a shot.

[anomalocaris]

Yah? And who first drowned an enemy aircraft carrier?

[tlauicol]

yes, in the Baltic there are also Deutschland, Seydlitz, Prince Eugen and Hipper again

[redwolf_13]

The article SLAC author is poorly acquainted with the topic.
1. Keeping a fleet in the Baltic is nonsense until it reaches the end already, as 2 squadrons showed themselves.
2. The commander of the 1st squadron, sorry was a coward and. Knowing about the intentions of the Japanese, about the blockade of Korea, he did not recall the Varyag back. He left the entire squadron in the outer roadstead and did not order them to deploy anti-torpedo nets on the ships. The watch was not reinforced. Even after the attack, there were no identification and communication signals between the coastal defense batteries and the fleet. The Japanese landed troops on the coast and the fleet watched the landing on the sidelines. And throughout the entire company, only Makarov took measures to counteract the supply of ammunition and additional forces of the Japanese to the shore. The cruising war near Japan was undertaken only by a detachment of Vladivostok cruisers. 4 cruisers made a rustle more than the entire Pacific squadron, which was stupidly standing on the inner roadstead.
3. The 2nd squadron took a very long time to get to the battlefield. Well, that’s understandable. She had to go through almost half the world. With the complete opposition of England and America, they very carefully watched the actions of 2 squadrons and did everything possible to control the bunkering of the squadron. Ships were able to bunker only in German and French ports.
4. Useless fuses on armor-piercing shells about which Makarov wrote were not replaced, which sometimes led to a late response and the shell, as a matter of fact, burst already behind the ship, that is, it was flashing the ship and already exploding overboard. As the ships went through the equatorial cabins the cameras began to soak. This old tradition dates back to the time of sailboats. Due to the high temperature in the cabin, humidity rose.
4. Ships went to the overload precisely with coal, and the author’s attempts to photograph captured ships that they were already after cleaning. Since the ship received holes during the battle, the team was forced to throw coal overboard. I know this sounds wild, but 2 of the crew were thrown to unload coal. Since it was folded in bags and stored in the corridors and between the deck rooms. And why the overload due to the fact that the squadron went to Vladivostok. In the last place of the bunkering, it became known that Port Arthur had fallen. The team didn’t go back. The nearest port is Vladivostok, so they rushed to their misfortune through the Tsushima Strait.
4. The shooting was bad, which was shown by training firing, and there were only 3 of them for the entire trip. On the last 4 targets set, only 2 were hit. And these targets were without a move. Saved in battle only a centralized gun guidance that was first used on Russian ships.
And the last one, it’s very sad that there are bribe-tellers who are trying to denigrate great people such as Makarov. The man who has done more for the fleet than all the admirals of the past 50 years.

[Pilat2009]

Quote: redwolf_13

Left the entire squadron in the outer raid

It is believed that if the Japanese blocked the fairway it would be even worse

[Pilat2009]

Quote: redwolf_13

denigrate great people such as Makarov

Great people make mistakes too

[Iraclius]

Then you need to indicate their mistakes, and not write words offensive to Russian sailors:

It is usually customary to write about Makarov either well or very well. But this approach is not true.

Those. Should you write about Makarov badly or very badly? Only for these words I put a "minus" on the article. I am ready to discuss with the author all the key actions of Makarov. Stepan Osipovich alone, which is generally unthinkable in those circumstances, did more for the fleet than the entire ITC.

[Ddhal]

Once again, you are convinced how great the influence of the "human factor" in our country.

Only it is not entirely clear - why stir the dissolved sugar by taking another spoon?
See ›Military archive» History
Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905's. State of the Russian fleet. Bad luck and missed opportunities
May 15, 2013

[optimist]

You can name a bunch of reasons for the defeat of Russia in the Russian-Japanese war, but the main one: the COMPLETE DECOMPOSITION OF RUSSIAN POWER! It is a historical fact that the commandant of the Port Arthur fortress actually sold it to the Japanese, which was proved by the court. Yes, and the First World War tsarist Russia blew through, whatever they say about the Bolshevik-corruptionists. And the worst thing is that the current gangster-oligarchic Russia is again stepping on the same "rake" as 100 years ago. Only instead of the Japanese and the Germans, Muslim rabble from all over the world ...

[lexe]

What did you purge with?-Shells from the tsar’s depots, which were used in the Second World War? Is Brusilov alien to you too? 5 million Russian soldiers betrayed by the Bolsheviks? We were on the verge of victory in 1917. not only over Germans but OVER the whole world! —the ratio of casualties at the front to the civilian population was much less! And the French and British then washed their blood. -For them, Verdun is a symbol of that blood. And with us? In the Russian Empire decomposed only part of the top (killing too. Stolypin for example).

[lexe]

So it was a victory? (If there were grenades of that system)) - and there wouldn’t be a revolution of 1905? - it was a defeat, but from whom .. it was a click on pride and .. a trigger for excitement, I will support this conclusion.
At the expense of the stupidity of the Navy headquarters, I do not quite agree, then the German fleet was sharply gaining tonnage (the British were just in a panic from this) .And there was no 100% confidence who the enemy would be / a friend in the new war. Our naval commanders rightly thought that the German fleet was clearly smoking it’s not preparing in the Baltic. Kaiser, after all, was swimming on graters to the tsar.) To remove the entire squadron and the Japanese, to upset the fragile balance in the Baltic, yes it was possible, then claims to our diplomats were more likely ... And then the British wanted to pull them away from their coasts and Germans and Russians, they succeeded in ito e.
The 20th century teaches us that any external defeat leads to the internal. 1905-Japan. 1917-1 world. 1991-Afghanistan-conclusion. 08.08.08/XNUMX/XNUMX-the grandchildren of those distant events in Japan also started. A defeat in battle is already a defeat in the rear -progress however..After all, they could have won and defeated everywhere. Not stupidity and stupidity, but purposeful sabotage with the ideological recruitment of officials.

[VADIMKRSK]

Afghan is not a defeat. Decent care. Maybe they left in vain, there are more losses from drugs now ...

[Alex]

Worthy?? Is it dictated by the West, having lost thousands of young guys killed and crippled, putting the border state under US control? But it was precisely to prevent this control that all this catastrophe was conceived.

Is it really not clear that the outcome of the war is determined not so much by the number of military victories as by political outcomes. You can win all the battles and lose the war as a whole.

[tlauicol]

If you believe the article - well, we were not inferior to the Japanese in anything: neither in technology, nor in combat training. Some shells let us down!
No matter how it is! Remember how they tried to drown the destroyer "Exuberant" - a stationary target, a stationary cruiser, 250 m distance. Only with the sixth shot was slightly touched, with the eighth shot. They did not know how to shoot at all! And the training firing in Nossi Be? And what about attempts to maneuver? Shame!
The ratio of losses to 95 to 1 fuses can not explain. The whole fleet, the whole system was no good!

[lexe]

If in 1905 The German fleet and the Russian Imperial fleet conducted joint exercises off the coast of foggy Albion - there would be no Russo-Japanese war. And without any circumnavigation. We did not agree, but it was necessary to make concessions with the Germans in the division of spheres of influence of China. Qingdao whose base was?
Who was responsible for the training of personnel and the nomenclature of ammunition / weapons in the Navy? -People official .. and not the whole fleet.

