Military Review

Logistical misunderstanding

Logistical misunderstandingThere is an opinion in society that the generals are always preparing for the last war. In many ways, this is unfortunately the case. Preparing for war, based on previous experience, is easier than predicting the development of military art for the future. However, there are separate areas of the functioning of such a complex mechanism as the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, where experience and achievements gained in previous wars must be taken into account.

It is about the logistics of the troops, the basic laws of which have remained unchanged for decades and the outcome of the war depends on the proper implementation of which. However, in the course of the recent reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the old MTO system, instead of refining and improving under the changed conditions of the internal and external situation, underwent a fundamental breakdown, and without sufficient military-scientific and military-economic justification. Particular attention should be given to the difficult situation in the Ground Forces.


“During the Great Patriotic War, the organization of maintenance of combat vehicles, their timely repair and evacuation in the dynamics of battles was one of the most important problems in the total amount of combat readiness measures,” said Lieutenant-General of Engineering and Technical Services Alexander Karpenko.

- The importance of these issues was determined primarily by the fact that the replenishment tank troops with new military equipment was carried out mainly during preparation for an operation or during long operational pauses. In the course of battles, the supply of tanks from industrial plants to units was extremely rare. Therefore, the restoration of damaged equipment during battles and its quick return to service were the most significant, and sometimes the only source of replacement for losses in tanks. In a number of cases, the number of repaired tanks and self-propelled guns was two to three times the number of combat vehicles available at the beginning of the operation. In other words, each tank went out of action two or three times and returned to battle formations the same number of times.

However, by the beginning of the war, the army was not ready to repair damaged equipment in sufficient quantities, and often had to just throw it on the battlefield or in the swamp. Only after a year and a half in the armored forces they created a full-fledged organization of regular repair and evacuation facilities: platoons in tank regiments and separate battalions, maintenance teams in the brigades, and separate tank repair battalions and evacuation companies in the armies. As a result, according to the data given in the work “Construction and Combat Use of Soviet Tank Forces during the Great Patriotic War,” 66,5% was repaired by means of troops and armies, 27,6% by means of fronts, 4,2% by means of central subordination, and 1,7% by factories all restored tanks and ACS. As a result, in the 1943 year, says armor historian Maxim Kolomiets, the German command was forced to issue special circulars so that the Wehrmacht soldiers would undermine all Soviet tanks remaining on the battlefield - otherwise Soviet tanks would evacuate and restore them at night!

The rate of recovery of damaged cars approached the rate of failure. As Alexey Radzievsky points out in the work “Tank Impact”, “at least 60% of combat vehicles during the preparation of the operation and 85 – 90% during the offensive arrived at the replenishment after the repair”. For example, in the Battle of Kursk from 617 tanks of the 1 Tank Army, which failed during the period from 3 to 20 in August, 539, or 87%, were restored. In total, during the war years, the repair and restoration bodies repaired almost 4,5 times more tanks and self-propelled guns than were produced by the industry!

Say - the affairs of bygone days? But here is another example. In the book “On the shores of Suez: Israeli General’s memories of the Doomsday War,” Major General Abraham Adan, commander of the Israeli 162 Armored Division, recalled the events of 8 on October 1973:

“At some point I was not sure that I still have a division. Now, looking at the dark silhouettes of tanks with their commanders, towering from their towers, my heart was overflowing with pride and sympathy for our soldiers ... We started this day with 170 tanks, and finished with 100. 40 was badly damaged, and 25 was left on the battlefield. However, thanks to the dedicated work of the repair teams, the next morning my division had 120 tanks ... A small division, but ready for battle. ”

The situation was similar in other Israeli divisions, which, with the overwhelming numerical superiority of the enemy, were able not only to delay its advancement, but to go on a counterattack, cross the Suez Canal and surround the two Egyptian armies. If the division commanders relied on "services of outside organizations", the result would be different.


In the post-war period, a harmonious and well-designed MTO system was created in the domestic Ground Forces, with special attention being given at all levels to timely maintenance and fast repair of weapons and military equipment (VVT), which was essential for ensuring high combat readiness of troops.

