Shell scandals in the Red Army in 1940-1941 that went unnoticed

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Shell scandals in the Red Army in 1940-1941 that went unnoticed


In the early spring of 1941, two defective hulls with turrets were fired upon tank T-34 tanks were fired to determine the effect of armor plate cracks on their resistance to shelling. The shelling was conducted with 37–76,2 mm caliber guns and various projectiles, including experimental ones.



Firing tests revealed that cracks in the hull and turret plates had minimal impact on their resistance to shells. However, the same tests led to an unexpected conclusion unrelated to cracks: they revealed the poor quality of the standard 45mm armor-piercing rounds (APC). This observation is the focus of the following analysis.

Thus, according to the table below, the through-penetration limit (PSL) of a standard blunt-nosed armored vehicle (standard 0130) when hitting at normal speed was more than 760 m/s for armor sheets 45 mm thick, which gives an armor/projectile coefficient (according to the de Marr formula) of 2890 units.


It's important to define the scale right away: the higher the K coefficient, the more the armor resists the projectile—or, equivalently, the worse the projectile's performance. The reference design value for Krupp cemented armor (KTs) in the USSR at that time was 2400 units; anything significantly higher indicates excessive "resistance," which is, in fact, a weaker projectile.

Not armor, but shells


One could justify these results by citing the high armor resistance of the MZ-2 econom armor (a grade of armor made from ship scrap), but data from firing at the same hulls and turrets with other 45mm and 37mm caliber projectiles doesn't allow this. Firing at the 45mm pointed-nosed gun carriage-test projectile (drawing 2-01991) showed only a slight decrease in the armor-to-projectile ratio—known in professional jargon as the "plate price," or armor resistance expressed numerically—to 2660 units when firing at 45mm armor.


The 37mm shells demonstrated mediocre resistance for the MZ-2: K = 2295 for a thickness of 45mm. As a reminder, the armor-to-shell ratio calculated in the USSR at that time for armor penetration tables was 2400 units and corresponded to Krupp cemented armor (KTs).


Thus, in the author's opinion, the issue isn't the superior armor, but the poor quality of the standard 45mm shells. Furthermore, the use of blunt-nosed shells with undercuts didn't help the 45mm gun much: their armor penetration was slightly higher when hitting at normal angles—at K = 2662–2706 (the table below is likely an error: the penetration rates for the vertical 45mm side are reversed).

Moreover, the T-34 hull and turret test report contains no evidence of defects in the standard 45mm shells. Otherwise, one would have to assume that all three types of 45mm shells were defective (according to the report, a total of over three hundred rounds were fired—the exact number requires verification against archival documents), including the two experimental types, which is highly unlikely.

The reason is the shape of the head


According to the author, the most likely reason for the low armor penetration of 45mm blunt-nosed projectiles is the shape of the ogive, or, in other words, their bluntness (see appendix). The principles of improving penetration through the shape of the warhead have been developed since the late 19th century; I leave the specific attribution of priority and dating to clarification from sources. The superiority of blunt-nosed projectiles in penetration over sharp-nosed ones was also demonstrated during armor testing as part of Research Project No. 25 in 1936.


Why, then, in real-world fire, couldn't the standard 45mm shells penetrate either 50mm of homogeneous or 50mm of cemented armor at point-blank range? Apparently, the advantage of blunt-nosed shells depended on the thickness of the armor plates—or, more precisely, on the ratio of armor thickness to caliber: 30mm plates were easily penetrated by blunt-nosed shells (a ratio of 30/45), but as soon as the ratio increased to 40/45 or more, blunt-nosed shells lost out to sharp-nosed shells.

For example, according to a document on actual armor firing, a 30mm cemented plate ("plate price" - 2400) was penetrated by a standard blunt-nosed 45mm BBS from a range of 1000 meters at an angle of 30°. The normalized thickness at this angle, as well as the projectile's energy conservation at this range, mean that at point-blank range, this projectile should have been calculated to penetrate approximately 50mm of KTs armor with 100% probability. However, this did not occur, even against the highly hardened homogeneous armor of the MZ-2.