[Iraclius]

In consolation, we can recall that the Qingdao Germans epic erred .. if in 1913, there even did not work out an analogue of Port Arthur - they merged cleanly.

[Pilat2009]

Quote: Iraclius

then the Qingdao Germans epic delay .. if in 1913

The Germans made it a well-fortified fortress, designed for a 2-3 month siege. In August 1914 in Germany, it was assumed that the outbreak of the war would not last longer — just 2 months and lasted, and given that no one was going to rest on the point of help did not have-
Germans could not continue to defend due to the complete depletion of ammunition

Quote: Iraclius

even an analogue of Port Arthur failed

On the night of October 17-18, the German destroyer S-90, under the command of Captain Lieutenant Brunner, tried to break through the naval blockade. He managed to torpedo the Japanese cruiser "Takatiho", while killing 271 people

[Alex]

So the Germans in China had the same problem as ours. The colony was seized, the empire (or something like it) was bunged, but why the hell is it - only God knows. And the supply of Pacific acquisitions is the same haemorrhoids. If not worse: there was no Kaiser transsib either.

[revnagan]

Quote: Lexi

If in 1905 The German fleet and the Russian Imperial fleet conducted joint exercises off the coast of foggy Albion - there would be no Russo-Japanese war.

If grandmother had yay ... primary sexual characteristics, she would be grandfather. And by the way, why would the Germans support Russia? Kaiser sought to remove or weaken the Russian fleet in the Baltic as much as possible, which he ultimately succeeded in.

[lexe]

Colonies were grandmother / grandfather of the 1st World War. And only the English fleet prevented getting all these colonies. Yes, Kaiser wanted to creep into our Baltic States \ Ukraine \ Poland where he would face the strongest land army in the world and put all his future colonialists in the ground .Here is France \ England and divided the world, and the worse is Germany / Russia? Did Kaiser want to remove and weaken? If he wanted to turn his neck to the enemies both at sea and on land, then he was full. But he still wanted the colonies .. Catch up together the tonnage of the English fleet was easier. But there was also a French The Navy is an ally of England. I don’t think that Kaiser was happy with Tsushima. But he could make adjustments with a priority on the land component in the coming years (we, as sea allies, were blown away). This was perhaps Russia's most important foreign policy defeat. or conditional opportunity.)))

[unknown]

Article is normal. Enough competent.

1. Pyroxylin as an explosive was only with us and Germany. The Germans had no claims to it
In addition, 152mm shells of the 2nd squadron received from Germany

2. Russian shells really through the efforts of Makarov to the REV had a lot less than the Japanese.
But enough mass. In the battle of Jutlan, the British had shells of the main caliber of linear
ships had a mass of 385 kg, 585 kg, 635 kg, 870 kg, and the Germans 300 kg and 400 kg.

3. After the battle, the "Eagle" kept the speed of 16 knots. The real speed of the first unit could be higher,
than the Japanese. The Japanese, because of "Fuji" could not walk more than 16 knots

4. Japanese armored cruisers had a speed equal to or even lower than that of armadillos, and
weapons are weak. They were just lucky in the REV. In the next series of armored cruisers, the Japanese bypassing
254mm immediately jumped to 305mm

[tlauicol]

Those. Is everything normal with weapons and equipment? But why such a shameful rout? The Japanese were lucky, but we weren’t? What is the reason ?

[Drednout]

There are many reasons, and the general fatigue of people on a long trip should also be taken into account.

[77bor1973]

Do not forget such a moment as prefabricated crews on most Russian ships.

[revnagan]

Quote: ignoto

In addition, 152mm shells of the 2nd squadron received from Germany

152 mm shells did not play a large role in Tsushima. When countries drew conclusions from the Tsushima battle from the use of 152 mm. guns on battleships practically abandoned.

[Pilat2009]

Quote: revnagan

from using 152 mm. guns on battleships practically abandoned.

The Germans were 150mm on all BFs
The British have half, including the latest Quinn

[Alexey M]

The campaign marked the main trouble of Russia. Negligent leadership.

[alicante11]

On the topic raised by this article, there is a site http://tsushima.su/. There are discussion forums there.
In short, the following can be said.
1. The myth of the useless shooting of Russian ships is just a myth. During the overtaking of the Russian squadron, Mikasa received a large number of hits. As well as the first ship out of order was Japanese - Asama (then returned to duty).
2. Light shells - yes, at battle ranges - this is bad. The armored and high-explosive effects of Russian shells were weak due to the small number of explosives. However, the Japanese shells were also not perfect. They simply did not penetrate Russian armor with rare exceptions (Borodino). As a result, Alexander and Suvorov could withstand a large number of hits, but maintain combat effectiveness.
3. Explosive. Most likely no. Even the article says that the Germans had no problems with this explosive.
4. Overload took place - coal. After the battle, our ships still had to reach Vladivostok.
5. Vehicles in battle did not play a significant role in setting the squadron speed. They were separately covered by the cruiser Enquist (here they were hindered by the speed of transports) and they did not bind armadillos in any way.

Oddly enough, it is impossible to name the cause of the defeat under Tsushima. The Russian squadron was inferior to the Japanese not so much. And in some parameters, for example, in the number of large-caliber artillery barrels, it even exceeded. Moreover, until the very end of the day, the Admiral of Togo could not congratulate himself on his victory. And really. The death of Oslyabya and the fires of the leading Russian armadillos is good. But there was no rout of the squadron. The squadron continued to fight and maneuver. But ... everything changed at the very end of the battle. Almost simultaneously, Suvorov drowned by mines perishes, Alexander exhausted the opportunity to fight, and, in fact, Borodino accidentally died. And at night the enemy destroyers finish off the squadron. What is this talking about? And this indicates the lack of leadership of the squadron. Indeed, if the squadron operated normally, then the failed Suvorov could well be covered by cruisers that would protect him from mine attacks. It was possible to order Alexander III to fail on time, it was possible to force the cruiser to fulfill its duties at night to protect the battleships from mine attacks. But the leadership of the squadron was lost by Rozhdestvensky. And an army without leadership cannot win the battle. This is perhaps the largest reason for the defeat of our squadron.

[Pilat2009]

Quote: alicante11

failed Suvorov could well be covered by cruisers

It was real only to remove the rest of the team
Squadron and so all day cut circles around it

Quote: alicante11

in time to order the failure of Alexander III

They went out periodically, changed places, eliminated breakdowns

[alicante11]

So it was not necessary to cut circles, but to order the cruisers to take him under protection. The Japanese needed to beat the squadron, not the dilapidated flagship. And so he periodically again and again fell under attack, while the HS on both sides revolved around him.

And Alexander had to be ordered not to return to duty. All the same, there was a little daylight. Especially his participation was no longer needed.

In short, the squadron needs to be led.