A veteran of the Russian armored forces, the author of a number of books, Colonel Sergei Suvorov, who served in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany at one time, recalls: “At the end of the 70's - the beginning of the 80's we went through intensive combat training. Most of the burden fell on the crews of the training and combat group of tanks, which ensured the entire training process in battalions and regiments. Due to the high load and high consumption of motor resources, and sometimes the presence of insufficiently trained personnel, there were cases of failure of components and assemblies on machines, such as engines, onboard gearboxes, suspension units, loader mechanisms. But the damage was eliminated quickly and competently. I remember in my unit a sergeant — a senior platoon driver-driver — for a night with two or three soldiers without the help of officers, if there was a “bat” (maintenance machine with a crane boom. - Note by the author) changed the onboard gearbox or engine, and in the morning the car went to class. It was commonplace. And the ensigns repaired from the three failed 5TDF engines to independently assemble two serviceable ones. The engines were supposed to be handed over and sent for repair to Leipzig at the repair plant, but it took a long time, but they could also make the squad or company officer pay for the engine failure. ”

During the Afghan war, thanks to the efficient work of repair units from 5270 units of damaged armored vehicles more than 4000 were evacuated, having repaired more than 2750 from them. In the next war, in the North Caucasus, integrated repair and restoration agencies formed on the basis of three districts allowed to cover repair and evacuation of 80 – 90% of armored vehicles that had failed.


In the conditions of modern wars, characterized by high intensity and intensity of military operations, and also due to the growth of technical and technological complexity of weapons and military equipment, the likelihood of their failure for military and technical reasons increases significantly. Accordingly, the importance of timely and high-quality technical support increases, which, in turn, requires a high level of professional training from personnel, and the availability of the opportunity to constantly improve it. Simply put, the current “conscript” cannot be trusted with such questions, or it is necessary for him to learn this for a long time. In terms of a one-year service life, this is impossible.

However, in the course of the recent reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, it seemed that individual representatives of the military-political leadership ambiguously assessed the principles and capabilities of the forces and technical support systems for the troops that existed at that time, as well as the traditional approaches and the vast experience gained data systems. As a result, many experts believe, insufficiently thought-out and sometimes incorrect decisions were made to optimize the military command and control agencies responsible for organizing the functioning of the logistics and technical support systems for the troops.

The policy of “blind” copying of Western standards and approaches to the creation of such kind of support systems turned out to be destructive without thoroughly checking them for compliance with the Russian realities and the directions of military construction of the RF Armed Forces. In fact, not even a copy was introduced into the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, but an imitation of the Western MTO system of the troops, the system that existed before was almost completely broken and sent “to the dump stories»The achievements of many decades, paid not only by budgetary funds, but also soldiers' sweat and blood.

Comprehensive provision of troops was, on the one hand, the subject of consideration from a commercial point of view (introduction of outsourcing), and on the other, it was characterized, as is known from open sources, a systemic reduction of positions, primarily of the engineering and technical staff of the Armed Forces, military administration, agencies and organizations that previously determined and regulated the main directions of development of systems for the operation, supply, storage, maintenance and repair of weapons and military equipment.

At the same time, the replacement of government bodies and high-class specialists was carried out, according to a number of military experts, to a far from identical equivalent of the services provided by specialists from outside organizations. Such an approach to the MTO system inevitably had to lead to duplication of functions and tasks, dispersion of resources and dilution of responsibility in the field, the importance of which has been proved by time and is recognized, without exception, by all specialists.

At the round table organized in the State Duma 14 in November 2012 of the year, Lieutenant-General Viktor Sobolev, from 2004 to 2006 year, the commander of the 58 army, said: “The commander must have both logistics and technical controls, and relevant parts, connections and divisions. There are no real rear units in the army now, which were before. The separation of ammunition, other property is missing. Everything needs to be restored. ”

Moreover, the leading main and central military authorities were actually deprived of the administrative functions assigned to them for the development and comprehensive support of the troops according to the fixed IWT nomenclature, including the functions of the main customer. As a result, the military control bodies that once had the most direct influence on the process of creating, testing and supplying weapons and military equipment were transformed into structures that were unable to influence a single military-technical policy in the development, creation, operation, repair and disposal of weapons and military equipment.

The result was a blatant situation when, after the decision of the Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu, to return to the troops the functions of routine maintenance and certain types of weapons and military equipment repair, including numbered ones, in the literal sense of the word “clutching their heads” in the field, since the decision to carry out this decision after the previous reorganization turned out .

In particular, in an interview with one of the federal newspapers, a representative of the command of the Southern Military District noted that in the district troops the battalions and logistics brigades are equipped with an average of 80%, and no more than 5% of the personnel have knowledge and at least some experience in the field repair armored vehicles. And only about 1% of personnel are able to perform relatively complex electrical repairs, communication and control systems, stabilizers, etc. “The rest are trained only to wave a sledgehammer, and that’s bad. It is unlikely that there is a fundamentally different picture in other districts, ”the newspaper’s interlocutor emphasized.