For reference: the calculated armor penetration of a 2400-kJ KTs plate with a 45mm armor-piercing round at the muzzle was 58 mm at normal range. With 40mm of armor, the K coefficient increased to 2604: at an angle of 30°, the standard 45mm APFSDS could penetrate this armor only from 150 meters.

Why didn't you switch to pointed-nosed projectiles?


Why didn't they switch to sharp-nosed projectiles? The quality of the projectile steel was also a factor: according to the document below, sharp-nosed projectiles provided better armor penetration only if they were made from higher-quality (and more expensive) tool steel using special heat treatment. It was precisely this high cost and complexity of production that hindered their transition.


Thus, the blunt-headed projectile provided two advantages at once: firstly, it was made of relatively cheap steel; Secondly, provided satisfactory penetration of armor, the thickness of which was noticeably less than its caliber.

Customer reaction and consequences


Since the blunt-nosed projectile was considered acceptable within the accepted logic, the unsatisfactory results of firing 45mm APFSDS at two T-34 hulls and turrets—both in the spring of 1941 and in an earlier data series in the fall of 1940 (see the commission's conclusions in the appendix)—in the author's opinion, did not cause any particular concern to the customer. Underestimating the actual armor penetration of the mass-produced 45mm artillery, was likely one of many factors that allowed enemy tanks to reach Moscow, Kyiv, Leningrad, and Stalingrad. It should be noted, however, that the military failures of 1941 were multifactorial and cannot be reduced to the quality of 45mm shells. Nevertheless, 45mm tank and anti-tank artillery was in widespread use, making the weakness of its standard armor-piercing shell all the more noticeable.

And if the measures taken on the basis of the firing test in the spring of 1941 may seem too late (the development of the 57-mm ZIS-2 cannon), then, according to information available to the author, no clear decisions on the part of the Main Artillery Directorate regarding the data on the low armor penetration of the standard 45-mm BBS in mid-autumn 1940 are recorded in the documents, which may be connected, among other things, with the general reorientation of the department to new calibers.


Information about a 1938 batch of defective (overheated) shells from one of the factories did not change the overall picture of the weak effect of blunt-nosed shells on armor with a thickness close to the caliber of the 45-mm BBS.

And finally, the responses of Comrade Beria from two different departments.


application


From the conclusions of the commission on the results of shelling of armor in 1940.
"The commission also noted that the effect of the 37-mm sharp-nosed armor-piercing projectile (drawing no. 3882) when fired at normal angles at plates up to 35 mm thick was weaker than that of 45-mm blunt-nosed armor-piercing projectiles. When firing at plates 35 to 40 mm thick, the effect of both projectiles was approximately equal, and when firing at plates 45 and 50 mm thick, 37-mm sharp-nosed armor-piercing projectiles were superior in their effect on armor than 45-mm blunt-nosed projectiles. When firing at armor plates 25 to 50 mm thick, positioned at an angle of 30° to the vertical, the anti-tank velocity determined by firing 37-mm sharp-nosed armor-piercing projectiles was lower than that determined by firing 45-mm blunt-nosed armor-piercing projectiles. The through-penetration limit for 37mm shells hitting armor plates up to 40mm thick had higher absolute velocity values ​​than the through-penetration limit for 45mm blunt-nosed armor-piercing shells. When hitting armor plates thicker than 40mm, the impact of 37mm sharp-nosed shells was greater than that of 45mm blunt-nosed shells. For example, at an impact velocity of 760 m/s, a 45mm blunt-nosed armor-piercing shell (standard 0130) could reliably penetrate only a 45mm plate, while a 37mm sharp-nosed armor-piercing shell (drawing no. 3882) penetrated a 50mm armor plate made of MZ-2 steel at this velocity.


