Lieutenant Colonel Tarasov's report: engineering support for the landing operation to capture the islands of Shumshu and Paramushir
I. Preparation in the period before the outbreak of hostilities
During the spring maneuvers and throughout the summer of 1945, units of the Kamchatka Defensive Region trained in advance for amphibious operations. One rifle battalion in each rifle regiment trained in amphibious operations and conducted practical landings and landings near the shipyard, Sarannaya Bay, and the mouth of the Kotelnaya River.
During the spring maneuvers, the 302nd Rifle Regiment landed entirely on Khalaktyrsky Beach. The regiment's engineer platoon secured firing points, cleared mines, and provided engineering reconnaissance of the landing area.
II. Preparation for surgery
By the time the loading order was received on August 15, 1945, units of the Kamchatka Defensive Region had occupied their defensive lines and were strengthening them. The engineer battalion and engineer platoons of the rifle regiments were busy preparing operational obstacles. Units of the 119th Separate Engineer Battalion were located 25–30 km from the embarkation point. The battalion was assembled within seven hours and by 6:00 PM on August 15, 1945, was finally concentrated in the loading area of the ship repair yard. Neither the units nor the engineers had any time to prepare.
The distribution of sappers and their material support was carried out in the following order:
1. The 2nd sapper company, company commander Senior Lieutenant Zamintsev, received 9 sets of obstacle clearance kits No. 9, 1 set of No. 71, and 50 TM-35 anti-tank mines from the capture group.
2. From the 373rd Rifle Regiment, one platoon of the 1st engineer company, platoon commander Lieutenant Samarin - 3 sets of obstacle clearance kits No. 9, 1 set of No. 71, 80 TM-35 anti-tank mines. 3 A-3 boats, 1 small inflatable boat, 1 mine detector.
3. In the 1st echelon, in reserve of the division commander, the headquarters of the 119th separate engineer battalion and two platoons of the 1st engineer company. Nine obstacle clearance kits No. 9, 250 TM-35 anti-tank mines, 0,5 tons of explosives, 3 A-3 boats, 3 small inflatable boats.
The sapper platoons of the rifle regiments had with them one set of No. 71, 100 pieces of TM-35 anti-tank mines, and 2 pieces of No. 9 obstacle clearance sets.
All personnel of the 119th separate engineer battalion were armed with grenades.
III. Landing
1. The embarkation of troops, horses, guns, tractors, and all cargo was carried out from three points on the Petropavlovsk port piers, using cranes. No difficulties were encountered, and no special equipment was required.
2. Due to the large number of troops involved in the landing (8824 personnel, 192 guns and mortars, 61 tractor-trailers and vehicles, 643 horses), the lack of transport, which could only lift the manpower, guns, tractors, ammunition, some horses and, from the engineering equipment, 9 A-3 boats, 14 small inflatable boats, 2000 PMD-6 wooden anti-personnel mines, 1000 PM-3 anti-personnel mines, 250 TM-35 anti-tank mines, 4 sets of explosives and 150 units of entrenching tools, it was not possible to load anything else.
IV. Landing
1. Due to the large distance of the landing point from Petropavlovsk - up to 300 km - and the extremely limited time, it was not possible to concentrate a sufficient number of small floating craft (boats and launches) in the landing area, therefore the landing of manpower, heavy infantry weapons and horses was planned mainly from 16 American landing craft with a carrying capacity of up to 205 people, with a bow draft of up to 150 cm and retractable ramps, which were tasked with landing the landing force directly on the shore or, in extreme cases, in water at a depth of no more than 150 cm: the capture group - under cover of darkness, the first and second echelons - after capturing the shore and suppressing the batteries on Cape Kokutan-Saki and Cape Kotomari-Saki.
2. The unloading of guns, tractors and heavy cargo was entrusted to two self-propelled barges sailing from Petropavlovsk as part of convoys of ships, to 4 boats and to 4 fifteen-ton kungas, which by the end of 17.08.45 were concentrated in the area of the border outpost "Lopatka" from the Ozernovsky fish factory, but were not used in a timely manner by the landing commanders. The boat sent for the kungas on 18.08.45 returned, not having found the kungas in the fog, and only a second dispatch on 19.08.45 brought the kungas to the landing area, which then began unloading. artillery to the shore. Later, 9 more boats and 4 kungas arrived.
3. The following floating craft were in reserve:
- a) capture group: 3 A-3 boats and 2 small inflatable boats;
- b) first echelon: 3 A-3 boats and 4 small inflatable boats;
- c) the second echelon: 3 A-3 boats and 8 small inflatable boats.
