On the armor of the cruisers Izumo and Bayan

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On the armor of the cruisers Izumo and Bayan

In my previous article, I examined the armor of the cruiser Bayan in detail. Now let's look at its Japanese opponents.

Izumo Reservation Map


You can find various diagrams on the Internet, but the most illustrative one, in my opinion, is presented by the respected A.S. Alexandrov and S.A. Balakina in their work "Asama and Others."


Unfortunately, this diagram contradicts in some places the description of the armor protection provided by A.S. Alexandrov and S.A. Balakin. For example, according to the diagram, a 178 mm thick section of the main armor belt extends behind the feed pipe of the rear turret, further aft, while according to the description, it should have begun and ended under the main caliber turrets.


There are other inaccuracies in it, but more on that below.

Main armor belt (MAB)


The Izumo's main armor belt was 178 mm thick at its thickest point. It stood 2,13 meters high and 84,13 meters long. This length allowed the Izumo's main armor belt to cover the engine and boiler rooms, as well as the turret compartments, with 178 mm of armor. However, whether this belt covered the ammunition magazines for the 8-inch guns is questionable, as the diagram of the Asama shows these magazines located forward of the turrets, not under them. The same was true of the stern, albeit to a lesser extent.


The designs of the Asama and Izumo were quite similar, with minimal differences in their internal layout. Therefore, I cannot vouch for the Izumo's magazines being protected by a 178mm armor belt; they were likely located entirely (fore) and partially (aft) outside the protection of its seven-inch armor plates.

At the same time, the Izumo's ends were significantly lighter protected—the main battleship's bow and stern were now covered with 89mm armor plates. At the bow, these plates extended to the stem, but at the stern, they fell just short of the sternpost, leaving approximately five meters of unprotected side. Therefore, the main battleship's bow had no beams, while the stern was made of plates the same thickness as the ends—89mm.

At normal displacement, this armored belt rose above the water by 2 feet, or 61 cm. In addition, the citadel was protected by an armored deck, 63 mm thick throughout. The armored deck was sloped within the 178 mm belt, and was carapace-shaped at the ends, but there are issues here too, and we'll get to them later. The horizontal portion of the armored deck was located at the level of the upper edge of the main armor belt, and the slopes connected to its lower edge.

If we examine the main armor belts of the Bayan and Izumo, we can conclude that the differences are not that significant, but the Bayan is still inferior to the Japanese cruiser in literally every way, albeit slightly. The Bayan's armor plates are 33 cm thinner, and the length of the "thick" section of 200/100 mm plates is shorter (approximately fourteen meters). Even taking into account the 150/90 mm plates, it still falls short of the 178 mm length of the Izumo section, albeit only slightly. Furthermore, the "thick" section of the Bayan has an average thickness of 150 mm and 167 mm at the waterline, compared to 178 mm on the Izumo. Only at the ends does the cruisers' main armor resistance become comparable, or perhaps even better, if the 120/80 and 100/70 armor plates were cemented. However, the Bayan's unarmored stern was approximately four times larger than the Izumo's (20,7 meters versus approximately 5 meters).

In general, it's certainly not true to say that Bayan's main armor belt was completely useless compared to Izumo's, but it was still noticeably weaker. Both Izumo and Bayan had coal pits behind the main armor belt, but Bayan's were comparatively narrow—according to naval engineer N.N. Kuteinikov, at approximately three meters (10 feet) from the waterline, the width of the coal pits was 7 feet, or 2,13 meters. On the other hand, higher up, opposite the armor belt, the pit widened—possibly reaching 2,5 meters, and the width of Izumo's coal pits is unknown to me. It's likely that the cruisers were roughly equal in terms of coal pits, which was a significant component of the citadel's defense.

If the comparison were limited to the GBP and coal pits, it could be said that Izumo had a definite, but by no means decisive, advantage. However, Izumo's citadel was also protected by sloped armor decks, while Bayan's was lacking these. Given this, it should be noted that Izumo's vertical citadel protection significantly exceeded that of Bayan. Calculations show that in the most heavily protected part of the citadel, Izumo (178 mm GBP + coal + 63 mm slope) outperformed Bayan's (167 mm + coal) armor-piercing shells by approximately 40%.

Upper armor belt


This element of Izumo's armor protection was quite interesting. The upper armor belt covered the side of the hull only in the center—a length of 53,34 meters (on Izumo's sister ship, Iwate, it was even shorter, at 51,21 meters). Here, it was positioned so that its lower edge abutted the upper edge of the main armor belt.

Beyond this protection, the upper armor belt "folded" into the ship's hull, transforming into armored beams of the same thickness, extending all the way to the feeder pipes of the bow and stern main battery turrets. And here, the esteemed A.S. Alexandrov and S.A. Balakin presented us with two very interesting riddles.

First, they pointed out that the height of the upper armor belt amidships was only 1,53 m. And this is extremely strange, because in the armor diagram given above, we see that the belt converged with the lower edge of the casemates of the 6-inch guns.


But then it turns out that the height of the Izumo's interdeck space was only 1,53 meters! This, pardon me, is a bit excessive even for the short Japanese, so I can't rule out an error here. On the other hand, perhaps the diagram itself is incorrect, and the upper armor belt didn't connect to the casemate floor, leaving an unprotected gap? Theoretically possible, but somehow doubtful.

The second mystery. In the diagram, we see that the horizontal portion of the armor deck runs along the upper edge of the main armor belt within the citadel, that is, where the Izumo's sides are protected by 178 mm of armor, and only further forward, toward the bow and stern, does it become carapace, gradually tapering toward the stem and sternpost.


At the same time, A. S. Alexandrov and S. A. Balakin write that the armored traverses, which continued the upper armor belt, rested with their lower edge on the armored deck and gradually increased in height, verbatim:

As the protective deck dropped significantly toward the ends, the height of the athwartship bulkheads gradually increased. And where they surrounded the bases of the main battery turrets, the 127mm plates reached a height of 10 feet (3,05 m).

If this is so, then it must be stated that the diagram is incorrect, and that the armored deck turned into a carapace deck already within the citadel, despite the fact that the carapace at the ends was located much lower than in the diagram.

As for the Bayan, things were much simpler. The upper armor belt, 60 mm thick, made of non-cemented steel, was likely thicker than the Japanese one (where it covered the side), as it occupied only the space between decks and extended along the side from the stem to the edge of the aft casemate.

The Japanese logic is generally understandable: we followed a similar approach when designing the armor for the Peresvet-class battleships. The Izumo's citadel is quite powerful, but it rises only 61 cm above the waterline at normal displacement, and in a real combat situation, with coal reserves close to full, it's significantly lower. Consequently, even a slight list is sufficient for the upper edge of the main armor belt to be submerged. Moreover, the closer to the ends, the greater the list required for the main armor belt to be submerged, since closer to the stem and sternpost, the distance from the centerline to the main armor belt becomes increasingly smaller until it disappears. Therefore, a "short" upper armor belt in the middle of the hull is needed to provide armor protection to the side even with a slight list.

Nevertheless, I am inclined to view the 127mm upper armor belt and the main gun turret athwartships as one of the most unfortunate armor protection solutions for Japanese armored cruisers in general, and the Izumo in particular. The athwartships were long, tall, and very heavy. However, they did not ensure watertightness, leaving the ends of the Japanese armored cruisers exposed.

Many naval lovers stories It is believed that since the Izumo and other Asamoids had a continuous main armor belt, five meters short of five meters thick, covering the ends, and with carapace protection behind it, the issue of unsinkability of the ends was satisfactorily resolved. But this, of course, was completely untrue, as we can see from the damage to the armored cruiser Asama in the Battle of Tsushima.

Two ten-inch shells struck the armored cruiser's unarmored starboard stern very close together, suggesting they were fired from a salvo from a 10-inch turret firing two barrels. Moreover, they struck quite high above the waterline, just below the middle deck. The shells' caliber was determined by their entrance holes—one was 11 inches wide and could not have been fired from a 12-inch shell.

Both shells easily penetrated the plating, apparently hitting the bulkhead at frame 201 and detonating under the middle deck. Given the range, it's unlikely these shells were armor-piercing, and domestic 10-inch high-explosive shells were loaded with pyroxylin. The amount of pyroxylin in two such shells wasn't at all astounding, amounting to approximately 13,42 kg (16,39 Russian pounds in each shell). As a result, the middle deck was heavily damaged, which, however, turned out to be of little importance. But besides these shells, the

Bulkheads:


Lower deck:



The left side of the Asama was heavily damaged by shrapnel from the shells that hit the starboard side:


Interestingly, the cruiser's steering gear was damaged, though unlike the Rurik, it was quickly restored to service: the Japanese estimated it would take six minutes. I'm unclear what happened; the hull deck wasn't breached and should have protected the steering gear.

But the Asama had already had enough troubles. The armor on her ends, 89 mm thick, was not penetrated on either the port or starboard sides, and the carapace deck seemed undamaged. However, 16 fragments that punctured the port side allowed water to enter the ship, and damaged bulkheads caused a significant amount of water to spill over the stern. Worse still, the breached lower deck naturally lost its watertight seal, so the water not only spread along it but also flowed below, flooding spaces all the way to the carapace deck. As a result, without any armor penetration, the Asama trimmed up to 1,5 meters by the stern, temporarily lost speed, and was put out of action.

Meanwhile, the Bayan's belt armor, although half as thick, protected a much greater length of the side and bow, despite 60 mm being sufficient against high-explosive shells of the time. And against armor-piercing shells, even 127 mm of armor wouldn't have been enough, as the Russian 8-inch/45 armor penetrated it to 22 cable lengths with a 25-degree deviation from the normal, and 26 cable lengths if the shell struck strictly perpendicular to the plate.

Therefore, at the upper zone level, I consider Bayan’s defense to be both better and more rational.

Artillery, conning tower


Izumo's main battery turrets had 152mm armor thickness, offering virtually identical protection to Bayan's 150mm. The feed pipes, extending from the turret floor to the upper deck and then to the middle deck, were also protected by 152mm of armor, again matching the Bayan's protection. However, below, for the three meters separating the middle deck from the armored deck, the feed pipes were protected only by the extension of the upper deck's beams.

The three meters up to the armor deck of the Izumo and other British-built Asamoids were protected by 127mm of armor only on the sides and front, but the rear, facing the center of the ship, had no protection at all. Consequently, a shell coming from the sharp bow or stern angle could penetrate the thin side plating above the 127mm beam and penetrate the deck, leaving no protection at all on its way to the feeder pipe.


The Bayan's aft turret was obviously better armored—its feeder pipe was 150 mm thick across its entire height, all the way to the armored deck. The Bayan's forward turret was less well protected than its aft turret. Because the forward turret was mounted on the forecastle, its feeder pipe was longer. Over the two interdeck spaces (from the forecastle deck to the upper deck and from there to the gun deck), it had 150 mm of armor, but below that, it was only 60 mm. However, this section of the feeder pipe was covered by the Bayan's upper armor belt, giving it two layers of 60 mm each.

This section of the Bayan's armor was less well protected than the Japanese one—after all, 60+60 mm of homogeneous armor was significantly inferior in armor protection to a 127 mm thick cemented armor plate. Furthermore, there was a non-zero probability that a shell, flying over the upper edge of the 60 mm armor belt, would penetrate the unarmored battery deck and strike the 60 mm feed pipe directly.



This, of course, doesn't paint the Bayan's armor scheme in a good light, but in my opinion, Japanese ships that didn't have armor on their supply pipes, other than the beams from the middle deck to the armored deck, were much more vulnerable. Therefore, it's probably safe to say that the vertical armor of the Izumo's turrets and supply pipes was still inferior to that of the Bayan.

The same conclusion applies to the horizontal protection of the turrets. In the previous article, I discussed how the 30mm thick turret and conning tower roofs might have been insufficient against large-caliber shells. But on the Izumo, the turret and conning tower roofs were even thinner—only an inch, or 25,4mm, of armor steel.

When it came to casemates, the Japanese were clearly ahead. The Izumo had 10 individual casemates, with the front, enemy-facing side being 152 mm thick, and the sides and rear being 50,8 mm. The casemate roofs, however, were the same 25,4 mm thick as the conning tower and turret roofs. However, this protection was, of course, significantly stronger than the 60 mm casemates with 15 mm roofs of the Bayan.

Part of the middle artillery The Izumo's 4 x 6-inch guns were mounted in deck mounts and protected only by box-shaped shields with a 76,2-mm thick front plate and 31,75-mm thick side plates. While the shields were fairly thick, given their relatively small surface area, this protection was very weak, though better than nothing. But let's not forget that compared to the Bayan's 8 x 6-inch guns, the Izumo had 10 guns in better-protected casemates and only 4 in deck mounts. Therefore, the Izumo's 6-inch guns were clearly better protected.

The same can be said about the conning tower. Actually, the Bayan's wasn't bad, with 160mm thick walls, but on the Izumo, it was made completely indestructible, increasing the thickness to 14 dm (356 mm).

Horizontal protection


We've already discussed the roofs of the casemates, turrets, and conning towers; the only thing left to discuss is the armored decks. On the Izumo, it was 63 mm thick, and would have been considered very good protection, were it not for one issue. This deck was not armored at all, being constructed from two or possibly three layers of shipbuilding steel (on the Asama and Tokiwa, the decks were constructed from two layers, each 25,4 mm thick, for a total of 50,8 mm). On the Bayan, however, the armored deck was truly 30 mm thick armored steel on a backing of two 10 mm thick plates.

Considering that armor steel was approximately 20-30% stronger than shipbuilding steel, it turns out that 30 mm of Bayan's armor deck was roughly equivalent to 36-40 mm of ordinary steel. Therefore, Bayan's 50 mm deck, in "steel equivalent," could be estimated at approximately 56-60 mm. In other words, it was practically no different from Izumo's deck and stronger than Asama and Tokiwa's. However, soft armor steel resisted tangential shell strikes better than ordinary shipbuilding steel, more often resulting in ricochets. Therefore, I consider Izumo's comparatively thick armor deck to be the second significant design error—they should have reduced its thickness by using armor. Look, thanks to the weight savings, it would have been possible to place not 10, but all 14 6-inch guns in casemates...

On the protection of Bayan and Izumo in a spherical vacuum


As is well known, the Japanese armored cruiser was significantly larger than the Russian one—the Izumo's normal displacement was 9,503 tons, while the Bayan's was 7,805 tons, meaning the Izumo was almost 22% heavier. Its armor weighed 2,632 tons, while the Bayan's was only 1,449 tons, so in this respect, the Japanese cruiser's advantage was a colossal 82%!

But how did the Japanese utilize this undeniable superiority? As the comparison above shows, the Izumo gained a significant advantage over the Bayan in three areas, namely vertical defense:

1. Conning tower;

2. Citadels;

3. Artillery of 6-inch caliber.

How well protected the Izumo was against the armor-piercing shells of the 8-inch/45 guns of the Bayan is shown by the following table.


From which it is quite obvious that the Bayan’s artillery could penetrate the Izumo citadel only at a distance of 10–15 cables, while the Izumo’s artillery installations could be hit by the Bayan at a distance of 18–22 cables.

And what about the Bayan? Its citadel at the waterline (167 mm of armor plus coal) could be penetrated by an armor-piercing shell from a Russian 8-inch/45 gun at a range of 14-17 cable lengths. The Japanese eight-inch gun was somewhat more powerful, so if the Izumo's main battery had been armed with first-class armor-piercing shells, they would have been able to penetrate the Bayan's citadel at a range of 16-18 cable lengths, and its turrets, protected by 150 mm of armor, at 21-25 cable lengths.

As for the protection of the main battery turret magazines, it's very difficult to understand. On the Bayan, the magazine area was protected by 120/80 and 100/70 armor plates, with nothing behind them. However, the magazines themselves were located "one floor below," so shells penetrating the main armor belt would explode not in the magazines, but in the spaces above them. On the Izumo, the magazines were, as far as can be determined, completely outside the 178mm citadel for the forward turret and partially outside the stern turret. But this raises a question.

Unfortunately, I don't have a diagram of the Izumo, but the diagram of the structurally similar Asama shows the magazines located directly under the armored deck, as I've already shown above. So, if the diagram is correct, these magazines are quite vulnerable to the Bayan's 8-inch shells at virtually any reasonable range, as they penetrate the 89 mm side and 63 mm slope at 34-37 mm. But if A.S. Alexandrov and S.A. Balakin were correct and the 127 mm beams of the Japanese armored cruisers were 3 meters high near the main battery feed pipes, then it follows that the carapace deck was located significantly lower than in the diagrams. That is, even at the feed pipe, it wasn't level with the upper edge of the main armor belt, but rather at the waterline, if not lower!

In short, an 8-inch shell definitely had the potential to hit the magazines of a Japanese cruiser; the only question was the probability of such a hit. I can only conclude that both the Bayan and the Izumo were in roughly equal conditions in terms of the protection of their 8-inch gun magazines, as 8-inch shells could penetrate their protection at virtually any reasonable range with armor-piercing shells of the time.

Some preliminary conclusions


If the Izumo's commander had had high-quality armor-piercing shells at his disposal, it would have meant that the Bayan would have had to close to within 10-15 cable lengths to penetrate any of the Izumo's armor, while the Izumo would have been able to penetrate any of the Bayan's armor at 16-18 cable lengths. In reality, it was even less, because I calculated the Bayan's waterline armor strength at normal displacement, whereas she would have gone into battle at, if not full displacement, then close to it, and her armor thickness at the waterline would have been greater.

At the same time, at 16-18 kbt, both the Izumo’s artillery and ammunition magazines would have been vulnerable to the Bayan’s 8-inch guns; only the engines and boilers were safe, as well as the supply pipes in the area of ​​the 178-mm armor belt, and even then only on the condition that the Izumo was turned sideways to the Bayan.

Thus, having spent 82% more armor than the Bayan's designers, the British did not make the Japanese armored cruiser ultimately protected from 8-inch armor-piercing shells. Moreover, in a number of combat situations, the Izumo, due to its armor design, performed worse than the Bayan.