40 comments
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  1. +5
    28 June 2026 06: 57
    It should be added that the GAU commission established in 1941 that about 40 (forty!!!)% of the produced shells were defective.
    People's Commissar of Ammunition Vannikov went to prison. He was saved by a miracle and the outbreak of war. But that's another story.
    He subsequently became a three-time Hero of Socialist Labor, and his contribution to the creation of the nuclear missile shield was simply invaluable.
    1. +1
      28 June 2026 11: 56
      After the seventh paragraph from the top:
      "Thus, in the author's opinion, the issue isn't the superior quality of the armor, but the poor quality of the standard 45mm shells. Furthermore, the use of blunt-nosed shells with undercuts didn't help the 45mm gun much: their armor penetration was somewhat higher when hitting at normal angles—at K = 2662–2706 (the table below is likely an error: the penetration rates for the vertical 45mm side are swapped)."—a table should follow (to make it clear what we're talking about):
      1. 0
        28 June 2026 12: 05
        The actual armor penetration of the 45-caliber and 30-caliber three-inch guns in 1940:
        1. 0
          28 June 2026 14: 04
          Why wasn't this document differentiating between armor-piercing and concrete-piercing shells?
          A bit unclear table...
          1. +3
            28 June 2026 15: 34
            Quote: hohol95
            Why wasn't this document differentiating between armor-piercing and concrete-piercing shells?
            A bit unclear table...

            Concrete-piercing guns were for a 152mm caliber. The table is truncated for guns that could actually fire at enemy tanks in large numbers.
            1. +1
              28 June 2026 15: 56
              The KT-28, L-10/11, and F-32 guns were weaker than the F-34 and ZiS-5 that replaced them.
              Please also indicate their armor penetration.
              1. +1
                29 June 2026 05: 29
                Quote: hohol95
                The KT-28, L-10/11, and F-32 guns were weaker than the F-34 and ZiS-5 that replaced them.
                Please also indicate their armor penetration.

                You can specify it, but why?
                Article about 45 mm.
                Almost half of the T-34s in the Western Military Districts were equipped with L-11s, and all the KVs and T-28s were equipped with .30-caliber or smaller tanks. It's worth noting that things were pretty bad with them, too.
                1. 0
                  30 June 2026 12: 32
                  Quote: Jura 27
                  It is given for reference that everything was sad with them too.

                  Well, sad or not, but the L11 penetrates 40 mm of armor with a sixfold advantage in range) If they hit from that distance, of course.
    2. 0
      4 July 2026 22: 18
      Before the war, Vannikov was the People's Commissar of Armaments and had nothing to do with ammunition. He went to prison because in 41 he refused to sign the arrest warrant for Shavyrin, the chief of mortars. He was accused of sabotage and sabotage during mortar production, and since Vannikov was his direct superior, his signature was required. Stalin had gotten tired of him anyway—he argued too much, had his own opinions, so why bother with him? Then came the war, work had to be done, and Vannikov was "forgiven." First, he was appointed Deputy People's Commissar of Ammunition, and then People's Commissar.
  2. +9
    28 June 2026 07: 26
    In 1941, the forty-fives showed themselves well against the weak Pz Kpfw I, Pz Kpfw II, and early Pz Kpfw III and Pz Kpfw IV tanks and Czech tanks, and they were clearly not the cause of the defeats.

    The German 37 mm anti-tank gun and most of the German tank guns in 41 were inferior to it.
    1. +4
      28 June 2026 09: 54
      Quote: Olgovich
      In 1941, the forty-fives showed themselves well against the weak Pz Kpfw I, Pz Kpfw II, and early Pz Kpfw III and Pz Kpfw IV tanks and Czech tanks, and they were clearly not the cause of the defeats.


      https://dzen.ru/a/aH_hY4mLr1s6wPx-

      The quality of the armor was no less impressive. According to tank historian M. Svirin, this was the main discovery. Tests at Kubinka showed that the 45mm Soviet anti-tank gun, model 1937, could not penetrate the armor from a distance of more than 300 meters. Some shots fired from 400 meters penetrated the armor only twice out of five, provided they hit at an angle of no more than 30 degrees.

      A documentary commission headed by E. Satel recorded that the German tank's 32mm cemented armor was equivalent in strength to 42–44mm domestically produced armor. Furthermore, its high hardness frequently resulted in ricochets.

      https://militera.lib.ru/docs/0/pdf/1941-1.pdf

      "Special message from the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army on the direction of development of the German armed forces and changes in their status. March 11, 1941." pp. 751-752

      "1. Light tanks.