The reason for this is that in the process of implementing the reform, the troops reduced a significant number of engineering and technical posts, as well as junior repair specialists, who had previously formed the basis of the troop repair system, were its foundation. This foundation was destroyed, and at the posts of deputy commanders of subdivisions on logistics, noted by the representatives of the Defense Ministry and the military-industrial complex familiar with the situation, they began to translate chiefs of food, clothing and other services that are far from military equipment and weapons.

Technicians, professionals who held similar positions earlier, were either fired from the ranks of the RF Armed Forces, or taken out of the state, or transferred to command positions, from which they were completely unwilling to move from the zakommandirov to more problematic and complex positions. Plus, many specialized higher educational institutions and training centers, where maintenance and repair specialists were trained, during the transformations arranged by the former leadership of the Ministry of Defense, also ceased to exist or were “merged” into non-core institutions.

The author of this article, a military expert familiar with the situation, noted that in the process of reforming, the gradation of the repair and restoration agencies across the troop links (tactical, operational, and strategic levels of the distribution of repair and recovery forces and equipment, as well as the WMT repair fund) was almost completely destroyed. And if in Soviet times it was guaranteed to carry out work to restore the order of 80% of the total demand for weapons and military equipment, today, the expert says, when the main functions were outsourced, the repair and restoration bodies of the troops became little functional. They are able to perform no more than 10% of planned work at the tactical level, and even that simple maintenance and if there are enough spare parts.

It is not difficult to imagine what will happen in the case of the beginning of intensive hostilities, especially if for the participation in them the formations and units “hooked up” to the outsourced technical support will be moved a considerable distance from the places of permanent deployment. The vehicles abandoned along the way and on the battlefields, which the servicemen themselves will not be able to restore ... But specialists from "outside organizations" either will not have time to arrive at the right time, or refuse to do it at all ...

Repair outsourcing was acceptable in the places of permanent deployment of military units. Problems arose when parts of the tasks were thrown hundreds of kilometers away.

War is not a civilian business, they have the right to refuse to go to the front - after all, they can kill or cripple (fines are not intimidating - life is more expensive). And if they are captured by the enemy, then according to the laws of wartime, being in the front line, but not being “combatants” and not having uniform and insignia of servicemen, and not being members of the Ministry of Defense at all, they can rightly be considered saboteurs or terrorists. And with such categories in the war years usually come simply - assign for the nearest barn - and "in expense".
A serious mistake, according to domestic experts, was the decision to transfer to foreign organizations the functions of supplying troops with military-technical property and form a scheme for centralized supply of spare parts, components, assemblies and materials to provide measures for the maintenance and repair of weapons and military equipment in the troops. This is completely contrary to current trends in military affairs and does not conform to the scheme that exists in the armies of leading foreign countries, the experience of which is constantly referred to by those who introduced such innovations.

As a result, representatives of the military-industrial complex note that the supply of troops with spare parts, assemblies and materials is actually carried out at the expense of previously accumulated material resources and only according to the nomenclature of the mass military equipment park of the still “old Soviet” and, accordingly, physically and morally outdated production. Experts familiar with the situation testify that reserves have been exhausted for some items, but they are practically absent for many modern models of weapons and military equipment.

We especially note that the military outsourcing mechanism itself was not worked out. In particular, in the 2011 year in the article “Outsourcing in the military”, Doctor of Law V. Koryakin and applicant for the Law Institute of the Moscow Institute of IT and Technology N. Kamennaya pointed out possible negative consequences of its use in the army:

- The level of professionalism of the employees of an outsourcing company may not be sufficient to perform work or provide services at the proper level;
- insufficiency in the military unit of the levers of controlling, controlling influence on the organization supplying services, which may lead to a decrease in the quality of services and an increase in costs;
- the presence of risks of violation of the security of military property, security and leakage of confidential information and information constituting a state secret, due to the granting of the right of access of outside organizations to the territory of military facilities, documents, information and material values ​​of military organizations;
- difficulty, and often, the impossibility of using this method of providing services outside the place of permanent deployment of a military unit, during training, ship launches, military training and combat tasks, as well as military units deployed in remote, sparsely populated areas, where there are no civilian structures with which it would be possible to conclude relevant agreements.

