The Last Great Jochid, or Akhmatova's Drama. Act Three: Moscow
“The Moscow Kremlin under Ivan III”, A.M. Vasnetsov
Doomed but mighty
This article will discuss the final part of Akhmat's tragedy and the final chord stories The Great Horde, the curtain on which will be lowered by the Crimean Khan Mengli Giray.
So, Akhmat. In a sense, the starting point of his downfall, if we follow the analogy with the Ugra, was the standoff on the Oka in 1472. Had Akhmat won then and convinced Ivan III to return to the previous format of relations based on the issuance of a label and payment of an exit, the fate of this extraordinary man would have turned out differently.
The Grand Duke, as we shall see, was leaning towards a similar scenario on the Ugra, which is not surprising: the inertia of the elite's consciousness, as a rule, lags behind changes in military-political realities.
And in historical perspective, they doomed the Great Horde to defeat in the confrontation with Moscow, which took advantage of the fruits of the “gunpowder revolution” and, in the 15th century, as a result of the emerging pan-Russian market, overcame feudal fragmentation.
Tamerlane, having destroyed the Golden Horde cities, left Tokhtamysh's successors no such opportunity. Without the Volga cities, the Horde had no prospect of cementing the disintegrating uluses on a common economic basis and creating a foundation that would have allowed it to form an imperial bureaucratic apparatus, unthinkable outside a settled urban environment, or establish firearms production. weapons, organize infantry. In Moscow, this function was performed by pishchalniki. Incidentally, the aforementioned Tamerlane had infantry at his disposal.
The Great Horde had nowhere to take it from. Genoa, whose infantry is mentioned in the "Tale of the Battle of Mamai" as part of Mamai's army? Firstly, archaeologist and military historian O.V. Dvurechensky, who has been excavating the site of the battle for many years, expresses doubt about the Genoese presence on the Kulikovo Field. Secondly, Genoa had other things to worry about: by 1475, it had lost its Crimean possessions.
Sarai did not control the agricultural region of the Kazan Khanate, which possessed infantry, albeit small, as military historian I.L. Izmailov writes. The Crimeans also developed an infantry force, as his colleague L.A. Bobrov's research points out.
In short, the Great Horde, lagging behind in military development, deprived of access to the sea, squeezed by powerful hostile neighbors – Moscow, Crimea, the khanate of nomadic Uzbeks, which cut off Akhmat from rich Khorezm, was suffocating economically and politically.
There was a hypothetical chance of conquering Kazan. But what would that have provided in economic and political terms? Yes, it provided infantry, and even, according to I.L. Izmailov, artillery, but too few in number. Ultimately, they did not become an effective force in the confrontation with Russian troops in the 16th century.
That is, the game with Kazan was not worth the candle, but it would have drawn Akhmat into military action with Moscow in conditions that were not very convenient for the Horde cavalry - a river, a forest - a theater.
Conquering Crimea? There weren't enough resources to hold onto it in the long term. A protégé? Yes. And Akhmat would succeed. We'll discuss this below. But again, not for long.
Nevertheless, in the last quarter of the 15th century, the Great Horde emerged as one of the leading Eastern European powers, as discussed in the article "The Last Great Jochid, or Akhmatova's Drama. Act Two: Venice."
The Doge attempted to draw Akhmat into a war with the Porte, whose Sultan, Mehmed II, in turn, sought an alliance with Sarai. Another influential player in the region, the Polish King and Grand Duke of Lithuania, Casimir IV, also sought to develop friendly relations with the Great Horde, seeing it as a counterweight to Moscow.
A memorial stone near Aleksin commemorates the heroic deeds of its defenders against the troops of Khan Akhmat in 1472.
During that period, it and Vilnius acted as poles of sorts, attracting the lands of the previously disintegrated Old Russian state. Novgorod became the stumbling block in the relationship between the two states.
The apple of discord from the banks of the Volkhov
Almost from the very beginning of its existence, it held itself apart in Rus', positioning itself either as a center of separatism relative to Kyiv—the war that nearly broke out between Vladimir and his son Yaroslav in the early 11th century—or as evidence of the military and economic power of its ruler—Andrei Bogolyubsky's desire to bring Novgorod under his control.