      [...]

      b) The 38-T light tank is being built for Germany at the ČKD factories,
      having the following characteristics:
      Weight approx. 10 tons.
      Speed ​​42 km / h
      Armament: 1 37 mm cannon and 2 machine guns
      Armor: frontal 50 mm
      30mm turret,
      side 15 mm,
      roof and bottom 8-10 mm
      Crew 3 man.
      The thickness of the armor (frontal plates) is noteworthy,
      withstand a hit from a 45mm shell. By the end of 1941, 1.590 such tanks were to be built."

      I also recommend:

      https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/proizvodstvo-protivotankovyh-boepripasov-v-sssr-nakanune-i-v-nachale-velikoy-otechestvennoy-voyny

      "Production of anti-tank ammunition on the eve and at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War"

      "...Thus, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, 76-mm divisional and tank guns were actually not provided with armor-piercing shells. As a result, the main burden of the fight against German tanks was placed on the 45-mm anti-tank guns (PTP) mod. 1937, the provision of which with armor-piercing rounds, in contrast to 76-mm guns, amounted to 91% of the total requirement (taking into account the emergency reserve and emergency reserve). Nevertheless, 45-mm PTP could not always be used as an effective means of combating enemy armored vehicles, especially with such tanks as the T-3 and T-4. By June 1, 1941, the Wehrmacht troops had 1957 T-3 and T-4 tanks, of which about 1000 tanks were modernized and had frontal armor thickness of 50-60 mm. The overwhelming majority of these vehicles were intended for the attack on the Soviet Union and were transferred to the Soviet-German border. In total, by June 22, 1941, the four tank groups prepared for the invasion of the USSR had 3332 tanks, of which 1404 were T-3 and T-4 tanks [11, p. 267]. A 76-mm armor-piercing projectile fired from a 76-mm divisional or tank gun from a distance of 500 m penetrated 69 mm of armor at an angle of impact of 90 degrees and 56 mm of armor at an angle of impact of 60 degrees. An armor-piercing 45-mm projectile under the same conditions penetrated 43 and 40 mm of armor. Accordingly, it did not seem advisable to use 45-mm anti-tank guns against the modernized T-3 and T-4: only 76-mm divisional or tank guns. However, there were no armor-piercing shells for them. This did not allow the use of 76-mm guns as an effective means of anti-tank defense and made Soviet troops virtually defenseless against attacks by German T-3 and T-4 tanks with increased armor protection. In this regard, already on July 1, 1941, the Chief of Artillery of the Western Front, Lieutenant General of Artillery N.A. Klich, reported to the Chief of the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU RKKA) that the front was in dire need of 76-mm armor-piercing shells to combat tank formations [12, pp. 84–85]. The Chief of Artillery of the Southwestern Front, Lieutenant General of Artillery M.A. Parsegov, wrote the same thing in his report to the Chief of the GAU on July 14, 1941. He noted that from the very first days of the war, the front’s troops began to sharply feel the need for 76-mm armor-piercing rounds in combat against enemy tanks. At the same time, according to M.A. Parsegov, the abnormal supply of 76-mm armor-piercing rounds to troops continued [13, pp. 99–100].

      [...]

      Thus, due to the Soviet ammunition industry's failure to produce the 76mm armor-piercing shell in sufficient quantities before the Great Patriotic War, Soviet artillery in the second half of 1941 proved incapable of effectively combating modernized enemy medium tanks. This was one of the main reasons why, in the second half of 1941—especially from July to October—German tanks broke through Soviet defenses whenever and wherever the Wehrmacht command needed them. Consequently, German tank spearheads, supported by motorized infantry, penetrated so deeply into our defenses along converging axes that the encircled Soviet troops were unable to break out before running out of ammunition, fuel, and food. Since communication and supply lines were disrupted by the enemy who had broken through, there was nothing left to fight with. As a result, mass surrenders occurred—during the encirclement of our units near Kiev in September 1941 alone, approximately 650,000 Red Army soldiers and officers were captured. All this worsened the situation at the front as a whole and led to the loss of vast territories, which later had to be recaptured during the fierce battles of the second half of 1942–1944.

      The German 37 mm anti-tank gun and most of the German tank guns in 41 were inferior to it.


      https://history.wikireading.ru/hLGMVtmPRa

      "Excerpts from a Soviet report on shelling trials of Red Army tank armor can be used as examples of the effectiveness of Wehrmacht anti-tank artillery fire. The trials were conducted at the Gorokhovets Artillery Proving Ground from September 25 to October 9, 1942. The shells fired at the armored hull and turret of a "mass-produced T-34" were fired at with shaped-charge and sub-caliber projectiles of German and domestic manufacture."