In addition, each landing craft had 250 American inflatable life belts specially designed for the paratroopers, and the Kokinaki transport had up to 500 cubic meters of dry timber (which had not been unloaded in Petropavlovsk).
4. The landing began at 4:00 on 18.08.45. During the landing, the landing craft, due to overload and heavy enemy artillery fire, did not land anyone on the shore or in shallow water.
The paratroopers were forced to swim 40 to 200 meters to the shore, suffering losses from enemy fire.
Landing craft No. 581's three A-3 boats and two small inflatable boats could not be inflated due to a lack of space for their deployment, and one inflated small inflatable boat was destroyed by a shell that struck the vessel. An attempt by the duty officer on landing craft No. 524, Senior Lieutenant Zaimintsev, commander of the 2nd Engineer Company, to stretch a rope from the landing craft to the shore under enemy fire to assist the landing force and unload two 45mm guns was unsuccessful, and the rope was not stretched.
Some of the weapons, including engineering equipment, were sunk. The sappers reached the shore with only personal weapons, anti-tank grenades, a few probes and grappling hooks, and about 10 kg of explosives with a dozen incendiary tubes, some of which had become damp in the water.
V. Action of the capture group and the first echelon
During the first phase, sappers provided reconnaissance, mine clearance, and the detonation of unexploded bombs dropped by Japanese aircraft on the shore near Kokutan-Saki. They also served as marksmen in combat formations.
In the moment tank During the Japanese attack in the area of height 171,0 on 18.08.45, sappers fought enemy tanks: Lieutenant Samarin and private sapper Drovalikhin each knocked out a tank by throwing an anti-tank grenade.
Due to a shortage of our own explosives, by the end of August 18, 1945, reconnaissance was organized to locate enemy explosive depots. On August 19, 1945, under the leadership of divisional engineer Major Klyuchkin, the final blocking of the three-embrasure artillery pillbox on Cape Kokutan-Saki near the lighthouse was organized and preparations were made for its detonation with captured explosives found in the area.
The work was carried out after the pillbox had already been suppressed by our artillery fire, but inside the pillbox there was a garrison of over 70 people and they tried to prevent the blockade with rifle fire and hand grenades.
The pillbox had a complex system of covered communication passages leading to it, along with separate camouflaged embrasures and sniper slits. Therefore, all entrances and embrasures had to be rigged with grenades and combed with machine gun fire. Then, at the initiative of Senior Lieutenant Nazarov, Chief of Staff of the 119th Separate Engineer Battalion, the junctions and intersections of the covered passages connecting the pillbox with other firing positions were explored and discovered. Three external explosions, each containing 20 kg of explosives, were detonated to destroy these passages, thus completing the final blockade of the pillbox.
Then, 250 kg of explosives were placed in the reinforced concrete exhaust pipe above the central part of the pillbox to completely destroy it. Only the arrival at 6:00 PM on August 19, 1945, of the chief of the political department of the 101st Rifle Division and a Japanese envoy—the chief of staff of the 91st Infantry Division—who ordered the garrison to surrender prevented the explosion and the destruction of its garrison. Sixty-three Japanese soldiers and officers were evacuated from the pillbox, along with two dead and six wounded. By this time, only 12 sappers, led by the commander of the 119th Separate Sapper Battalion, were present at the pillbox, and they disarmed the garrison.
During the first half of the day on August 20, 1945, due to the fact that individual Japanese snipers remained in the pillbox, and the work of an underground radio was overheard in the depths of the reinforced concrete lighthouse tower, and at the same time Japanese aircraft, having violated the truce, bombed the shore, ships in the strait and the command post of the division headquarters, the demolition of the lighthouse tower, the observation post and the reinforced concrete machine gun point in the Kokutan-Saki area was authorized.
VI. Transition to defense and preparation for the offensive
In the second half of 20.08.45, the units went on the defensive, the enemy occupied the defensive line and began to bring in reinforcements.
In order to provide engineering support for the operations of our troops, the 119th separate engineer battalion was assembled in one place and given the task:
- a) Protect the flanks and junctions of the units and the road leading from Kataoka from a breakthrough by Japanese tanks.
- b) Conduct engineering reconnaissance.
- c) Prepare to make passages in enemy minefields in the event that our units go on the offensive.
- d) Equip the command post (CP) of the division commander.
The distribution of sappers was organized as follows:
1. The right flank of the 138th Rifle Regiment was provided by the 2nd platoon of the 1st engineer company.
2. The junction between the 138th Rifle Regiment and the 373rd Rifle Regiment - the 1st platoon of the 1st engineer company, without one squad.