After the Mongol invasion, it remained the only major Russian city with intact military and economic potential, which allowed it to balance for some time, with varying degrees of success, between the Grand Duchy of Vladimir and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
But in the 15th century, the situation changed. The veche system, which prevented the formation of a centralized government similar to that of Moscow, led the republic to political collapse, the first chord of which was the Battle of Shelon in 1471. This was the prologue to the conflict between Moscow and the Horde.
That same year, Akhmat's elder brother, Mahmud, formally considered the Khan of the Great Horde, died. I suspect he was less ambitious than his younger brother, content with control over the Black Sea region and Haji-Tarkhan (Astrakhan), which his son Kasym inherited.
As noted in the previous article, citing the work of the Venetian traveler A. Contarini, a "Great War" raged between uncle and nephew. However, its scale and the intensity of the fighting are not entirely clear.
It must be assumed that the "great" figure is an exaggeration, since the following year after Kasym's accession to the throne in Haji-Tarkhan, Akhmat was able to launch the main forces of the Horde into a campaign against Ivan III without fearing for his rear. Furthermore, the first article in this series already discussed Kasym's concession to his uncle in the affair with the sons of his rival, the Uzbek Khan Abu al-Khair.
Accordingly, I believe Kasym's ambitions, like those of his father, extended no further than control over the territory of the Astrakhan Khanate, which was then being formed. However, it's unlikely that Akhmat was prepared to accept his nephew's independence, given Astrakhan's advantageous trade, economic, and military position. But in 1472, Kasym could wait.
Moscow occupied a key place in Akhmat's military plans. For ten years, Ivan III, who had seen everything in his childhood and, accordingly, was accustomed to avoiding drastic steps in the political arena and inclined to compromise, had ruled in Moscow.
Compromises are compromises, but not in the case of Novgorod, for which the Crimean Khan Hadji Giray issued a label to Casimir IV back in 1461.
Of course, Ivan III could not agree with such a decision by Crimea, given that the label had previously belonged to his father Vasily II the Dark – issued by Khan Ulugh Muhammad.
"Ancient Veliky Novgorod" by A.M. Vasnetsov
Apparently, Casimir IV had anticipated such a reaction from his opponent, calculating the prospects of the upcoming conflict with Moscow and seeking to secure the support of the Great Horde in it, having obtained a label from Akhmat for the possession of Novgorod, and having concluded a military alliance with him.
For this purpose, in 1470, an embassy headed by Kirey Krivoy, mentioned in the previous material, was sent to Akhmat.
In turn, Ivan III did not coordinate his claims to Novgorod with the Khan of the Great Horde, who, moreover, sent him to Krakow – let me remind you that in 1385 Poland and Lithuania concluded the Union of Krewo, so Casimir IV had two capitals – an embassy, since the desire for an alliance between the parties was mutual.
And so, in Akhmat’s picture of the world, behind the tsar’s back, the vassal on the banks of the Shelon is acting willfully, putting the overlord in the person of a third party – Casimir IV – in a foolish position, which could have been hinted to the Tatar ambassadors.
The cautious Ivan III, while certainly planning to seize the wealthy city, did not seek conflict with Sarai. "After returning from Novgorod (and perhaps even before the Shelon campaign), he did not forget," writes historian A.A. Gorsky, "to insure himself against the Horde: in 1472, the Grand Duke's ambassador, Grigory Volnin, was with the Khan's army. But this could not change Akhmat's intentions."
Perhaps the khan's refusal to engage in dialogue with Volnin, given the unsuccessful campaign of 1472, was his fatal mistake; however, this is only a guess. The question remains: what authority did Volnin have?
Another, equally key, question explaining the logic behind Akhmat's military and political moves is when Ivan III stopped paying the Horde's cession fees. This question is a matter of debate among scholars. A.A. Gorsky, citing the Vologda-Perm Chronicle, believes it began in 1472.
This does not at all indicate a rupture in relations between Moscow and Sarai. Ivan III had already sent an embassy to the Great Horde in 1473, and another three years later. Of course, in both cases the khan was presented with traditional gifts, but can they be considered a solution? A.A. Gorsky expresses doubts about this.