      [...]

      The test results were as follows:

      "The side of the T-34 hull is penetrated:

      50 mm sub-caliber projectile at a firing angle of 0 degrees - up to 1250 m;
      50 mm sub-caliber projectile at a firing angle of 30 degrees - up to 800 m;
      37 mm sub-caliber projectile at a firing angle of 0 degrees - up to 400 m;
      A 37mm sub-caliber projectile at a firing angle of 30 degrees – up to 200 m…
      The hull liner of the T-34 can be penetrated by: a 50 mm sub-caliber projectile at a firing angle of 40 degrees - from a distance of up to 500 m... The side of the T-34 turret can be penetrated by: a 50 mm sub-caliber projectile at a firing angle of 30 degrees - from 700 m;
      A 37mm sub-caliber projectile at a firing angle of 0 degrees – up to 150 m…

      The upper frontal plate of the hull cannot be penetrated by either German sub-caliber shells or domestically produced sub-caliber shells."
      1. +3
        28 June 2026 11: 44
        It didn't seem practical to use 45mm anti-tank guns on the T-3 and T-4 tanks: only 76mm divisional or tank guns could handle them. However, armor-piercing shells were unavailable for them.

        Approximately 180 BR-350As were produced before the war. Each of the two thousand "heavily armored" tanks suffered nearly a hundred armor penetrations, with even a single hit from a 3" shell at least putting the tank out of action for a very long time, if not permanently.
        1. +2
          30 June 2026 21: 46
          You are wrong to think that you need to divide the number of shots with armor-piercing shells by the number of German tanks and self-propelled guns with 50-60 mm of frontal armor.

          You need to divide by the number of 76mm guns with divisional ballistics. It should also be taken into account that a significant portion of the armor-piercing rounds simply weren't included in the ammunition loadouts of these guns, having been lost in warehouses or even in train cars during the first days of the surprise German offensive "on all fronts."

          And yes, the ballistics of the L-10, L-11 and F-32 tank guns were actually not enough to successfully combat German tanks and self-propelled guns with 50-60 mm of frontal armor as successfully as in the case of tanks with F-34 guns.

          Another problem was that the 1902/30 model gun had a very narrow horizontal firing arc, only 5 degrees, while the more modern 76 mm divisional guns F-22 and F-22USV had separate horizontal and vertical aiming (one gun crew member aimed horizontally, another crew member aimed vertically, with the aiming mechanisms located on opposite sides) - this significantly complicated and slowed down direct fire at moving tanks.

          The 76mm anti-aircraft guns, which boasted excellent ballistics, simply lacked armor-piercing rounds. By the summer of 1941, the same thing happened with the 85mm anti-aircraft guns.

          The Germans didn't have any of these problems. They used the same 88mm anti-aircraft gun extensively against Soviet tanks from the very first days of the war (the Germans had experience with this since 1940, when they successfully used 88mm anti-aircraft guns against French tanks).

          In addition to armor-piercing shells for anti-aircraft and field artillery guns up to and including 150 mm, by the summer of 1941 the Germans had subcaliber rounds for 20 mm anti-aircraft guns, 20/28 mm heavy anti-tank rifles, 37 mm, 47 mm, and 50 mm guns, which they had been using since the first days of the war. The Red Army simply did not have such ammunition at the start of the war.

          The Germans also had 75mm HEAT rounds for low-ballistic artillery systems. The Red Army had no HEAT rounds at all by the summer of 1941.

          The German infantry possessed tens of thousands of anti-tank rifles suitable for combating light tanks with bulletproof armor and armored cars. The Red Army infantry had no anti-tank rifles by the summer of 1941. Marshal Kulik, head of the Main Artillery Directorate, halted production of the 14,5 mm PTR-39 designed by Rukavishnikov, which had been underway in the USSR in the fall of 1940.
          1. 0
            1 July 2026 17: 43
            You need to divide by the number of 76 mm divisional ballistic guns.