[Pilat2009]

Quote: alicante11

and order the cruisers to take him under protection

The Japanese also had cruisers, and in larger numbers
and if you read the memoirs, then our cruisers hardly defended themselves
And they still had to guard the squadron from destroyers
and where do you think Alexander was to go? to repeat Suvorov’s fate only. In fact, the ship’s commander decides whether he can fight or not

[alicante11]

Cruisers must protect damaged battleships (and not only damaged ones) from mine attacks. Neither Suvorov nor Alexander the cruiser Dev or Togo the younger of the country were. By the way, one of the strongest cruisers of Deva - "Kassagi" barely left for Ozaki Bay, having received a twelve-inch gift from our battleships. So Alexander and Suvorov, who went to the transports, would not only be safe from mine attacks, but would also help Enquist to reflect the attacks of Japanese cruisers. That would, most likely, keep intact, for example, "Svetlana", "Ural". And Oleg and Aurora would have gotten less. The GS of the Japanese were already shackled by our linear forces, they did not touch the transport.
In addition, while maintaining control of the squadron, with the onset of night, the cruisers could take the squadron under cover from destroyer attacks. Considering how the Emerald coped with this task, not allowing the Japanese to attack the lead ships Nikolai and Oryol, I think that Zhemchug, Svetlana and Almaz could well have saved our end ships from mines. Yes, it would be easier for the large cruisers going together to fight off mine attacks by joint efforts.
As a result, the next morning, Togo would have seen in front of him not three feeble vessels of Nebogatov with a battered Eagle, but the entire squadron, with the exception of Oslyabi and Borodino, and, perhaps, Suvorov and Aleksandr, who would again retreat to wagon train
And, given how much time the Japanese took to kill our ships and the remaining number of shells on Japanese ships. I think that most of the ships would reach Vladik.

[Pilat2009]

Quote: alicante11

So Alexander and Suvorov, who had retreated to the transports, would not only be safe from mine attacks, but would also help the Enquist to repel the attacks of the Japanese cruisers

3 guns of 76mm caliber remained on Suvorov, the steering wheel was damaged
And following your logic, after Alexander, Borodino and Oryol would have gone to the transports, too, because they too had failed
Then Togo would come back and it all happened again
And Nebogatov slipped through dimming and greater speed - all the others just fell behind and were pulled by destroyers

[alicante11]

So when is it left? By the end of the day? Upon failure, he had enough artillery left. And we can’t even talk about Alexander. Suvorov’s damage to the steering wheel is most likely - slaughterhouses. And in another way it is hardly possible. The steering gear was under armor, and the Japanese fired HE mines. Managed simply from a central post. If they normally covered, he could very well put out the fires and establish normal control.
Borodino would not have time. Very quickly it all happened. He was quite combat ready before his death. The Eagle is all the more combat-ready and neither Borodino nor the Eagle went out of order. Borodino at the beginning of the battle only had problems in the car.
In general, the commander decides who goes out and who comes back. Just so that the "train" does not turn into a target for the enemy's GE.

Regarding the speed of Nebogatov - what a stupid thing, you’ll excuse me. But you at least look at the passport data on the speed of Nicholas. At the same time, he stayed in the Mediterranean, while Navarin, Sisoy, Donskoy and Monomakh underwent a major overhaul of the power plant (the boilers were changed, but earlier). Only Ushakov with a broken nose lagged behind. And the rest had problems after torpedoing. Monomakh, Navarin, Nakhimov, Sisoy, all were in order, although the latter would not have reached nowhere, perhaps he also received well.

[Pilat2009]

Quote: alicante11

So when is it left? Suvorov’s damage to the steering wheel is most likely - slaughterhouses. D.

Let's open wikipedia and start over:
about 14: 32
One of the pipes was soon knocked down on the “Prince Suvorov”, a fire broke out in unarmored superstructures, all the halyards were interrupted and burned, so Rozhestvensky could no longer give any orders. A strong explosion was seen near the rear bridge, which disabled the aft 12-dm tower
at 14:32, the Russian flagship “Prince Suvorov” ceased to obey the helm and began to circulate to the right. Admiral Rozhestvensky was injured a second time (and this time seriously) with fragments of a shell that fell into the conning tower
“Prince Suvorov” described the full circulation to the right and cut through the squadron system between “Sisoy” and “Navarin”. It could only be controlled by cars, lost almost all artillery, burned like a torch, and then stalled the cars for fixing the rudder. After putting the rudder in a straight position, the ship began to move independently. Subsequently, the ship was shot several times by passing Japanese ships, zigzagged in the general direction to the northeast with a 10-knot course, trying to accompany the Russian squadron
14:35-14:47
Several fires broke out on the head “Emperor Alexander III”, it went out of order and, having subsequently dealt with the damage, went into operation (probably between “Sisoy the Great” and “Navarin.” The squadron was led by the battleship “Borodino”
“Sisoy the Great” received several holes in the nose just above the waterline, water began to flow through them into the hull, because of which the ship began to lag, stretch the formation, as a result of which Nebogatov’s detachment began to increase speed to bypass the left behind “Sisoy” 2- armored squad
15: 10-15: 15 Kamimura’s detachment stumbled upon the long-suffering “Prince Suvorov”, fired at him and attacked with four torpedoes, one of which the Japanese mistakenly considered to have hit the target. At the same time, the Chikhaya memo was hit by three 75-mm shells from the sternos of the battleship with the formation of an underwater hole and left the battle until the end of the day. At 15:27, the Suvorov attacked the 5th fighter squad with five torpedoes, but the flagship was covered by the fire of Russian battleships
Further: Togo's detachment crossed the head of the Russian column in the direction from right to left and soon lost it in the fog that had found. Kamimura also lost Russians due to fog
Now, at this time, one could try to dump, if there was enough coal ???

[Pilat2009]

Quote: Pilat2009

Here

So at 15,00 2 ships were lost, the rest more or less hold on, those following your logic, Alexander should have left the system and dump? And should Nebogatov give him an order? Pay attention to Sisoy’s injuries — they will come back to him at night.

[Pilat2009]

Quote: Pilat2009

Quote: Pilat2009

Here

So at 15,00

Going further ... In 15: 40, the opponents saw each other and the battle resumed from a distance of 27 cab
Among the Russians, the Eagle and the Great Sisu were particularly affected. At the last one, a fire started in the entire 6-dm battery, and the battleship temporarily failed, and then took a place at the tail of the column — following your logic, should Sisoi dump a total of 1 ship away from the battle?
16:17 opponents again lost sight of each other.
Around the same time, a new battle took place near the dying Suvorov. The ship, which was fired by ONLY ONE 75-mm gun from the feed casemate, was attacked by the 4th detachment of fighters, 4 torpedoes were fired at it, and to no avail (the Japanese again considered that they had hit). The flagship was again covered by art. armadillos fire
16: 17 - 17: 42
The cruising battle was, in general, independent of the battle of armored squadrons approximately south of them, and by the time the Russian battleships arrived, the position of cruisers and transports was critical
The battle order of the Russian battleships was greatly disrupted by this time. In front of the pair were Borodino and Orel, which at about 16 p.m. took place at the counter-contractions between the Russian and Japanese cruisers, and the first went under the protection of the non-firing side of the battleships. This maneuver explains the turn to the west of the Russian squadron. The 30rd Russian armored detachment, which had already managed to overtake the 3nd by this time, followed the first pair and at 2:16 also opened fire on the cruisers of the detachments S. Deva and S. Uriu, whose flagships, having received damage from the fire of the armadillos Nebogatov , they took their troops to the east — those virtually without the support of our armadillos, the Japanese cruisers crushed ours and if they guarded Suvorov it would not have seemed to them.
At 16:51, the cruiser Kamimura, walking to the sound of gunfire, approached the scene of the battle and opened fire on crowded Russian ships and transports, achieving hits in Ushakov and Apraksin. Around this time, the ship’s commander was seriously injured at Borodino, and senior officer Captain 2nd Rank D. S. Makarov joined the battleship and led the squadron. At 17:00 on the battleship “Emperor Nicholas I” (which Nebogatov commanded because of the wound of the commander), the signal “North-east 23 ° course” was raised, according to which the Borodino turned north-west. The Russians again went to Vladivostok. At 17:30, the cruiser Kamimura left the battle, being south of the Russian ships.