3. Right flank of the 373rd Rifle Regiment - one squad.
4. The 2nd Engineer Company is in reserve along the road opposite the center of the 373rd Rifle Regiment with the task of covering the main road to Kataoka and acting as a mobile barrier detachment in the most important threatened directions.
During the night of 21.08.45, the delivery of 230 unloaded TM-35 anti-tank mines and half a ton of explosives from the landing point to the area of the 2nd sapper company was organized and a field warehouse of explosives and mines was organized, where they also began to concentrate captured explosives and mines.
The decision was made not to mine the area, but to have mines ready and deploy them along the determined battle lines of Japanese tanks. To prepare for mine clearance, sappers were armed with Japanese bayonets as probes, grappling hooks were prepared from captured equipment, and concentrated explosive charges were prepared.
Two engineering observation posts were allocated from the 2nd engineer company on the flanks of the 373rd rifle regiment, and one post each was in the engineer platoons of the 373rd and 138th rifle regiments.
The enemy's front line was 500 m away, and in some places 200–300 m from our front line, and was clearly visible.
During the night of 21.08.45 and the morning of 21.08.45, engineering observation posts established that the enemy was mining the road to Kataoka from its front line to the rear and the area in front of the 373rd Rifle Regiment on a front of 2,5 km and to a depth of 400 meters.
The Japanese mined the area using antipersonnel mines, both throw-and-go and tripwire; as it later turned out, the Japanese used hand grenades as antipersonnel mines, based on the operating principle of our POMZ-2 antipersonnel fragmentation mines.
During the day of August 21, 1945, a 5-kilometer stretch of road from the division headquarters command post to the forward edge of our forces was cleared and demined. Antitank and antipersonnel mines were found scattered along the road, in ditches and lightly camouflaged, some without fuses, as well as large quantities of ammonite in 12-kilogram boxes, safety fuses, and various fuses and caps, scattered along the road and shoulder.
Retreating hastily to the main line of defense, the Japanese did not have time to completely mine the road.
VII. Surrender of Japanese troops and provision of marching units for the occupation of Kataoka
On August 22, 1945, Japanese troops on Shumshu Island capitulated, began laying down their arms, and surrendering. Units were ordered to occupy Kataoka.
To support the march, one engineer company was assigned to the forward units and one to the main force column. The engineers were tasked with conducting engineering reconnaissance along the route and clearing mines from the roads.
VIII. Further actions to secure the occupation of Kataoka and Kashiwabara
The sappers' activities consisted of conducting reconnaissance in the occupied areas to identify mining, as well as taking stock of captured engineering equipment.
IX. Scope of work performed
The 119th separate engineer battalion and regimental engineers carried out:
- a) cleared mines and carried out reconnaissance for mining: airfields - 1, bridges - 1, roads - 75 km, various warehouses - 80 units, residential premises - 95, ports - 2, underground radio stations - 1, power plants - 1;
- b) cleared two minefields on roads where 82 aerial bombs had been planted as mines in the Banjo area;
- c) blew up: pillboxes - 2, observation posts - 1, reinforced concrete lighthouse tower - 1.
X. LOSSES
Personnel:
1. Killed and missing:
- a) officers - 1 person (Lieutenant Kirichenko was killed);
- b) sergeants - 5 people;
- c) rank and file - 16 people.
2. Wounded:
- a) officer staff - 2 people (regimental engineer captain Trofimov, platoon commander lieutenant Laev);
- b) rank and file - 12 people.
In addition, in an explosion that occurred for an unknown reason while clearing the road of captured explosives, 2 sergeants and 2 privates were killed.
Engineering property:
1. Small shovels - 810, sapper shovels - 58, axes - 37, shortened saws - 9, pickaxes - 9, mine detectors - 8, anti-personnel mines PM-2 - 2 pcs., A-3 boats - 6 pcs., small inflatable boats - 4 pcs., sentry locks - 1, sets of barrier equipment - 3 pcs.
XI. Trophies as of 10.09.45
Entrenching tools - 3290 pcs., wire cutting shears - 112 pcs., anti-tank mines (AT) model 93 - 381 pcs., anti-personnel mines (AP) magnetic mines (MP) model 99 - 700 pcs., hand mines model 96 - 505 pcs., various explosives (HE) - 60 tons, detonators - 28 thousand, various fuses - 4166 pcs., electric detonators - 1440, fuse cord - 8000 meters, detonating cord - 1190 meters, self-propelled barges - 12 pcs., self-propelled ferries - 4 pcs., various boats - 8 pcs.