Let's imagine the Izumo trying to catch the Bayan. Yes, the Bayan's stern was downright indecently exposed, but its steering gears were still protected by a 30mm armor deck, resting on a 10mm+10mm steel backing, and this deck was located below sea level. An armor-piercing shell would likely ricochet off such armor upon impact. And then there's the 8-inch turret, the bottom of which is protected by a 200mm/100mm armor beam, meaning at the waterline—the same 167mm of armor, 150mm feed pipes, and turret walls.

And what about the Izumo, the pursuing ship? A very thin strip of armor at the bow, 60 cm above the waterline at normal displacement, and much lower in real combat. That's all! The rest of the ship's bow is just plating, which an armor piercer would pass over without noticing. And behind it is a 63 mm carapace, only it's not horizontal, but at a significant angle, sloping toward the stem, making the Bayan's 8-inch armor piercing chance of penetrating this carapace much greater than the Izumo's chance of penetrating the Bayan's deck at the stern. Where the Bayan's magazines are protected by approximately 150-200 mm of abeam armor (the narrow part of which is located under the armored deck) and 150 mm of feed pipe protection, the Izumo has three meters of 127 mm abeams, which are clearly less durable than the Bayan. Even if the Russian shell doesn't penetrate the Izumo's carapace and feed pipes, damage to the bow could cause it to flood, similar to the Asama, forcing the Izumo, having a bow trim of a meter or a half, to abandon the chase. But then the Bayan might even return...

Let's imagine a different scenario: the Bayan is catching up, and the Izumo is escaping. The Bayan is essentially invulnerable here—its relatively high 60mm upper belt will cause shells that hit the hull to ricochet. The only danger is if a shell passes directly over the upper edge of the armor plates, penetrates the upper deck, and hits the 60mm section of the barbette, but that would require some clever maneuvering. Meanwhile, the Izumo has the same problem as the bow: a relatively vulnerable carapace, three meters of weakened 127mm armor, and a very good chance of suffering serious flooding and loss of propulsion without any damage to the armor at all.

Thus, even considering a possible clash between the Bayan and the Izumo within the logic of free maneuvering zones, I don't see an overwhelming advantage for the Japanese cruiser. Especially considering that the Bayan, with a couple of knots faster, would choose a convenient engagement range, and the firepower of its two single-gun turrets is only slightly inferior (if at all) to the Izumo's four eight-inch guns.

But all of the above would only have worked if the Izumo's magazines had been stocked with fully-fledged and effective armor-piercing shells. But they weren't there, because, as I've written many times before, Japanese armor-piercing shells were essentially a type of high-explosive shell. Furthermore, a warship's protection isn't limited to the thickness and surface area of ​​its armor. Let's consider what a confrontation between the Izumo and the Bayan could have resulted in under the real conditions of the Russo-Japanese War.

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  1. +2
    18 June 2026 07: 54
    +++ Thanks for the great continuation, and for not letting me lie in bed in vain in the mornings...
    1. +3
      18 June 2026 11: 25
      I join Ragnar's kind words, we look forward to the continuation of the series About Bayan!
      Thanks Andrew!
  2. +1
    18 June 2026 08: 16
    Dear Alexey, you did post the correct booking schemes.
    "Asama et al." is a very ancient work, when there was no access to "modern" sources.
    Therefore, the article can be rewritten completely, everything in it is incorrect.
    The Izumo has almost identical armor, only it has KN armor instead of HS.
    1. +2
      18 June 2026 08: 55
      Quote: Jura 27
      Dear Alexey, you did post the correct booking schemes.

      But he didn't have a diagram of Izumo.
      Quote: Jura 27
      Therefore, the article can be rewritten completely, everything in it is incorrect.

      The only noticeable difference from the Asama is the presence of a 127mm belt at the extremities instead of 89mm. But, darn it, the Izumo didn't have that belt. And all the key defensive zones are defined according to Alexey's diagrams for the Asama you provided. So everything is perfectly correct.
      Quote: Jura 27
      The Izumo has almost identical armor, only it has KN armor instead of HS.

      And here you are mistaken, and this has already been discussed here: https://topwar.ru/243224-rabota-nad-oshibkami-bronja-japonskih-bronenosnyh-krejserov-i-jeta-zagadochnaja-russkaja-desjatidjujmovka.html
      1. +3
        18 June 2026 09: 17
        The only noticeable difference with the Asama is the presence of a 127 mm belt at the ends instead of 89 mm:

        Not only that, the cellars are covered with 7" armor.

        But, damn it, this is precisely the belt that Izumo didn’t have.

        And where did he go, did he evaporate?

        you are mistaken

        Let's say there is no diagram, we'll believe the inscriptions, although it is also not written anywhere about Mikasa that he has KN armor.
        1. +2
          18 June 2026 09: 42
          Quote: Jura 27
          Not only that, the cellars are covered with 7" armor.

          Okay, let me point this out in the next article.
          Quote: Jura 27
          And where did he go, did he evaporate?

          Transformed to 89mm.
          1. 0
            18 June 2026 13: 42
            Transformed to 89mm.

            Opposite the cellars there was a 7". According to Brook, the length of the 7" belt is 276 ft., which covers the barbettes with a margin.
            1. +1
              18 June 2026 20: 03
              Yuri, I just received a source refuting the diagram. The length of the 178mm section is 86,62 meters at Asama and 83,87 meters at Izumo, meaning it didn't cover any cellars. And the ends are 89 mm at both.
              There's something wrong with your drawing, 84 m would be smaller.
              1. +2
                18 June 2026 20: 16
                However, I will check my measurements now too.
              2. +3
                19 June 2026 10: 55
                There's something wrong with your drawing, 84 m would be smaller.

                Everything is fine with my scale - double checking the full length and the length between the perpendiculars.
                And anyway, to take the British for completely crazy salesmen to palm off on the customer an battleship with an 89mm belt of non-cemented armor opposite the magazines is too much, especially since the previous two ships had 5" cemented armor.
                1. +1
                  19 June 2026 10: 57
                  Quote: Jura 27
                  Everything is fine with the scale for me.

                  Yes, you're absolutely right. I remeasured it last night and came to the same conclusion as you. I should have measured it with a ruler right away, instead of using the scale that came with the drawing.
                  1. +2
                    19 June 2026 11: 18
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Quote: Jura 27
                    Everything is fine with the scale for me.

                    Yes, you're absolutely right. I remeasured it last night and came to the same conclusion as you. I should have measured it with a ruler right away, instead of using the scale that came with the drawing.

                    Scale rulers are wrong almost everywhere; I haven't used them for a long time, or I calibrate them using precisely known dimensions.
                    And if available, you need to use drawings (or something similar to them, since diagrams can be distorted.)
                    1. +3
                      19 June 2026 11: 38
                      Quote: Jura 27
                      Scale rulers are wrong almost everywhere; I haven't used them for a long time, or I calibrate them using precisely known dimensions.

                      That's right. I do it that way, tying the ruler to a known length (usually between perpendiculars), but when I was writing the article, I got sick and messed up. For some reason, I was sure I'd already checked and the scale was correct—a case of false memory.
              3. +2
                19 June 2026 11: 29
                The length of the 178 mm section is 86,62 m at Asama

                According to Brook, it was only 62,2 m (204 ft), further than 5", which ended 11,6 m (38 ft) from the bow and 9,14 m (30 ft) from the stern, the rest was armored with 89 mm homogeneous armor, with a total belt length of 123,7 m (406 ft).
                1. +1
                  19 June 2026 11: 45
                  Quote: Jura 27
                  According to Brook,

                  There's also Conway's Warships 2014—by the way, the turret diagrams there are much more decent and a track cross-section showing Asama's armor. According to it, Asama didn't have a 127mm section at all, only 89mm, like Iwate. But what's interesting is that only Asama and Tokiwa had a 61cm belt extension above the overhead line, while Iwate and Izumo had 80cm and 74cm, respectively.
                  respectively. And yes, according to the publication, Krupp is still in Izumo and Iwate laughing
                  So, as far as I understand, until you fly into the past in a time machine with a ruler...
                  1. +2
                    19 June 2026 11: 59
                    So, according to him, the Assam didn’t have a 127 mm section at all.

                    According to Brook, Asama's armor changed four times, three times in key areas. Hence the discrepancies. But Brook is logical, and I stand by his information.
                    By the way, P. Brook cites the sources from which he took data (with flaws) on foreign-built ships - these are JFS 1902 and 1904.
                  2. +1
                    19 June 2026 13: 00
                    So, as far as I understand, until you fly into the past in a time machine with a ruler...

                    P. Brook, in comparison with Ishibashi:
                    1. +1
                      19 June 2026 14: 30
                      I think the most correct thing to assume is that Izumo's 8-inch magazines were covered by 178 mm of armor - too many sources give the length of the 178 mm citadel as about 84 meters.
        2. +2
          18 June 2026 11: 52
          Brook, Peter (1999). Warships for Export: Armstrong's Warships 1867-1927. Due to a weight saving in the propulsion plant – about 300 tons. "Izumo" and "Iwate" received 5 in. at the ends, instead of 3,5 in. The last four cruisers had Krupp armor plates.
    2. +1
      18 June 2026 09: 00
      Quote: Jura 27
      Therefore, the article can be rewritten completely, everything in it is incorrect.

      Fact: The difference between 89 and 127 mm is noticeable, to say the least.
      1. +2
        18 June 2026 09: 09
        Quote: Saxahorse
        Fact: The difference between 89 and 127 mm is noticeable, to say the least.

        Yeah. And the fact that Izumo didn't have this armor doesn't make much of a difference.
        1. 0
          18 June 2026 13: 14
          A plaque from Peter Brook's book, it's also about Garibaldi)))
          1. +3
            18 June 2026 14: 19
            Quote: TermNachTER
            a plaque from Peter Brook's book

            You took the words right out of my mouth. The source is amazingly accurate: the Bayan had 7-inch turret armor instead of 6, and Krupp armor instead of Harvey.
            1. +1
              18 June 2026 14: 54
              The book is dedicated to the ships built by Armstrong. Where the author got the data for other ships, I don't know. Besides the table, each ship has a short article describing its performance characteristics.
              1. +1
                18 June 2026 15: 19
                Quote: TermNachTER
                The book is dedicated to the ships that Armstrong built.

                And the book contains some very serious errors, including regarding Armstrong's ships - it was Harvey, not Krupp, who was on the Izumo.
                1. 0
                  18 June 2026 15: 49
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  Quote: TermNachTER
                  The book is dedicated to the ships that Armstrong built.

                  And the book contains some very serious errors, including regarding Armstrong's ships - it was Harvey, not Krupp, who was on the Izumo.

                  According to P. Brook's sources, it was Krupp; according to some others, it was GN.
                  Most likely, it was KH, hence the discrepancies.
                2. 0
                  18 June 2026 17: 34
                  How do we know what Harvey stood for? By 1898, Armstrong had mastered the Krupp process.
                  1. 0
                    18 June 2026 17: 46
                    I wrote it wrong here. My apologies.
                    1. 0
                      18 June 2026 18: 07
                      The Krupp process was mastered by Whitworth, who was, it seems, like Armstrong.
                3. -1
                  18 June 2026 17: 45
                  Where does it say that Harvey stood on Izumo? - Specifically.
                  1. 0
                    18 June 2026 17: 57
                    Quote: TermNachTER
                    Where does it say that Harvey stood on Izumo? - specifically

                    for example, here
                    1. -2
                      18 June 2026 18: 06
                      So what is it? And where did it come from?
                      1. +2
                        18 June 2026 18: 39
                        Quote: TermNachTER
                        And what is it?

                        The Engineer magazine (Sept. 22, 1899)
                      2. +1
                        19 June 2026 11: 10
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Quote: TermNachTER
                        And what is it?

                        The Engineer magazine (Sept. 22, 1899)

                        "The Engineer" is certainly a good source, but it contains more accurate information, dating back to after the acceptance trials. In September 1899, both ships were still under construction (Iwate hadn't even been launched), and the information was from the design stage. Therefore, there were changes to the armor, as P. Brooke points out.
                        The same thing applies to Bayan, according to the contract the armor was Krupp (and even RMM Krupp), but during the construction process, at the insistence of the contractor, the armor was replaced with GN.
                    2. +2
                      18 June 2026 18: 19
                      Now our mutual "friend" will begin his usual routine of demanding a certificate of the presence of a certificate bearing the personal signature of the acting Tsar Ivan Vasilyevich Bunsha...
                      1. -2
                        18 June 2026 18: 32
                        Well, if you are satisfied with a piece of toilet paper as a SOURCE, then good luck to you in your hopeless endeavor)))
                        I cite an author who worked with Armstrong's original documents as my source. And what do they offer me? Another far-fetched source?
                      2. +2
                        18 June 2026 18: 43
                        Quote: TermNachTER
                        Well, if you're happy with a piece of toilet paper

                        What's especially funny is that you, without waiting for the source to be identified, declared it to be toilet paper in advance. laughing
                        Quote: TermNachTER
                        I cite as my source the author who worked with Armstrong's original documents.

                        No problem, please refer to the Armstrong document that the author refers to.
                      3. +2
                        18 June 2026 20: 42
                        Quote: TermNachTER
                        And what do they offer me?

                        The same as you do to others. Take a time machine and personally measure the armor thickness with calipers. request
                        Oh, and don't forget to take a photo of this moment with your phone camera, just in case... feel
    3. +1
      18 June 2026 23: 13
      Yura, this cadaver diagram is incorrect. The Asama/Tokiwa has 89mm GBP ends, the transition point from 178mm to 89 can be seen by the thickness of the side line in the plan (in the bow and stern from the turret barbettes). The GBP does not have 127mm at all.
      1. +1
        19 June 2026 11: 03
        Asama/Tokiwa have 89mm GBP ends

        This is most likely correct.
        The GBP doesn't have 127mm at all.

        But this is not true.
        This cadaver diagram is incorrect.

        In general it is correct, only the boundaries of different armor thicknesses are in other places.
        1. +2
          19 June 2026 11: 40
          Generally correct

          It also has 5"(127) ends that...
          But this is not true.

          It might be wrong. Here are the diagrams from my folders) I don't know where they are from/I'm too lazy to check. There are some without 5", and there are some with 7" (178) only in the length of the top, opposite the towers/cellars - 5" (127) and the ends - 3,5" (89)
          In general, the Japanese BrK designs are quite "diverse"). Here are the designs of Izumo and Azuma with rectangular traverses of the upper belt (like Yakumo), and here are the same heroes with inclined ones... So, figure it out))
          1. +1
            19 June 2026 12: 56
            Here are the diagrams by P. Brook and Ishibashi, in comparison:
            1. +1
              19 June 2026 13: 30
              Maybe the lower one (Ishibashi) is the original design ("they wanted the best")), and the upper one (Brook) is because they exceeded the weight and "it turned out as usual"))
              1. +1
                20 June 2026 14: 14
                Quote: anzar
                Maybe the lower one (Ishibashi) is the original design ("they wanted the best")), and the upper one (Brook) is because they exceeded the weight and "it turned out as usual"))

                Initially it was different, this is already the fourth, final version.
            2. +1
              19 June 2026 13: 40
              Yura, what about the inclined traverses of the upper chord? Perhaps Azuma's are straight, while Izumo/Iwate's are inclined. Or...?
              1. +2
                20 June 2026 14: 15
                Quote: anzar
                Yura, what about the inclined traverses of the upper chord? Perhaps Azuma's are straight, while Izumo/Iwate's are inclined. Or...?

                At Izumo/Iwate, at an angle to DP.
                I don't know about Azuma.
  3. +6
    18 June 2026 08: 19
    What about the comparison with the "Garibaldi"?
    feel
    1. +4
      18 June 2026 08: 56
      Definitely and absolutely, as soon as we finish with "Izumo":))))
  4. +5
    18 June 2026 08: 57
    Andrey, thank you for the article. I would really like a similar series of articles, comparing Borodino (Tsarevich) and Mikasa.
    1. +5
      18 June 2026 09: 16
      Good afternoon, Alexander, I'll definitely do this someday, it was always in my plans :)
  5. +2
    18 June 2026 09: 14
    A virtual fight between Izumo and Bayan?
    It is interesting to look at the damage to Izumo and Iwate after the battle in the Korean Strait with the Vladivostok cruisers.
    The flagship Izumo received 21 hits (20 men: 3 killed, 3 seriously (two of whom died in the hospital) and 14 lightly wounded), not counting minor damage to the spar, such as, for example, the shell hits on the gaff halyard or the masthead fire stand noted in the ship's commander's report. In total, Izumo was hit by 1 203-mm, 13 152-mm, 1 120-mm and 6 75-mm shells. A 203-mm shell hit the starboard side (a hole 400 x 360 mm) and exited through the port side (a hole 800 mm long and 250-300 mm wide). Most likely, the shell was fired by Rurik between 07.20 and 08.00
    The Iwate, the ship of Rear Admiral S. Misu's junior flagship and the last ship in the 2nd Battle Detachment, suffered the most damage. It took more than ten hits, with two 203mm shells being particularly effective: one each on the starboard and port sides. Three 152mm and one 76mm guns were disabled. According to the commander's report, crew losses totaled 76: 40 killed and 36 wounded (including seven seriously). Overall losses were 40 killed and 47 wounded.

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    Armored cruisers. Admiral Kamimura's flagship. "Izumo".
    April 17 2020
    7295
    10 minutes
    Plums are a spring blossom
    Gives its aroma to a person...
    To the one who broke the branch. (TIYO)
    Six virtually identical armored cruisers, known as "Asamoids," built to the designs of the renowned British shipbuilder Philip Watts, along with six battleships, formed the core of the Japanese Empire's Combined Fleet in the war with Russia. Unlike the battleships, they suffered no combat losses. They pursued Russian raiders, protected convoys, and participated in squadron battles practically on equal terms with their older comrades.

    During the Russo-Japanese War, the armored cruisers were assigned to Vice Admiral Kamimura Hikonojo's 2nd Squadron. Izumo became his flagship. Together with Iwate, they sailed the entire campaign from Port Arthur to Tsushima.