From 17:10 to 17:30, the destroyer Buyniy removed the wounded vice admiral Rozhestvensky and 19 people from his headquarters from Prince Suvorov. By this time, “Suvorov” had practically lost control and the order-move of Rozhestvensky to remove the remaining people, the destroyer “Bedovy” did not fulfill again
Half an hour later, after the Russian battleships went north, the abandoned Suvorov was surrounded by the 4th, 5th and 6th Japanese fighting units, fired at them for an hour and a half, and then was attacked by the 2nd destroyer group, which fired on it at point blank range 8 torpedoes. 3-4 of them exploded and at 19:30 the ship, which until the last was fired from the aft 75-mm gun, turned over and went to the bottom with all the remaining people (

[Pilat2009]

Quote: Pilat2009

and went down

Now we don’t go anymore, but move on ....
The Russian squadron, despite the order of Nebogatov, was heading north-north-west. By 17:40 it was built in several wake columns (the data are contradictory): in front were the Borodino and Orel, led by captain of the 2nd rank D. S. Makarov. The third armored detachment, as well as the “Alexander III”, was behind them and noticeably to the left. To the left and behind the column of Nebogatov were the remnants of the 3nd detachment (Sisoy closed this column for a long time, but Navarin and Admiral Nakhimov went to the tail of the column, injured after 2:18 from the fire of the cruisers Kamimura). The fourth column was formed by the cruiser "Oleg", "Aurora", "Dmitry Donskoy", "Vladimir Monomakh", which were held on the left beam of the battleships. The cruisers "Pearls", "Emerald", "Diamond", "Svetlana" and destroyers went even more to the left, not observing the order. There were four remaining vehicles there - Anadyr, Korea, Svir and the heavily damaged Irtysh. The destroyer Buiny with the headquarters on board and the signal Admiral on the destroyer (no one understood which admiral) caught up with the squadron at about 30 p.m. raised the signal “Admiral transfers command to Rear Admiral Nebogatov,” but on “Nikolay I” , this signal was not dismantled, and at 18:00 the same order was transmitted to Nebogatov in a voice from the destroyer Impeccable, along with an instruction to follow to Vladivostok.

The Japanese 1st combat detachment was on the right in a parallel course at a distance of about 35 cable ones, slowly again stepping into the head of the Russian column and at 17:42 opened fire on Borodino and Orel. The 2nd battle detachment went far behind the first and at 18:32 began to fire at first three ships of the 2nd armored detachment from a distance of approx. 40 cab. But then “Emperor Alexander III” fell into a critical situation, who, with a strong tilt to the starboard side and a fire, followed somewhere at the end of the Russian squadron and to its right (information about its location is contradictory). At 18:48 he came under fire from six cruisers of the Kamimura detachment and literally 2 minutes later rolled over to the starboard side.
Here it’s a little incomprehensible, Alexander all this time followed with a fire and a roll, or after a shelling of Kamimura a fire and a roll occurred.
The cruiser "Emerald" approached the site of the tragedy to raise people out of the water, but he himself fell under heavy shelling and was forced to return to the squadron. Of the 867 people in the crew of “Emperor Alexander III,” no one escaped, so the circumstances of the battle and the death of this ship are unknown. It can be assumed that he sank from the spread of water along the main deck (which had only one bulkhead), which fell through the casemates of 75-mm guns due to the overload of the ship.
The Russian squadron was still led by Borodino, at around 18:50 heavy fires started on it, at 19:00 a huge flame engulfed the entire ship, and the aft tower fell silent. One of the shells, apparently from the "Fuji" hit the cellar of the onboard 6-dm tower. After the explosion of this cellar, the ship, steadily leading the squadron for four and a half hours, turned over and sank around 19:12, a few minutes before sunset
That is, at 19,00 four ships were lost (transports do not count) the ship is not yet a defeat. Now can you think where to go next? Either stupidly follow the order and go to Vladivostok or scatter to neutral ports
What would you do?

[Pilat2009]

Quote: Pilat2009

What would you do?

So that we are not called cowards, we go further ...
The eagle took about 300 tons of water to the deck and was on the verge of overturning. The ship almost completely exhausted its combat resource. On Sisoe and Navarin, the main-caliber towers were in good condition, but both had holes in the forward unarmored part through which water flooded the compartments, while on Navarin it was possible to pump it out, pumps could not cope on Sisoe Veliky, “ Admiral Ushakov "had a trim on the nose due to a hole in the nasal extremity - a question about backfill, at what speed could these ships move?
The Russian battleships went south for some time, but at the beginning of the 9th hour Nebogatov again lay down on the course of the Nord-Nord-Ost. The ships of the 3rd armored detachment of Nebogatov were already prepared during the campaign for night sailing without navigation lights. The reference point was only a lantern with a narrow beam, placed at the stern of the ship. The “Eagle”, located in the wake of the “Nicholas I,” was forced to act in the same way (all the spotlights were broken), and all five battleships went for a while as a single group. Thanks to blackout they were hardly noticeable. Adversaries destroyers drove off the cruiser "Emerald", staying near the flagship. The remaining ships, for reasons of camouflage, did not open fire on destroyers, although they once mistakenly fired on the Emerald (there were no hits). Unable to withstand the 13-node move, the Admiral Ushakov, which received the hole, began to lag; over time, “Admiral Senyavin” and “Admiral General Apraksin” overtook him and he was lost. The remaining ships of the Nebogatov group safely escaped mine attacks and went north.

The three remaining ships of the 2nd armored detachment, led by the Sisoy the Great, lagged behind, as the armadillo slowly filling with water also sailed at low speed. They were not prepared for movement without lights, therefore they were clearly visible to the enemy.

The terminal “Admiral Nakhimov” was the first to use searchlights to repel mine attacks, which only made the task easier for the enemy. Here’s the passport data

[alicante11]

Let's open wikipedia and start over:

Pilate. After all, it was not for nothing that I gave a link to a forum where there are specialists who are involved in the history of the Tsushima battle, at least from the 2000 of the year (this is just what is on the Web). This question has been raised. Well, it is impossible to destroy Suvorov’s steering with high-explosive shells, because the steering car was under the armored deck and protected by the side armor. Perhaps the damage to the steering gears led to the failure, or the steering wheels in the conning tower were broken / the helmsmen were out of order (the spare rear pilothouse failed even earlier). In fact, Semenov also speaks of the failure of helms and steering wheels. but no one is talking about the failure of the steering machine. Now imagine controlling an armadillo from a central post deep in the ship, without communications, when the commander of the ship is upstairs in one of the dilapidated towers around which fire is raging. The compass is not a panacea either. Given that the amount of metal on the ship has changed a lot (fired shells), the superstructures have been heated by fires, the magnetic compass did not show the north-east of 23 city, but the direction to the Mikado palace. In such conditions, the battleship could not be controlled normally.
By the way, your quote does not say that at the time of its death the battleship had lost all its artillery. But how you can bring the steering wheel to the "straight" position, I still find it difficult to guess :). This is a quote, in my opinion, from Novikov. Well, he, the battalion, is, of course, forgivable. But his words do not become true because of this.