XII. 99 people were nominated for the award.
XIII. Brief description of the Japanese defense
The Japanese defense system on the islands of Shumshu and Paramushir consists of pre-prepared lines filled with pillboxes and bunkers of all types, with underground shelters for personnel and warehouses, connected to a system of underground galleries, the length of which reaches up to 3 km, with a protective layer of natural soil from 4 to 50 meters, providing protection from any caliber of shells and aerial bombs.
The identified pillboxes and bunkers are divided into three main types:
1. A reinforced concrete artillery and machine gun pillbox with walls 1 to 1,5 meters thick and a ceiling 2 meters thick. The pillbox has 2 to 6 embrasures and a 180-360 degree field of fire. It provides protection against 152 mm shells and 250 kg aerial bombs.
2. A mixed-construction pillbox: the frontal portion, canopy, and part of the roof are reinforced concrete, while the remainder is wood and earth. Provides protection against 152-mm shells.
3. DZOT with heavy overlap of 3-4 ramps, most of them artillery, are planted in folds of the terrain on steep slopes, connected by communication passages.
4. A lightly covered pillbox, usually positioned above artillery positions to provide machine gun cover. Provides protection against 76mm shells.
Most of the ground passages and clearings in the cedar forest for the maneuver of manpower are equipped with separate firing cells for shooting through the passages and clearings.
The characteristic features of the defense are:
- a) A large number of underground galleries, shelters for housing and warehouses of all kinds.
- b) All ammunition, food and fuel are distributed in small batches along the roads throughout the islands.
- c) A large number of anti-tank ditches and scarps.
- d) Excellent camouflage and a large number of false models of guns and tanks.
- d) Almost complete absence of wire obstacles.
The fortification work lasted three to four years, with the last year and a half working around the clock in three shifts. According to sources who need to verify the information, in addition to the garrisons, approximately 30,000 Chinese and Malays were employed in the work.
Extensive road construction work has been carried out. Most of the roads are located in cuttings.
Earth bags are widely used to line parapets and machine-gun nests. All barracks are typically connected by communication passages and galleries with firing positions.
Large stockpiles of explosives were discovered, but the Japanese did not have time to lay mines and did not manage to do so; they tried to mine the coastal edge, roads, and their own front line first.
When mining roads, mines were placed in ditches. The most common mines were the Hakobakuri anti-tank mines, Model 99, anti-tank mines, and Model 96 hand-held mines, which were found on the shore near the Kashiwabara piers and on roads in the Banjo area. Cases have been recorded of the use of 50 kg aerial bombs to mine roads and airfields; the detonation was expected to occur under a pressure of 20 kg.
The following explosive equipment was discovered:
- Ammonite powder, grey in colour, in 10-12 kg boxes with two inserted friction fuses (according to the explanation of Japanese sappers, they are intended to detonate tanks in the hands of a soldier, that is, the tank should detonate, simultaneously causing the inevitable death of the sapper).
- Melinite in 100 g checkers, in standard charges with two sockets for primers weighing 1 kg, in cylindrical cartridges of 100 g.
- Dynamite in cylindrical cartridges in a paper shell of 75 g.
- Small capsules and large capsules.
- Bickford fuses in white and black braiding, standard and extra-thick diameters. Detonating fuse in yellow braiding.
From the engineering units operating on Shumshu Island, the following were identified:
1. Engineering Regiment of the 91st Infantry Division No. 12635, with a staff of 850 people (724 surrendered), regiment commander Major Iohari, stationed 8 km northeast of Kataoka on Shumshu since 1943.
2. Pontoon (transport) battalion of the 91st Infantry Division, 1830 people, armed with 80 floating units - self-propelled barges, unit commander Lieutenant Colonel Netsume, stationed at Kashiwabara.
Conclusions
1. Both the engineering units and all units of the Kamchatka Defense Region had almost no time to prepare for the landing operation. Therefore, a number of issues related to backup landing assets in case of their failure could not be resolved.
2. The landing craft failed to fully accomplish their assigned task of landing troops on the beach or in shallow water. The landings were carried out at depths of over 2 meters, 50–200 meters from the shore.
3. The landing commander and the commanders of the landing craft had no practical experience in the techniques and details of landing troops and equipment on the shore under enemy fire.
4. To maintain the combat readiness of communication equipment, light signals missiles and accessories for the explosion must, in addition to special landing suits, have waterproof shells that simultaneously keep these loads afloat.
5. All paratroopers and sappers must have machine guns and grenades as personal weapons.
6. The Japanese defense system and fortifications on the Kuril Islands require comprehensive and detailed study.
Engineer of the Kamchatka Defensive Region, Lieutenant Colonel Tarasov
Information