A major milestone in Akhmat's political life came in 1476, which briefly marked the peak of his success: he subdued the Crimean Khanate, installing his nephew Janibek as its ruler, and defeated the Uzbek ruler Shaikh Haidar, mentioned in the first article of this series. Impressive, but fragile.
Janibek failed to find support among the local elites, and was overthrown in 1477. The following year, Akhmat was forced to abandon his dream of Crimea once and for all, after the Ottomans restored Mengli Giray, who had become an enemy of the Great Horde, to the throne.
Paradoxically, relations between Istanbul and Sarai were friendly, while those between Crimea and the Great Horde were hostile. But something else is more important: for Akhmat, parting with the Crimean dream meant parting with the prospects of creating an economic base for the revival of his Horde: the Black Sea cities and the possibility of access to the Mediterranean market.
I suppose Akhmat lacked the political intuition to forget about Moscow for a while and throw all his forces into Crimea.
Ugra: In Search of Compromise
But, apparently, the khan resigned himself to the overthrow of Janibek and began to settle relations with Moscow, which, in turn, was conducting active negotiations with Mengli Giray, which began back in 1474 and were interrupted by the accession of Janibek.
In 1479, they resumed. A.A. Gorsky points out an important detail: Ivan III acted as an independent player, a position facilitated by Mengli Giray, who, on the one hand, did not recognize Akhmat's primacy, but on the other, did not demand any expression of submission, even formal, from the Grand Duke. He apparently had a sober assessment of the military and political realities and, no less than Moscow, needed an alliance with it: after all, Akhmat was a dangerous adversary.
The latter took countermeasures by forming an alliance with Casimir IV. However, in my opinion, this was less significant militarily, as it did not eliminate the threat to the southern lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from Crimea.
Paradoxically, the strategic situation was not in favor of either side; Akhmat began a campaign against Ivan III without securing his rear.
Standing on the Ugra River, miniature from the Illustrated Chronicle. 16th century
The Grand Duke's relationship with Casimir IV was unresolved, and conflict arose with his brothers, Boris of Uglich and Andrei of Volotsk. Furthermore, presumably, his entourage included many supporters of reconciliation with the Horde.
As for Akhmat, he was undoubtedly an experienced commander, but for some reason he did not dare to throw his main forces into the action during the attempts to force the Ugra and did not take advantage of the chance given to him by Ivan III to put the brakes on the conflict and achieve a political victory.
The speech is about an embassy to Akhmat “led,” write historians T.R. Galimov and I.M. Mirgaleev, “by a person significant and well-known for the Horde side – boyar Ivan Fedorovich Tovarkov: “with a petition and a gift, asking for a salary, so that he would retreat, and not order his ulus to fight.”
However, Akhmat demanded the Grand Duke's presence, which was clearly too much. Apparently, the khan was acting on an "all or nothing" principle. His actions strangely combined military indecisiveness with the rigor of his political demands.
An internal breakdown? Perhaps. After all, he would then soften his demands and demand the Grand Duke's son be sent, and then the courtier Nikifor Basenkov, who had previously led an embassy to the Horde. This whole game of debasement doomed Akhmat to defeat.
But Ivan III also played the Ugra River to Akhmat's advantage: after it froze over, he withdrew his troops to Kremenets, which is sometimes compared in historiography to the events of 1812, claiming the Grand Duke was luring the enemy. However, Alexander I did not send missions similar to Tovarkov's to Napoleon.
Ivan III, I admit, was inclined to make concessions rather than to implement a strategy aimed at a decisive battle:
According to some sources, writes A.I. Filyushkin, in 1480, upon hearing the news of the approach of the Tatar army of Khan Akhmat, he wanted to flee Moscow, but the boyars (I note that among them were, apparently, supporters of recognizing the power of the khan, which only increased Ivan III’s hesitation – I.Kh.), the townspeople and the church clearly explained to him that he would have to fight, there was no way back.
In short, both were hesitant. And here, perhaps, the personality of Archbishop Vassian of Rostov, who with his famous letter turned Ivan III's mood around, played an important, if not decisive, role.