[Pilat2009]

Quote: alicante11

impossible to use high-explosive shells to disable the steering of Suvorov

Yes, in fact, I do not insist that the steering wheel is damaged. The main thing is that the battleship could not be controlled. Although, if there was a helm in the main post, the battleship had to poorly and poorly keep the course, another thing was to operate the machines, especially without experience. The fact that Suvorov was moving with difficulty, did the cruisers have to stick around him? And what about the rest of the squadron, which still has to go to Vladivostok? The cruisers had to withdraw the command and catch up with the squadron, flood the battleship

Quote: alicante11

That's just Navarin before the night mine attacks were not badly injured

Damn you read my posts carefully? Where did I say that he suffered seriously?
at the same time, I managed to pump it out on the Navarino, so I wrote. But to what extent should it be pumped out? keep it at a constant level? Or drain it by a liter? The fact that the ships got water, slowing down. At the same time, Sisoy was the flagship of the group and set the speed he couldn’t keep up with Nikolai

Quote: alicante11

How much time would there be to decide his fate by issuing a withdrawal order.

With what to stay against the main forces? With Navarin and Sisym with Nikolai? As long as the ship can fight, he remains in the line, he shoots and causes harm to the enemy. How can the commander know Alexander will sink or cope with the damage? Alexander would have gone, the Eagle would have drowned, on him would have carried the fire. "The eagle took on the deck about 300 tons of water and was on the verge of capsizing."
When were you supposed to give the order to Alexander? During the first failure, you do not want to let him go. During the loss of contact between the squadrons? Why? Suddenly we will not meet the enemy again, we will slip through and then separate the lonely ship is all the more dangerous and even stupid)) So, Alexander get out of line and go ... where?
Looking for Suvorov? Excuse me, but this is nonsense.

Quote: alicante11

And the armadillos would be covered not only by the Emerald, which did a good job of covering the head armadillos, but all the cruisers

But the cruiser is guarded by Suvorov, who is barely moving. And Alexander cuts circles around ...

Quote: alicante11

be on a rehearsal cruiser

Well, you can agree, although he will be away from the battle
But for some reason Scheer did not heed Makarov’s instructions, which didn’t prevent him from brilliantly leading the squadron in Jutland. Yes and Jellico and Beatty, the impudent people also missed Makarov’s lectures

Quote: alicante11

With the preservation of Suvorov and Alexander - yes, defeat, but not defeat.

And why did you decide that they will survive the night? And then they will meet the others? The squadron rushing to Vladivostok, does not wait for lagging behind. Suvorov is barely lagging behind him, Alexander is hobbling with cruisers .... Is there enough coal?

Quote: alicante11

By the way, your quote does not say that at the time of death the battleship lost all artillery.

If I hadn’t lost, I could have fought back although getting into the destroyer is not easy

[alicante11]

The main thing is that the battleship could not be controlled. Although, in the presence of a helm in the central post, the battleship had to poorly and poorly keep the course, another thing was to operate machines, especially without experience

Yeah, "no experience". Actually, this was a standard exercise in the exercise.
And the rest is simple. If the ship went to the cruisers, then they would put out fires, establish communication with the CPU and go along with the 10-nodal move. And given the fact that there were TRs, this would be quite enough.

Damn you read my posts carefully? Where did I say that he suffered seriously?

Sisy was not the flagship of the "group". Well, not like that. This was the order for the squadron to follow the leader. But in terms of the detachment - hardly :). So Navarin Sisoya would have bypassed if necessary.
But this is not about that. And that the commander had to set the speed of movement accessible to all.

Why stay against the main forces? With Navarin and Sisym with Nikolai?

Why don't you like Navarin, Nikolai? Their armor against land mines is normal. Cannons at combat ranges and with a real combat rate of fire at Tsushima are also normal. And, taking into account the problems in speed of Borodino and generally untested in a normal way "Eagle", then they were not much inferior in speed. Moreover, they already had Belleville boilers. Sisoy, of course, has been disabled since childhood, but he also worked well as a projectile trap. Nakhimov and BBO in the ranks also showed themselves normally. Plus Borodino and Eagle. The line is still normal.

But the cruiser is guarded by Suvorov, who is barely moving. And Alexander cuts circles around ...

Suvorov holds 10 units with us, manages fires and goes with cruisers. And with darkness, along with Alexander, the battleships enter service. To, together under the guise of cruisers, repel MN attacks.

Quote: Pilat2009

But for some reason Scheer did not heed Makarov’s instructions, which didn’t prevent him from brilliantly leading the squadron in Jutland. Yes and Jellico and Beatty, the impudent people also missed Makarov’s lectures

That's for sure, it's them in vain. Sheer, thanks to this, he twice poked his column head into the center of the British column, substituting for the execution of Hipper and the third squadron. As a result, Lyuttsov died, Seidlitz barely crawled to the base, and the best battleships of the fleet were the most affected ships in the battle after LCR. In general, all the successes of Hipper were profane. And Beatty is also a stupid person. But a foolish person is lucky. On Lyon, too, there was a hit in the tower, as well as on Queen Mary. But ... lucky. And so only a cap would be caught, or a jacket.

And why did you decide that they will survive the night? And then they will meet the others? The squadron rushing to Vladivostok, does not wait for lagging behind. Suvorov is barely lagging behind him, Alexander is hobbling with cruisers .... Is there enough coal?

This is real. And in the case of maintaining the command - see above.

[Pilat2009]

Quote: alicante11

Yeah, "no experience". Actually, this was a standard exercise in the exercise.

I admit that the third lieutenant was not allowed to steer.
You don’t know who was in charge, maybe Warrant Officer Courcelles

[alicante11]

this column was closed for a long time by Sisoy, but Navarin and Admiral Nakhimov went to the tail of the column, having suffered after 18: 30 from the fire of the cruisers Kamimura).

That's just Navarin before the night mine attacks were not badly damaged.

In 18: 48 he came under fire from six cruisers of the Kamimura detachment and literally after 2 minutes he rolled over to the starboard side.

That's it, but out of order - even when. How much time would there be to decide his fate by issuing a withdrawal order.

What would you do?

Talking about what I would do at the moment, I think it's too late :).
After the death of Borodino and Alexander - yes, it was already a complete defeat, although not yet a defeat. But if it had been possible to save Alexander from the fire of the Japanese capital ships and Suvorov from the attacks of destroyers, then everything would have been very uncertain.

[alicante11]

Going further ... In 15: 40, the opponents saw each other and the battle resumed from a distance of 27 cab
Among the Russians, the Eagle and the Great Sisu were particularly affected. At the last one, a fire started in the entire 6-dm battery, and the battleship temporarily failed, and then took a place at the tail of the column — following your logic, should Sisoi dump a total of 1 ship away from the battle?