It turns out that if it is worthwhile to keep outsourcing in the area of ​​troop maintenance, then it is necessary to urgently correct the provisions for its implementation. That is why at the general meeting of the Academy of Military Sciences at the beginning of 2013, its President, Army General Makhmut Gareyev, was categorical in this matter. “In our opinion, the outsourcing system needs to be radically revised: to issue laws providing for the transfer of these organizations to martial law and complete subordination to the unit commanders in the event of a war,” he stressed, noting that otherwise logistics and, in particular, technical support will be ripped off.


A striking example of the consequences of outsourcing in this area is the results of a training exercise conducted earlier this year in the Central and Southern Military Districts with the involvement of more than 7000 military personnel and various equipment, including 48 aircraft. As already noted in February of this year. "NVO", on the 565-th airbase of the 2-th command of the Air Force and Air Defense on five helicopters Mi-24 and Mi-8 were detected malfunctions of the units and units, for which reason they did not participate in the exercise.

A similar fate befell the two MUST-S self-propelled guns belonging to the 28-th separate motorized rifle brigade, and the Uraltransmash specialists, with whom the contract for servicing this equipment was contracted, did nothing to eliminate these previously identified faults. In addition, when executing the test control firing of the BMP-2 armament, the brigade experienced constant delays related to the state of the equipment, and three BMP exercises did not perform the exercise.

At the subsequent conference call, the warlords expressed particular concern about the fact that a lot of complaints were caused by the state of weapons and military equipment that were repaired at repair plants and industrial enterprises. “Often the equipment that has gone through major or medium repairs and is under warranty service goes down in the first months of operation,” said Army General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. The results of the exercise, he said, showed that only 66% of airplanes and helicopters are intact, and many Msta-S and BMD-2 self-propelled guns could not leave the parks due to deterioration and breakdowns.

“The audit confirmed the feasibility of the decision taken by the Minister of Defense to restore military repair agencies,” General Gerasimov said. “At the same time, the level of training of the personnel of the repair units, their organizational structure and the supply of spare parts need to be improved.”

It turns out that a seemingly good attempt to compensate, or rather, replace the previously existing possibilities of repair and restoration bodies by attracting qualified personnel from outside organizations on a contractual basis led to the fact that groups of troops in a certain, and perhaps a significant part were not capable to provide their needs in the maintenance and repair of weapons and military equipment. This was demonstrated by the aforementioned doctrine, causing quite natural resentment of the new leadership of the Ministry of Defense.

General Gerasimov demanded to conduct a detailed analysis of the identified deficiencies in the field, eliminate them and prevent them in the future. It is good if this is done in the near future, but then it is urgent to thoroughly analyze the results of the “outsourcing reform” of the logistics system, to identify specific officials who will be personally responsible, including shoulder straps, to be responsible for the implementation of certain activities.

The latter is especially important because, as stated by the author of the material familiar with the current situation in this area, the source, the reform led to the fact that today there is no clear line of responsibility between the authorities for organizing activities aimed at maintaining the combat readiness of troops I am building serviceable models of weapons and military equipment. Moreover, the management bodies, previously directly responsible for organizing the operation and restoration of weapons and military equipment, today have been deprived of subordinate forces and means, do not have the ability to make operational decisions and merely submit, by their types of support, proposals to generalized administrative and planning documents on logistical support. As a result, information comes to the troops with a delay, not in full, and a wide range of people have access to information that does not provide the required level of security.

In one of his articles, retired Colonel-General Vasily Vorobyov, Doctor of Economic Sciences, who headed the General Directorate of the military budget and financing of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation in 1991 – 1995, said: “The US military leadership does not seek (as we have done) to replace civil servants, employed in military structures, representatives of the private sector, since the experience and qualification level of such officers are generally higher than the personnel from the structures of potential contractors ”. In the end, in his opinion, as a result of the massive transition to civilian outsourcing, the RF Armed Forces "lose their life support autonomy under war conditions, in emergency and emergency situations."

In turn, Colonel-General Alexander Rukshin, who in 2001 – 2008 held the position of Chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff - Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, pointed out another drawback: “When creating a unified MTO system, brigades and MTO bases are concentrated in the district, in the armies There were no relevant bodies, although there is a deputy commander for logistics and logistics. Considering that the army is the main operational unit leading combat operations, there is no logic in this decision. ”

A positive moment in the field of organization of technical support for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was the creation of highly specialized repair units in combined-arms units, to which even deliveries of new special equipment began. In particular, in the summer of 2012, the MTO units of one of the motorized rifle formations in the Volgograd region received new maintenance workshops on the Ural chassis, intended for repair in field conditions of vehicle and armored vehicles. But for the most part, such units are still few in number, insufficiently equipped with the required special equipment, and cannot boast of having a sufficient number of trained specialists.


