On the hypothetical duel between the armored cruisers Izumo and Bayan
In the previous article, I examined the maneuvering zones of Izumo and Bayan in a hypothetical situation in which both cruisers' gunners had high-quality armor-piercing shells. The results were as follows: Bayan's 8-inch/45 model 1892 guns could penetrate Izumo's citadel at a range of 10-13 cable lengths, and at a range of 12-15 cable lengths in the areas of the main battery turret feed pipes, where there were no coal pits. Meanwhile, Izumo could penetrate Bayan's citadel at a range of 16-18 cable lengths with 200/100 mm shells.
Here, however, it's important to note an important detail. We know for certain that the Bayan's 8-inch turret feeder pipes were located outside the citadel, formed by 200mm/100mm armor plates. This is less clear with the Izumo, however, as reliable armor diagrams are lacking. Nevertheless, most descriptions agree that the length of the Izumo's 178mm citadel was approximately 84 meters. Here, while preparing the previous article, I made a measurement error, for which I apologize to the esteemed reader: a citadel of this length covered not only the feeder pipes but also the magazines of the 8-inch turrets. The latter, of course, gave the Izumo an advantage, as its magazines could be penetrated at best with 15 kbt, while the Bayan's could be penetrated with any reasonable thickness for 1904-05. ranges of use of armor-piercing shells.
On the other hand, the Bayan's advantage was that its 8-inch gun magazines were located not behind the armor belt, but "one floor below." So, if the citadel were breached, a Bayan shell would explode in the Izumo's ammunition magazine, while an Izumo shell would explode in the room above the Bayan's.
The Izumo's main battery turrets, feeder pipes, and casemates, with their six-inch armor, were penetrated by Russian eight-inch shells at 18-22 cable lengths, but where the feeder pipes were protected by 127 mm armor, the penetration was at 22-26 cable lengths. As for the Bayan, its turrets and feeder pipes, where they were 150 mm thick, would have been penetrated at 21-25 cable lengths.
Interestingly, at a range of 18-20 cable lengths—less distances were rare during the Russo-Japanese War—both cruisers would have been on almost equal terms using conventional armor-piercing shells. They could penetrate virtually everything except the citadel, which could only be penetrated by a perfect hit on the Bayan. However, the Japanese had a higher chance of a successful hit due to the superior armor penetration of their shells.
About Japanese armor-piercing shells
But all of the above calculations bear no relation to the realities of the Russo-Japanese War, as Japanese sailors did not use classic armor-piercing shells in 1904–05. The ammunition the Japanese called armor-piercing was equipped with Ijuin base fuses, which had a detonation time of approximately 0,005 seconds after impact with the plate, like conventional high-explosive shells. These fuses operated similarly to the domestic Model 1894 fuses; the only noticeable difference was the method of disengaging the safety catch.
In general, both the Ijuin fuse and the Model 1894 tube would detonate a shell 1–2 meters behind the armor if the shell retained sufficient energy and, consequently, velocity after penetration. If the shell's energy was sufficient for a close penetration, but the shell itself was not destroyed, then its detonation would occur as it penetrated the armor.
It's also interesting that the shells considered armor-piercing by the Japanese had comparatively thin walls. For example, the 386-kg, 12-inch Japanese shell, according to V. Polomoshnov, contained 19,28 kg of explosive, while even the remarkable Russian 12-inch shell, model 1911, weighing much more (470,9 kg), contained only 12,8 kg. While the Japanese shell could certainly penetrate armor of a certain thickness, its casing was still too weak for a good armor-piercing shell due to the excessive chamber size for the explosive. And if the shimoza didn't detonate upon impact, one could consider the Japanese armor-piercing shells to be good semi-armor-piercing.
However, shimoza shells apparently often exploded immediately upon impact with an obstacle, be it the side plating, the rigging, or the armor. In the latter case, detonation occurred before the shell had time to penetrate the armor, causing the explosion to occur at the armor rather than during its passage. I can't explain this "behavior" of Japanese shells other than the special properties of shimoza shells. But even if I'm wrong, it doesn't change the fact that, for the most part, Japanese shells tended to function similarly to high-explosive shells later developed, with a "momentary" fuse that initiated the detonation upon impact with the obstacle. This, in all likelihood, was the reason why Japanese shells often failed to penetrate even thin armor.