Following my logic, the squadron commander had to determine how important the presence of this ship in the line is important. And how dangerous it is for him. That's all.

in front of the couple were Borodino and Orel, which were near 16: 30 were on the counter-contractions between the Russian and Japanese cruisers

That's what I had the honor to say, the head battleships, which in the ranks were already almost useless, at short distances, would have helped Enquist well fight the Japanese cruisers.

[Pilat2009]

Quote: alicante11

the head battleships, which were already practically useless in the ranks at short distances, would have helped Enquist to fight the Japanese cruisers well.

Then the rest of the trash 100% would go to the bottom in the afternoon. The latest armadillos at least took on most of the shells

[alicante11]

And where did Borodino and Orel go?

[Pilat2009]

you didn’t answer when to give command to Alexander about the failure? If at the time of the battle the Kamimura’s cruiser detachment could follow it, it would act autonomously (or get an order), or two battle cruisers would be sent, or destroyers
The eagle drowns instead of Alexander because: "The eagle took on the deck about 300 tons of water and was on the verge of capsizing." By the way, the Eagle remained practically unarmed
How can a commander command a detachment of cruisers with the lagging behind Suvorov and the remaining armadillos? If Enquist commands it is not a fact that he will go to Vladivostok and not leave Suvorov with Alexander. How could Suvorov and the cruisers catch up with the squadron before dark, and then with 10 nodal underway

Quote: alicante11

Following my logic, the squadron commander had to determine how important the presence of this ship in the line is

and again: "So, we get out of order and save ourselves as much as possible"?

Quote: alicante11

What do you dislike about Navarin, Nikolai? Their armor against landmines is normal. Guns at combat distances and at real combat rate of fire under Tsushima are also normal.

Well, they will not pull against the Japanese alone. The trash is
Eh .... again to climb into the directories ....
Nikolay: The artillery was especially outdated (the old short-barreled black powder guns were inconvenient, extremely short-range and slow-reloading) and the booking scheme (the booking area was small, and as a result, the ship was very poorly protected from high-explosive and semi-armor-piercing shell fragments). There were several projects for its rearmament. However, during the repair and modernization, special attention was paid to the mechanisms. "Emperor Nicholas I" was hardly the only ship of the Russian fleet, whose running characteristics were better than the original ones. As for artillery, only one thing was implemented: the installation of a modern 6 "gun with a barrel length of 45 calibers above the admiral's cabin, as well as several small-caliber guns
The damage caused by the battleship to the Japanese cruisers is not so much the merit of its commandants as the inexperience and tactical illiteracy of the Japanese commanders, who, in pursuit of the shelling zone of the flagship of the Russian squadron, became close to the obsolete ships of the Nebogatov squadron
Navarin: The lack of an armor belt along the entire length of the waterline was a significant drawback. At the time of the design of medium-caliber rapid-fire guns with powerful high-explosive shells, there were still no, but their appearance in the 1890s immediately made all ships with a similar reservation scheme (and there were a lot of them) significantly more vulnerable
The guns also fired smoke powder
The installation of main caliber guns in unbalanced towers (the center of mass of which did not coincide with the axis of their rotation) made them difficult to aim at the target, and also created a roll when turning the towers on board

In short, the conversation of the blind with the deaf, do not be offended please))

[alicante11]

And who said that Alexander needed to leave after 15-00? What time did he die?
About Sisoy, I said that he would hardly have reached Vladik in any situation. He had a mine hole above the water in the morning. And it was not Nebogatov who had to give the order, but Rozhdestvensky, who was supposed to be on a rehearsal cruiser, as Makarov demanded, instead of sitting on Suvorov, knowing from the experience of the July 28 battle that the flagship would receive the strongest slap in the face and knowing the fate of Wittgeft and Ivanova.

[alicante11]

So that we are not called cowards, we go further ...

I wonder what the cowards have to do with it ... You might think that there were options.

Here you have the passport data

All this, of course, is cool, but now think about what would happen if the Russian squadron had command. And the armadillos would be covered not only by the Emerald, which did a good job of covering the head armadillos, but all the cruisers.
Those. all ships that died at night would remain in service in the morning. With the preservation of Suvorov and Alexander - yes, defeat, but not defeat.

[VADIMKRSK]

Squadron without a commander. And the courage and courage of our sailors is eternal glory!

[Pilat2009]

Quote: VADIMKRSK

Squadron without commander

Read about the dumb commander

http://tsushima.su/RU/libru/i/Page_7/page_18/page_19/Page_32/chistyakov-tsushima

/

[Pilat2009]

Quote: alicante11

But the leadership of the squadron was lost by Rozhdestvensky

At this time he was already wounded three times and transferred command
But Nebogatov trudged in the middle.
In general, if yes, if this is incorrect
Sitting at the monitor makes it easy to give advice

[alicante11]

I am talking about opportunities that were missed. For what reasons - this is the third question.
Yes, it is easier to argue after the fact, and that is why I do not blame Z. P. Rozhestvensky, but only discuss what happened. The actions of ZPR can be explained; he made not so many real mistakes.

[Arct]

I did not like the first part of the article - in fact, the census of the past. The second is noticeably stronger - even attempts of some analysis are visible. Therefore, I wish in future to pay more attention to the processing of several sources, rather than copying from one. In general, a plus due to the second part.
About Makarov (I understand that they will minus). Iraclius either does not know Russian or does not understand the meaning of the sentences. The author does not suggest writing badly about Stepan Osipovich, he suggests writing honestly. Makarov is a man of his time, not immune from mistakes. I already wrote earlier and will remain with my point of view now. A good naval tactician, inventor, advanced administrator, Makarov, unfortunately, was not a naval strategist. Against the background of the Admiralty swamp of Russia, he certainly stood out from the best side. But some of his ideas and views on tactics left much to be desired. Offhand, rejection of long-range combat and the idea of ​​"armored cruisers" - well, you can't put him in a plus.
And by the way, concentrating the fleet in a single fist has its own sound thought (especially for that time).
Well, regarding the candidacy of the commander - yes, the choice was unsuccessful (if it can be called a choice). Even in the admiral swamp of Russia there was at least a couple of worthy naval commanders.
P.S. I am glad that this article, with all its shortcomings, is noticeably better than the nonsense of two weeks ago.

[Iraclius]

Iraclius is fine with Russian. Are you suggesting that I read between the lines and think out the text for the author?
He writes, I quote:

It is usually customary to write about Makarov either well or very well. But this approach is not true.

I read in such a way that talking about Makarov in a good manner is wrong. Therefore, one must speak in a bad manner. The author, however, was afraid to spit in the face openly. Either there was enough delicacy or no courage. Okay. Now about your "offhand".
What is the range? At what firing ranges was the squadron battle fought in the late 19th and early 20th centuries? Please read the descriptions of battles of battleships in the "dotsushima period". At that time, there was a clear tendency for the superiority of armor over a projectile. That is why it was necessary either to bombard the ship with a hail of shells in order to drown it, or to get as close as possible in order to break through the armor and undermine the enemy's ship with a few successful hits. What was Makarov wrong about?
Going further - what is the idea of ​​"armored" cruisers? Explain the meaning, please.