"Commander-in-chief of the types of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, commanders of military districts, commanders of combat arms of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, heads of central military authorities ... to prepare proposals for improving the organizational and staff structures of repair units in the troops and increasing their capabilities", demanded in February this year . Army General Valery Gerasimov. Now the main thing is to quickly implement this requirement.

In this regard, it seems that the leadership of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation needs, first, to decide whether to further improve the MTO system as a single structure and under the unified leadership further, or to create, as it was previously, separate specialized military control bodies capable of solve technical, logistical and other security issues; and secondly, to revise as soon as possible the functional purpose of the specialized military command bodies with the elimination of duplicating functions and the mandatory return of customer functions to them, which will solve the problem of the ultimate responsibility of commanders (chiefs) for the result of their work.

The latter is especially important because today the duplication of a number of functions of the military administration is observed even in matters of formation and execution of the state defense order: the requirements for the general plan of the state defense order are formed by the specialized headquarters under the auspices of one deputy defense minister, and the direct placement and execution of tasks within the state defense order deputy At the exit - the lack of personal responsibility for the final result.

This situation adversely affects the activities of defense enterprises. The representative of one of them noted, in particular, that “in the absence of direct control of relevant content main departments” during the implementation of tasks for the state defense order, “often the necessary technical solutions for their execution are made by officials who are not competent in their subsequent operation in the troops”. The result is that either the equipment that does not meet the stated requirements goes to the troops, or it fails prematurely and needs to be restored as part of the reclamation work.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov emphasized: any brilliantly designed operation without corresponding logistical and technical support will remain beautiful arrows on paper. And if the leadership of the Ministry of Defense intends to triumph over the enemy, he must urgently pay attention to the MTO system. Otherwise, it may happen that it will have to improve under the falling missiles and bombs.

The editorial board of Voenniy Obozreniye urgently needs a proofreader. Requirements: impeccable knowledge of the Russian language, diligence, discipline. Contact: [email protected]

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  1. aviamed90
    aviamed90 25 May 2013 15: 19 New
    And what, our military leaders did not know what the result would be? Absolutely - they knew! But to cut down the loot is a more important task than the combat effectiveness of the army.
    There are no words!
    And how now to restore all this? And who was responsible for this?
    1. elmir15
      elmir15 25 May 2013 15: 52 New
      Quote: aviamed90
      And who was responsible for this?

      For a start - Serdyukov. He is the second Chubais, ruined everything that is possible. The service life must still be increased; for a year, the equipment cannot be mastered.
      1. waisson
        waisson 25 May 2013 19: 14 New
        Undoubtedly the best one is 2, and in the Navy 3, this term is enough for a butt half a year in training, half a year of real practice, half a year of service, half a year of transferring skills to young people. The fleet is a little friend. and not as he was now called upon by the snotty, he was demobilized by the snotty even his home-made pies failed to be digested and even if they had time if they even wiped the ass of the soldier’s mother’s ass.
    2. Larus
      Larus 25 May 2013 17: 15 New
      We don’t have any military men, we have a general caste, I’ll do everything as the minister said, and I won’t even say anything against it. There are no officers there, some sloppies and careerists and heroes don’t understand what merits they give them.
      1. d.gksueyjd
        d.gksueyjd 25 May 2013 17: 45 New
        Quote: Larus
        I won’t even say anything against it.

        This is the main disadvantage of contract service - OFFICER! UNTIL LATER IT IS NECESSARY FOR THIS Vicious PRACTICE TO CANCEL The officer should not be a contractor!
        1. Maj.
          Maj. 25 May 2013 20: 33 New
          And who should be an officer - conscript?
          1. d.gksueyjd
            d.gksueyjd 25 May 2013 20: 35 New
            Quote: Major
            And who should be an officer - conscript?