About High-Explosive Shells and the "Half-Caliber" Rule
Many people interested in the navy history, know that domestic "post-Tsushima" high-explosive shells were capable of penetrating armor up to half their own caliber. Indeed, the 1907 and 1911 model shells possessed this property, and pre-Tsushima Russian high-explosive shells were apparently also capable. There is no definitive proof, but the Japanese repeatedly recorded cases of our shells penetrating armor half the caliber, passing through intact, and at ranges where armor-piercing shells should not have been used. In one case, even half a caliber was not the limit for a Russian shell: the 102mm armor of the Shikishima in the Battle of Tsushima was penetrated by a 6-inch shell from a range of approximately 30 kbt, without causing a burst.
These are all facts, but unfortunately, they often lead to a completely wrong conclusion. Specifically, that during the Russo-Japanese War, any high-explosive shell from any country could penetrate armor half its caliber thick.
The fact is that this characteristic of the Russian Model 1907 high-explosive shells didn't emerge out of nowhere; it was a consequence of the technical specifications given to the designers. To achieve this, the shell designers had to reduce the explosive mass somewhat, and, starting in 1908, introduce a special procedure—heating the shell's warhead.
Unfortunately, I don't know by how much the explosive content of the 1907 model shells was reduced, but the explosive content of the 12-inch high-explosive shells of 1911 was 58,8–61,5 kg instead of a possible 70,6 kg (12,5–13% instead of 15%). I would like to caution my esteemed readers: you should not directly compare the percentage of explosives in shells from different countries, as it will depend, among other things, on the length of the shell in calibers, and this dependence is not linear. For example, in the 12-inch high-explosive shell of 1907, despite efforts to ensure maximum explosiveness, it was possible to achieve only 8,5% explosive content.
But for the “pre-Tsushima” high-explosive shells, it seems that such a task was not set, at least not for armor penetration tests during delivery. the fleet These munitions were not tested accurately. However, Professor E.A. Berkalov, author of the textbook "Design of Naval Artillery Shells" and many other works, and one of the leading Soviet experts of his time on this subject, pointed out that:
The wall thickness of the high-explosive projectile is the same as that of the armor-piercing projectile and is left almost the same throughout the entire body, from which one can conclude that the goal was to give the projectile some strength when acting on armor.
Interestingly, when evaluating the drawings of the "pre-Tsushima" high-explosive shells, E. A. Berkalov does not consider them to be high-explosive, let alone semi-armor-piercing:
...a projectile which, according to our concepts, cannot, in any case, be classified as a high-explosive projectile or even a semi-armor-piercing projectile, but represents a peculiar intermediate type of projectile.
In fact, this isn't surprising, because even after reloading with TNT, which had a higher density than smokeless powder or pyroxylin, the explosive content of the 12-inch "Dotsushima" shell didn't exceed 3,7%. This was even less than the Japanese armor-piercing shell's 5%.
Typically, when evaluating pre-Tsushima high-explosive shells, we rely on the "Resolution of the Naval Technical Committee to the Chairman of the Investigative Commission on the Battle of Tsushima," which cited the quality of the steel as the primary reason for the low explosive content. The MTC, however, failed to mention that while the country knew how to make good steel, it used it to produce armor-piercing shells, but they wanted to get high-explosive shells cheaper, which is why they chose to use simpler steel. However, had the MTC mentioned this, they would have had to explain the reasons why its leadership was forced to cut corners. Let's not forget that the Ministry of Finance, having allocated funds for ships, categorically stinted on shells for them.
Be that as it may, MTK attributed everything to the quality of the steel, while E.A. Berkalov also saw in the drawings an attempt to provide the "pre-Tsushima" high-explosive shells with some armor penetration. This is quite likely true and fully explains MTK's decision not to equip the "pre-Tsushima" high-explosive shells with "especially sensitive tubes," but instead to use double impact tubes (Brinka).