    Vice Admiral Kamimura Hikonojo, commander of the 2nd Battle Division.
    On February 9, 1904, following a nighttime attack by Japanese destroyers on the Russian naval base in Port Arthur, the Japanese Combined Fleet conducted a reconnaissance in force, testing the Russian squadron's combat readiness. After firing on Russian ships moored in the outer roads, Admiral Togo's fleet came under fire from shore batteries and was forced to withdraw. At least one 152mm shell from Iwate struck the cruiser Askold. Ten men on board Iwate were wounded by shell fragments. Another shell, exploding in the water, damaged the hull on the starboard aft side.

    The Second Battle Detachment in 1904 near Port Arthur, Izumo in the foreground.
    Kamimura's detachment was later sent on a raid. On the morning of March 6 (February 22), Izumo, Iwate, Yakumo, Azuma, and Asama, along with two armored cruisers from the 3rd Detachment, Kasagi and Yoshino, raided Vladivostok but nearly became trapped in ice up to 45 cm thick. After struggling to reach thinner ice, the cruisers began firing at Vladivostok. The attack was intimidating (the fire was ineffective), but went unpunished.

    Having limited himself to demonstrative maneuvering in full view of the coastal batteries, Kamimura left and on March 16 (3) joined the main forces of the fleet, which were in the Yellow Sea at a temporary base off the west coast of Korea.

    On March 22 (9), the Combined Fleet appeared at Port Arthur in full force. Following the death of Admiral Makarov and the lull at Port Arthur, Kamimura's force (except Asama and Yakumo, which were replaced by the armored cruiser IJN Kasuga) received orders to return to the Sea of ​​Japan. For some time, Kamimura's force unsuccessfully pursued the Vladivostok cruisers (Rossiya, Gromoboi, Rurik, and Bogatyr, escorted by destroyers). The Russian raiders successfully dealt with Japanese convoys and military contraband, dealing significant blows to Japanese communications and sinking transports carrying troops and heavy weapons.

    Battle_off_Ulsan Propaganda postcard depicting the death of the Rurik, sunk by the Japanese fleet.
    On August 1 (14), 1904, while on a mission to meet a squadron breaking out of Port Arthur, three Russian cruisers (less the grounded Bogatyr) were finally cut off from Vladivostok by Kamimura's force (four armored cruisers, including Izumo and Iwate, and two armored cruisers and destroyers). The battle in the Korea Strait (the Battle of Ulsan) ended with the destruction of the Russian cruiser Rurik. Kamimura's force was several times superior to Admiral Jessen's in firepower.

    Iessen attempted to lure the Japanese cruisers away from the damaged Rurik. He succeeded, but two old Japanese armored cruisers arrived and finished off the Russian cruiser. Kamimura was forced to abandon his pursuit of the furiously firing Rossiya and Gromoboi—around 10:00, he was informed that Izumo had expended three-quarters of its ammunition, and its stokers were exhausted from the five-hour battle.


    A hole in the mainmast of Izumo, received during the battle near Ulsan on 14 (1) August 1904.
    The flagship Izumo received 21 hits (20 men: 3 killed, 3 seriously (two of whom died in the hospital) and 14 lightly wounded), not counting minor damage to the spar, such as, for example, the shell hits on the gaff halyard or the masthead fire stand noted in the ship's commander's report. In total, Izumo was hit by 1 203-mm, 13 152-mm, 1 120-mm and 6 75-mm shells. A 203-mm shell hit the starboard side (a hole 400 x 360 mm) and exited through the port side (a hole 800 mm long and 250-300 mm wide). Most likely, the shell was fired by Rurik between 07.20 and 08.00


    Figure 1 - General diagram of hits on the Izumo's port side
    Figure 2 - General diagram of hits on the Izumo's starboard side
    The Iwate, the ship of Rear Admiral S. Misu's junior flagship and the last ship in the 2nd Battle Detachment, suffered the most damage. It took more than ten hits, with two 203mm shells being particularly effective: one each on the starboard and port sides. Three 152mm and one 76mm guns were disabled. According to the commander's report, crew losses totaled 76: 40 killed and 36 wounded (including seven seriously). Overall losses were 40 killed and 47 wounded.


    At 07.00:23 AM, a powerful explosion occurred in Casemate No. 1—the forward casemate on the starboard upper deck. Japanese documents attribute the explosion to a 203 mm shell from the Rurik. The explosion was caused by the detonation of ammunition stored in the casemate and on its roof. Twenty-three armor-piercing 152 mm shells, 36 152 mm cannon charges, and 24 76 mm rounds were "lost." The casemate was almost completely destroyed. Debris from the structure caused extensive damage to the forward superstructure, funnels, lifeboats, etc., with some large pieces reaching the opposite side and the aft bridge. Despite the extensive destruction, the Iwate did not even temporarily break line during the battle.
  6. +3
    18 June 2026 10: 13
    I wonder who awarded Asama that 10-inch double? All of the main battery artillery on the BBO had their barrels shot out. Did Oslyabya really manage to do that in the first half hour of the battle? It seems Asama sustained some damage early on in Tsushima...
    1. 0
      18 June 2026 16: 20
      There were rumors that "Oslyabya" was a pretty good shot...
    2. +4
      18 June 2026 16: 47
      Quote: Victor Masyuk
      I wonder who awarded Asamu the 10-inch double?

      Someone from BBO
      The BBO had all of the main battery artillery with their barrels shot out.

      This isn't entirely true. The Japanese, for example, didn't count the guns as completely empty.

      Quote: Victor Masyuk
      It seems Asama received some damage at the beginning of Tsushima...

      First at 14:27 (Japanese) 12-inch, in some sections of the database it is estimated at 9 inches. The steering is damaged.
      Then at 15:00 (Japanese) there was a double hit. The Asama was out of action again.
      1. +2
        18 June 2026 17: 26
        Quote: rytik32
        This is not entirely true.

        They were rather shot several times as a result of the battle.
        1. +3
          18 June 2026 17: 43
          Yes, that's right.
          The BBO demonstrated a surprisingly high consumption of ammunition.
          1. +3
            18 June 2026 17: 58
            Quote: rytik32
            The BBO demonstrated a surprisingly high consumption of ammunition.

            I totally agree
      2. 0
        19 June 2026 07: 11
        Thank you for your detailed and comprehensive answer.
  7. +1
    18 June 2026 12: 59
    Good afternoon.
    Dear Andrey, thank you for your interesting consideration of the booking issue.
    Let's consider what the confrontation between Izumo and Bayan could have led to in the real conditions of the Russo-Japanese War.

    At that time, methods existed for comparing different ships. Certain constants were used for evaluation, but ships had to be comparable in displacement, design, armament, armor, maneuverability, and the ability to moderately increase engine power. If we are to believe E. Reed, who wrote that the designs of the Asama- and Garibaldi-class armored cruisers were based on his "cuirasses courts" designs (I have French sources), comparing these ships with the Bayan becomes even more complex.
    1. +1
      18 June 2026 13: 55
      Quote: 27091965i
      Good afternoon.
      Dear Andrey, thank you for your interesting consideration of the booking issue.
      Let's consider what the confrontation between Izumo and Bayan could have led to in the real conditions of the Russo-Japanese War.

      At that time, methods existed for comparing different ships. Certain constants were used for evaluation, but ships had to be comparable in displacement, design, armament, armor, maneuverability, and the ability to moderately increase engine power. If we are to believe E. Reed, who wrote that the designs of the Asama- and Garibaldi-class armored cruisers were based on his "cuirasses courts" designs (I have French sources), comparing these ships with the Bayan becomes even more complex.

      All these articles are certainly interesting, and one can argue until one is blue in the face about what would happen if one increased the reservation here and saved on the length there.
      But the facts show that the Asamoids survived the entire war and withstood squadron combat, meaning their concept was proven correct. Why the Russians failed to sink a single one, however, is another matter.
      Don't scold the pianist, he plays as best he can.
      1. +1
        18 June 2026 14: 02
        Quote: Panin (Michman)
        But the facts show that the Asamoids went through the entire war and withstood squadron combat, which means their concept was justified.

        I agree with you, the value of any ship is determined by the results of the war.
        Quote: Panin (Michman)
        Don't scold the pianist, he plays as best he can.

        Why criticize you? You're writing your opinion on the topic of the article, and it's interesting anyway.
        1. +1
          18 June 2026 15: 37
          Quote: 27091965i
          Why scold you?

          I didn't mean myself, but Russian sailors.
          1. +2
            18 June 2026 15: 44
            Quote: Panin (Michman)
            I didn't mean myself, but Russian sailors.

            Well, you see... You've already assigned blame. I prefer not to simply state the facts.
            Quote: Panin (Michman)
            The Asamoids went through the entire war and withstood squadron combat

            But to figure out why this happened and whether it really happened
            Quote: Panin (Michman)
            their concept proved itself
            1. -1
              19 June 2026 14: 29
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              But to figure out why this happened, and whether their concept really justified itself

              Dear Andrey, after the Tsushima artillery battle, in which the Japanese deployed only four squadron battleships in the battle line, and eight armored cruisers (six so-called "Asamoids", two so-called "Garibaldians"), did anyone still have any doubts that the concept chosen by the Japanese in 1896, and found by the Italians in 1893, of a squadron armored cruiser suitable for deployment in the battle line with 8" (10") turret main battery artillery, 6-7 rapid-fire 6" guns in a broadside (most of which are protected by cemented shell-proof armor of casemates or batteries), with full (almost full) side armor along the waterline, a second belt of cemented armor together with armored traverses forming Citadel, are there any doubts that this concept has proven itself?

              I live in interesting times, the postmodern era. laughing

              It is interesting to understand how, not only during the entire pre-war decade, but even in the war year of 1904, after the battle in the Yellow Sea, our wise MTC never noticed this concept, which the Italians began to implement back in 1893, and the Japanese chose in 1896, ordering the design and construction of armored cruisers corresponding to this concept in Britain, Germany and the same France.
              1. +2
                19 June 2026 18: 01
                Quote: AlexanderA
                suitable for in-line installation

                Are you ignoring the experience of the Battle of Santiago?
                1. -2
                  19 June 2026 19: 16
                  Quote: rytik32
                  Are you ignoring the experience of the Battle of Santiago?

                  What exactly is the experience of this battle?

                  The experience of the ultimately unsuccessful attempt to escape from superior enemy forces by the cruiser "Cristóbal Colón", which was not armed with main battery artillery?

                  Unsuccessful due to the poor quality of the local coal and the fatigue and exhaustion of the stokers who were starving in the besieged city, who had not slept the night before going out to sea and were not fed during the entire following day.

                  If in place of the cruiser there was an EBR without main battery guns, what would change in your opinion?

                  I'll write about what would have changed. We would have caught up with the EBR faster, and its captain would have been forced to make the decision to beach the ship sooner.

                  If Vitgeft had taken the experience of the Battle of Santiago de Cuba seriously, he would probably have attempted to launch his squadron in the evening, giving the enemy a chance to lose him during the night rather than in the morning, giving them daylight to pursue and engage, just like Cervera. What do you think?

                  The only difference is that artillery fire in the Battle of Santiago de Cuba opened at approximately 09:40 in the morning, and in the Battle of the Yellow Sea at approximately 12:20 in the afternoon.

                  The superior enemy forces had enough hours of daylight to engage in artillery fire and possible pursuit in this battle in both places.
                  1. +2
                    19 June 2026 19: 27
                    Quote: AlexanderA
                    If Vitgeft had taken the experience of the Battle of Santiago de Cuba seriously, he would probably have attempted to launch his squadron in the evening, giving the enemy a chance to lose him during the night rather than in the morning, giving them daylight to pursue and engage, just like Cervera. What do you think?

                    Of course. The best thing is to spend the night under torpedo boat attacks without a wink of sleep, and then in the morning, after a sleepless night and losses from night attacks, to engage in battle with a fresh Japanese fleet...
                    "Brilliant! Stay! You'll be the planet's greatest mechanic!" (c)
                    1. +1
                      19 June 2026 20: 14
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Of course. The best thing is to spend the night under attack from destroyers and not sleep a wink.

                      And so, not having had enough sleep the night before going out ("04:30 – The crews began to build steam in the boilers. A convoy of minesweepers and escort destroyers moved to the outer roadstead to clear the fairway of Japanese mines.") fought off Japanese destroyers in an uncontrollable crowd, returning in the evening and at night to Port Arthur.
                      after a sleepless night and losses from night attacks

                      Considering the absence of torpedo losses during the uncontrolled horde's return to Port Arthur, why did you impose these obligatory losses in an alternate reality during a controlled squadron's breakthrough at night without searchlights blazing in all directions? "Go at night without lights, transmitting signals via a Ratier lantern," "In fog, release floating cones astern." And when, in your opinion, is it better to repel night attacks by destroyers—on ships not yet damaged by enemy shells before the artillery battle, or on damaged ships after the artillery battle? Incidentally, it worked both ways. As I understand it, the enemy wouldn't have been wary of night attacks by destroyers accompanying the Russian squadron during a night pursuit, and wouldn't have been on guard, but would have slept peacefully by their guns?
                      Anything that reduced the accuracy of Japanese fire, Japanese gunners who hadn't slept enough during the night pursuit during the Russian squadron's breakthrough, which began late at night, and the breakthrough being launched in fresh weather, or better yet, a storm—all of this would have worked in the Russians' favor, not the Japanese. But this requires thought, studying the experience of others, like the unsuccessful Cervera breakthrough. "It's complicated, it's complicated..." (C)
                      engage in battle with the fresh Japanese fleet...

                      "Captain 2nd Rank E. P. Eliseev answered affirmatively to the admiral's question about whether a detachment of destroyers could attack a Japanese squadron at night."
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      "Brilliant! Stay! You'll be the planet's greatest mechanic!" (c)

                      The fact is that what I wrote was proposed to Vitgeft.

                      "Rear Admiral V.K. Vitgeft also responded with a categorical refusal to the proposal of the Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral N.A. Matusevich, to discuss issues of preparation for the battle of July 27, 1904. The recommendations of the Viceroy regarding the departure of the squadron on a stormy day and the proposal of the squadron navigators regarding the departure at night were also not considered."

                      You would have been a bad Admiral Vitgeft, just like Vitgeft himself, dear Andrey. Even with hindsight, you wouldn't have broken through to Vladivostok with the squadron. wink
                      1. +2
                        19 June 2026 20: 53
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        And so, without getting enough sleep the night before the departure ("04:30 - The teams began to make steam in the boilers.

                        True. Well, according to you, first there will be a day of hard work – loading, then a sleepless night, and then the decisive battle.
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        Taking into account the absence of losses from torpedoes during the return of the uncontrollable crowd to Port Arthur

                        You don't know that the Poltava actually received a torpedo, but it simply didn't explode. You don't understand that the dispersed squadron made it easier to evade the destroyers. You don't realize that the admiral simply must assume such losses would occur, since he was sailing at night, and this was known during the day, so he should expect attacks from dozens of destroyers.
                        The main thing is to offer some kind of option, different from what's happening in reality - and it will definitely work, right, Alexandra? :))))


                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        By the way, it worked both ways. As I understand it, the enemy, in a night pursuit, wouldn't have been wary of the night attacks of the destroyers sailing with the Russian squadron, wouldn't have been on guard, but would have slept peacefully by their guns?

                        Of course. And your knowledge of the material is so terrible that you don't even understand why.
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        But you have to think about it.

                        That's exactly it. But this is for you.
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        "Complicated, complex..." (C)
                      2. +1
                        19 June 2026 23: 29
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Well, in your opinion, first there will be a day of hard work - loading, then a sleepless night, and then a decisive battle.

                        Working hard during the day is normal. The pursuing enemy will also have a sleepless night. Or do you think the enemy will sleep on the battleships and cruisers of the 1st Combat Detachment pursuing our alternative Vitgeft's squadron at night and miss the mine attack by Captain 2nd Rank E. P. Eliseev's subordinates? wink

                        Thus, even if the Japanese fleet manages NOT to lose Vitgeft's squadron during the night (as it did the evening after the battle, losing the Tsarevich, which had fallen behind the squadron and headed south, and the Askold and Novik, which had broken away from the squadron), everyone, both Russian and Japanese, will be sleep-deprived in the morning. And this will have a greater impact on the ability of the Japanese stokers to maintain a speed of more than 13 knots for the 1st Battle Detachment and on the firing accuracy of that detachment's gunners than on the ability of the Russian stokers' squadron to maintain a speed of 13 knots or on the firing accuracy of the Russian gunners. Incidentally, according to Makarov's "Instructions for Campaign and Combat," which Vitgeft used as a guide, large-caliber gun crews were not called upon to repel mine attacks: "Fire at battleships with heavy guns (10-12) and use guns of 152 mm and below to repel attacks by destroyers." - so that the crew of these guns were not required to stay awake at night (if they could sleep).
                        You don't know that the Poltava did receive a torpedo, but it didn't explode.

                        I know. I've read the respected Polomoshnov, and I'm not a sclerotic yet. :)) In your alternate reality, if the squadron had launched a breakthrough in the evening, "just before dark," would that torpedo have definitely exploded? And by the way, when you offered me the chance to become a "planet mechanic," did you forget that Vitgeft was offered the chance to launch the breakthrough on a stormy day or at night, and he brushed it off?
                        You don't understand that the disintegrated squadron made it easier to evade the destroyers.

                        Seriously? But in the Battle of Tsushima, everyone who stayed in Nebogatov's wake wasn't torpedoed, unlike those who fell behind and scattered while moving alone.

                        Thus, your idea that it is easier to fight off mine attacks while out of formation is not confirmed by the practice of the Russo-Japanese War.

                        By the way, getting into Poltava only happened because: "The battleship was attacked by two Japanese destroyers, which the battleship mistook for their own destroyers." - They started firing back and dodging by bringing the torpedo behind the stern only after the launch. "Fire opened, but it was too late. The destroyers were almost abeam and launched a mine at us, its phosphorus trail cutting perpendicularly into our side. For the second time, Midshipman Pchelnikov saved the Poltava. Seeing the shot, he immediately ordered full astern and port."