It's certainly possible, as the view that the archbishop's letter changed the Grand Duke's mood is controversial within scholarship. In particular, Yu. G. Alekseev, a leading expert on the history of Ivan III's reign, wrote the following in his comprehensive study dedicated to the Grand Duke:
As can be seen from the text (the message – I.Kh.), it was written after news of the first battles with Akhmat on the Ugra reached Moscow. Ivan Vasilyevich was no longer in Moscow at the time. There was no need to "persuade" him to join his troops.
The problem also lies in the fact that it is difficult to get a clear idea from the sources about Akhmat’s plans, not strategic ones – to take Moscow, but tactical ones – ways to achieve victory on the Ugra.
In the end, the khan retreated. Lost? From a post-knowledge perspective, undoubtedly. But what if we look at it from the military-political realities of the late autumn of 1480?
Reflecting on the answer, I will allow myself to turn to the conclusions about the political consequences of Ugra by T.R. Galimov and I.M. Mirgaleev:
V.V. Trepavlov, a leading researcher at the Institute of Historical Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, characterizing this period in history, introduced the concept of "inertia of unity," according to which the Horde's disintegration did not occur overnight. For a long time, throughout the 15th and 16th centuries, the individual polities of the Ulus of Jochi (including the Muscovite state) continued to perceive themselves as integral parts of a common political space. In line with this concept, M.V. Moiseyev, a Moscow historian and researcher at the Russian State University for the Humanities, expressed the opinion that even after the fall of the Great Horde in 1502, Moscow princes were forced to continue their confrontation with the khans of Crimea, Kazan, and the rulers of the Nogai Horde, as well as with other heirs of the Golden Horde. Thus, Moscow, in essence, continued its struggle for primacy in the post-Horde political space.
For my part, I would like to point out that in this case, one should take into account the gradual transformation of the consciousness of the Russian church and military-political elite, which ceased to see the khans as kings sent by Providence.
Instead, they were transformed into pharaohs with a negative, biblical connotation. Akhmat is the first to receive this dubious honor:
“The accursed Batu,” writes the Rostov Archbishop Vassian (Rylo) in his letter to Ivan III in Ugra, “who came as a robber and captured our entire land, enslaved us, and reigned over us, but was not a Tsar, not of royal lineage.
Analyzing this document, medievalist Yu.V. Seleznev emphasizes:
Akhmat is denied the royal title, becoming a "pharaoh," since the khan's power is not only politically illegitimate but also unsanctified by divine will. Thus, the Rostov archbishop denies the Horde rulers not only the royal dignity but also the royal title, declaring them impostors.
The final act of a protracted drama
And so the first flakes of snow falling on the still fragile ice of the Ugra seemed to announce the onset of the final act of Akhmatova's drama: returning to the Horde, he disbanded his army and on a January morning was killed during a raid by his former allies led by the Siberian Khan Ibak.
The steppe near Astrakhan. Somewhere in these parts, the last great Jochid met his death.
Did Ivan III breathe a sigh of relief? Yes and no. On the one hand, his main adversary was dead. On the other, the phantom of the Great Horde apparently continued to haunt the Grand Duke's mind:
It's significant, write T.R. Galimova and I.M. Mirgaleeva, that even many years after the events of the Stand on the Ugra River, in 1501, likely pursuing the goal of ensuring his own security during the struggle against Lithuania, Ivan III sent a message to the court of Shikh-Akhmat regarding the possibility of resuming the previous relations. And already in the following year, 1502, likely cementing his intentions, Ivan III sent an embassy to the Great Horde, offering an extraordinary sum of money.
How many more years would Ivan III have sent his troops? But in that year, Mengli Giray defeated Shikh-Akhmat and destroyed the Great Horde. The curtain fell.
I will finish Akhmatova’s trilogy with the Roman: Sic transit gloria mundi.
References
Alekseev Yu. G. Sovereign of all Rus'. – Novosibirsk: Science, Siberian Branch, 1991
Galimov T.R., Mirgaleev I.M. On the interpretation of the “Stand on the Ugra” of 1480 // Golden Horde Review. 2019. Vol. 7, No. 4. Pp. 652–662
Gorsky A.A. Akhmat's label to Ivan III
Kargalov V.V. The end of the Horde yoke. - M.: Nauka, 1980
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