But if E.A. Berkalov is correct, it follows that the "pre-Tsushima" high-explosive shells, even at the design stage, did not have the maximum explosive content possible for the steel used for their manufacture. And the ability to penetrate moderately thick armor was factored into these shells' design.
Whether this was true or not, I can't say. But, in any case, it's quite clear that the domestic "Dotsushima" high-explosive shells were a completely unique type of ammunition, completely unrelated to high-explosive shells. Therefore, their capabilities cannot be projected onto the typical high-explosive shells of other countries.
From the above, the following conclusion can be drawn. Classic high-explosive shells of the era could not penetrate armor half their caliber, unless this requirement was specified by the designers during their development. This conclusion is supported by tests in 1890, during which French sailors discovered that 60 mm of armor was sufficient to protect against 164 mm steel high-explosive shells.
Of course, any high-explosive shell of that era with a base tube and explosive that didn't immediately detonate upon impact with an obstacle was capable of penetrating armor of some thickness. But exactly what thickness depended on the design, the steel used, and so on.
On the Bayan's resistance to Japanese armor-piercing and high-explosive shells
Due to the nature of Japanese shells, the Bayan was exceptionally well protected. Its entire main armor belt, conning tower, 8-inch turrets, and feed pipes provided virtually absolute protection not only from 6-8-inch shells, but even from 10-12-inch shells. This statement also applies to the comparatively weak section of the cruiser's bow turret feed pipe, which had only 60 mm of armor behind the 60 mm upper belt. Although such protection was weak against a classic armor-piercing shell, it was quite adequate against Japanese ammunition. Even a 12-inch Japanese shell would normally detonate upon impact with the upper armor belt, and the 60 mm of protection the feed pipe provided from its fragments was quite sufficient. It is noted that this section could have been damaged by a shell flying over the upper edge of the armor belt and penetrating the deck.
But the whole point is that a Japanese shell on such a trajectory would likely have exploded upon impact with the deck, and again, the 60mm feed pipe would have been reduced to fragments. Even if this hadn't happened, 60mm of armor provided excellent protection against Japanese shells of 6-8 inch caliber and was quite capable of withstanding even larger caliber shells. To see this, one need only look at the damage to the 50,8mm armor plate of the battleship Retvizan, sustained in the battle of July 28, 1904.
The shell that struck the ship was estimated to be 10-12 inches long, but cracks in the armor clearly indicate that the impact behind the armor was minimal. The impact occurred in the area of the conductor's mess room, and the damage report noted that "some asbestos panels and furniture" were broken in this room.
Based on the above, it can be concluded that both the upper armor belt and casemates, 60 mm thick, provided ample protection against Japanese shells of 6-8 inches at any combat range. Generally, a hit from such shells could cause some damage to the armor plate, but without any behind-the-armor impact.
Nevertheless, the Bayan certainly had its vulnerabilities. Three of them.
Roofs of casemates. Their 15mm armor was too weak to withstand the impact of a Japanese shell, and it was expected that the shell would explode as it penetrated the armor. Such a hit could have sent a hail of shrapnel into the casemate, potentially disabling the gun itself and its crew. However, such a strike had virtually no chance of causing anything more serious—the 6-inch shell casings and 75mm rounds stored in the casemate were relatively immune to such impacts. Even the ignition of one or two 6-inch rounds could not have led to catastrophic damage to the ship.
"Naked" food. It would certainly have been better to armor it with at least 60-mm armor plates, but this was not done, and approximately 20,7 meters of the Bayan's waterline was exposed to high-explosive shells. This is an unfortunate shortcoming, but it should not be overstated—the 50-mm armor deck located below the waterline (30 mm of armor steel and 2 x 10 mm steel plates) guaranteed the impermeability of the steering system to shells of 6-8 inch caliber. At the same time, as the battle of January 27, 1904, demonstrated, the cofferdams that protected the unarmored part of the stern worked quite well—when a 6-inch Japanese shell exploded in one of these cofferdams, it did not cause flooding of the aft compartments.
But even if we disregard cofferdams, we mustn't forget that hitting unarmored ends didn't always result in damage that would reduce the combat potential of Russian ships. A good example is the photo of the damage sustained by the armored cruiser Gromoboy in the battle of August 1, 1904.