  2. Ruslan67
    Ruslan67 25 May 2013 15: 24 New
    Just a classic of the genre fool For decades, to gain experience building a system just to say it is outdated, let's get a new one then stupidly copy the western pattern to scratch our turnips and come to the conclusion that this is not suitable for us request The feeling that they should not be planted but treated
    1. mike_z
      mike_z 25 May 2013 15: 49 New
      Quote: Ruslan67
      The feeling that they should not be planted but treated

      ... previously shot.
    2. Alekseev
      Alekseev 25 May 2013 18: 16 New
      Quote: Ruslan67
      The feeling that they should not be planted but treated

      Reply Citir

      Exactly! good
    3. ded10041948
      ded10041948 25 May 2013 23: 38 New
      It was necessary to treat when the disease had just begun. Now this is such a headache that only the guillotine will save
    4. wax
      wax 26 May 2013 12: 08 New
      In essence, this is more suited to treason.
  3. knn54
    knn54 25 May 2013 15: 27 New
    Material Support Parts ...
    MIKHAN 25 May 2013 15: 39 New
    Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov emphasized: any brilliantly designed operation without corresponding logistical and technical support will remain beautiful arrows on paper. And if the leadership of the Ministry of Defense intends to triumph over the enemy, he must urgently pay attention to the MTO system. Otherwise, it may happen that it will have to improve under the falling missiles and bombs.
    This is our eternal misfortune in Russia "Until the thunder breaks out, the man does not cross himself .."
  5. mike_z
    mike_z 25 May 2013 15: 45 New
    Finally, they wrote sensibly about MTO! In fact, the collapse that occurred and what is built on these ruins is still mildly described. In the Northern Fleet (and I think that in other fleets the same balls and not even in profile) on the ruins of the Rear of the SF several monsters are not well understood and the system has become so uncontrollable that I just feel sorry for the ships and units. And also the system of writing off material assets and stockpiles was turned upside down. Two orders of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (No. 2666 and 222) are read by different specialists in different ways: Finns one at a time, lawyers, apparently another, brainless new specialists in new MTOSh structures in a third, and we, poor end consumers - i.e. hard workers, take our heads and sob. I have a material accountant with an experience of more than 20 years, put a statement on the table, barely told me to stay, but she actually cries! ... no one has poison? With General Bulgakov I want to drink a coffee.
    1. sergmoryak
      sergmoryak 25 May 2013 20: 39 New
      here !!! after the arrival of such hard workers, then with your own hands you remake everything for several months !!!!!
      1. mike_z
        mike_z 27 May 2013 08: 55 New
        Quote: sergmoryak
        such hard workers

        What hard workers? What are you talking about? I’m talking about receiving and writing off inventories by a ship repair company or some other military unit, it doesn’t matter. that the concepts of liability for write-offs are blurred. Those. I'm talking about Thomas! And you, as I see, about Yeryoma? Learn to read, and maybe you will remodel correctly.
  6. sashka
    sashka 25 May 2013 15: 48 New
    We must assume that the questions are purely rhetorical, because there is no answer to them. As long as the Supreme Commander will teach the cranes to fly. Well, it's just that there is no time for a person to do such "little things". This is not a royal affair. Find it out on the spot.
  7. kind
    kind 25 May 2013 15: 59 New
    The result was a blatant situation when, after the decision of the Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu, to return to the troops the functions of routine maintenance and certain types of weapons and military equipment repair, including numbered ones, in the literal sense of the word “clutching their heads” in the field, since the decision to carry out this decision after the previous reorganization turned out .

    in the process of reforming, the gradation of repair and restoration bodies by military units (tactical, operational and strategic levels of distribution of repair and restoration forces and assets, as well as the IWT repair fund) was virtually completely destroyed.

