Vietnam - Dien Bien Phu, beginning
In November 1953, the French leadership realized the war had reached a stalemate. After World War II, the country's financial situation was bleak, political squabbles, and successive governments were afoot. Against this backdrop, a "brilliant" decision was made: withdraw from Vietnam, but first strengthen their negotiating position by winning a decisive battle, or, as the National Defense Committee put it, "force the enemy to admit the impossibility of achieving a decisive military outcome." Simply put, they had to destroy all six divisions of the regular Viet Minh army deployed in the north of the country.
"Navarre Indochina" - Americans love big headlines!
The vastness of the plans began to be scaled back already during the preparatory phase of the operation. First, Admiral Georges Cabanié, who had been sent from Paris to Saigon, instructed Henri Navarre, the High Commissioner of French Indochina, not to take too many aggressive actions, leaving the final settlement to the politicians. His task was to create the conditions for an "honorable political resolution." In other words, a resounding victory was needed, allowing the Gallic rooster (in the heraldic sense of the word!) to leave Vietnam with its comb held high.
But Navarre had his own view on the matter. "We were absolutely confident of our superiority in fortified defensive positions," he later wrote. The experience of the Korean War, or more precisely, its final trench phase, reinforced this confidence: the numerous and courageous infantry of the Chinese People's Volunteers proved incapable of breaking the deeply entrenched "UN troops."
Uncle Ho had no shortage of intelligence for military planning.
Meanwhile, the French command had a fairly good idea of what was happening in the enemy's favor, where their troops were positioned, and what their intentions were. And Uncle Ho could rely on his French party comrades. Especially since they, after being brazenly removed from power at the behest of the Americans, were happy to play dirty tricks on the right-wingers appointed in their place. In short, the French Ministry of Defense was leaking like a sieve, and the Vietnamese leader was quite well informed about the colonialists' plans.
C-47 Dakota with French Navy markings.
Why did Navarre choose Dien Bien Phu? As I've already written, the French were short on helicopters—23 aircraft couldn't supply any large force. Therefore, they had to rely on transport. AviationThe 69 C-47 Dakotas available could transport cargo equivalent to hundreds of helicopters of the time, up to 80 tons per day! And the Japanese had even built an airstrip at Dien Bien Phu. With this support, Navarre believed, French troops could conduct raids on Vo Nguyen Giap's army's communications, depriving the Viet Minh of rice supplies and curbing opium smuggling—one of the organization's sources of income.
Henri Navarre had a reputation as a fearless officer and a cool-headed staff officer, which gave him a certain amount of self-confidence, but he had little experience commanding large units. Moreover, his task was extremely vague: to ensure a strong negotiating position. Given his superiority in supplies, weapons, and military planning, the French general assessed the risks of the operation as low.
Paratroopers load into the Dakota, with Dien Bien Phu ahead.
On Friday, November 20, 1953, the first two battalions of French and Vietnamese paratroopers landed in the "Plain of Jars." What's the most dangerous mistake a commander can make? Do what the enemy expects. That's exactly what Navarre did! Back in October, a meeting had been held, attended by Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Truong Tinh, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam and also Uncle Ho's chief strategist. The guerrilla leadership decided that an offensive in the Red River Delta would allow the French to use their overwhelming firepower close to their bases, so they needed to lure them deeper into the jungle, force them to disperse, and then attack piecemeal. The landing at Dien Bien Phu was a celebratory tidbit for the Vietnamese!
Who's taking it so boldly? Colonel Pierre Langlais!
The advance detachment was commanded by Colonel Pierre Langlais, whose courage no one questioned. Unlike his intelligence, his intellect was. The paratroopers were met with fire while still in the air. A doctor landing with the first detachment was shot in the head before reaching the ground. In total, the first detachment lost 15 men killed and 34 wounded, but managed to secure a beachhead. Langlais himself broke his ankle upon landing and was evacuated to the mainland as soon as possible.
The C-119 "Flying Freight Car" is, if I'm not mistaken, French
However, as it turned out on the ground, the old runway wasn't ready for aircraft, so cargo and equipment had to be dropped from C-119 cargo planes by parachute. A total of 60 parachutes were used. Bulldozers were also deployed, finishing the runway, after which reinforcements began landing. Soon, the Dien Bien Phu garrison numbered 12. Colonel Christian de Castries was appointed base commander. The colonel was later accused of cowardice because he always holed up in his dugout, but his record prior to 1953 provided no grounds for such suspicions. De Castries was a competent officer, but he lacked the ability to inspire his subordinates, and later, his character began to deteriorate under the pressure of circumstances.
Colonel Christian de Castries. After Dien Bien Phu, he became a brigadier general—you have to know how to lose!