The holes were huge, but they had no effect on the cruiser's combat capability.
Lack of armored chimneys and armored grates. The latter protected the boilers from shrapnel penetration from shells exploding in the funnels. For Japanese cruisers, this was a viable, practical way to slow down the Bayan. However, strictly speaking, the presence of armored grates only reduced the likelihood of damage to the propulsion system, which would force the ship to slow down, rather than eliminating it entirely.
Based on the above, it can be concluded that Izumo had virtually no chance of inflicting decisive damage on Bayan at any combat distance.
On the Izumo's resistance to Russian armor-piercing and high-explosive shells
Let's first determine at what range the Bayan would have used high-explosive shells. The Izumo had a maximum range of 65 cables with its 8-inch guns, but it would hardly have sought to engage at such a distance. It's reasonable to assume that the Japanese would have opened the engagement at 55 cables, but would have then sought to close and engage at 30-40 cables. However, the Bayan is faster than the Izumo, making it capable of dictating the latter's firing range.
At the same time, for the 1st Pacific Squadron, the distance for switching to armor-piercing shells was regulated by the order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Ocean Fleet, Vice-Admiral S. O. Makarov, dated March 4, 1904, No. 21. According to it, switching to armor-piercing shells was permitted (but not mandatory) from the following distances:
1. For guns 10–12 dm — 25 kbt;
2. For 8 dm guns - 20 kbt;
3. For 6 dm guns - 15 kbt;
4. For 120 mm guns - 10 kbt.
But, apparently, the specified ranges were prescribed even before S. O. Makarov, since in the battle on January 27, 1904, the Bayan switched to armor-piercing shells when the distance to the target was reduced to 19 cables.
As for the 2nd Pacific Fleet, the transition distance to armor-piercing shells was not regulated for 8-inch guns, and for 6-inch and 10-12-inch guns, it was set 5 cable lengths shorter than for the 1st Pacific Fleet. It should be assumed that if Z.P. Rozhestvensky's ships had carried 8-inch/45-inch guns, they would have been assigned a transition distance of 15 cable lengths. However, since the Bayan was not listed under Z.P. Rozhestvensky, we will assume that the Bayan would begin firing armor-piercing shells at the Izumo at precisely 20 cable lengths, and until then, she would be firing high-explosive shells.
Let's look again at the distances from which Japanese armor was penetrated by armor-piercing shells from the 8-inch/45 guns mounted on the Bayan.
At a distance of 30–50 cables, Izumo was vulnerable to:
1. The bow and stern ends of the cruiser;
2. Two open-mounted 6-inch guns on the upper deck;
3. Roofs of the casemates of 6-inch guns.
Bow and stern ends. The Japanese could have had a multitude of problems with them. If a Russian 8-inch shell hit the narrow strip of 89 mm armor belt protruding above the water, it would have penetrated it at virtually any range. In the worst-case scenario, the shell would have exploded as it passed through the plate, and it's unclear how much worse it would have been for the Izumo, as such an explosion would have damaged the armor plate more severely and allowed water to enter the ship more easily. On the other hand, the impact of the shrapnel had a good chance of damaging the bulkheads and lower deck, threatening serious flooding all the way to the carapace deck.
Shell hits above the armor belt also posed a risk to the Izumo. Both 8-inch and 6-inch Russian shells would explode deep within the hull, creating a relatively narrow cone of fragments in the direction of the shell's trajectory. Given the shell's angle of impact, this cone would tend to strike the opposite side just above the 89-mm belt, very close to the waterline, allowing water to enter the Izumo's hull even if the entry hole was high enough above the waterline to prevent flooding. The consequences of such flooding were demonstrated by the example of the Asama, which became the "lucky" owner of a 1.5-meter trim by the stern, despite the armor at the end not being penetrated.
At a range of 30–40 cable lengths, the danger increased even more. At this point, a Russian shell had a good chance of not only penetrating the 89mm armor but also exploding as it penetrated the hull deck, which could cause flooding below it.