            So divide it - I don't mind.
            A significant portion of the shots with armor-piercing shells simply did not make it into the ammunition of the said guns, as they were lost in warehouses or even in train cars

            This is a question of the level of supply - the BBS should be in the troops, not in train cars.
            1. +1
              1 July 2026 21: 21
              Quote: Jura 27
              So divide it - I don't mind.

              Why? I already know that 76mm armor-piercing rounds, even if all those produced by June 1941 had been distributed directly to the divisional gun limbers and loaded into tanks, would have been enough for 10 days of active combat.

              https://militera.lib.ru/docs/0/pdf/1941-2.pdf

              Document No. 473, p. 220

              https://rostislavddd.livejournal.com/373839.html

              "In the discussion of the "Saga of the Armor-Piercing..." there were, of course, readers who considered 8 armor-piercing shells out of 140 (5,7%) in the divisional gun's ammunition load to be quite sufficient, for whom high-explosive fragmentation shells were effective against German tanks in 1941, and who claim that all this "...the artillery's overall need for 76-mm armor-piercing shells (emergency (EZ) and mobilization (MZ) reserves) was determined at 797,000 pieces, although it could only be satisfied by 16%..." is sheer nonsense, and the 132,000 76-mm armor-piercing rounds (26,000 of which were in central warehouses) actually available in the Red Army to repel a German invasion, in addition to the 12,13 million 45 mm armor-piercing rounds, was more than enough."

              [...]

              "...against the background of the 4258 armor-piercing shells shot and lost with the T-34s of the 186th Brigade in a month and a half (summer 1943), 132 thousand of which were available in the entire Red Army (by June 1941), look not even pitiful, but ridiculous.

              At the peak of its materiel availability, the 186th Tank Brigade had only 3 medium tank companies (30 T-34s) and 2 command tanks. 4258 tanks out of 132,000 armor-piercing rounds is about 3,2%. :) In other words, one T-34 used up 0,1% of the Red Army's 76mm armor-piercing ammunition in a month and a half in 1943. There were 337 KV tanks with small turrets in the Western Military Districts on June 1, 1941, and 832 T-34s. Considering the actual ammunition consumption, equal to that of the 186th Brigade's tanks two years later, pre-war reserves of 76mm armor-piercing KA rounds could only supply new tank models, and for no more than a month."

              I think the illustration is clear. What if there are readers who think that every second, okay, every third armor-piercing 76mm shell destroyed an enemy tank?
              1. +1
                2 July 2026 11: 03
                one and a half months (summer 1943)

                In 43, the 76 mm BBS was as useless as the 45 mm BBS in 1941.
                1. +1
                  2 July 2026 20: 46
                  Quote: Jura 27
                  In 43, the 76 mm BBS was as useless as the 45 mm BBS in 1941.

                  I completely agree with you. The Pz.Kpfw. III Ausf. H's protection against 45mm armor-piercing shells in the summer of 1941 was roughly equivalent to the Tiger's protection against 76,2mm armor-piercing shells in the summer of 1943.
        2. -1
          2 July 2026 10: 05
          Quote: Jura 27
          It didn't seem practical to use 45mm anti-tank guns on the T-3 and T-4 tanks: only 76mm divisional or tank guns could handle them. However, armor-piercing shells were unavailable for them.

          Approximately 180 BR-350As were produced before the war. Each of the two thousand "heavily armored" tanks suffered nearly a hundred armor penetrations, with even a single hit from a 3" shell at least putting the tank out of action for a very long time, if not permanently.

          "The troops had very few armor-piercing rounds for the 76-mm gun. Specifically, this "very few" is expressed by the figure of 132 thousand armor-piercing 76-mm rounds available as of May 1, 1941. In terms of one divisional or tank 76-mm gun, this means 12,5 shot per barrel. And that's on average." (C)
          https://gunm.ru/kto-ukral-u-stalina-snaryady/
          1. 0
            2 July 2026 11: 05
            The troops had very few armor-piercing rounds for the 76mm gun.