What was the French bridgehead like, 280 kilometers from Hanoi? It was a plain with low hills, surrounded by mountains on all sides. The French positions were clearly visible, but the command decided that the rugged, jungle-covered mountains posed no threat. The frog-loving soldiers didn't bother to properly fortify the bridgehead before the fighting began: they weren't Americans, after all. The trenches were shallow, and no warehouses were dug—they assumed the flow of supplies from the mainland would be continuous. However, the free press of the Fourth Republic enthusiastically praised the impregnable fortress of Dien Bien Phu. The colonialists' intelligence was a C-minus, so the French were unaware that the PRC had given the Viet Minh American 105mm M2A1 howitzers (with a range of 11 km), 120mm mortars, and 37mm anti-aircraft guns. And Vo Nguyen Giap received full information from the newspapers—the French were traditionally chatty and careless.
And the mountains here are really beautiful!
The French overestimated the impassability of the mountains. The Vietnamese dragged them up them by hand. artillery 800 kilometers, a logistical feat. Furthermore, supplies for four divisions were transported over this distance: local peasants were forced to perform labor, and porter units carried ammunition through the jungle for a month, after which they were sent home, to be replaced by new units. The porters were motivated by Uncle Ho's promise of land reform, and the peasants would move mountains for land!
Today, there is a memorial complex at the site of the battle, but some of the remains dug up from above can still be seen.
Soon, by January 1954, a network of artificial caves, tunnels, and trenches had been dug around Dien Bien Phu. The French "fortress" was only 15 kilometers away. Viet Minh engineers were also busy: within a couple of months, jungle trails had been transformed into roads, passable even for trucks, and the group's supplies became regular. Above the roads, the Vietnamese wove a continuous green corridor of vines and tree branches—air reconnaissance couldn't detect even the busiest "highways." Where trucks couldn't pass, chains of porters carried the loads—a single howitzer shell weighed 20 kg, and Giap had no plans to skimp on ammunition.
Viet Minh fighters drag M2A1 howitzers into position. 2 tons each – no joke!
It all seems simple, but the difficulties the Viet Minh fighters faced were described by Tran Do, one of the Vietnamese officers: "Every night, when the freezing fog descended on the valleys, groups of people would gather... The paths were narrow and soon became covered with ankle-deep slippery mud... The slightest deviation of the wheels to the side - and the gun would roll down the steep slope. Drenched in sweat and tears, we dragged these guns that only trucks could move... Our only food was rice, often undercooked, because the field kitchens were not allowed to smoke during the day and light bright fires at night. On the ascents, hundreds of people pulled the guns on long ropes; a winch was installed on the ridge to prevent the guns from rolling down. The descents were much more difficult; The paths twisted and turned, and the heavy guns struggled to pick up speed. Artillery crews aimed and braked their guns, placing chocks under their wheels, while the infantry held them in place with ropes and winches. Sometimes, during the entire night, working by torchlight, we managed to advance only a kilometer, or even half a kilometer."
A column of bicycles with cargo - logistics, Vietnamese style!
It's impossible to say that French intelligence didn't uncover all this activity. But they greatly underestimated it. For example, the number of porters recruited was estimated at 25. The actual figure was 60. Bicycles were also widely used: a single cyclist could carry 50 to 100 kg of cargo. Furthermore, the Vietnamese launched diversionary attacks in the Red River Delta and the Central Highlands, during which they always retreated when they encountered French resistance. As a result, de Castries was confident that Giap's troops would do the same. The general mood among the soldiers was characterized by the phrase: "On va leur montrer!" – "We'll show them!"
A 155mm howitzer in position near Dien Bien Phu
The Vietnamese were in no hurry: 100 days passed between the landing of the advance party and the first assault on the French positions. But it would be wrong to say that the jungle was peaceful during this time. The French were confined to their base and not allowed to leave: any attempt to leave was met with fire. Initially, de Castries attempted several raids on the surrounding villages, but, encountering fierce resistance, he ordered them to limit themselves to holding the perimeter of the "fortress." The French also had artillery: 4x155mm howitzers, the same as the Vietnamese, 105mm howitzers, and 120mm mortars. The expectation was that they would suppress the enemy with their firepower, but this was not realized—the French had poor maps, meaning artillery and air controllers were unable to ensure accurate targeting. Moreover, the Vietnamese proved themselves to be unrivaled masters of camouflage: often, enemy crews simply could not determine the locations of Viet Minh batteries.
Lieutenant Colonel Jules Gaucher, killed at Dien Bien Phu
Meanwhile, the French were bored in their positions and even longed for the assault to begin as soon as possible—to kick some slant-eyed asses and head to Hanoi for a stroll through the local haunts. The officers were far more skeptical. On January 11, Lieutenant Colonel Jules Gaucher wrote to his wife: "Time is passing slowly, and nothing interesting is happening. We're told this won't last long and we should prepare for hard times. Rumor has it we're destined for sacrifice."