Of course, such damage didn't threaten the Izumo's destruction. However, a bow or stern tilt would have reduced the cruiser's speed, made it more difficult to fire her guns, and thus, of course, to some extent reduced her ability to inflict damage on the enemy.
It's noteworthy that the Izumo's ends were far more vulnerable to Bayan shells than Bayan's were to Izumo's. Bayan's vulnerable section, though relatively so, was the 20,7-meter-long, unprotected section of her stern. Izumo's bow and stern, outside the protection of her 178-mm belt, were 38,05 meters long.
Two open-mounted 6-inch guns. This is simple—their 76,2 mm shields could be penetrated by an 8-inch high-explosive shell at any reasonable range. But what's worse is the relatively small size of the shield, leaving some of the crew unprotected, as well as the need to store ammunition for the guns openly on the upper deck. Due to the above, this artillery could be disabled even without a direct hit to the gun or its shield.
Roofs and side walls of casemates. The Izumo fared just as badly with them as the Bayan did - the experience of naval battles during the Russo-Japanese War showed that the 25,4 mm roof of the Japanese casemates could be penetrated by almost anything.
Thus, in the Battle of Tsushima, 12-inch Russian shells penetrated the Mikasa's casemate roofs twice, and once, a 6-inch shell penetrated it (at a distance of approximately 22-30 cables). Moreover, the Japanese reported that this six-inch shell did not explode during penetration of the armor, but rather penetrated it first and only then exploded. However, to be fair, it should be noted that the casemate roof penetrated by the 6-inch shell had previously been hit by a 12-inch shell. During the battle of August 1, 1904, ammunition exploded in the casemate of the cruiser Iwate, although the accepted theory is that the explosion was caused by an 8-inch shell that penetrated the roof of the upper starboard casemate.
All of the above does not mean, of course, that the roofs of Japanese casemates were easily penetrated by a 6-inch shell. During the same battle on August 1, 1904, between the cruisers H. Kamimura and K.P. Jessen, there were frequent instances of Russian shells of this caliber ricocheting off the decks of Japanese cruisers, meaning they could also ricochet off the casemate roofs. However, the latter were quite vulnerable to Russian 6-inch and 8-inch shells at ranges of 30-50 cables, or even less.
Furthermore, there was a risk of a shell hitting the side or rear walls of the Japanese casemates. This was because only the part of the casemate facing the enemy had 152mm of protection.
Therefore, a shell fired from the sharp bow or stern angles could easily hit the side wall of the casemate, which was protected only by 50,8 mm of armor, which was no obstacle to an 8-inch shell. Even a 6-inch shell, exploding while penetrating the armor, could have caused considerable distress to those in the casemate.
During the Battle of August 1 in the Korea Strait, Russian 8-inch shells twice penetrated both sides of the Japanese cruisers and escaped without exploding. In one instance, a shell struck the Izumo just off the sternpost, and this hit can be considered unremarkable, as the shell's path through the cruiser's hull was minimal. However, the second shell penetrated the side of the Azuma, passed through the sick bay, pierced a cabin bulkhead, ricocheted off the middle deck, leaving a 0,45-meter-long crack, and then pierced a ventilation shaft, a coal loading pipe, and the bulkhead of another cabin before escaping overboard. In short, this shell, which struck the Azuma's port side, had its trajectory been slightly different, could easily have struck the aft wall of the starboard casemate—with dire consequences for the latter, of course.
And here an important caveat is necessary: although the Bayan's casemate could also be hit through the roof, and with very, very great Japanese luck – through the armor, the consequences of this defeat for the cruisers were fundamentally different.
The problem is that the British, by cramming powerful artillery and armor into the limited displacement of the Asama and Izumo, were forced to sacrifice a lot, including the ease of ammunition supply. In the Bayan design, the French arranged each 6-inch gun so that it had its own magazine, from which it was fed. The British couldn't afford this in their armored cruiser design for Japan—they lacked space.
Therefore, on Izumo, as on other British-built cruisers, the 6-inch magazines were located closer to the bow and stern. Shells and charges from these magazines were transferred to special corridors located under the armored deck between the engine and boiler rooms and the coal bins. Ammunition was transported within these corridors using special rails running under the corridor's roof directly to the feed pipes.