By the way, about armor-piercing caps and lightening the weight of shells. Many of Stepan Osipovich’s undertakings were not completed, which did more harm than good. And so it happened in this case. By the way, caps were introduced after his death.
I’m saying this to the fact that the names of the titans - Makarov, Kondratenko and a number of other figures - are the names of heroes and there is nothing to try to tear off some mythical coverings and tarnish the page of an already tragic war for Russia.

[Andy]

With all due respect to S.O. Makarov and recognition of his merits, I want to note the following on the day of the death of Strashny and Petropavlovsk in the sea, the Japanese were spotted. I find it difficult to name, I read for a long time, but this is not my fantasy, believe me.

[Thunderbolt]

Quote: Andy

on the day of the death of Strashny and Petropavlovsk, the Japanese were spotted at sea. but the conclusion was made that they were their destroyers. No measures were taken. I find it difficult to name the source, I read it for a long time, but it's not my fantasy, believe me

The book "Port Arthur". If you read, then from there you could take.

[Andy]

No, it’s not a literary literary, according to the recollections of the participants in the war. Alas, I can’t remember in more detail. I didn’t think that I would ever come in with the sources of information and didn’t save it.

[nnz226]

It would be interesting to know the names of the heads of the Main School and the ITC! Are not the Romanovs relatives of the idiotic "tsar-father"? Because of their incompetence and theft, Russian sailors died for nothing in Tsushima, not even really taking revenge on the enemy!

[Pilat2009]

Quote: nnz226

surnames of the heads of the GMSh and MTK! Are not the Romanovs relatives of the idiotic "tsar-father"

No, not the Romanovs. But if you substitute the names of the current effective managers, the result will be even worse. The highest position in the fleet-Admiral-General was held by his uncle, who spent naval money on ballerinas
Actually, to understand all this, you need to read at least biographies of Makarov and Rozhestvensky. Yes, Novikov-Priboy himself admits that Rozhdestvensky was not a bribe taker and not a traitor, the system made him that way

[Enot-poloskun]

I believe that the then political system was to blame for the defeat of the Russian Empire.

[I think so]

Not an article, but a complete babble!
Take at least pearls about explosives (explosives)
"The explosives were not suitable, since they detonated upon contact with the armor. The Russian armor-piercing projectile was loaded with pyroxylin, so that it would not detonate."

EVERYTHING (!) Knows that Pyroxylin is not an EXPLOSIVE substance at all - it is POWDER! And how can such delusional articles be read from authors who do not distinguish EXPLOSIVE from POWDER.

He names the cause of the defeat under Tsushima correctly - the absence of shells equipped with EXPLOSIVE material in the Russian fleet (and the army is the same). But it so confuses the real picture with senseless and incompetent verbiage that such articles will only make experts laugh ...

The Japanese gouged the Russian fleet and army for a simple reason - the absence of shells equipped with EXPLOSIVE material. All Russian shells of that time were equipped with POWDER. And this HUNDREDS of times (!) Worsened their brisant and high-explosive properties. And as a result, with the same number of hits, the Japanese inflicted HUNDREDS of times (!) More powerful damage to Russian ships and infantry ... And all the other reasons they are SECOND - and the mistakes of the leadership of the battle and the weakness of the ships and the inaccuracy of shooting is a trifle compared to the weakness of artillery shells ...

[anomalocaris]

Are you again?
Well, I already wrote to you about pyroxylin, and about shimosa, and about the abuse of caps ...
By the way, do you know how the blasting explosive differs from the propellant?

[I think so]

What did you write there, I did not read. And the difference between the propellant and the brisant is in its burning rate. So the propellant burns (detonates) hundreds and thousands of times SLOWER than the brisant ... Hence the destructive power of the BRIZANT substance as compared to the METAL. It is not possible with any gunpowder to achieve the destruction resulting from the explosion. Hence the causes of the destruction of the Russian fleet. They shot more precisely, and the result in HUNDREDS times worse ...

[anomalocaris]

The fact that they did not read is very bad.
And in your head you have porridge. The detonation process has a very indirect relation to the combustion process.
I wrote this to you, but I repeat: pyroxylin has been known as an explosive since the 30s of the XIX century. In this capacity, it was used by us, and Germans, and Austrians, and the British. It was possible to obtain stable combustion from it, which did not turn into detonation, for smooth-bore weapons in 1865 (Schulze gunpowder), and for rifled weapons only in 1885 (Vjel gunpowder). By the way, the basis for smokeless gunpowder can serve not only pyroxylin. Almost any blasting explosive can be taken as a basis. The nitroglycerin base is, for example, English cordite. By the way, it was the cord that caused the explosions of several dozen ships of the British, American and even! Japanese fleets.
Melinitis, shimosa, trinitrophenol, liddit, TNF, picrin, etc. approximately equal to trotyl, yielding to it in brisance and energy release, but surpassing in explosiveness and detonation speed. It is 4 times more powerful than pyroxylin.
Accordingly, it is not necessary to make a vigorous loaf of Japanese landmines, and learn the materiel.

[I think so]

This is your cereal in your head Dear ...
"It is approximately 4 times more powerful than pyroxylin."
Power is the energy allocated per unit time, and therefore the detonation SPEED is the main criterion for the DEADTING force or for scientific BRIZANCE. And therefore, if the detonation velocity of TNT (according to your data) is 4 times higher than that of pyroxylin, and the detonation velocity of milenite (used by the Japanese then) is EVEN higher than that of TNT, then this UNDERSTANDLY indicates the CARDINAL (about 20 times) superiority of Japanese shells over then Russian. (4 times gives an assessment of TNT + 2-3 times gives the superiority of milenite over TNT + 2-3 times gives a greater charge weight of a Japanese shell). And therefore, you should teach a little equipment, and not mentor here demonstrating incompetence ... dear ... You can’t argue against reality ...

[anomalocaris]

Mdya ...
Well, at least in what measure is brisance you can answer and, at the same time, provide comparative data on TNT and melinite (by the way, you write this nickname of picric acid with an error)?
If you can’t, then I really will not go against reality, because to prove that to a fool is toss beads in front of pigs

[I think so]

Well, really, when there is nothing to say, they start looking for spelling mistakes ... It’s really impossible to prove that Fool (with a capital letter) ... I bow down and leave you alone with your ignorance ... practice finding spelling mistakes and more .. .

[anomalocaris]

Which should have been proved. You did not answer my direct and ambiguous question, so you cannot be taken as a serious interlocutor. Although it’s simple to disgrace, since you don’t know, at least they could type in a search engine, it would give you at least a couple of dozen links to relevant literature. However, you preferred to slip into an indirect remark, so as not to admit your mistakes (I confess, I specially left you this loophole) because this requires some courage.
Alas, from now on you are an absolute zero for me ...

[shurup]

Who has not read - I recommend Kostenko's report on the battleships of the "Borodino" type, made by him in the ITC. Everything is described in non-artistic way.
On my own I will add the inevitable fouling of the hulls of Russian ships. In addition, Rozhestvensky waited until the last moment for the recall of the squadron. The court clique, frightened by the nearby events initiated by the "friends" of Russia, simply abandoned the fleet.
Likewise, some events in contemporary Moscow may lead to the "throwing" of Syria.