                        The fact that Poltava was then following in a wake formation did not prevent the destroyers from being brought astern and opening artillery fire on them: Based on their war experience, Russian officers noted that Japanese destroyers never came close to battleships, and that Russian ships did not open their battle lanterns at night.
                        The admiral simply has to assume that such losses will occur, since he is sailing at night, it is known during the day, so one should expect attacks from dozens of destroyers - you can’t guess.

                        And you haven't guessed yet that during the morning sortie, we should have expected attacks from dozens of destroyers the night after an artillery battle, especially on damaged ships with partially disabled artillery? But they did happen. And they were expected. Incidentally, a breakthrough according to the scenario I described almost happened on June 10th. But Vitgeft chickened out and turned back:

                        "The Russian squadron, having released the minesweeper convoy, put to sea and 20 miles from Port Arthur (around 18:00) met with the 1st combat detachment of the Japanese fleet, accompanied by cruisers and destroyers. Rear Admiral V.K. Vitgeft did not dare to engage in combat and missed a real chance to break through, especially since maneuvering the 1st combat detachment of the Japanese fleet to reach firing positions would have taken the rest of daylight hours (there was little time left before sunset). The late hour of the day would not have allowed for a prolonged artillery battle, although the danger of night attacks by the Japanese was quite high.
                        destroyers, especially considering the incomplete composition of the medium artillery on some Russian ships. The minimum distance between the opponents was about 50 kilometers.
                        At 6:45 p.m., Rear Admiral V. K. Vitgeft gave the order to return to Port Arthur. The squadron's chief of staff, Rear Admiral N. A. Matusevich, wrote: "What reason and considerations prompted the late admiral to make such a decision remains unclear to me to this day..." A real chance for a breakthrough under favorable conditions was missed. The squadron remained in the outer roadstead and, together with its batteries, repelled eight attacks by Japanese destroyers, which launched 38 torpedoes but scored no hits. All the attacking Japanese destroyers and fighters were clearly visible in the darkness, as they were betrayed by flame jets and sparks from their funnels at full speed. As the squadron returned on June 10, 1904, at 9:35 p.m., the battleship Sevastopol struck a mine. The battleship's failure became a deterrent to a second breakthrough attempt."


                        As a result, on July 28, they attempted a breakout without the Bayan. Had they waited until September, they would have attempted a breakout without the Sevastopol, which had been struck by a mine again. The longer they waited, the fewer ships there were capable of breaking out, and the less likely they were to succeed.
                        The main thing is to offer some option that is not like the reality

                        The one in historical reality didn't work. Would you have chosen the same breakthrough option as in the historical reality we know?

                        "Insanity is repeating the same mistakes and expecting different results."
                        And you know the material so poorly that you don’t even understand why.

                        Unlike you, I remember that on June 10th Vitgeft had a chance to break away from the Japanese at night without a prolonged artillery battle in the evening, and that before leaving on July 28th he was offered to break through at night.

                        It seems, unlike you, I know that Servera decided to break through at night, but it didn't work out:

                        https://history.wikireading.ru/155320

                        "On July 2, Cervera convened a war council and reported the demand of Marshal Blanc, who commanded the ground forces, to withdraw the squadron from the island so as not to reduce the troops' rations. It was decided to break through under cover of the following night. But since the Americans were standing close to the passage, illuminating it with searchlights, the Spanish command decided to postpone the breakthrough until the morning. A column of four cruisers appeared in the passage at 9:30 a.m., 15 minutes later they reached open water, and 10 minutes later they were joined by two destroyers. Since the admiral had orders to save at least one cruiser, before leaving, he ordered two cruisers to engage the enemy in battle, while the Cristobal Colon and Maria Teresa were to rush along the coast. Knowing that the fastest cruiser of the enemy was the cruiser Brooklyn, standing in front of the exit, he gave the order: "Sink "Brooklyn," and then we can leave. However, the sailors from the Brooklyn turned out to be better prepared..."

                        You, like perhaps our hapless Vitgeft, apparently did not know that Cervera wanted to break through at night, and decided that the squadron's attempt at a daytime breakthrough should be "repeated again and again."

                        By the way, did you know that during the American Civil War, Confederate blockade runners made thousands of breakouts, usually at night, from besieged Atlantic ports with a success rate of over 80%?

                        Okay, my goal is to disseminate information, not engage in ad hominem argumentation. Which is clearly what you did after I wrote that you would have been a bad Admiral Vitgeft, since even with hindsight, you'd likely repeat all of Vitgeft's major mistakes "over and over again." Please don't be offended, Andrey. Those are my jokes.
                      3. +1
                        20 June 2026 06: 43
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        Or do you think the enemy will sleep on the battleships pursuing our alternative Vitgeft's squadron at night?

                        Well what can I say?
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        I live in interesting times, the postmodern era.

                        Dear readers, do I need to refute this astonishing thesis?
                      4. 0
                        20 June 2026 13: 50
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Well what can I say?


                        https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/first-world-war/jutland/timeline

                        "Around 20:30, the British and German battlecruisers exchanged their last shots.

                        Since 21: 00 to 22: 00

                        Jellicoe orders his fleet to go into night marching formation and signals "no action during the night." Despite this, most sailors remain at their combat posts all night.."


                        The era of modernity sends greetings to your current postmodern views on the issue raised.
                      5. +2
                        20 June 2026 14: 25
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        The era of modernity sends greetings to your current postmodern views on the issue raised.

                        Okay, so be it:))))) You made me laugh enough today, so I’ll reveal a military secret to you.
                        Togo had no intention of chasing the 1st TOE at night. If the Russian squadron had attempted a breakout that evening, he would have left Elliott Base and headed... for the Tsushima Strait. In other words, he would have taken a route along which there were no, were not, and could not have been any Russian ships, because the breaking Russian squadron would have been following him, not in front of him, and everyone on the Japanese ships would have been asleep except the duty shift of stokers and watch officers.
                        And the next morning, he would resume the search for the Russian squadron with his numerous light forces, find it, and engage it in a decisive battle. And if he didn't find it, he would retreat to Tsushima, where, joining up with Kamimura, he would engage the 1st Fleet, which had no chance of either passing Tsushima undetected or outflanking Japan from the ocean side.
                      6. -1
                        20 June 2026 18: 04
                        I wrote a long, funny message with you, dear Andrey, in the role of a traveler into the body of Admiral Vitgeft in the leading role, but it... flew off. wink

                        Therefore, I'll be brief. The further from Port Arthur harbor we could have engaged the squadron battle forced by Admiral Togo with the 1st Battle Detachment of the Japanese Fleet, the higher the chance that at least some Russian ships from the 1st Pacific Fleet would have broken through to Vladivostok. Moreover, the number of damaged Russian ships reaching neutral ports and interned there would likely have increased compared to what we know historically.

                        However, I haven't seen your plan yet. Perhaps, compared to the breakthrough on a stormy day proposed to Vitgeft by the Viceroy and the night breakthrough proposed by the squadron's navigators—proposals that Vitgeft dismissed—your plan is far superior. Or do you not have one?
                      7. +5
                        21 June 2026 05: 55
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        I'll be brief about this.

                        I'll be brief, too. Study H. Togo's actual plans. Then perhaps you won't be so ridiculous imagining yourself an admiral. Perhaps.
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        However, I haven't seen your plan yet.

                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        Or you don't have it?

                        I don't have it. Because if I were in Vitgeft's place, I wouldn't have even tried to break through to Vladivostok—I would have gone out and fought a general battle, returned to the PA afterward, repaired myself, and fought a general battle again.
                      8. -2
                        22 June 2026 02: 22
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        I'll be brief, too. Study H. Togo's actual plans. Then perhaps you won't be so ridiculous imagining yourself an admiral. Perhaps.

                        Dear Andrey, you spoke out in our exchange of opinions against Admiral Vitgeft, who once again dismissed the proposal to break through in bad weather or at night.

                        I'm glad you're well aware of Admiral Togo's plans. But it turns out you didn't know (or have forgotten?) what the Viceroy and the squadron's navigators proposed to Admiral Vitgeft, because with the remark: "Brilliant! Stay! You'll be the planet's brilliant mechanic!" - They attributed these proposals to me.

                        I have no idea why you're so amused. If someone doesn't know something, like who exactly proposed something to Admiral Vitgeft, and he brushed it off, I don't find it funny. Especially if it's you, dear Andrey—one might say the main popularizer of Russo-Japanese history on the highly visited website topwar.
                        I don't have it. Because if I were in Vitgeft's place, I wouldn't have even tried to break through to Vladivostok—I would have gone out and fought a general battle, returned to the PA afterward, repaired myself, and fought a general battle again.

                        If you were Vitgeft, you would have died, just as Vitgeft did. The order to break through to Vladivostok was given to Rear Admiral Vitgeft personally by Emperor Nicholas II, who supported the categorical demands of His Imperial Majesty's Viceroy in the Far East, Admiral Alekseyev.

                        https://statehistory.ru/books/YU--V--Diskant_Port-Artur--1904/28

                        The monotony of the battlefield on August 7 was interrupted by the previously mentioned shelling of the fortress's inner basin from the landward side. This signaled to the squadron's command and crews that the time for safe anchorage in port had expired. That same day, Vitgeft received a dispatch from the viceroy categorically demanding that he abandon Port Arthur under threat of not only criminal liability but also "the stain of shame that would fall on St. Andrew's flag if the squadron were sunk in port." Vitgeft, more convinced by the wound he had received than by the dispatch, convened a war council on the flagship Tsarevich on August 8. He informed those present of Alekseev's order and scheduled the ships' departure for 6:00 a.m. on August 10, ordering them to replenish their coal and provisions.

                        If you believe Vitgeft could continue to sabotage this order with impunity, then you have a very strange understanding of both the "vertical of power" and military subordination. And most importantly, after the siege weapons began shelling Port Arthur harbor, the plan to "fight a decisive battle, repair the damage, fight another battle" became a complete gamble.

                        And finally, although there was still enough artillery ammunition in Port Arthur to replenish the ships' ammunition supplies after the battle in the Yellow Sea, there was no more high-quality coal left.

                        Your hypothetical "repeat general battle" would have to be fought with low-quality Yantai or Kaiping coal.
                      9. +4
                        22 June 2026 07: 06
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        If you were in Vitgeft's place, you would have died just as Vitgeft died.

                        Perhaps. Or perhaps not, because I would have been in the conning tower during the battle, not where Vitgeft was, "it doesn't matter where I die."
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        The order to break through to Vladivostok was given to Rear Admiral Vitgeft personally by Emperor Nicholas II.

                        You don't know the history of 1TOE well.
                        The squadron was ready to sail in early June and sailed on June 10th to engage the Japanese fleet decisively—the viceroy had convinced Vitgeft that it was weakened. But, seeing a fleet that had never been weakened, Vitgeft decided against battle and retreated to Artur. Along the way, his Sevastopol struck a mine, forcing him to undergo further repairs, and Vitgeft was determined not to leave Artur.
                        Then the governor, realizing that there was no other way to get the 1TOE out of Arthur, turned to the emperor.
                        If I were Vitgeft, I would have given battle on June 10th and then retreated to Arthur. Considering the time it actually took to repair the fleet after the battle of July 28th, the squadron would have been ready for another fight by August at the latest. Therefore, under my scenario, there would have been no order from Nicholas at all, and I would have had plenty of coal—no need to make things up:))))))
                  2. +2
                    19 June 2026 21: 30
                    Quote: AlexanderA
                    Unsuccessful due to the poor quality of the local coal and the fatigue and exhaustion of the stokers who were starving in the besieged city, who had not slept the night before going out to sea and were not fed during the entire following day.

                    Rear Admiral P. Cervera has only himself to blame for what happened. His squadron had 29,000 tons of coal and provisions for two months prepared in Havana. However, he hesitated too long in choosing a course.
              2. +1
                19 June 2026 19: 31
                Quote: AlexanderA
                did anyone still have any doubts?

                Almost no one. That's why everyone immediately abandoned such cruisers—except the French, if I remember correctly.
                1. +1
                  19 June 2026 20: 33
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  Almost no one. That's why everyone immediately abandoned such cruisers—except the French, if I remember correctly.

                  Your timeline is off, in my opinion. The advent of dreadnoughts and battlecruisers with all-big guns forced the abandonment of the BRK-Kr class, not how the BRK-Kr performed during the Russo-Japanese War and the Battle of Tsushima in particular.

                  Before the Russo-Japanese War, the French simply had no battleships suitable for line-of-battle deployment, meaning with a medium caliber no less numerous than that of the "standard" battleships. Well, except for the Azuma, a French Asamoid built for the Japanese. Incidentally, it was the weakest Asamoid, with only twelve 6" guns, the longest, but not the most fast, but with the shortest 178mm main gun at the waterline and the most fragile crane control mechanism. The Azuma clearly demonstrates that of the four foreign "schools" of armored shipbuilding—British, German, Italian, and French—the French "school" was the weakest in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It designed and built one of the latest, but also the worst, battleships of the eight purchased by the Japanese at that time.
                  1. +2
                    19 June 2026 21: 00
                    Quote: AlexanderA
                    The emergence of dreadnoughts and battlecruisers with all-big guns forced the abandonment of the BRKr class.

                    That is, you know nothing about the construction of armored cruisers of the Tsukuba and Ibuki types, the latter of which were laid down in 1906. I'm not surprised.
                    The Japanese were actually building armored cruisers. The Japanese, who won the Russian Navy and, it would seem, knew better than anyone what kind of armored cruisers were needed. And then, based on the results of the battle in the Great Patriotic War, they immediately adjusted the design of their newest armored cruisers by slapping 12-inch guns on them (the "Tsukuba").
                    But for you, this is a closely guarded secret. You are deeply in love with "Garibaldi," and love, as we know, is blind...
                    1. 0
                      20 June 2026 00: 56
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      That is, you know nothing about the construction of armored cruisers of the Tsukuba and Ibuki types, the latter of which were laid down in 1906. I'm not surprised.

                      Taking offense at "bad Vitgeft," you've come to the wrong conclusion. I even know of a couple more armored cruisers officially laid down in the same year, 1907, as the Japanese Ibuki. These include the German Blucher and the Georgios Averof, originally built for the Italian Navy as the Genova but later sold to Greece while still on the slipway.

                      But how does this relate to the fact that by disputing the fact that armored cruisers were buried as a class and replaced battlecruisers in squadron battles, are you trying to argue with Wikipedia?

                      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armored_cruiser

                      "The Italian navy, lacking the means to build battleships, built the 7500-ton cruiser Garibaldi, which enjoyed worldwide success.[55] Sir William Henry White, Chief Shipbuilder of the British Royal Navy, submitted a design for a 12,000-ton cruiser of the Cressy class, which was intended from the outset to complement the pre-dreadnought battle line.[56] Thus, the armored cruiser became the direct predecessor and prototype of the battlecruiser.[56]"

                      "The Japanese successfully used armored cruisers in the Battle of Tsushima in 1905.

                      [...]

                      Encouraged by their success at the Battle of Tsushima, Japan built four Tsukuba-class cruisers between 1905 and 1908. With a speed of 20,5 knots, they were armed with four 12-inch (305 mm) guns, 8-inch (203 mm) armor protection on the belt and turrets, and 3-inch (76 mm) armor protection on the deck. The Tsukuba-class ships were intended to replace aging battleships and thereby demonstrate Japan's intention to continue using armored cruisers in naval combat.

                      "In 1908, the armored cruiser was replaced by the battlecruiser, which, thanks to armament comparable to that of a dreadnought battleship and a speed comparable to that of a cruiser, was faster and more powerful than the armored cruiser."


                      That being said, I appreciate conversationalists who try to argue with Wikipedia articles. They're generally interesting people.
                      You are deeply in love with Garibaldi, and love, as we know, is blind...

                      Well, there's even talk of love. It's trivial that the Garibaldi-class cruisers, incidentally designed in 1893, turned out to be the world's first armored cruisers truly capable of engaging in a battle alongside the "standard" battleships of the 1890s and early 1900s, as was clearly demonstrated during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. The reason for this was the lack of standard 12" armor-piercing shells (12" was a typical main gun for standard 12" armor-piercing brigades of the era) in the main armor of the "standard" battleships at that time. These shells, capable of penetrating 6-7" thick main armor belts of cemented armor, coal, and the slope of the armored deck at the artillery combat ranges prevailing in those years, followed by an explosion in the area of ​​the ammunition magazines, boilers, and machinery. As soon as these 12" shells appeared, the "squadron" armored cruisers, which had looked so good in 1895-1905, immediately became obsolete as a class. And these 12" shells appeared roughly simultaneously with the advent of the first battlecruisers with their all-big guns.

                      What does some kind of love have to do with the fact that the Garibaldi, with half the displacement and cost of the most powerful attack boats of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, could successfully fight against these attack boats in squadron battles? Not alone, of course, but as a complement to the "standard" attack boats of the time. This is something the Japanese successfully demonstrated in the squadron artillery battle in the Yellow Sea, and, best of all, in the squadron artillery battle at Tsushima.
                      1. +1
                        20 June 2026 06: 53
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        I even know of a couple more armored cruisers that were officially laid down in the same year of 1907.

                        Well, at least you know something. I have no doubt that someday you will also learn that the Blucher was intended to counter the Invincible, which the Germans thought was armed with 234mm guns. In other words, the Blucher was a ship for squadron service, not
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        concept of a squadron armored cruiser suitable for line-of-battle deployment

                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        but then sold while still on the Greek slipway "Georgios Averof".

                        Which, unexpectedly, was built for the Italian fleet with 10-inch guns...
                      2. +2
                        20 June 2026 16: 22
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Well, at least you know something.

                        I know a lot. Don't bully me, dear Andrey.
                        "Blyukher" is a ship for service with a squadron, and not... for deployment in the battle line.