But these feed pipes themselves were of an extremely primitive design—two endless chains with two hooks on each. One chain was for shells, the other for charges. One hook and the shell (charge) on it were fed to the gun, while the other was located in the corridor.
So, not only did the shells and charges have to be transferred to the guns in numerous iterations, but the ammunition feed was also done manually. In other words, the endless chains were turned not by electric motors, but by humans. Four people per gun: two for the endless chain with charges and two for the shells. The Russian Imperial Navy, of course, didn't have this anachronism on the contemporary Asama and Izumo ships. Our ammunition was lifted by electric winches, which allowed it to be fed in arbours containing three rounds each. And understandably, feeding ammunition to the Bayan's six-inch guns was much faster than the Japanese could manage on their armoured cruisers.
The result of such cost-cutting was predictable. The 6-inch ammunition feed system adopted on British-built armored cruisers was nowhere near capable of ensuring the combat rate of fire of 6-inch guns. Feeding shells at the rate at which they were expended in actual combat was simply impossible. This was not due to the "short stature" or "physical weakness" of Japanese sailors compared to their European counterparts, but to the primitive and archaic ammunition feed system.
The solution to this problem was similar to that used for the main-caliber turrets: a significant portion of the ammunition was stored directly in the casemates. I can only assume the only difference was that:
1. In the towers, shells were stored routinely and on a permanent basis, but in the casemates, supplies were formed in anticipation of a battle;
2. Only shells were stored in the towers, but both shells and charges were supplied to the casemates.
This order of ammunition supply to the 6-inch guns led to the tragedy on the Iwate, which received an 8-inch shell in the upper starboard casemate of the cruiser's bow. As a result of the explosion, the Japanese lost 23 shells and 36 charges for the 6-inch gun, as well as 24 76-mm rounds stored on the roof of the casemate. It is likely that not all of them detonated or burned; some may have been thrown overboard. However, the force of the explosion was sufficient to disable three 6-inch guns, including both six-inch guns in the "two-story" forward casemate where the shell struck, as well as another deck gun closest to this casemate, as well as the 76-mm gun located on the roof of the casemate. Forty men were killed and 36 wounded, seven of whom were seriously injured. The officer losses must have disrupted the firing, as the commanders of the third and fourth artillery groups (the forward and aft 6-inch guns) were incapacitated: one killed, the other seriously wounded. The commander of the forward 76-mm gun group was also killed, while the senior artillery officer was only lightly wounded.
Overall, the blow was devastating. But any 6-inch gun casemate could have suffered the same blow, since they were all converted into artillery magazines before battle. And where the Japanese kept their ammunition for the exposed six-inch guns with their meager shields—I don't even want to think about it.
It must be said that the Iwate withstood this terrible blow with honor: having lost 76 men killed and wounded and almost half of the 6-inch guns firing to starboard, she continued to fight without abandoning her place in the line. But such an outcome was not always to be expected: the fire and energy from the casemate explosion could spread down the supply pipes into the corridors used to transport ammunition, and there was a considerable amount of it.
Much later, during World War I, this scenario proved fatal for the German armored cruiser Blücher, whose ammunition supply for her 210mm guns was organized in a similar manner—through a corridor beneath the armored deck. A British shell ignited 35-40 charges in this corridor, causing two turrets to burn to the ground along with their crews. The shells did not detonate, but a massive fire broke out amidships, and severed steam lines led to a drop in speed, which ultimately sealed the Blücher's demise.
So, at a range of 30-50 cable lengths, the Izumo had plenty of weak spots, significantly more than the Bayan. As the range closed, things got even worse: at 22-26 cable lengths, the upper belt and traverses of the 127 mm armor protecting the feed pipes of the 8-inch turrets began to be penetrated. Such armor was quite resistant to our 8-inch high-explosive shells: even if the shell exploded upon passing through it, the force of hot fragments and gases would obviously penetrate the feed pipes. And from 22 cable lengths, even the 152 mm armor of the turrets and feed pipes above the 127 mm traverses was at risk. Of course, 152 mm of plate is much thicker than the four inches that a Russian 8-inch shell could penetrate according to the "half-caliber" rule, and a Russian high-explosive shell would not have penetrated it entirely. But, having exploded in the process of penetrating the armor, it still had a good chance of transmitting its “flaming-fragment greeting” to the space behind the armor, as was done in the battle at Shantung by a 12-inch shell that penetrated the 173 mm armor plate of the Mikasa.