    Destroyed a whole system of TO and R IWT. It's like a man with an artificial kidney, like alive, but can’t move. At one time, all small and partially medium-sized malfunctions were eliminated by the forces of calculations, and now don’t dare to poke around — outsourcing.
  8. k220150
    k220150 25 May 2013 16: 09 New
    During the WWII war, up to seventy personnel were required to provide one tank unit, today it is clearly no less. The military must eat, need medicine, delivery of ammunition, fuel ... It's all either on or near the front line. And outsource this? This is either a mistake or a crime. One result - the army and the country will pay for it with blood. I hope not too late to take action. The first is the trial of Makarov-Serdyukov and further down the list.
    1. ded10041948
      ded10041948 25 May 2013 23: 34 New
      First of all, it is necessary to pay for this bedlam by the Society with Complete Irresponsibility (OPB) "Taburetkin & Company" so that the people can see that undermining combat readiness is not forgiven to anyone. While these freaks are being shunned from responsibility, there will always be followers!
  9. individual
    individual 25 May 2013 16: 47 New
    A bit of humor.
    I do not welcome such figures with three nationalities as V. Pozner. Nevertheless, here is his story:
    In the victorious 1945, his father worked as an adviser to the USSR in the occupation forces in defeated Germany. Once I was driving with a German chauffeur driving a Studebaker from Berlin to Hamburg. Suddenly the engine of the car “stalled” - the driver raised the hood and said: “We need to call a“ technical service. ”Next was a“ lorry ”- a little fair-haired guy was driving. The driver approached and asked:“ What happened? ” the fuel pump cap and we explained that we needed "technical assistance" and asked to play the role of a messenger. "
    Further senior Posner says was fantasy...
    The guy went into the field tore out the root crop of the turnip. I cut it in two and pulled out the spoon from the bootleg - I cleaned out the insides of the swede. The desired shape of the cap is obtained. Having tied this product with a rope and having previously pumped gasoline into the carburetor, he launched the Studebaker. He handed over the second half of the swede to us - in reserve.
    The German rode all the way to Hamburg with his jaw dropped. And upon arrival he said: "Now I understand why the Russians won the war with us".
  10. maestro123
    maestro123 25 May 2013 17: 09 New
    Well, there are simply no words. Idiocy is utter! How can you make decisions regarding the budget and defense of the country in a rash manner. They like to experiment with us.
    A soldier in one year will definitely not learn the materiel, and even less so the equipment that is beginning to enter service. Repair and logistics support units are necessary, but at a completely different level and with trained specialists. Each army should be trained in theory and in practice. Maybe then there will be a sense, and since you do not reform, there will be no sense, since without practice and experience there will be no.
  11. Old warrant officer
    Old warrant officer 25 May 2013 17: 33 New
    For 18 years I served in one unit - 204 separate repair and restoration battalion of 130 pulads in the Primorsky Territory. Our unit was engaged in the repair and maintenance of all types of weapons of the division, with the exception of missiles. The battalion was also involved in the Maintenance Procedures (RTO) of BT and AT. In the Far Eastern Federal District, only a couple of units were admitted to the RTO. The team was friendly, together on the exercises, celebrated together. Over the years, the battalion took first places in 5 A in combat training. In the part, a turning, locksmith, carpentry, welding workshop operated. There were well-equipped PTORs for equipment, storage and parking. All this we saved in the terrible 90, when we had to literally survive. I would especially like to single out the command of the unit: submarine Vasiliev, regiment Gromova, Mr. Zakriyaev, Mr. Velichko, Mr. Nevolin. Unfortunately, this is all already in the past tense: the part is gone, the place where life once boiled resembles a battlefield - all buildings are destroyed, building materials are stolen, pipes and cables are dug! It is frightening to see all this! In the new part, where I currently serve, there is not a single technical worker, conscripts in driver’s positions are just a fiction, they can’t be trusted with anything, only the contract soldiers with whom I served in the REMBAT will save. Here is such a sad story about TECHNICAL SUPPORT!
  12. gladysheff2010
    gladysheff2010 25 May 2013 19: 00 New
    At one time, conscript service "began" in DOSAAF, of course, now a lot of the old cannot be returned, it will be necessary to build anew, "thanks" to the reformers, but I still want to remember with a kind word those who are now restoring the system of preparing young people for service in Sun. People did not give up, and God willing, we will survive this time too, for the Army is people, and in this field the Westerners are far from us, there are people with both hands and heads!
  13. 123tank
    123tank 26 May 2013 04: 48 New
    Who thank you to say for the collapse described in this article? Only to two comrades, a real and a former one. Have they not seen? The post of commander-in-chief obliges a lot. Now the collection of stones has gone. It’s good, too.
  14. Pushkar
    Pushkar 26 May 2013 11: 02 New
    I can add little to the article. He served in aviation, in the IAP was a power supply, with her PARM (field aircraft repair workshops) on the basis of ZILs (KUNGI). During routine maintenance, we were actually trained in military aircraft repair. Was this system of Serdyukov given to merchants?
  15. Egen
    Egen 27 May 2013 10: 49 New
    It seems to me that in this way we will slide down to the "pepsikol" American army: ((
  16. seller trucks
    seller trucks 27 May 2013 14: 24 New
    I am an absolute layman how things are in the MTO troops, please do not judge strictly, but through simple manipulations with my "clave" I learned the following:

    "To equip the repair bodies of automotive equipment, the PARM complex (mobile car repair shop) was created and put into service, back in Soviet times. PARM is of two types: PARM-1M1 and PARM-3M. The PARM-1M1 kit was used to equip a repair platoon of automobile ( special) equipment as part of remrot regiments.PARM-1M consists of 5 vehicles, which are equipped with various sets of tools and assemblies, which makes it possible to deploy seven working posts on the basis of one PARM-1M:
    post of dismantling and assembly work and maintenance of units;
    post mednitsky works;
    post tin works;
    vulcanization work post;
    washing post;
    grease post;
    blacksmithing post.
    The PARM-3M set consisted of three PARM-1М1 and was supplied to equip the repair companies of automotive vehicles as part of the OVB divisions. On the basis of PARM-3M the same work posts were deployed as in PARM-1М, but their productivity increased by 3 times.
    According to the same principle, AT equipment rembats were organized as part of the ARVB (they consisted of three PARM-3M) and a FRVB re-regiment (the regiment included three ATRA armament).
    Such a system of equipping repair bodies with equipment was created to maximize unification of the processes of repair and restoration of failed AT equipment.
    There were no separate PARM-1М1 in the “new look”, since the regiments were disbanded, and with them the repair companies. Now the main and only park in the RF Armed Forces remains PARM-3M.
    The main type of repair in the RF Armed Forces is the so-called “modular repair”. Aggregate repair means that instead of completely disassembling the machines and eliminating all breakdowns and damage on the spot, the specialists of the repair body inspect the machine, determine the damage (breakage), and then replace the damaged units without restoring them in place. The defective unit is transferred to the plant, where it is restored and returned to the troops for further operation. Before the reform, the repair of units was carried out in repair bodies, starting with the army link. In the "new look" the situation has changed, now the units are immediately transferred to the manufacturers.
    It should be noted that the increase in the "cost-effectiveness" indicator of automotive (special) equipment is achieved by the fact that not one model of a machine is adopted for service, but a whole family of machines on one base. For example, on the basis of the Zil-131 truck, command and staff vehicles, tank cars, repair vehicles, etc. were created and put into service. KAMAZ and Ural vehicles also have the same families. The adoption of a family of machines greatly facilitates the work of repair bodies, as well as logistics bodies, because they maintain and repair machines with the same structures and assemblies. "

    © Alexey Ramm, Arsenal. Military Industrial Review ”, No. 2 2011
  17. seller trucks
    seller trucks 27 May 2013 14: 25 New
    Here is an interview with Dmitry Vitalyevich Bulgakov, chief of the rear of the armed forces, Army General

    "Ahead is a phased transition to the maintenance of military equipment for its technical
    state: for promising samples - continuous monitoring, for obsolete
    modern - according to the mixed system. As for the armored and military
    of beatable equipment with warranty periods, then it can be serviced by the forces of
    manufacturing centers. Professionally, in full,
    guarantee obligations to the military department.
    For those models of weapons of military equipment (IWT) for which the warranty has expired
    la, we introduce comprehensive maintenance by civic organizations
    on a contractual basis. V2011 a year for this method of maintenance transfer
    There are 12 of combined arms brigades: 7– in the Eastern Military District and 5– in the Southern Military District
    district. Next year their number is expected to be an order of magnitude higher.
    For reference: prepared for disposal by civil organizations on
    contractual basis:
    –58thousand units of supernumerary arms;
    –62thousand VTI kits;
    –229 thousand tons of consumables and 312 thousand tons of scrap metal "

    maybe it is not worth it to swing the "saber" ahead of time
    1. mike_z
      mike_z 27 May 2013 16: 23 New
      Quote: seller trucks
      maybe it is not worth it to swing the "saber" ahead of time

      Yes, waving checkers is generally not constructive. But these prospects are very vague and long-term. The fact that I personally don’t believe them is of course my business, I don’t impose my opinion, but, being the head of the "small ship repair", I DO NOT BELIEVE! In addition, even if I'm wrong, where will they find specialists for such work? They are simply NOT there now. Will they appear? Someday they will probably appear ... But the ships are breaking now, at the present time, so to speak, on-line ...
      1. seller trucks
        seller trucks 27 May 2013 16: 35 New
        Well, why not, there were automobile vocational schools, technical schools, institutes left, why not to take specialized professions on appeal, in addition, the revival of the DOSAAF school was recently discussed, as far as I remember, after it they called to serve in the Automobile Troops, everything could have been a wish.
        1. mike_z
          mike_z 27 May 2013 21: 24 New
          in some places, all this remained, but there are already fewer specialists who know at least something in quantity than these same educational institutions in the country. Everything can be done with us! Only nothing is done. And on appeal, you can take profile guys. They do not know a damn thing, but you can take. Learn faster. And demobilize right there! We still cannot properly arrange double basses on ships (and on shore). What are we talking about? Yes, actually, a conversation about the coastal structure, i.e. about the rear, etc. And civilians are doing this. And here is the appeal from vocational schools?