                        https://topwar.ru/136664-oshibki-germanskogo-korablestroeniya-bolshoy-kreyser-blyuher.html

                        Errors of the German shipbuilding. Big cruiser "Blucher"

                        "And here a whole series of questions arises. The fact is that the overwhelming majority of sources and publications describe the birth of Germany's ninth armored cruiser as follows: the Germans knew about the construction of the Dreadnought and knew that the British had laid down the newest armored cruisers of the Invincible class to "pair" with her. But the British managed to misinform the Germans, and they believed that the Invincibles were similar to the Dreadnought, only with 234-mm artillery instead of 305-mm. Therefore, the Germans, without a second thought, laid down a lighter version of the Nassau with 210-mm guns, and ended up losing, because the 210-mm Blücher, of course, was significantly inferior to the 305-mm Invincible.

                        This theory is logical; the dates seem to line up perfectly. But then why does Muzhenikov mention in his monograph that the Blucher was designed in 1904-1905, when no one had even heard of any Invincibles? And the second question: If von Tirpitz secured permission to resume construction of new "large cruisers" in 1906, then why wasn't the Blucher laid down until early 1907? Unfortunately, Russian-language sources lack details of the Blucher's design, and we are left with only guesses of varying degrees of reliability.."


                        Dear Andrey, "Blyukher", in your opinion was it a "wonderful mistake" of German shipbuilding? wink

                        Before the era of dreadnoughts and battlecruisers, the official tactical doctrine of the Kaiserliche Marine did not envisage the use of the Große Kreuzer in a line of battle alongside squadron battleships. During that period, such cruisers, both large armored deck cruisers and armored cruisers, were designed and built in Germany for two purposes:

                        1. Stationary and colonial service, as part of the same East Asian cruiser squadron.
                        2. Squadron reconnaissance with the main forces of battleships in home waters.

                        The design for the cruiser "Blücher" was developed by the design departments of the German Navy's Main Directorate in 1904-1905. The design was simply outdated by the time the cruiser was laid down in 1907. Construction could not begin earlier due to financial restrictions in the Naval Law. Only after the construction funds were officially approved by the Reichstag and funding was opened in the 1906 fiscal year, the shipyard was able to begin construction, order metal, and so on. This pushed back the official laying of the keel of the "Blücher" to early 1907.

                        At the time funding for the construction of the Blücher was finally approved by the Reichstag, the same design department of the German Navy's Main Directorate was already underway designing the first German battlecruiser, the Von der Tann, whose design was ready by June 1907. However, construction of the Von der Tann could not begin immediately in 1907. Again, the financial restrictions of the Naval Law were in place. Therefore, we will simply admit that the Blücher:

                        1. She was not an armored cruiser built to operate alongside German battleships. Even in 1904-1905, during the design of the Blücher, German naval tactical thinking had not yet reached the point of "is this even possible?" They were just as slow on this issue as Russian tactical thinking, which at about the same time decided that the Russian Fleet should receive three more "luxuries of the squadron," meaning three more Bayan-class cruisers.

                        2. Despite the fact that the foundation was laid in 1907 "Blücher" was in no way a response to the appearance of the first English battlecruiser."

                        It's trivial that the gears of the German financial "ordung" were working in such a way that the armored Große Kreuzer "Blücher", developed in 1904-1905, could only be officially laid down in 1907, and the first German battleship Große Kreuzer "Von der Tann", the design for which was ready in June 1907, could only be officially laid down on March 21, 1908.

                        If I were asked, "How did Imperial Germany lose the dreadnought race?" I would answer, "Economically and systematically. Under the watchful guidance of Kaiser Wilhelm." wink
                        Which, unexpectedly, was built for the Italian fleet with 10-inch guns...

                        The 10" guns of the Kasuga cruiser, for example, show that the licensed Armstrong 10" guns produced by Stabilimenti meccanici di Pozzuoli were quite impressive. From 1893 to 1907 (San Marco was laid down on January 2, 1907), Italy laid down and built excellent, I would even say the world's best, "squadron" armored cruisers with 10" main guns for limited naval theaters: the Giuseppe Garibaldi class, the Pisa class, and the San Giorgio class. The Italians, however, were no longer able to develop battlecruisers. And the world's first fully-fledged fast battleships, the Francesco Caracciolo class, were also never built. Too bad.
                      3. +1
                        20 June 2026 16: 54
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        I know a lot.

                        I have no doubt that you are sure of it.
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        The official tactical doctrine of the Kaiserliche Marine, before the era of dreadnoughts and battlecruisers, did not envisage the use of Große Kreuzer in the same line of battle together with squadron battleships.

                        That's exactly it:))))
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        Unfortunately, Russian-language sources lack details of the Blucher's design, and we are left with only guesses of varying degrees of reliability."

                        Of course. Therefore, you have the right to choose any assignment for Blucher—the one considered canonical (opposing Invincible) or another. But what you cannot choose is that Blucher was created for line fighting. Hence your example of Blucher, which you cited in support of your thesis.
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        concept of a squadron armored cruiser suitable for line-of-battle deployment

                        is worth absolutely nothing.
                        That's it:)))
                      4. -1
                        20 June 2026 18: 39
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        I have no doubt that you are sure of it.

                        Moreover, I know a lot of things that you don’t know. wink
                        That's exactly it:))))

                        What's so funny about the fact that the official tactical doctrine of the Kaiserliche Marine was flawed in this matter until the Große Kreuzer actually became battlecruisers?

                        "... there seems absolutely no reason, under modern conditions, why first-class cruisers should hold aloof if designed & constructed suitably. This has become true largely through improvements in armor & armaments made in the last few years & the point seems of sufficient importance to justify further illustration.

                        If cruisers are to be built capable of acting with battle-ships in fleet-actions, they must be given such protection to buoyancy, stability, guns & crews, as will enable them to come to close quarters with the enemy without running undue risks.

                        Until the latest improvements in armor were made, the thicknesses & weights necessary to secure adequate protection, over a sufficient area & height of broadside, were such as to involve very large dimensions & cost, when associated with the high speeds & large coal supplies of necessary in cruisers. Consequently it may be said, with confidence, that no existing cruisers have the necessary protection to justify their undertaking close action with battle-ships, except it to be the Italian cruisers above mentioned & a few vessels similarly protected & of later date."

                        10 June, 1897, the Assistant Controller and Director of Naval Construction, Sir William H. White, S.11584. The National Archives. ADM 116/446. Unnumbered folios.

                        What can one say here other than that Sir William H. White was a highly skilled professional? Professionals of his caliber, capable of reasoning so sensibly about whether first-class cruisers could participate in squadron artillery combat and what improvements in armor and armament, "made in the last few years, contributed to this," were not found in either the German or Russian navies, either in 1897 or later, while the armored cruiser class was still relevant.

                        Well, since there were no specialists of this class, it turned out that neither the Russian nor the German fleets developed armored cruisers suitable for artillery combat as part of armored squadrons in time.

                        The Germans, well, they lost their war at sea back in the era of dreadnoughts, superdreadnoughts, and battlecruisers. We lost ours when the "squadron" armored cruiser class was still quite relevant.
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        The concept of a squadron armored cruiser suitable for deployment in a line of battle... is worth absolutely nothing.

                        It is funny that on this issue you are arguing not even with me, but with Sir William H. White, who clearly stated his position in a document dated June 10, 1897.

                        I understand that this is because you simply never read the document, even short quotes from it.

                        Well, it's never too late to read:

                        https://www.dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php/Cressy_Class_Cruiser_(1899)#cite_ref-1
                      5. +1
                        21 June 2026 05: 56
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        What's funny about the fact that the official tactical doctrine of the Kaiserliche Marine was flawed in this matter?

                        The fact that you screwed up again. And White has absolutely nothing to do with it:)))
                      6. -1
                        22 June 2026 03: 46
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        The fact that you screwed up again. And White has absolutely nothing to do with it:)))

                        You have a jumble of horses, people, the doctrine of using the Große Kreuzer Kaiserliche Marine before the era of battlecruisers and your so-called "in absentia" dispute on the issue of "squadron" armored cruisers with Sir William H. White, who expressed his opinion in writing on the issue in 1897, justifying the technical features of the Cressy-class armored cruisers.

                        I don't like to tell someone that they screwed up, but you screwed up with the "squadron" armored cruisers of foreign fleets, declaring that they were conceptually "worthless" (I'd like to see what the Japanese would have fought in the Tsushima artillery battle without eight armored cruisers in the line of battle).

                        However, you are a popularizer of the history of the Russian Fleet, not of foreign navies from the late 19th to early 20th centuries. So you can be forgiven.
                      7. +1
                        22 June 2026 07: 10
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        You have a jumbled mess of horses, people, the doctrine of using the Große Kreuzer of the Kaiserliche Marine before the era of battlecruisers and your so-called "in absentia" dispute on the issue of "squadron" armored cruisers with Sir William H. White.

                        I had only one thesis: the Japanese BKR concept was unjustified. And your attempt to prove otherwise by citing the Blücher failed, because the Blücher was never intended for line combat.
                        So, it is you who have mixed up "pony people and the salvoes of a thousand guns"
                      8. 0
                        24 June 2026 21: 04
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        I had only one thesis - the concept of Japanese BRKR did not justify itself

                        Which once again confirms my thought that you are a historian of the postmodern era.

                        Because professionals quickly realized that the concept works:

                        https://keu-ocr.narod.ru/Exotic/

                        "After reflecting on the costly combat experience (the Russians lost the battles of July 28 and August 1, and the Bayan, which hit a mine, was out of action for a long time), the General Staff of the Navy came to the conclusion that "the absence of armored cruisers in the 2nd Squadron's ships... represents one of its weakest points. It is therefore necessary to take advantage of the opportunity to acquire four Argentine and three Chilean ships now in order to delay the departure of the 2nd Squadron until these ships arrive in Libau and are ready for sailing."

                        And historians of the modern era fully agreed with this point of view.

                        You, postmodernists, would love nothing more than to destroy the norms of scientific rationality that were established earlier:

                        https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/pozvolit-proshloe-kak-istoriyu-o-vliyanii-postmodernizma-na-istoriopisanie-v-xxi-v

                        "Allowing the Past as History": On the Influence of Postmodernism on Historiography in the 21st Century

                        "Yet postmodernism poses the greatest threat to history, inviting the fabrication of interpretations of the past through free writing, essays, and the pursuit of various professional preferences, where there is no room for precise epistemic criteria by which to distinguish competing interpretations. In the long run, this could lead to the debunking of historiography as a problematic field where certain academic compromises were previously reached.
                        Not all researchers see such a tangible danger for academic knowledge in the influence of postmodernism. D.D. Roberts, in a review of S. Susan's book, summarizes that postmodernism became a notable cultural phenomenon, gravitating "...toward extremes, extravagance, and overreaction, and partly for this reason it provoked polarization and counter-overreaction. This brought with it elements of sheer eccentricity, and it is not surprising that the term soon fell out of favor. But much remained undigested, and the consequences and possibilities of the postmodern turn were still not properly
                        “disassembled in this way” [7. P. 126].

                        It is obvious that researchers have different assessments not only of the content, but also of the degree of influence of postmodernism on socio-humanitarian thought; reflection on the nature of its theoretical influence on the historiographic sphere is only just beginning."


                        P.S. I didn't prove anything to you. Especially not with a "reference to the Blucher." You brought up the Blucher. I knew that the Germans hadn't yet developed a concept for using the Große Kreuzer in squadron battles. The Blucher was designed as a typical there's a bow on the side "Luxury with a squadron." I simply told you that, as a postmodernist, you argue with all historians of the modern era on the question of "justified/not justified."
                      9. +1
                        24 June 2026 21: 33
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        P.S. I didn't prove anything to you. Especially not with the "Blücher reference." You brought up "Blücher."

                        Are you completely overcome by sclerosis?
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        Taking offense at "bad Vitgeft," you've come to the wrong conclusion. I even know of a couple more armored cruisers officially laid down in the same year, 1907, as the Japanese Ibuki. These include the German Blucher and the Georgios Averof, originally built for the Italian Navy as the Genova but later sold to Greece while still on the slipway.
                      10. 0
                        24 June 2026 22: 43
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Are you completely overcome by sclerosis?

                        Dear Andrey, for some reason you started citing the "Blücher" in the context of this discussion. First, you wrote that I don't know about the construction of the armored cruisers "Tsukuba" and "Ibuki." I replied that I even know of a couple of armored cruisers laid down the same year as the "Ibuki" (laid down on May 22, 1907), which I listed for you: "Blücher" and "Georgios Averof" (originally "Genova"). This is what led you to assume that I don't know that the Germans, before the era of battlecruisers, lacked a concept for the combat use of the Große Kreuzer in squadron combat? So this is how postmodernist historians construct their narratives. Wasn't it interesting to discuss the Italian "Genova"? wink
                      11. +1
                        24 June 2026 23: 00
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        Dear Andrey, for some reason you started referring to "Blyukher" in the context of the discussion.

                        And can you quote where I referred to it? :)))
                      12. -2
                        24 June 2026 23: 19
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        And can you quote where I referred to it? :)))

                        In your reply beginning with the words: "I have no doubt that someday you will also learn that the Blucher was intended to counter the Invincible."

                        For some reason, you decided that by mentioning the BRKr "Blyukher" among those laid down in 1907, I classified it as a "squadron" armored cruiser, and not as a "class" We don't know why we built this, but others are building something similar, so let us have one too. "luxury with a squadron."

                        I have already answered you that the Blucher, designed in 1904-1905, was not designed to "counter" the Invincible-class battlecruisers and that when the Blucher was designed, the Germans did not have the concept of using the Große Kreuzer in artillery combat between armored squadrons.

                        Can we close the "Blucher" topic already?
                      13. +1
                        25 June 2026 08: 06
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        In your reply beginning with the words: "I have no doubt that someday you will also learn that the Blucher was intended to counter the Invincible."

                        Which followed your mention of Blucher. So, it was you who dragged him into the discussion of Blucher—and now he's blaming me for it.
                        This is all you.
                      14. +1
                        27 June 2026 17: 49
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Which followed your mention of Blucher.

                        I mentioned the Blucher as one of the last three armored cruisers in the world, laid down in 1907. You dragged her into this discussion, trying to catch me out in the fact that the German doctrine for the combat employment of the Große Kreuzer, which was backward at the time of the Blucher's design (the Germans didn't even bother to differentiate their "large cruisers" into armored and armored deck cruisers), didn't envisage the direct participation of these cruisers in artillery battles between armored squadrons. The debate is won by any means necessary, isn't it, dear Andrey?

                        And so, by 1897, the advanced doctrines of combat use of armored cruisers of such naval powers as Italy, Japan, and Great Britain already required the construction of "squadron" armored cruisers capable of participating in battles of armored squadrons alongside squadron battleships.

                        The backward doctrines of the combat use of armored cruisers of such naval powers as Russia and Germany, even by 1904, still did not understand what role armored cruisers could play in artillery battles of armored squadrons and were still oriented towards the construction not of squadron armored cruisers, but of a few armored cruisers "with the squadron", seeing in the latter nothing more than "luxury" reconnaissance cruisers with a squadron of battleships, possessing increased combat stability (they are armored cruisers, after all).

                        What is surprising is how, at the beginning of the second quarter of the 21st century, you are trying to convince the readers of your postmodernist essays that the doctrine of squadron armored cruisers, suitable for deployment in the line of battle of artillery combat of armored squadrons during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, born in Italy in 1892-1893, "did not justify itself." wink
                      15. +2
                        24 June 2026 21: 52
                        The General Staff of the Navy came to the conclusion that “the absence of armored cruisers in the fleet Obtained 2th squadron... represents one of its weakest sides.

                        Heh heh, they gave birth)) And what is the presence of armored cruisers? as part of the courts Obtained 2th squadrons would it have helped her? Were we preparing for cruiser operations in the ZhM? (from the already lost base)) Previously, when the base was, "didn't realize" )) and they wanted more battleships, now that they needed more (good) battleships, they wanted BrK... Rather, they only saw this as a possibility.
                        As a result of understanding the costly combat experience (the battles of July 28 and August 1 were lost by the Russians...

                        Undoubtedly due to the lack of Russian BrK in ZhM))
                      16. 0
                        24 June 2026 23: 06
                        Quote: anzar
                        Heh heh, they gave birth)) And how would the presence of armored cruisers in the 2nd squadron's ships help it?

                        I believe the Russian Naval Staff was completely unoriginal here. After the Battle of the Yellow Sea, they planned to deploy these relatively modern armored cruisers into the line of battle. After all, Rozhestvensky deployed the Admiral Nakhimov cruiser into the line of battle. Perhaps the Naval Staff even planned to use these cruisers as the squadron's fast wing.
                        Undoubtedly due to the lack of Russian BrK in ZhM))

                        If Port Arthur had had three or four more decent turreted battleships, then after the Hatsuse and Yashima mines were blown up, the question would not have been about breaking through to Vladivostok, but about forcing the Japanese into a battle of armored squadrons and defeating the Japanese fleet in that battle. We hadn't yet realized that our gunnery was far worse than the Japanese's and that the lethality of our shells was significantly inferior to that of the Japanese.
                      17. +1
                        22 June 2026 08: 23
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        Your so-called "in absentia" dispute on the issue of "squadron" armored cruisers with Sir William H. White, who expressed his opinion in writing on the issue in 1897, substantiating the technical features of the Cressy-class armored cruisers.

                        Dear Alexander, a professional translation is different from an online translator. I understand that you use AI for parsing. But by using W. White's letter, you're forgetting that a complete translation requires reference to multiple documents on the topic. Therefore, "approaching enemy battleships safely" doesn't mean "engaging in close combat with enemy battleships." hi
                      18. +1
                        24 June 2026 20: 17
                        Quote: 27091965i
                        Therefore, "approaching enemy battleships safely" does not mean "engaging in close combat with enemy battleships."

                        Dear Igor, do you think that the same Kanopus-class battleships, with their Krupp 6" armor belt, were not built to engage in combat with enemy battleships?