From 20 cable lengths, the cruiser's gunners would have switched to armor-piercing shells. It's hard to imagine ships meeting at less than 15 cable lengths in a Russo-Japanese War battle, so we can assume the Izumo's citadel and magazines would have remained safe. However, anything protected by 152 mm of armor or less would have been reliably penetrated by Russian 8-inch shells at a range of 15-20 cable lengths—even if the Izumo had been protected by Krupp armor rather than Harvey.
The conclusion from the above is simple: Bayan had the potential to inflict far more serious damage on Izumo than Izumo could on Bayan, at both long and short ranges. Bayan, however, should have acted decisively and, with its speed advantage, quickly closed with Izumo to within armor-piercing range, where our cruiser had a good chance of destroying Izumo.
Fly in the Ointment
Given the above, at first glance it appears that, despite being lighter, less heavily armored, and less armed, the Bayan is more powerful than the Japanese Izumo. But this isn't entirely true.
Let's take a battle at a range of 30-50 kbt. Without a doubt, at such distances, the Bayan's shells could cause far more serious damage to the Izumo than the Izumo's shells could to the Bayan. But would they?
At such ranges, it's impossible to target the waterline extremities or the roofs of Japanese casemates. Impact locations will be largely random, and to have a chance of hitting the Izumo in a vulnerable spot, a sufficient number of hits would be needed.
In terms of the 8-inch gun mounts, the Bayan had everything for this. Her single-gun turrets provided a firepower comparable to the twin turrets of British-built Japanese armored cruisers. Thus, the Bayan could unleash roughly the same number of 8-inch shells on the enemy as the enemy unleashed on her. However, the situation with her 6-inch guns is less clear—as is well known, some of our six-inch Canet guns were prone to breakdowns when firing at long ranges. According to some estimates, the fault lay not with the guns themselves, but with the weak deck reinforcements beneath them. It's possible that a similar problem could have befallen the Bayan's 6-inch guns, which were already few in number, only four per side.
But even if the Bayan's six-inch guns were reliable, firing doesn't necessarily mean hitting. And hitting would have been significantly more difficult for the Bayan's gunners than for the Japanese. I don't know if the Bayan had a rangefinder, but most likely not, and there were no accurate optical sights. All of this, of course, would have greatly reduced the Russian ship's accuracy relative to the Izumo.
Even if the Bayan's gunners had had both rangefinders and optical sights, they still couldn't have been expected to match the Japanese gunners' accuracy. Russian shells, even high-explosive ones, could penetrate armor of a certain thickness, but this advantage came at a very high price. The pyroxylin-filled shells had no tendency to explode upon impact with the water (although this did happen), and they usually exploded not on the hull but inside the ship, which obscured the flash (and was impossible to see at such distances) and produced no noticeable smoke. All this meant that both target acquisition and target engagement were poorly observed from the Russian ship, if at all. The navy would eventually learn to fire such shells, but this happened much later than the Russo-Japanese War and with improved fire control systems.
The Japanese shells exploded both on the water and on the hull, and the explosions produced clearly visible columns of black smoke, so the Izumo's gunners had no problems with sighting in and assessing the effectiveness of their fire.
So, in a battle at a range of 30-50 cable lengths, the Japanese cruiser, thanks to its rangefinders and optical sights, its larger number of 6-inch barrels, and its better visibility of the impact and detonation of its own shells, would have scored significantly more hits on the Bayan than the Bayan scored on the Izumo. These hits could not have caused critical damage to the Bayan, but they had some chance of weakening its artillery potential. Overall, the Bayan was well protected against high-explosive shells, but, as mentioned above, the roofs of its casemates were vulnerable. Furthermore, in battles during the Russo-Japanese War, there were frequent instances where a shell exploding on the belt armor or deck killed or wounded gun crews with shrapnel flying into the embrasures of the turrets and casemates. Let us also recall the extremely poor design of the conning towers, which literally absorbed Japanese shrapnel from shells exploding nearby - such shrapnel could have incapacitated the officer directing the Bayan's fire.
