What is Russia building near Finland's borders?
Commissioning ceremony of FLF Finland, June 6, 2026. Photo by the German Ministry of Defence.
In 2024, the Leningrad Military District was reinstated within the Russian Armed Forces. It incorporated a number of existing formations and units, as well as various facilities. Furthermore, plans were made to build new military infrastructure to strengthen defenses in the northwest. These plans are being implemented and are attracting the close attention of foreign countries.
Strategic concerns
NATO member states are closely monitoring Russia's military buildup. One of the agencies conducting this monitoring is the Swedish Military Intelligence Service (MUST). Together with several Nordic media outlets (SVT, NRK, DR, Delfi), it presented an international investigation based on Planet Labs satellite monitoring and intelligence assessments.
Experts examined available satellite images of Russian territories near the borders with Poland, Finland, and Norway. They revealed the construction of several new military facilities, as well as signs of preparations for others.
According to the investigation, the areas in question are seven districts located between 10 and 190 kilometers from the state border, including Petrozavodsk and Pechenga. Of these seven districts, three or four are undergoing construction or modernization of military camps and other permanent facilities, and in some of them, accumulations of military and transport equipment have been recorded, indicating increased activity.
Swedish soldiers during training. Photo: Swedish Ministry of Defence
The Finnish Defence Ministry commented on the construction. According to it, approximately 20 personnel currently serve in Russian units near the Finnish border, and the new facilities will allow this force to be roughly quadrupled. The estimates cited in the investigation relate to different areas: approximately 80 troops represent the potential deployment directly on Finland's border (according to the Finnish command), while approximately 115 cover the expanded force along all of NATO's northern borders, including the Baltic states. This second, higher estimate was obtained based on an analysis of 19 military facilities along the entire northern border, a broader area than the seven border areas cited in the main part of the investigation.
MUST believes the construction is being carried out with the long term in mind. According to this theory, after concluding military operations against Ukraine, the Russian army will be able to free up large forces, some of which can be deployed to new facilities in the northwestern regions. Swedish experts also note the Russian army's ability to quickly redeploy large troop groups.
Sweden and NATO admit that the construction may be related to preparations for a hypothetical conflict between Russia and the Alliance. However, the authors of the investigation themselves assess the likelihood of such a scenario as extremely low at the moment. However, they believe that a possible cessation of hostilities in Ukraine could quickly change the situation.
NATO's Eastern Flank
The idea that Russia is preparing for armed conflict with European countries has long been used by foreign politicians. In the past, such arguments served as justification for launching international military programs, and in 2023–24, they accompanied NATO expansion to include Finland and Sweden.
Here, cause and effect can be reversed. From the perspective of NATO and the Nordic countries themselves, the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine in 2022 was the reason Helsinki and Stockholm abandoned their long-standing neutrality and joined the Alliance. For Finland, an additional factor is the length of their shared border with Russia—approximately 1340 km. Moreover, the Finnish and Swedish armed forces had already actively cooperated with NATO; official accession merely opened up new organizational and operational capabilities.
Swedish tank crews. Photo: Swedish Ministry of Defence
Thus, on June 6, 2026, NATO's Forward Land Forces (FLF) officially began their service. Two such structures have been formed: one stationed in Sweden and the other in Finland. Other countries may also join the FLF.
The two FLFs will comprise several thousand personnel. Sweden, as the framework nation (i.e., the country responsible for the formation and command of the unit), has contributed a battalion-level task force to FLF Finland: approximately 600 troops with dozens of pieces of equipment, with the ability to double the contingent to 1200 personnel at short notice. The Swedish units are based in Boden, and the NATO headquarters element is deployed in Rovaniemi.
NATO also has other joint programs on its eastern flank: the deployment of ground forces from various countries, combat airborne alert, etc. Strengthening existing groups by deploying additional units is also possible.
Defense plans
Russia has long criticized NATO expansion, viewing the Alliance's approach to its borders as a potential threat requiring a response. The accession of Sweden and Finland is seen as an additional risk factor, prompting retaliatory measures.
The most notable step of this kind was the reestablishment of the Leningrad Military District. This reorganization allowed the command and supply of the northwestern troops to be transferred from the overburdened Western District to a separate structure. The new district is focused on defending the northwestern sector—a region of heightened NATO interest.
Finnish Army exercises. Photo: Finnish Ministry of Defense
The LVO was formed in 2024 by allocating part of the territories and formations of the Western Military District and the Northern fleetIt was planned to reform existing units and create new ones, as well as build new infrastructure or restore existing ones.
It appears that this very phase of construction has now come to the attention of Swedish intelligence and its partners. Prior to the publication of the investigation, open-source information on the LVO's structure was fragmented; the investigation clarifies the picture in several key areas:
- Near Petrozavodsk (Novaya Vilga, Karelia), according to the investigation, a new army corps is being formed from scratch: satellites recorded the clearing of about 1 km² of forest and the construction of about 50 facilities to accommodate up to 16 thousand people; earlier, in online publications, this corps was mistakenly linked to the Leningrad region or the headquarters in Pskov;
- in Pechenga (Murmansk region), the existing motorized rifle brigade is presumably being expanded into a division with an expanded infrastructure for 10-17 thousand people;
- The construction of a new base was noted in Kandalaksha artillery high-power brigade;
- In Luga (Leningrad region), the highest concentration of artillery and missile funds, which, according to the authors, is at odds with rumors about the complete depopulation of the district's rear units.
The listed locations are only the most visible portion of the identified facilities. According to the investigation's authors, the infrastructure is being developed for a single combined arms army and three army corps, with a focus on the Karelian and Murmansk sectors. Thus, behind the change of name lies real construction. Separately from this northwestern group, the Kaliningrad sector is covered by an army corps of the Baltic Fleet.
Standoff continues
In recent years, NATO has been justifying its activities in Europe with a hypothetical Russian threat: programs are implemented and new countries are admitted to this effect. Russia responds with its own measures, and the Alliance interprets them as confirmation of its initial concerns. Each step by one side is justified by the other and countered with its own. This vicious circle continues.
At a Finnish training ground… Photo: Finnish Ministry of Defense
The chronology is also revealing. In early June, the FLF advance force was officially formed, and a few days later, an investigation by MUST and partner media was published. European audiences were presented with a coherent picture: Russia was preparing an offensive force in the northwest, and the Alliance was responding in kind.
There are two places in this painting that seem like contradictions. Both, however, are easily explained.
First, NATO deployed its forces significantly before Russia had completed its bases. However, this is precisely how forward troops are used: they are deployed in advance, as a signal of readiness, rather than being adjusted to match the enemy's already established force.
Second, the FLF's 600-1200 personnel versus 80-115 is a striking contrast. However, parity was not intended from the outset. The FLF serves as a "tripwire": a small contingent drawn from troops of several NATO countries. A strike against it would be a strike against all of NATO, which would entail the involvement of the main forces. It's not the sheer numbers on the ground that constrains the situation, but the almost automatic escalation that such a multinational presence guarantees.
The fact that both discrepancies are explainable doesn't make the official version complete, but it also doesn't refute it. The conclusion is simpler: the "defense against aggression" model doesn't work in either direction here. Both sides are amassing forces at their shared border, and each calls it defense. Actions, not statements, should be the judge. For NATO, these are two FLF groups—in Finland and Sweden. For Russia, these are construction projects in the Leningrad District: a clearing near Petrozavodsk, a new artillery base in Kandalaksha, and an expansion of the garrison in Pechenga. By the end of 2026, this infrastructure should be largely ready, and then we'll no longer be talking about construction sites, but about tens of thousands of troops actually stationed there.
Information