                        The concept of "close action" in this context certainly requires professional translation. In my opinion, the translation "close combat" is definitely not applicable here.
                      19. +2
                        24 June 2026 20: 58
                        Good evening.
                        The concept of "close action" in this context certainly requires professional translation. In my opinion, the translation "close combat" is definitely not applicable here.

                        Dear Alexander, the fact is that there are certain rules for translating military-technical texts. By following these rules, you can obtain a fairly accurate translation.
                        Do you think that the same squadron battleships of the Canopus type, with their Krupp 6" armor belt, were not built to engage in combat with enemy battleships?

                        These ships have been criticized, including by the Italians. I hope the esteemed Andrey will write an article comparing the armor of the Italian Garibaldi and the Russian Bayan, so we can discuss this topic. I'm not a big fan of the Italian Navy, but I've done some digging in the publications of the Italian Ministero Della Marina and can say that this is an interesting topic.
                      20. +1
                        24 June 2026 22: 16
                        Dear Igor, do you agree with me that close action in this context cannot be translated as "close combat"?
                        These ships were criticized, including by the Italians.

                        Nothing is perfect. These ships were only suitable for closed and limited theaters of operations, their crane manipulators were equipped with machines of insufficient power, and they never received water-tube boilers with sufficient steam output, while this was still a necessity.

                        On the other hand, construction of the first cruiser of the project began in 1893. And in 1904-1905, the last two cruisers of the project proved themselves to be quite modern, highly effective ships in combat. Twelve years, for that time, was a very good result.
                        I hope the respected Andrey will write an article comparing the armor of the Italian Garibaldi and the Russian Bayan, then we can discuss this topic.

                        It takes a lengthy article to point out that, despite roughly the same construction costs, the Garibaldi, commissioned in 1895, completely outclassed the Bayan, commissioned in 1902, in armor protection and firepower. To say nothing of the second subseries of cruisers of this class, with their Krupp cemented armor.
                      21. +2
                        25 June 2026 12: 20
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        Do you agree with me that close action in this context cannot be translated as "close combat"?

                        I agree.
                      22. +1
                        20 June 2026 11: 32
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        the world's first armored cruisers truly suitable for engaging in a single-line battle with the "standard" battleships of the 1890s and early 1900s

                        Such ships were built out of poverty. The Japanese were no exception. Any naval power that could afford to build a sufficient number of battleships never even considered deploying armored cruisers.
                      23. -1
                        20 June 2026 16: 51
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Such ships were built out of poverty. The Japanese, too.

                        And these days, "out of poverty," everyone is building multi-role jet fighters instead of building specialized interceptor, reconnaissance, bomber, and attack aircraft?

                        Well, then let's admit that at the end of the 19th century even the Mistress of the Seas acknowledged her poverty:

                        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armored_cruiser

                        "The armored cruisers built in the mid– to late–1890s were often as large and expensive as pre-dreadnought battleships."

                        "Armored cruisers built in the mid- to late 1890s were often as large and expensive as pre-dreadnought battleships."

                        [...]

                        "William H. White DNC of the British Royal Navy was taken by the design and presented the design for the Cressy-class cruiser of 12,000 tons displacement designed from the onset as an adjunct to the pre-dreadnought battle line, on 3 May 1897."

                        On May 3, 1897, Sir William Henry White, Chief Shipwright of the British Royal Navy, submitted a design for a 12,000-ton Cressy-class cruiser, which was intended from the outset to complement the pre-dreadnought battle line.
                      24. 0
                        20 June 2026 22: 43
                        Such ships were built out of poverty. The Japanese were among them.

                        The Italians, maybe, but the Japanese, no. They have a well-thought-out concept (6+6) based on the experience of the Sino-Japanese War.

                        And the RIF's counterattack, along the lines of "we'll have 10 battleships" (by only approving prices), proved to be less than effective. The "self-awareness" of cruisers would still be there. Even if there were 10 EBRs in Arthur, they wouldn't assign battleships to cruiser detachments, as the Japanese did with their Battleships. They weren't as fast, and you could catch them with a squadron of EBRs... The 10th EBR is only advantageous for a general engagement, but a blockade of Japan with battleships alone won't work. Yes, Manchuria is easier to blockade, but there will still be issues there.

                        Powerful, fast ships are the ability to fight successfully even without superiority in forces (due to "poverty" or economics). Why did Russia, after Sevastopol, lay down not a battleship, but a battlecruiser?
                      25. +2
                        20 June 2026 23: 12
                        Quote: anzar
                        They have a well-thought-out concept (6+6) based on the experience of the Sino-Japanese War

                        The concept is well thought out, but the detachment of armored cruisers appeared only because there was no money for a 2nd detachment of battleships, read
                        Evans, David C. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941
                        The "self-fear" of the river cruisers would not have gone away

                        There was no such disease)))
                      26. 0
                        22 June 2026 18: 12
                        The detachment of armored cruisers appeared only because there was no money for the 2nd detachment of battleships

                        Is that really the only reason? And how much money was saved? What's the price of these cruisers compared to battleships?
                        1 RIF refused to build such because of "their price is (almost) the same as that of an armadillo"And the battleships are stronger, so they decided to increase their number to 10. They didn't think about any other fighting qualities besides "strength."
                        2 And why do the Japanese need the 12th EBR? (2nd detachment)
                        There was no such disease)))

                        Well, yeah, no way) that's why the "goddesses" stuck around in Arthur, moving away at most to the outer roadstead)
                      27. +1
                        23 June 2026 00: 14
                        Quote: anzar
                        And how much money did you save?

                        The Asams are generally very budget-friendly ships. They skimped on everything they could. For example, the manual feed of the 6-inch shells alone is worth it...
                        Quote: anzar
                        They didn't think about any other fighting qualities besides "strength"

                        That's right, they were thinking about a squadron battle, in which battleships are clearly stronger.
                        Quote: anzar
                        Why do the Japanese need the 12th EBR? (2nd detachment)

                        To win the war
                        Quote: anzar
                        Well, yeah, no way) that's why the "goddesses" stuck around in Arthur, moving away at most to the outer roadstead)

                        Have you ever tried looking at this situation from the other side? "Asamu" and "Yakumo" were pulled out of Kamimura's squadron and assigned to reinforce the light cruisers. For what reason? Were they afraid "Bayan" would tear the camouflage apart?
                        A kind of fear of accordions?
                      28. +2
                        23 June 2026 16: 03
                        Quote: rytik32
                        fear of accordions?

                        good
                      29. +3
                        20 June 2026 11: 59
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        Sir William Henry White, Chief Shipwright of the British Royal Navy, submitted a design for a 12,000-ton Cressy-class cruiser, which was intended from the outset to complement the pre-dreadnought battle line.

                        WH White didn't write that the Cressy-class armored cruisers would be deployed alongside battleships. The armored cruisers were intended to operate as a separate force. Wikipedia is not the appropriate source of information on this matter.
                      30. 0
                        20 June 2026 17: 16
                        Quote: 27091965i
                        WH White didn't write that the Cressy-class armored cruisers would be deployed alongside battleships. The armored cruisers were to operate as a separate force.

                        If the Japanese had not bought the Nissin and Kasuga by chance, and had not lost the Hatsuse and Yashima to mines, then their armored cruisers would have acted in squadron combat as a separate detachment, the 2nd battle detachment - part of the main forces of the Japanese fleet.

                        Do not agree?

                        Practice often corrects theory. For the Japanese, practice corrected theory in just this way.
                        Wikipedia is not the right source of information to refer to on this matter.


                        https://www.dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php/Cressy_Class_Cruiser_(1899)

                        In an important document dated June 10, 1897, Assistant Controller and Director of Naval Construction Sir William H. White wrote: "The fundamental ideas underlying this project are as follows:"

                        1. Specially adapted for service with the Channel and Mediterranean Fleets, and for performing all the tasks hitherto assigned to first-class cruisers assigned to the fleets.

                        2. Close combat capability as a complement to battleships.

                        3. Suitability for independent action if protection of shipping, trade and communications is required.

                        4. Armament, protection, speed and coal capacity must be such that the new cruisers can seriously compete with the best cruisers built or being built for foreign navies.[1]

                        White was influenced by a number of factors. Over the previous two years, he had visited France, Italy, Germany, and Russia, becoming familiar with the naval construction in these countries. In his own words, the Cressy-class cruisers "were largely inspired by what I saw in Italy early in 1895." Italy, for financial reasons, had largely halted battleship construction and had instead begun building cruisers that could, "if necessary, join battleships and take part in naval battles." White noted that while "for the Royal Navy there was no question of replacing battleships with cruisers," he decided "the time had come when it became necessary to build cruisers for fleet operations, which should be capable of taking part in naval battles as a complement to battleships."

                        Noting that cruisers had taken over the historical duties of frigates, that is, "scouts and escort warships" that "did not participate in naval battles," he wrote the following:

                        ...in today's conditions, there is absolutely no reason why first-class cruisers should be neglected if they are properly designed and built. This has become possible largely due to improvements in armor and armament over the past few years, and this issue seems important enough to warrant special attention.

                        If we are to build cruisers capable of operating alongside battleships in a fleet, they must be provided with such protection for buoyancy, stability, and the safety of guns and crews as will enable them to engage in close combat with the enemy without undue risk.

                        Before recent advances in armor protection, the thickness and weight of armor required to provide adequate protection over a sufficient area and side height were such that they required very large dimensions and expense, especially given the high speed and large coal reserves required of cruisers. Consequently, it is safe to say that no existing cruiser possessed sufficient protection to engage in close combat with battleships, with the exception of the aforementioned Italian cruisers and a few similarly protected cruisers built later.
                      31. +1
                        20 June 2026 18: 21
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        If the Japanese had not bought the Nissin and Kasuga by chance, and had not lost the Hatsuse and Yashima to mines, then their armored cruisers would have acted in squadron combat as a separate detachment, the 2nd battle detachment - part of the main forces of the Japanese fleet.

                        Do not agree?

                        What does WH White have to do with the actions of the Japanese Navy?
                        The placement of Japanese armored cruisers in a line was caused by a shortage of battleships.
                        White was influenced by a number of factors. Over the previous two years, he had visited France, Italy, Germany, and Russia, becoming familiar with the naval construction in these countries. In his own words, the Cressy-class cruisers "were largely inspired by what I saw in Italy in early 1895."

                        I have a book called "The Life of Sir William White" and I am familiar with its contents.
                        In an important document dated June 10, 1897, Assistant Controller and Director of Naval Construction Sir William H. White wrote: "The following fundamental ideas underlie this project:"

                        There is just one "nuance": it was not WH White who decided what kind of ship to build, with what armament and armor protection, and what its tactical tasks would be, but the "Board of Admiralty".
                        If we are to build cruisers capable of operating alongside battleships in a fleet, they must be provided with such protection for buoyancy, stability, and the safety of guns and crews as will enable them to engage in close combat with the enemy without undue risk.

                        This is the original text from a discussion on "Board of Admiralty".
                        "It is now possible to build first-class cruisers of high speed, well armed, and with good coal supplies, which shall have vertical armor of sufficient thickness to give protection to buoyancy, stability, and armament against armor-piercing projectiles from the largest true quick-firing guns, and against the attack of shell with large bursting charges from guns of greater caliber under service conditions."
                        I can also add that the armor belts of these cruisers did not protect against large-caliber armor-piercing shells. For this reason, close combat in line with enemy battleships was out of the question; the initial engagement distance was set at 5000 yards.
                      32. +1
                        20 June 2026 19: 44
                        Quote: 27091965i
                        What does WH White have to do with the actions of the Japanese Navy?

                        An interesting question. The Japanese concluded that armored cruisers were suitable for active participation in battles involving armored squadrons based on their own experience in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895. The construction program for a "six-six" fleet, with six armored cruisers forming part of the main body of the Japanese fleet, was approved by the cabinet in late 1895. Sir W. H. White voiced a similar understanding in a document dated June 10, 1897, substantiating the fundamental ideas underlying the design of the Cressy-class armored cruisers. Prada drew this understanding from the experience of building the Italian fleet, "originated largely from what I found in progress in Italy in early 1895."

                        It's called "the idea was in the air."

                        The truth is, it's not for everyone. The Russian MTC, discussing the technical design of the future "squadron luxury" later known as the armored cruiser "Bayan," didn't grasp the idea. The idea, floating around, flew right past the MTC.

                        It's hardly surprising—this ancient idea, which in 1893-1897 defined the technical design of ten Garibaldi-class armored cruisers, six Asamoids, and six Cressy-class armored cruisers, hasn't even reached some of those present here today. Although it would seem that what could be easier than for someone well-versed in the Russo-Japanese War at sea to understand the idea of ​​the "squadron" armored cruiser of the 1890s and its technical prerequisites, which had already been fully developed by 1892-1893?
                        The placement of Japanese armored cruisers in a line was caused by a shortage of battleships.

                        The Japanese decided on their future deficit, as recorded in the "six-six" program, back in 1895.
                        I have a book called "The Life of Sir William White" and I am familiar with its contents.

                        Then you should have no question how the idea of ​​a "squadron" armored cruiser with capacity for close action, as adjuncts to battleships, was conceived by Sir William H. White.
                        There is just one "nuance": it was not WH White who decided what kind of ship to build, with what weapons and armor protection.

                        Does this "nuance" make the idea of ​​an armored cruiser with capacity for close action, as adjuncts to battleships, untenable?

                        And just above, the respected Andrey wrote that the idea is "absolutely worthless." Oh, this postmodernist war with modernism. wink
                        This is the original text from a discussion on "Board of Admiralty"...
                        I can also add that the armor belts of these cruisers did not protect against large-caliber armor-piercing shells. For this reason, close combat in line with enemy battleships was out of the question; the initial engagement distance was set at 5000 yards.

                        There's an idea, and then there's its implementation. The Cressy-class armored cruisers were one of the worst implementations of the "squadron" armored cruiser concept.

                        https://dzen.ru/a/Z_ZR5obpaEyEi1v3

                        "The height of two armor belts of the same thickness was almost 3,5 m (11 ft 6"), of which almost 2 m (6 ft 6") was above the VL.
                        For the first time in British history, the thickness of the cruiser's armor belts amidships equaled that of a first-class battleship (the Canopus class), theoretically allowing these ships to be used in a single formation. And, as usual, the shortcomings were an organic extension of the strengths. Although the armor belt was equal in thickness to that of the Canopus, whereas the battleship had a sloped armor deck behind it, the Cressy, while retaining the sloped shape, made it purely structural, using mild shipbuilding steel and a thinner material.
                        It quickly became clear that the Krupp armor's shell resistance was unreasonably overstated, and since the plate thickness was calculated based on the lower penetration limit of guns of the time, it quickly became insufficient. As a result, they became vulnerable to enemy fire in squadron combat, and they never became full-fledged squadron cruisers as intended. However, they became excellent trade defenders and flagships at distant stations, replacing second-class battleships. Furthermore, the belt didn't cover the entire upper line, leaving the stern vulnerable to even the smallest guns. 5" casemate walls, just 3-4 years after the ships were laid down,
                        were already considered insufficient to protect against fire even from 6-inch guns
                        enemy at combat ranges. And the turrets and their feed pipes could not protect against enemy shells with a caliber greater than 6-7". The ships turned out to be large (displacement of 12000 tons) and, as a result, expensive, suitable only for small-scale construction.


                        But the Russian Imperial Navy's battleships, along with Japanese attack brigades, would have been dealt a beating with even those "Cressies" during the Russo-Japanese War. Just like the Russian Imperial Navy's six Asamoids and two Garibaldis, for a number of primarily technical reasons.
                      33. +1
                        20 June 2026 20: 01
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        Then you should have no question how the idea of ​​a "squadron" armored cruiser with capacity for close action, as adjuncts to battleships, was conceived by Sir William H. White.

                        Are you really sure about this?
                        " The large armored cruisers which are being built for many navies are from some points of view as powerful as the second-class battleships, and would no doubt, in certain circumstances, fight in the line of battle. The cruisers have the advantage in speed and in protection for the secondary armament; the battleships have the advantage in the power of the main armament and in protection for the hull of the ship. The cruiser could probably silence the secondary armament of the battleship and inflict great damage; the battleship, on the other hand, has the power, which the cruiser has not, of inflicting a vital blow.
                        As compared with a modern battleship, the cruiser's only advantage is her speed. We therefore adhere to the opinion expressed last year, that unless the modern cruiser can fight the modern battleship, she will not secure the command of the sea. The relative strength of navies must still be estimated mainly by relative strength in battleships
                        . "1899.
                      34. +2
                        20 June 2026 22: 24
                        Quote: 27091965i
                        Are you really sure about this?

                        Only you can be sure of what you don’t have questions about, and what you do.

                        The "fatal blow" talk is all wishful thinking from 1899. When these words were formulated, no one had any decent 10-12" armor-piercing shells capable of penetrating, say, a 152mm plate of Krupp cemented armor, coal, and, say, a 51mm slope of an armored deck at the ranges of the Russo-Japanese War, with a subsequent explosion in the boiler room, engine room, or ammunition magazine.

                        Before that, in 1898, during the Spanish-American War, the rate of fire of 305-330 mm and the accuracy of the main battery turrets of battleships were so problematic that even at close range in that war, only two 305 mm shell hits were recorded during the Battle of Santiago de Cuba and zero 330 mm shell hits. This was despite the expenditure of 39 305 mm shells and 47 330 mm shells.

                        You'll get tired of waiting for the promised "deadly blow" while shooting at the battleship with rapid-fire guns.

                        At the same time, for the price of one 14-15 thousand ton squadron battleship, it was possible to buy two armored cruisers of the Garibaldi type, with a broadside, just a minute, 14 152 mm SC guns and 1-4 10" and from zero to eight 8" main battery guns in any combination.

                        Those with a brain began, with varying degrees of success, to design and build such "squadron" armored cruisers, with 152-178 mm of cemented armor, a sloped armored deck behind the main belt, as full a waterline belt as possible, a mandatory upper belt of cemented armor, 203-254 mm turret main battery artillery, and a powerful broadside from 152 mm guns, often exceeding the 152 mm broadside from a "standard" armored cruiser (as happened on six of the ten Garibaldi-class cruisers, and on the British-built Asamoids). The Italians, who started first, fared best.