            It's a supply issue. By June 22, about 180 BR-350As had been produced.
    2. +2
      30 June 2026 01: 28
      Farewell, homeland. It wasn't called the 45 for nothing.
  3. 0
    28 June 2026 10: 59
    And again the shells are to blame...
    Why doesn't anyone compare the number of 37mm guns in a German infantry division and in a Soviet infantry division in 1941?
    Soviet division - 18 "forty-fives".
    German division - 36 "door knockers".
    But the Germans also had anti-aircraft units attached to the infantry with their 88 guns and 20mm small anti-aircraft guns, which the Germans used to fight Soviet armored vehicles.
    1. +3
      28 June 2026 11: 34
      Soviet division - 18 "forty-fives".

      Actually 54 pieces.
      German division - 36 "door knockers".

      75 pieces, but they did not fight with German tanks.
      1. +2
        28 June 2026 11: 46
        75 pieces, but they did not fight with German tanks.

        They fought against Soviet tanks and armored vehicles.
        The T-34 could have been penetrated in the side by a massive attack.
        The saturation of the ground army with means of destroying enemy armored vehicles is also of great importance.
        The shortage of armor-piercing shells for 76mm guns of old and new models had a greater impact than the "defective" shells of the "forty-fives".
        And the weak capabilities of the F-22 and F-22USV guns in combating moving targets.
  4. +3
    28 June 2026 21: 41
    The penetration process itself is important here. A blunt-nosed projectile, using kinetic energy, pierces thin armor or knocks out a "plug" from it, which works for armor typically no thicker than the projectile's caliber. Blunt-nosed projectiles are also less prone to ricochets, meaning they normalize better upon impact. Apparently, at that time, the requirement for penetration was around 30 mm, which was considered quite sufficient in the mid- to late 1930s. Consequently, depots were filled with projectiles that weren't designed to penetrate the 40-50 mm of armor that existed in 1941.
    1. 0
      29 June 2026 05: 21
      Apparently, at that time, they were guided by the requirement for armor penetration of about 30 mm, which in the mid-to-late 1930s was considered quite sufficient.

      And in 1941, the enemy rolled out tanks with next-generation armor and almost wiped out more than thirty thousand 45mm tank and anti-tank guns.
      1. 0
        29 June 2026 19: 38
        And the enemy rolled out tanks with next-generation armor in 1941.

        What kind of next-generation tanks are these? By the summer of 1941, the armor of the "Three" and "Four" tanks was no thicker than 30 mm. Only the "Stug" tanks had 50 mm of frontal armor, and that's where the frantic search for a solution began. There was an article about it here on VO. Later, the Germans began thinking about strengthening their tanks' armor and began installing add-on armor while industry was developing new, thicker and heavier armored hulls.
        In general, the 1937 53-K "forty-five" had the ballistics of the 19-K model 1932 gun, the same one with German roots (incidentally, about 8000 of which were in service by 1941), as did its tank variant, the 20-K, and, accordingly, used the same ammunition. That is, ammunition for them had been produced since 1932, and the stockpiles likely contained shells from more than just the latest years. I'm not just referring to the quality of the shells, but also to the fact that the propellant properties of artillery propellants deteriorate over time—a fact that has been tested and proven.
        1. +1
          29 June 2026 20: 21
          By the summer of 1941, the armor of the "troikas" and "fours" did not exceed 30 mm.

          Pz.III with ausf.H (in series since October 1940) had a 30-mm screen, ausf.J had a 50-mm front, in total by June 1941 there were 707 Pz.III with a 50-mm gun, about 150 did not receive screens, another 150 were ausf.J, Pz.38(t) had 25+25 mm, about 220 Pz.IV had screens or a 50-mm front, in total 1201 vehicles (35,1%) out of 3,417 tanks of known types had shell-proof armor.
          1. 0
            29 June 2026 21: 09
            In total, 1201 vehicles (35,1%) out of 3,417 tanks of known types had projectile-proof armor
            .
            And not all of them were on the Eastern Front. Incidentally, according to German observations, the applique screens could withstand one or two hits. My point, however, was that the warehouses could contain shells of different vintages and, most likely, of varying quality. Furthermore, according to warehouse workers' rule, the products that have been stored the longest are shipped to the customer first. And the simplest truth is that an army with actual combat experience is always superior to one without.
            1. +2
              30 June 2026 06: 13
              And not all of them were on the Eastern Front.