At the same time, firing at 30-50 cable lengths, the Japanese armored cruisers did not demonstrate the ability to rain down shells on the Russian ships that would have reliably suppressed the Russian cruiser's fire. Still, Bayan, fighting at that range, would have scored significantly fewer hits, and statistically, its chances of inflicting serious damage on Izumo were slim.
Therefore, the most realistic outcome of a prolonged firefight between the Bayan and the Izumo at 30-50 cable lengths is a draw. Most likely, the Bayan would have sustained many more hits, but without sustaining any serious damage.
At a range of 20-30 cable lengths, the situation would have begun to change. Of course, Izumo's accuracy would have increased with decreasing range, but so would Bayan's. In fact, one might expect Bayan's accuracy gain to be even greater than that of the Japanese cruiser, as its mechanical sights allowed for a more or less accurate placement of shells within Izumo's silhouette at 20-30 cable lengths. This doesn't mean, of course, that Bayan would have demonstrated better accuracy than Izumo, but the gap in their accuracy would have tended to narrow.
Let's say that at a distance of 30-50 cables, with equal training of gunners, the Bayan would give one hit with an 8-inch shell on two Japanese (the figures, of course, are completely arbitrary and taken only as an example), then at 20-30 cables it could give two or three hits with 8-inch shells on three or four Japanese.
Compared to an artillery duel of 30-50 kbt, the Bayan had a better chance of inflicting significant damage on the Izumo, and the Izumo had a better chance of suppressing the Bayan's artillery, and overall, here too, one can diagnose the approximate equality of these cruisers.
The situation changed dramatically only at a range of 15-20 kbt. Here, the Bayan gained a significant advantage, as its accuracy was quite high even with mechanical sights; rangefinders were of little use at such a distance, and its 8-inch shells would confidently penetrate the Izumo's turrets, feed pipes, and casemates. At the same time, due to the characteristics of its ammunition, the Izumo didn't benefit significantly from closing the range to 15-20 kbt.
Conclusions
Despite the fact that the Izumo had a larger displacement, better protection, and was superior to the Bayan in the number of artillery guns, and also taking into account the ammunition actually used by both sides, it can be said that:
1. At a distance of over 20 cables, the capabilities of the cruisers should be considered comparable, and a fire battle at this distance would most likely end in a draw.
2. At a distance of 20 kbt and less, when the Bayan would have switched to armor-piercing shells, capable of penetrating 152 mm armor at such a distance, the Russian cruiser would have gained a noticeable advantage over the Izumo.
Earlier, in a series of articles devoted to the shells and armor of the Russian Imperial Navy, I showed in the final piece that our admirals, having relied on armor-piercing shells, which were effective only at relatively short ranges, were unable to provide their ships with the speed that would have allowed them to engage the Japanese at such distances. Because of this, the main weapon The fleet was actually unable to demonstrate its effectiveness.
But for the Bayan and Izumo pair, things would have been different. Bayan outscored the Japanese cruiser by approximately 2 knots (20 knots versus 18 knots), so its commander could impose any distance he deemed necessary on Izumo. At the same time, the Izumo's commander, commanding a heavier and more powerful (in terms of number of guns) ship, would likely not have avoided closing to 25–30 cable lengths, and perhaps even closer. However, by closing to 30 cable lengths, Bayan would have been able to quickly close to the firing range of its 8-inch armor-piercing shells.
In general, all that was required of the Bayan's commander in a hypothetical duel with the Izumo was, in the best traditions of the navy, to move forward at full speed to close in and engage the Izumo in combat at a "dagger" distance, where the presence of armor-piercing shells would give the Bayan a noticeable advantage.
Well, we've finished with the Izumo, now let's see what another Japanese cruiser, the Nissin, could do to counter the Bayan.
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