                        Those who had poor thinking skills did not build such armored cruisers back then.

                        This entire "window" of technological opportunity, which began with the first warship with Harvey's cemented armor, ended with the advent of the Dreadnought. Both the battleships themselves and the "squadron" armored cruisers, capable of successfully engaging enemy battleship squadrons in cooperation with their own battleships, instantly became obsolete.

                        And the advent of effective 280-305 mm armor-piercing shells (with a ballistic and armor-piercing tip, a bursting charge of phlegmatized high explosive and a fuse with a delay of ~0,05 seconds) simply turned all these ships into five-minute ships.

                        Everything flows, everything changes - the window of opportunity lasted just over a decade, from the laying down of the turreted "Garibaldi" in 1893, with its 6" Harvey side armor of the citadel and full armor belt along the waterline, which entered service in 1895, until the commissioning of the "Dreadnought" on December 2, 1906.

                        Before that, it was impossible to build "squadron" armored cruisers capable of thrashing battleships (especially battleships with incomplete waterline armor) with their numerous rapid-fire guns rather than their 8"-10" main guns. After that, they lost their purpose, as they became coveted prey for the all-big guns of dreadnoughts, and especially battlecruisers, capable of catching even the latest and fastest armored cruisers of the previous era: the 25-knot Blucher, the 23,5-knot Pisa, and the Scharnhorst.
                      35. +2
                        20 June 2026 22: 45
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        The "fatal blow" talk is all wishful thinking from 1899. When these words were formulated, no one had any decent 10-12" armor-piercing shells capable of penetrating, say, a 152mm plate of Krupp cemented armor, coal, and, say, a 51mm slope of an armored deck at the ranges of the Russo-Japanese War, with a subsequent explosion in the boiler room, engine room, or ammunition magazine.

                        Imagine you're unfamiliar with what you know now. Analyze the armor, shell, and gun tests conducted between 1890 and 1900 without taking into account modern knowledge. Try to reason as they did back then. If you ignore the Battle of the Yellow Sea and the Battle of Tsushima, much becomes clearer. Often, our understanding of how engineers, artillerymen, and naval officers worked is distorted by our knowledge of subsequent events. This leads to misunderstandings, which escalate into the creation of alternative historical narratives.
                      36. 0
                        21 June 2026 00: 23
                        It is not my fault that in those years there was no understanding of where exactly a large-caliber armor-piercing projectile should have delivered its “deadly blow” behind the armor.

                        The British lacked this understanding almost until the end of the First World War:

                        https://www.navweaps.com/index_nathan/British_Fuzes_after_Jutland.php

                        The British immediately began developing the Greenboy armor-piercing shell after the Battle of Jutland. It was significantly superior to all other armor-piercing shells of the time (primarily due to its ability to penetrate armor at a fairly steep angle, something other shells of the time could not do), including thanks to a new British fuse for armor-piercing shells—the Number 16D. The old fuse was a type 16 and was a simple instantaneous fuse. After firing, when the safety interlocks were engaged, the projectile only had to hit its target, causing the firing pin to strike the mercury detonator. This fired a small charge into a tube of black powder, transmitting the flame to a small ring of black powder pressed against the lyddite filler at the end of the fuse. And then—boom! To reliably activate the extremely sensitive lyddite (picric acid) filler, it required nothing more than a black powder "accelerator" at the tip.

                        In order to produce a new base fuze using a German-style delay timer that had not previously been used by any British APC projectile, the British decided to use the old APC base fuze number 16 and modified it to number 16D - for "Delay", of course., is the basic APC fuze. They decided to use the same delay as the German fuze (when it worked as intended), giving a nominal delay of 0,025 seconds (with some expected variation from shell to shell). (NOTE: According to one source, the true terminal delay was 0,024 seconds. Pretty close.)

                        P.S. Not instantaneous, of course, but standard action. There are no instantaneous bottom impact fuses.
                      37. 0
                        22 June 2026 17: 43
                        He drew this understanding from the experience of building the Italian fleet. "originated largely from what I found in progress in Italy in early 1895."
                        It's called "the idea was in the air."

                        It's still in the air)))
                        Dear Alexander, since you're such a fan of the Garibaldi-class armored cruisers, you might be interested in exploring an alternative involving their "successors." Where they act not as a supplement to battleships, but instead. Not "due to poverty" (although saving never hurt anyone), but the key feature is their shallow draft, which allows the fleet to enter and exit Arthur almost always, and not just in "big water." wink
                        https://alternathistory.ru/korabli-stroyatsya-dlya-artura-rossijskij-flot-na-nuzhd-dalnego-vostoka-dlya-melkovodya/#top_ankor
                      38. +2
                        24 June 2026 17: 53
                        Quote: anzar
                        It's still in the air)))

                        "Trump's battleships" are not cruisers.)))
                        Dear Alexander, since you're such a fan of the Garibaldi-class armored cruisers, you might be interested in exploring an alternative involving their successors.

                        Dear anzar, I am a "fan" of the idea of ​​a balanced navy. In the 1890s, the technical rivalry between "armor and shell" developed so that for more than a decade, "squadron" armored cruisers made sense, not as a single unit. there's a bow on the side "Luxury in a squadron," but as a fast wing of an armored squadron, which could be integrated into the line of battle in a squadron artillery engagement. The Italians were the first to develop such cruisers, and they were immediately successful (though successful only for closed and limited naval theaters). The Garibaldi-class cruisers, with minimal changes to their control mechanisms and artillery, remained virtually obsolete throughout the entire 10-plus-year period when "squadron" armored cruisers were relevant. Given the pace of technological progress in naval warfare then observed, this was a remarkable achievement.

                        The idea of ​​building ships not even for the conditions of a limited theater of operations, as we had for a long time in the Black Sea Fleet, but for the conditions of a single naval base in that theater, is so pretentious in its fantastical nature that the chances of its implementation in objective reality were no greater than those of Admiral Makarov's "unarmored" 3000-ton cruisers. Unless a time traveler who advocates such cruisers were to find themselves in the mortal coil of Nicholas II himself.

                        But let's say they started building Garibaldi-like ships, even ones with a real 20,5-21 knot capacity (due to a more advanced crane manipulator than the first-series Garibaldi), for the Russian Navy in 1897-1898, instead of the Bayan and the armored "six-thousanders" of the 1898 program. For this, it would have been enough if, say, Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich, a fan of French ballerinas, had suddenly died, and some other Grand Duke, a lover of ancient history and Venetian romance, had assumed the post of Chief of the Navy and Naval Department. laughing
                      39. +2
                        24 June 2026 22: 50
                        For more than a decade, "squadron" armored cruisers acquired meaning, not as a single bow on the side, "luxury at the squadron", but as a high-speed wing of an armored squadron

                        I'm so tired of this cliche (though it was popular back then). Who ever used them as the "fast wing" of a squadron? At Tsushima, the 2nd squadron followed in the wake of the 1st, apparently because of their "fastness."
                        The advantage of these "squadron" BRKs was that they COULD be deployed "in line" when there was a shortage of "regular" battleships. But their primary mission (and utility) was cruising—to dominate "cruiser" warfare, disrupt enemy communications, and protect their own... But the RIF considered doing this with battleships (?)
                        The idea is to build ships not even for the conditions of a limited theater, as we had for a long time in the Black Sea Fleet, but for the conditions one The naval base at this theater is so pretentious...

                        The only one in this "limited" theater, but that's not the point (they didn't get it))
                        But let's say we start building analogues of the "Garibaldi", and even really 20,5-21 knot ones...

                        So decide whether to build it or not? Or do you disagree with reducing the draft?

                        Did you want "squadron" armored cruisers like Garibaldi? I did too (once)) for the 1st TOE. And here's an "improved" version for you - 12" main guns, thick lower belt, 21 knots... For (almost)) the same money. laughing Slice through the JM as you please, fear no one, catch Japanese supplies to Manchuria... even without a "general battle")
                        I am a "fan" of the idea of ​​a balanced navy.

                        It's good to be rich, because the required "balance" varies across theaters and opponents. In this case, such "universal" ships are appropriate for this theater of war for poor/budget-conscious navies (Japanese, Russian).
                      40. 0
                        25 June 2026 00: 14
                        Quote: anzar
                        Eh, I'm tired of this cliche (though it was popular back then). Who and when used them as the "fast wing" of a squadron?

                        Armored, no one (unless you count the Brooklyn at the Battle of Santiago de Cuba). It wasn't needed. That's when: "In 1908, the battlecruiser replaced the armored cruiser." Then yes. Battlecruisers fought with varying degrees of success as fast wings of battle fleets. Successfully against the Germans, and three of the British battlecruisers exploded at the Battle of Jutland.

                        “Chatfield, there seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today.”

                        "There is something wrong with our ships... and something wrong with our system."
                        The only one in this "limited" theater

                        Except for Vladivostok. wink
                        So decide whether to build or not?

                        Naturally, squadron-sized BRKr-class cruisers should have been built for the Russian Imperial Fleet in the 1890s. And precisely along the lines of the Garibaldi, at half the cost of first-class EBRs.
                        Or do you not agree to reduce the draft?))

                        This couldn't have been achieved while retaining the tactical and technical features of the Garibaldi-class battleships. To reduce draft, the hull width would have been increased. The result wouldn't have been a battleship, but at best an 18-knot BDS with numerous 6-inch rapid-fire artillery.
                        The advantage of these "squadron" BrKs is that they COULD be placed "in line" - when there was a shortage of "regular" battleships.

                        "You can't be strong enough at the decisive point." That is, in a battle, everything that was even remotely suitable for deployment should be placed in the line. At Tsushima, Rozhdestvensky placed the old, 1888-built, large-caliber cruiser Admiral Nakhimov and three weak, small-caliber ships in the line. Vitgeft would have placed the large-caliber cruiser Bayan in the line in the Yellow Sea, if he had had the opportunity.
                        And here's an "improved" version for you - 12" main bearing, thick lower belt, 21 knots... For (almost)) the same money

                        Unrealistic. Garibaldi-class battleships were actually in service since 1895. Our attempt to build a battlecruiser with at least 10" main guns resulted in the Peresvet saga. What could have happened was: "Don't make it better, make it the same" (like the Garibaldi).

                        A 21-knot cruiser with a battleship main gun and 12" main guns at the end of the 19th century, and at a price lower than an EBR, was beyond the capabilities of either domestic or French designers.
                        It's good to be rich, because the required "balance" is different for different theaters and opponents.

                        At that time, Russia did not have any naval theaters or opponents against which, in one case, “squadron” BRKr were needed in a 1:1 ratio to EBMs, and in another case, they were not needed at all.
                        The Baltic, the Black Sea, the Yellow Sea and the Sea of ​​Japan are all closed or limited naval theatres for which "squadron" BRKRs like the British "Cressy" with transoceanic endurance and a displacement almost like that of the EBM were not required.
                      41. +2
                        20 June 2026 22: 04
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        then their armored cruisers would also operate in squadron combat as a separate detachment

                        The 2nd combat detachment already acted as a separate detachment.
                        The Japanese generally adopted squad-based command in combat.
                      42. 0
                        20 June 2026 23: 15
                        I should have added the word "only." It would have read, "then their armored cruisers would have operated in squadron combat only as a separate detachment."
                      43. +2
                        20 June 2026 23: 47
                        This doesn't change the picture at all.
                        Let me reiterate, the Japanese used squad-based command. Moreover, squad composition could change, even during combat.
                        "Main forces" is a flexible concept. Let me remind you that the Japanese once lined up their armored ships.
                      44. +1
                        21 June 2026 23: 15
                        Quote: rytik32
                        This doesn't change the picture at all.

                        For the respected Igor (27091965i) it changes. He wrote: "W. H. White did not write that the Cressy-class armored cruisers would be deployed with battleships. The armored cruisers were to operate as a separate detachment."

                        That is, the respected Igor wrote that the British planned to act differently from how the Japanese acted in the realities of the Russo-Japanese War.

                        I simply explained to him that the presence of the Nisshin and Kasuga in the 1st Battle Division was largely a coincidence. That the Japanese had also planned to use their six armored cruisers of the 2nd Battle Division as a separate force.

                        And that's how it turned out. By the start of the war, the Japanese Navy had eight, not six, battleship-class cruisers. And after May 2, 1904, there were four, not six, battleship-class destroyers. Therefore, during the Battle of the Yellow Sea, in addition to the four battleship-class destroyers, the cruisers Nisshin and Kassuga were part of the 1st Battle Division and in the same line of battle with these battleships. And after 16:15, the battleship Yakumo also joined the 1st Battle Division's wake column (the armored cruisers of the 3rd Battle Division had retreated behind the 1st Battle Division's line).

                        In the Tsushima artillery battle, again, the Nissin and Kasuga, along with four attack aircraft carriers, were part of the 1st combat detachment, in the same battle line with the squadron battleships.

                        The British didn't plan to fight like this, says the respected Igor (27091965i). I simply replied that the Japanese probably didn't plan to fight like this either. But no plan survives contact with the enemy.

                        "Kein Operationsplan reicht mit Sicherheit über das erste Zusammentreffen mit der feindlichen Hauptmacht hinaus"

                        "No operational plan can reliably extend beyond the initial contact with the main enemy force."
                      45. 0
                        20 June 2026 22: 40
                        I came across a publication with an excerpt/quote from a British naval journal of the time, where they discussed plans for Russia to build ships for the Far East on the eve of the Russian Nuclear War. They discussed the original appearance and armament composition of the prospective Russian cruisers of the Diana class, but not the project (an ugly thing) that was actually implemented at the insistence of Witte, the one proposed by the Main Directorate in the original project - a 6000 to 7000 t VI, a twin-shaft propulsion plant with a capacity of 15,000 - 15,500 hp, armament of 2 x 8 "in two single-turret mounts + 8 x 6 " auxiliary caliber. Armored deck. Speed ​​21-22 knots. In reality, these "goddesses" were built according to a completely different project and became an amazing disgrace to domestic shipbuilding and "naval thought." But in reality, this is exactly the appearance, but with an armor belt, that the "Bayan" received, and the "Bogatyr" could have received, if instead of two-gun 6" turrets they installed on it single-gun 8" turrets like the "Bayan".
                        That publication indicated that it was precisely to counteract these Russian armored deck ships on the communications that the English armored cruisers were designed and built - "to chase the Dian on the communications. With approximately the same speed of 12,000 tons, a sufficiently developed armor belt, 9,5 "guns in single-gun turrets and 12 x 6" - to have a guaranteed and overwhelming advantage in an artillery battle. That is, it was directly stated that the first 6 cruisers were built against the original appearance of the Dian project (which was never realized). And when the characteristics (including speed) of the Bogatyr and Askold ordered from Germany (24 knots+) became known in England, it was decided to lay down 4 more cruisers with a propulsion plant of 30,000 HP with the same armament composition, the speed of which was also 24 knots+.
                        That is, on the eve of the Russian Revolution, England built its fleet with the possibility of war both against Russia itself (in alliance with Japan), and against what then seemed a very likely alliance between the Russian Empire, France, and (surprisingly, after their joint ultimatum to Japan, this was widely believed at the time) Germany. At the time, England called them a (hypothetical/probable) alliance of continental powers.
                        Moreover, it was then that England urged the United States (including through Rothschild lobbyists) to begin building the aforementioned "White Fleet" for joint action against the Russian Empire, France, and Germany. But the alliance failed, the Russian Empire lost the war against Japan miserably even without England's participation, and the United States simply dispatched its "White Fleet" on a circumnavigation, supposedly to "terrorize Japan from becoming arrogant after its victory over Russia." But when the Russian Navy was first being prepared, those same 10 British armored cruisers were built in this configuration specifically to counter the Russian Empire's cruisers. Later they tried not to remember this again, because the fact that the Russian Empire built up against the Russian Empire and how it lost the war on the sea and on land, earning the contempt of all of Europe... to say and write that England built its fleet against "those clumsy bast-shoe-wearers", specific and expensive ones like battleships, cruisers... created coalitions... was already completely inconvenient.
                        But the spectacular disgrace of the Russian Empire in the Russian Empire was man-made - under the sensitive and deliberately villainous leadership of Witte (from the French line of Rothschilds on his grandmother's side).
                      46. 0
                        24 June 2026 20: 15
                        Exactly... And Togo was a reptilian... And he caught this disease when he was studying in the UK...
      2. +2
        18 June 2026 15: 21
        Quote: Panin (Michman)
        And that's why the Russians couldn't sink a single one,

        To answer this question, I write my articles:)
        1. +2
          18 June 2026 15: 56
          That's because they never even tried... Aside from a brief skirmish on January 27th, what do we have? We'll push back Ulsan... And the Yellow Sea, and Tsushima... what are those? Battles? No... Those were two breakout attempts (to the same port, oddly enough)... That's not how you win wars... Why didn't the 1st Pacific Army ever clash with Togo head-on? Not just brush it off and run to Vladik, but go toe-to-toe... Who'll win? With active maneuvering, destroyer attacks, etc.... There was some kind of repair base in Artur...
          1. 0
            18 June 2026 16: 06
            I look at "Peresvet" after Shantung... And after that they tell me that...
            1. +1
              18 June 2026 16: 11
              Were there really bad ship repairs?
            2. +2
              18 June 2026 16: 14
              Quote: Ragnar
              And after that they tell me that...

              But it's a fact. Peresvet was fully prepared for battle.
          2. +5
            18 June 2026 16: 13
            Quote: Ragnar
            Why didn't the 1st Pacific Army ever clash with Togo one-on-one?