              No, these are tanks on the Eastern Front.
        2. +3
          30 June 2026 08: 40
          What kind of next generation tanks are these?

          Not next generation tanks, but "tanks with booking next generation."
          Only the Stugs had 50 mm of frontal armor, and it was with them that the feverish search for a solution to the problem actually began.

          The fever began when the enemy's armored vehicles reached Moscow, Leningrad and Rostov.
          That is, ammunition for them was produced since 1932 and most likely the warehouses contained shells not only from the latest years of production.

          True, and all of them were not suitable for penetrating the armor of the so-called “thick-armored” German tanks.
          1. 0
            30 June 2026 18: 24
            From what I've read, the "higher ups" initially believed that the German tanks in use were quite effectively penetrated by anti-tank guns, in accordance with the findings of 1939-1940. Apparently, they initially overlooked the fact that, despite their external similarities, their armor protection was being strengthened. The result was the situation described in https://topwar.ru/210551-shturmovaja-artillerija-stug-iii-i-ego-potomki.html:
            In the fall of 1941:
            “The artillery attack tank is designed for operations in the first echelon of tanks.
            <...>
            The armor protection of the tank is affected by artillery of all calibers.
            Much belatedly, gunfire trials were conducted in September 1942. It turned out that the Soviet 45mm gun was unable to penetrate 50mm of frontal armor, even at point-blank range.
  5. -1
    29 June 2026 06: 35
    Soviet artillery on the eve of the war was something else entirely. Grabin was forbidden from installing a muzzle brake. The rationale? The gas escaping from the muzzle brake ports exposes the gun's position!! The result? About 15% more steel had to be added to the gun to prevent it from disintegrating too quickly. The recoil dampening was weak! The hydraulic cylinders and rubber wheels were weak. And a muzzle brake was forbidden! You couldn't see or hear the artillery battalion's position, but with a muzzle brake... Damn it!
    And that's not to mention the widespread production of shells from solid blanks, thanks to the ludicrous profit margins. Stalin always listened to the experts; his church education was quite impressive, but when it came to matters like artillery, not so much. But what can you do when the experts are like that?! Sigh...
    1. 0
      30 June 2026 12: 41
      Quote: Mikhail3
      Grabin was forbidden to install a muzzle brake.

      The Nizhny Novgorod Kremlin has a ZIS-3 with a perfectly serviceable muzzle brake. Although it may be a later production model.
      1. 0
        30 June 2026 21: 33
        Yes. When millions of people, millions of soldiers, died, there was enough blood to activate the army's brain. And Grabin was finally allowed to design guns properly. With a brake to lighten them and reduce recoil.
    2. 0
      30 June 2026 19: 33
      Stalin always listened to the experts. His church education was pretty impressive, but when it came to things like artillery, he wasn't so great. But what can you do when the experts are like that?! Sigh...

      Do you think something like: "Gentlemen are taken at their word"?
      1. 0
        30 June 2026 21: 31
        I don't get it at all. What are you talking about?
        1. 0
          30 June 2026 22: 27
          That Stalin apparently took them at their word, without any evidence or research or experimental results. That's probably what you meant, right?
          1. 0
            1 July 2026 06: 29
            What do you mean, "believed"? Are you talking about the domestic affairs of a less-than-well-off family or about public administration? The experts were selected from among the best based on their performance. Every word they said was confirmed by the fact that no one better than them could be found.
            The head of state can only read analytical reports to a very limited extent—they simply don't have the time; most of it is spent running the country. There are only 24 hours in a day, after all. They should have been reading the analytical reports, processing them into their own opinions.
            And yes, the main problem of Stalin's USSR was the failure to create a truly effective personnel selection system. It's a hellishly difficult task, actually. And Stalin was forced to use those people who were worthy of the highest power as mere waste—they were implementing grandiose projects, without which the country would have been destroyed, and they were burning out. Literally. Burning out at work, dying from the monstrous overload. Mostly, they had no time to attend meetings...
  6. 0
    1 July 2026 19: 13
    Summer 2023. PMC..................
    1. -2
      2 July 2026 10: 11
      Quote: AC130 Ganship
      Summer 2023. PMC..................

      The army was undersupplied with ammunition - that's a fact, but the PMC was getting more than enough through PR.