B-26 of the French Air Force
The fighting began "on the distant frontiers." First, the French attempted to destroy Viet Minh howitzers, but none of their sorties were successful. Then they tried to practice logistics with B-26s, but poor maps and inexperienced pilots... All in all, an epic fail. Well, not quite: the French aircraft successfully hit their own positions—that happens when bombing a small area from an altitude of 3,5 kilometers. The Vietnamese acted more effectively—several deep raids on airfields near Hanoi and Haiphong cost the enemy two dozen C-47s—precious transports that kept the "fortress" supplied.
By midwinter, it became clear that the Arctic fox was scurrying around the jungles near the positions of the descendants of Asterix and Obelix. French intelligence was working poorly, but it was working. And even it failed to miss Giap's extensive preparations. Reports were flying to Paris, subtly hinting that it was time to flee Dien Bien Phu. Had they been heeded, most of the world would have had no idea it was in Vietnam and that the name translated as "Palace of Jars." But in Paris, all was calm, croissants crunched between teeth, and after the war, coffee smelled like coffee, not barley or acorns... So the panicked reports from the ends of the earth were ignored.
Vo Nguyen Giap near Dien Bien Phu
Vo Nguyen Giap's trademark was meticulously crafted operational plans. The Vietnamese commander took his time, repeatedly rechecking intelligence and changing the plan on the fly, taking into account emerging circumstances. When his troops were already in position and awaiting the command "Tien Lien!", he decided it would be a good idea to provide the artillery with a little more ammunition and called off the assault at the last moment. The Vietnamese had good reason to hesitate: the rainy season was about to begin, the Viet Minh fighters were on the mountain slopes where the water was flowing, and their opponents were on the plain, which, according to the guerrilla commanders, would be thoroughly flooded, driving the French from their shallow trenches.
Graham Greene in Saigon
During the siege, the French "fortress" was regularly visited by world celebrities. Graham Greene, whose impressions of Vietnam would later be incorporated into his novel "The Quiet American," visited here. American commander John O'Doniel, the man known as "Iron Mike," also visited. This suggests that the supply of Dien Bien Phu was quite safe at the time; at least, most of the 650 French pilots killed in Vietnam were victims of piloting errors and the poor technical condition of old aircraft, and not the work of the Vietnamese. DefenseHowever, the impact of the French air force's actions was equally insignificant: the Viet Minh fighters quickly realized that the bombings were noisy, but of little use. Soon, Soviet 37mm anti-aircraft gun positions began appearing around the "fortress," making each subsequent flight to Dien Bien Phu more dangerous than the last.
Geneva Conference of 1954
Meanwhile, the recently concluded Korean War gave diplomats an excuse to try to avert a crisis through negotiations. In January 1954, a meeting of the foreign ministers of the victorious countries took place in Berlin. Molotov proposed convening an international conference with the participation of China, which the Americans and their allies had so far ignored. But John Foster Dulles declared that he would never sit down.
Position of Vietnamese anti-aircraft gunners
Giap positioned his artillery not on the reverse slopes of the mountains for indirect fire, but for direct fire. To protect the guns from return fire, the Vietnamese dug artificial caves and tunnels into which they concealed cannons and mortars. The French artillery was positioned in caponiers, which were of little use: from the mountains, the Vietnamese could see the "fortress" clearly. However, the Vietnamese commander was in no hurry, and his subordinates continued to play "mole": the network of tunnels, caves, and trenches was improved, and soon the Viet Minh's forward positions were 4,5 kilometers from the French trenches. The key point was that de Castries' positions were located at an altitude of approximately 180 meters above sea level, while Giap's were at 1100 meters. Vietnamese artillery shelled the entire French camp, so by February, despite the Viet Minh not yet launching a single attack, casualties among the Plain of Jars garrison exceeded 10 percent. Food and ammunition supplies were also becoming increasingly difficult to resupply due to air raids. Interestingly, two field brothels operated within the "fortress" throughout this time: the French—they're such French!
Diagram of the French fortifications
And the situation worsened with each passing day. On March 11, enemy artillery began firing on parked aircraft. From March 13, all aircraft taking off and landing were under anti-aircraft fire: flying below 2 kilometers became dangerous. Meanwhile, the Vietnamese dug and dug and dug: shovels became their own. weapons More dangerous than rifles. The French looked sluggish in comparison; the strongpoints on the nine hills around the base's perimeter were named after women, but their strength was vastly uneven. "Isabelle" and "Beatrice" were nearly impregnable, but the other strongpoints were far worse—the trenches and firing points vulnerable to artillery fire. But there was no time to reinforce the perimeter.
"Tien len!"
On March 13, music drifted over the Vietnamese positions—the soldiers were singing the Viet Minh anthem in chorus. Vo Nguyen Giap decided to bolster their spirits before the attack. The French suspected something was wrong and opened barrage fire at 17:05 PM, but it was too late—a barrage of shells and mortars rained down on Beatrice Hill, simultaneously hitting the warehouses, headquarters, and firing positions. As survivors of the battle recalled, the fire was extremely accurate—Chinese military advisers had trained the Viet Minh artillerymen well. The battle for Dien Bien Phu had begun....
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