            Because of the weakness of our forces—5 EBRs and 1 BRKr versus 6 EBRs + 4 BRKr—we couldn't really fight. And when the ratio improved to 6 EBRs versus 4 EBRs + 4 BRKr, there was no longer a commander capable of doing so. And, objectively, after spending six months in the interior, we didn't have much of a chance of success.
            1. 0
              18 June 2026 16: 38
              I agree, but every skirmish is an experience... Russian sailors are by no means fools in this regard...
              1. +1
                18 June 2026 16: 39
                And Vitgeft V.K. didn't seem like a complete layman either...
                1. +1
                  18 June 2026 17: 02
                  You wrote about this yourself: if the squadron had returned to Arthur, in a month it would have been a completely different squadron... Completely...
                  1. +1
                    18 June 2026 17: 11
                    Did the Japanese do a lot of repairs on the Eliots?
                    1. +1
                      18 June 2026 17: 27
                      The only problem they had was a damaged main gear. But it was serious—it couldn't be fixed on the Elliotts. They had virtually no other serious damage.
                      1. +2
                        18 June 2026 17: 31
                        In the hell of it, minor damage... 5 main battery guns... And the second battle in September?
                      2. +3
                        18 June 2026 17: 47
                        Quote: Ragnar
                        And the second fight in September?

                        There is an opinion that Vitgeft should have waited a little.
                        The Japanese were keeping a tense eye on Port Arthur all this time, jumping like dogs at every attempt at movement, wasting crane manoeuvres in the process. By September, the technology had finally declared that "this was no longer possible," and the ships began to be sent one by one to Sasebo for repairs.
                      3. 0
                        18 June 2026 20: 05
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        There is an opinion that Vitgeft should have waited a little

                        Ignore the direct order of the Tsar and the Viceroy?
                        By the way, this is what he was trying to do, otherwise what was he counting on when he went out for the first time?
                        Then Rozhdestvensky should have ignored all the orders and not waited in Madagascar.
                        But that's not how things are done in the army.
                      4. 0
                        18 June 2026 20: 39
                        Quote: Panin (Michman)
                        Ignore the direct order of the Tsar and the Viceroy?

                        Alas.
                        Quote: Panin (Michman)
                        Then Rozhdestvensky should have ignored all the orders and not waited in Madagascar.

                        It is good to...
                        Quote: Panin (Michman)
                        But that's not how things are done in the army.

                        You write it yourself
                        Quote: Panin (Michman)
                        By the way, that's what he was trying to do.

                        request
                      5. 0
                        18 June 2026 22: 46
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Quote: Panin (Michman)
                        Ignore the direct order of the Tsar and the Viceroy?

                        Alas.
                        Quote: Panin (Michman)
                        Then Rozhdestvensky should have ignored all the orders and not waited in Madagascar.

                        It is good to...
                        Quote: Panin (Michman)
                        But that's not how things are done in the army.

                        You write it yourself
                        Quote: Panin (Michman)
                        By the way, that's what he was trying to do.

                        request

                        I tried, but to no avail. You can't argue with the king.
                      6. 0
                        19 June 2026 15: 08
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        There is an opinion that Vitgeft should have waited a little.

                        Wait while receiving damage to ships in the inner roadstead, similar to what the Retvizan received on the eve of the battle in the Yellow Sea on July 27?

                        It's worth noting that Vitgeft himself was wounded during the first 120mm artillery shelling on July 25, when two 120mm shells struck the Tsarevich. One of them struck the admiral's cabin on the aft bridge, where Rear Admirals V.K. Vitgeft and I.K. Grigorovich were stationed at the time. Shrapnel wounded Rear Admiral V.K. Vitgeft in the shoulder, Senior Flag Officer Lieutenant M.A. Kedrov in the arm, and two sailors were shell-shocked. The telephone exchange was destroyed.

                        A day later, on June 27, the Retvizan was hit by seven 120mm shells. Because of these hits, the Retvizan went into battle with a hastily patched underwater hole, so the water couldn't be completely pumped out, and 500 tons of water in its compartments. Because of this, the bow was 10" deeper than normal. It also carried ten 6" Canet guns instead of twelve, because a 120mm shell hit the barge from which the Retvizan hadn't had time to load two 6" guns. Two more 120mm shells hit the Pobeda that day.

                        What could Vitgeft have waited for until September, especially since he had received the highest order from Nicholas II to break through to Vladivostok as quickly as possible?

                        All that remained for Vitgeft to do was to compose a telegram to Nicholas II:
                        "In accordance with the order of Your Imperial Majesty, conveyed to me by telegram by the Viceroy, I am leaving with the squadron to break through to Vladivostok. Personally, I and the assembly of flag officers and commanders, taking into account all local conditions, were against the departure, not expecting a successful breakthrough and hastening the surrender of Arthur, as I have repeatedly reported to the Viceroy.".

                        After which, carry out the highest command.
                      7. +1
                        19 June 2026 15: 49
                        1) This is not my opinion, so I will not defend it.
                        2) In principle, before the fall of Vysokaya, hits were only random.
                        3) And even in reality, the shelling was parried by taking the ships to the outer roadstead.
                        But yes, it is difficult to argue with the highest command (that is why it was often and widely ignored))
                      8. 0
                        19 June 2026 16: 22
                        Even if we ignore the Japanese artillery shelling and the damage to the ships from it, then "by September" we would have had to break through without the Bayan, which had not yet entered service after hitting a mine on July 14, and already without the Sevastopol, which hit a mine on August 10.

                        Does anyone believe the chances of a breakthrough would have been higher without another battleship in the line of battle? Meaning, the 1st Battle Detachment of the Japanese Fleet wouldn't have caught up with the Russian ships trying to break through? Or should the battleship Poltava have been left out of the breakthrough, as it was the slowest of the 1st Pacific Fleet's armored ships capable of making it?
                      9. +2
                        19 June 2026 20: 15
                        Quote: AlexanderA
                        Does anyone think that without another battleship in the line of battle the chances of a breakthrough would have been higher?

                        The question is, how many battleships had the Japanese sent to the homeland for repairs by that time?
                        If I remember correctly, "Shikishima" and one of the Asamoids, for sure.
                        But all this is, of course, purely speculative.
                      10. +6
                        18 June 2026 19: 39
                        Quote: Ragnar
                        And the second fight in September?

                        One of the best alternative forks for us:)))
                      11. +1
                        24 June 2026 20: 23
                        Andryukha, thank you for everything you do...
                      12. 0
                        24 June 2026 20: 26
                        Have you ever thought about digging deeper into the Retvizan and its commander?
            2. +1
              19 June 2026 12: 13
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              And when the ratio improved—6 EBMs versus 4 EBMs + 4 large cruisers—there was no longer a commander capable of doing so. And, objectively, having spent six months in the interior, we didn't have much of a chance of success.

              Plus, already as of May 1904, the ships had been heavily robbed of artillery, to the point of removing 6". And the army really didn't want to return this artillery.
              Summing up the past meetings, the squadron's flagship artillery officer, Captain 1st Rank K.F. Ketlinsky, in a note addressed to the commander on May 31, 1904, urged abandoning all individual tasks, ending the dismissive attitude toward the Japanese, recognizing them as a serious and capable adversary, and focusing all efforts on the global task of controlling the sea. To do this, it was necessary to "gather our forces," "fully arm all combat vessels," and, as time permitted, prepare for the soon-to-be-imminent actions. Thus, on the Pobeda, which was completing repairs, only five 75mm guns remained of all the artillery (not counting the turret guns). Two 6" guns could be returned from the Lit. B battery, and another 8 6", 15 75mm, and 10 47mm guns could be installed. In total, 18 6", 31 75-mm and 20 47-mm guns were required to be returned to the squadron's ships.
              © R.M. Melnikov. Battleships of the Peresvet class.
  8. -1
    18 June 2026 17: 33
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Because of the weakness of the forces—5 EBRs and 1 BRKr versus 6 EBRs + 4 BRKr—you can't really fight much. And when the ratio improved—6 EBRs versus 4 EBRs + 4 BRKr—there was no longer a commander.

    Suvorov and Ushakov strongly disagree with you...
    1. 0
      18 June 2026 17: 38
      Those that are not ships...
    2. +4
      18 June 2026 18: 03
      Quote: Ragnar
      Suvorov and Ushakov strongly disagree with you...

      As for me, we agree:))))
      You know, when Napoleon was praised for winning battles against numerically superior opponents, he replied that... he never did that. And that he always created numerical superiority by defeating enemy armies piecemeal, and if the army wasn't divided, then by creating a localized advantage at the key point of the battle. Suvorov and Ushakov had roughly the same approach.
      But with an effective firing range of 1-1,5 cables, limited by the sailing fleet's limitations, Ushakov could have achieved this even with the Turks' numerical superiority. But in the Russian Navy, this was simply unrealistic.
  9. 0
    18 June 2026 17: 43
    Andrey, can I ask an off-topic question?
    1. +1
      18 June 2026 18: 03
      Of course you can, but if it's completely off topic, it's better to send a private message.
      1. 0
        19 June 2026 18: 08
        No, not really...
        Reading your opus about the ordeals of domestic state-owned shipbuilding in the lead-up to the Russian Nuclear War, a question inevitably arose... Why, given such difficulties in implementing the program, wasn't ONZiV involved? It's a state-of-the-art facility, and the quality of its work was praised.
        1. 0
          19 June 2026 18: 43
          Quote: Ragnar
          didn't use ONZiV???

          "Naval", probably?
          1. 0
            19 June 2026 19: 40
            Well, that's his email nickname, but essentially, yes, it's about him...
  10. 0
    18 June 2026 17: 50
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    And they had practically no other serious damage.

    And the hole under the dragon's belly? Oh, "Mikasa"???
    1. +4
      18 June 2026 18: 04
      Quote: Ragnar
      And the hole under the dragon's belly?

      Is this a belt plate breach? They patched up the water resistance, but the plate clearly wasn't replaced.
  11. +3
    18 June 2026 18: 16
    As always, the material is a plus this morning! good
    Greetings, dear namesake drinks
    I'll just add that the topic of the hypothetical vulnerability of a ship's armor, depending on the distance and angle from which a shell can hit a vulnerable spot and become gold for the enemy, has been touched upon more than once, especially in the comments. And purely statistically, such a percentage is so small that it can frankly be ignored. Usually, such percentages can arise under completely magical circumstances (for example, the Bayan and Izumo were spinning around in a carousel for half a day at different distances, and the Bayan hit the Japanese with every second hit). Only then can we assume that out of 100 hits, one will hit the unprotected rear part of the Izumo's forward bartet, penetrating half the ship and sinking the last one. smileSuch a situation in the Russian Navy was simply a priori impossible. But the question of coincidences crosses over into the realm of the improbable, because coincidences don't exist due to the nature of the world. We call a torpedo hitting the Bismarck's rudder an accident, or the heroism of a single sailor on the Lion who solved the problem of burning cordite in the magazine. But there... winked As for randomness, I have my own opinion—I just experienced it firsthand. While it's certainly interesting to read about the various nuances of armor, such assumptions are too hypothetical to be taken seriously. Any commander will always maximize the ship's firepower and protection in a given situation, especially against a more or less equal opponent. This applies only to situations where the enemy is clearly superior or where damage is severe enough to make maneuvering or controlling the battle impossible. In a prolonged battle, when the number of hits translates into quality, it's still acceptable to allow for this, but otherwise, we can only speculate about how the designers' decisions when planning defenses and their compromises affect the actual combat stability of a given ship.
    So let's wait for the continuation, it's still interesting good
    C y hi
  12. +1
    18 June 2026 22: 57
    according to the diagram, it turns out that a section of the main armor belt with a thickness of 178 mm goes behind the feed pipe of the aft turret further to the stern,

    The diagram is accurate. However, the transition line from 178 to 87 mm is not shown in the side view; it's shown in the L-shaped plan: the thick side line is 178 mm, and further forward and aft, it's 87 mm. The side view also shows where the upper chord crossmembers increase in height—at the side, where the crossmember descends along the deck slope and reaches the lower edge of the main chord at the side.
    1. The comment was deleted.
  13. 0
    19 June 2026 21: 12
    Wouldn't it have been better to have a high, uniform belt 102 mm thick, excluding the underwater part?
  14. +1
    20 June 2026 18: 50
    The tables are good, but for some reason reality always differs from the calculations and it turns out that the shells cannot penetrate what they should, and the armor holds what it should not.
    1. +1
      21 June 2026 06: 10
      Quote: Victor Sergeev
      but for some reason reality always differs from calculations and it turns out that shells cannot penetrate what they should penetrate, and armor can withstand what it should not.

      And you, of course, can give such examples?:))))) The tables, by the way, are calculated based on real data that Russian shells showed during tests
  15. -1
    21 June 2026 14: 35
    Quote: AlexanderA
    Using the 10" guns of the cruiser Kasuga as an example, we know that the licensed Armstrong 10" guns produced by Stabilimenti meccanici di Pozzuoli were quite impressive. From 1893 to 1907 (the San Marco was laid down on January 2, 1907), Italy laid down and built excellent, I would even say the best in the world, "squadron" armored cruisers with 10" main battery artillery for limited naval theaters, like the "Giuseppe Garibaldi."

    I don't want to get into this debate, but there are BIG questions about the Garibaldi-class cruisers themselves and their 10" guns...
    1. +1
      22 June 2026 17: 39
      Quote: Ragnar
      but there are BIG questions about the Garibaldi-class cruisers themselves and their 10" guns

      What's wrong with the guns?
      1. 0
        22 June 2026 21: 27
        I didn't want to climb, but it looks like I'll have to...
        1. +1
          22 June 2026 21: 35
          And the icing on the cake... In the end, the cruiser was left without a main gun!!! Voila...
          1. +1
            22 June 2026 21: 43
            The Italians tried time and again to sell the Spaniards utter nonsense... Did the Russian Imperial Navy really need this??? Garibaldi... Garibaldi...
            1. +1
              22 June 2026 21: 59
              Sorry if I'm breaking any stereotypes... I told you I don't want to get involved...
            2. +2
              23 June 2026 16: 02
              Quote: Ragnar
              Time and again they tried to sell the Spaniards utter nonsense.

              The Dons showed off and went into battle without any main guns at all, which is why they were unable to fight off the not very well-armored Brooklyn.
              As for possible service in the RIF, there are two options.
              1) We order a ship under the 1895 or 98 program (which is fundamentally impossible because it didn't meet our vision for ships of this type), and then they will be equipped with domestic artillery without any options. That is, the main battery will be either 8"/45" or 10"/45" from the Obukhov Shipyard.
              2) We still buy the Rivadavia and Moreno, and then they come with their original guns. This adds to the hassle of the equipment, but based on Spanish experience, going into battle with guns is still better than without them.
              Somehow request
          2. +2
            23 June 2026 15: 51
            You see, here's the thing. These are purely Spanish quirks that have nothing to do with Armstrong's 10" guns. The whole point is that the "noble hidalgos," for some reason, "El Diablo," wanted to see Canet, not Armstrong, as the main gunner on their cruiser, and they paid for it.
            The Spaniards surprised the world by refusing to install them on the Cristobal Colon. The official reason given was the low quality and low power of these guns.It's reasonable to speculate, however, that the Spanish Ministry of the Navy wanted to use 240mm French Canet-type guns instead of the British ones, due to their design's similarity to the domestic guns already in service at the Hontoria factory, which manufactured them according to French designs. This fussiness cost the Spanish dearly: the Colon was forced to go into battle without its main battery.

            https://wunderwaffe.narod.ru/Magazine/MK/1995_03/04.htm
            Neither the Italians nor the Japanese complained about this weapon.
            1. -1
              23 June 2026 22: 15
              Maybe we just don't know about it???
              1. 0
                23 June 2026 22: 26
                Ivan, did you read my clippings carefully?
                1. -1
                  23 June 2026 22: 28
                  At the very least, there should have been some questions in the Italian Navy...
                  1. +1
                    23 June 2026 22: 39
                    Times change, but people don't?
                    1. 0
                      23 June 2026 22: 56
                      I'm finishing it, although I didn't want to get into this topic...
                      1. 0
                        23 June 2026 23: 05
                        I'm not trying to smear "Ansaldo" with a thick layer of "brown shoe polish"... We're talking about "let's talk" here, aren't we? No???
                      2. 0
                        23 June 2026 23: 10
                        Ivan, I have immense respect for you... But your source is as ancient as a mammoth...
                      3. 0
                        23 June 2026 23: 14
                        Use fresher sources (of eternal youth)
                      4. +2
                        24 June 2026 07: 38
                        As old Voltaire said, the best is the enemy of the good.
                        Kane systems were very good for that time and had a huge range of calibers from 100 to 370 mm.
                        https://alex-cat-1975.livejournal.com/30964.html
                        The only problem was that most guns, especially large-caliber ones, existed only in blueprint form. And the production time for such a complex piece at the time could reach a year or more.
                        Armstrong guns, Italian-made and possibly of inferior quality to the British ones, were here and now. And they even had their ammunition.
                        Quote: Ragnar
                        Maybe we just don't know about it?

                        Perhaps. After all, the Japanese only had one such weapon, which, according to the theory of probability, was quite likely to be of high quality. And the Italians' opponents were so wretched that for them, any modern gun (even with a few defects) was a wunderwaffe.
                        But the fact is that the Spaniards' completely misplaced perfectionism meant that Colon had to fight virtually unarmed. request
                      5. 0
                        24 June 2026 11: 00
                        https://mirageswar.com/flot/flot_before_ww2/166314-bronenosnyy-kreyser-kristobal-kolon-morskaya-kollekciya-2021-08-263.html
                      6. 0
                        24 June 2026 11: 38
                        Vanya, it's clear that the French simply didn't have time; the discussion stemmed from the fact that...
                        Using the example of the 10" gun of the cruiser "Kasuga" we know that the licensed Armstrong 10" guns produced by Stabilimenti meccanici di Pozzuoli were very, very good.
                      7. 0
                        24 June 2026 13: 41
                        And were they really, really? Not really, in my opinion...
                      8. 0
                        24 June 2026 20: 31
                        And the Italians' opponents are so wretched that for them, any modern gun (even with a few defects) is a wunderwaffe. Who are they referring to?
                      9. 0
                        24 June 2026 22: 43
                        Quote: Ragnar
                        Who is meant?

                        Turks, of course. Tripoli War.