[VADIMKRSK]

Tsushima's lesson is not to get involved in carnage when everyone is against one. Strengthen borders, make friends with neighbors, help friends (Syria, Serbia, Slovakia, etc. alphabetically). Something I liked the letter "U". Then ours would surely be respected as before ...

[anomalocaris]

Sorry, but to paraphrase a little: Russia has only three friends - the army, navy and Strategic Missile Forces.

[alicante11]

Uh-huh, we have already made friends with Serbia. Because of her, they climbed into the PMV, then they freed them from the Germans, and Tito built the whole Soviet history out of himself as a girl of easy virtue. Here they gave them a loan for the purchase of our own weapons, and in the GA they vote for the anti-Syrian resolution. These are, you know, brothers. And you can also remember how the Bulgarians, stretching out on themselves almost the entire First Balkan, then received from these "brothers" a stab in the back - the second Balkan. And the Slovaks are generally a song, with a funeral one. Do not remind who, together with the Wehrmacht, invaded the USSR in June 41?
Against this background, only Syria looks like a real ally. True, she also does not have such a long history of friendship with Russia. Just some years 60-70. By and large, the reign of two Assad father and son. So for now, we can speak of allies as the Assad family, not Syria.

[Prometey]

In the article, the author points out that the reason for the death of the ships was the huge destruction caused by the Japanese shells, and not the overload. But the "Suvorov", which took over almost all the fire of the main Japanese battleships, was eventually sunk by torpedoes, not shells. And the sinking of the Oslyabi just proves that the primary cause of its death was the overload and the sinking of the main armor belt. It is not known why "Alexander III" died. But before Tsushima, Japanese shells not only battleships, but even rank 2 cruisers could not sink. Yes, destructive, but not suitable for sinking ships. Therefore, after the Russo-Japanese War, as has already been rightly noted, all the fleets of the world make armor-piercing, not high-explosive, the main projectile.
I think no one will name 100% of the reasons for the defeat of the Russian fleet. Yes, the sum of the factors worked, but no one can say that each of them was decisive.

[Alf]

Quote: revnagan

When countries drew conclusions from the Tsushima battle, from the use of 152 mm. guns on battleships practically abandoned.

Yes, the Dreadnought was built almost without medium-caliber artillery, but on later battleships the caliber 150-152-155 reappears. The 6-inch rate of fire is higher than the 12-dm and the battleships are, in fact, bombarded with shells that, without penetrating the main armor, wedge towers, cut pipes, interfere with fire fighting. It turns out the situation is like a modern tank and infantry fighting vehicle, the tools of which, without breaking through the armor of the tank, demolishing attachments and disfiguring the chassis, actually disable the tank.

[Andy]

in what quality did that appear? to repel torpedo attacks on dreadnought and as a universal caliber later.

[bbss]

An article is a set of stamps. Rather, it is not a tribute to the memory of the dead sailors but a spit at them.

[Arct]

Iraclius, I repeat again. You do not know Russian well, for you interpret the author’s words in a light favorable to you. The author is trying to convey to you the idea that only good is written about Makarov, but does not try to say that only bad is written. You have to write the truth.
Further - if you are not aware, then Makarov was a fairly progressive inventor and naval officer, but nevertheless insisted on fighting at short distances (despite the tendency to move away from these trends). Here his worldview and his inventions in this area affected (the armored caps are the same). That is, a person firmly stood on the correctness of his ideas, despite their incorrectness (which was shown by further development). Please do not read the descriptions of battles of battleships in the Dotsushima period (by the way, there is almost nothing to read - except perhaps the Japanese-Chinese clashes). Read better the works of the theorists of naval combat at the beginning of the century. Read the memoranda of officers of the Black Sea Fleet 1903-1904 and the works of some of our authors on increasing the range of naval combat to 40-70 cables. Well at least they were able to realize this in the post-Tsushima period and adequately answer "Goeben". Therefore, I will say it again - Stepan Osipovich turned out to be categorically wrong in this matter, there is no fault of his, 90% of Russian admirals were in this position. But fact is fact.
Well, about the superiority of armor over a projectile. Yes, there is always such a struggle. Since the appearance of these opposites. I just can't understand why, speaking about the superiority of armor over a projectile, you are operating on data from 1897-99. It was by that time that the armor reached its peak in this competition, and then the inevitable decline in favor of the "shell" began. They began to produce armor using new technologies, reducing the thickness, but maintaining the same level of armor protection, considering that they had achieved parity. And the "shells" did not sleep, and found workarounds - beating the unprotected area of ​​the ship and increasing the range in order to hit noticeably thinner decks and upper armor belts. And you slept through this moment, operating with outdated data. And in general, do not read Wiki, read books, and it is better to several at once ...
P.S. For me, Makarov is also a hero of the Russian-Japanese war, and that is why I tried to study the maximum of literature related to his personality. And to you, flying over the surface layers, a huge minus, for not even asking about the biography of your hero. Not knowing about "armored cruisers", knowing the personality of Makarov, can only be an ignoramus or a populist.

[pinecone]

[quote = optimist] The historical fact that the commandant of Port Arthur fortress actually sold it to the Japanese, which was proved by the court. / quote]

The commandant of the Port Arthur fortress, Lieutenant General Stessel in a different light.
See http: //www.kprf.org/showthread.php? T = 15475

[PiP]

Article minus, and all comments plus. The fact that in the article (something similar) I met more than once, but in comments, I saw something new somewhere. Thanks to everyone who wrote

[crasever]

"... the defeat of the Russian troops in 1904 during the Russo-Japanese War left hard memories in the minds of the people. It fell on our country as a black spot. Our people believed and waited that the day would come when Japan would be defeated and the spot would be eliminated. For forty years we, people of the old generation, have been waiting for this day. And now this day has come ... "JV Stalin, radio speech on September 2, 1945

[revnagan]

Dear visitors of the site, I found a couple of interesting articles on the Tsushima battle. The first one is called "Tsushima: the riddles of the battle", author Maxim Komkov, historian. The second - "Admiral's missed chance", author Alexei Kilichenkov, historian. Articles published in the journal "Technics-youth" No. 6 for 1996. I can scan it tomorrow at work and put it out. But I don’t know if this would be a copyright infringement and can this be done on our website?

[Leksander]

Quote: revnagan

The first is called "Tsushima: the riddles of the battle", by Maxim Komkov, historian. The second is "The Admiral's Lost Chance", by Alexei Kilichenkov, historian

I googled a little:
http://macbion.narod.ru/war/tsusima/tsusima-3.htm
http://macbion.narod.ru/war/tsusima/tsusima-2.htm
thanks for the info! read at your leisure.

[Pilat2009]

Quote: alicante11

But a foolish person is lucky.

Mdya ... How many stupid people gathered. And what did they forget about Nelson? Does the Tovi bastard also seem to be chasing Bismarck? I’m silent about Eberhard. But Ushakov didn’t think of it .... well, maybe at least someone chose a cruiser with a larger one ship? Hmm and Makarov what way did you get to Petropavlovsk?

[Pilat2009]

Quote: alicante11

Sisy was not the flagship of the "group". Well, not like that.

In the dark, it was possible to keep only him - the next ship was hardly visible
and how did Navarin know at what speed rushing Nicholas? In the dark, signals are poorly visible ....