Oh, it's not an easy job: dragging a Thunderbolt out of a swamp.

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Oh, it's not an easy job: dragging a Thunderbolt out of a swamp.

It seemed like just a month ago we all came to the unanimous conclusion that it was time to shed a few manly tears and send the A-10 off to its well-deserved rest. This flying cataclysm is getting old, not so much physically as mentally. And even though there's nothing to replace it with, it's time to say goodbye.

But no, the U.S. Air Force will look for new ways to carry out missions with the A-10C strike aircraft under an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Bill prepared by the House Armed Services Committee.



Here, it's important to understand what the House of Representatives is. It's the lower chamber of the US Congress. Each state is represented proportionally by population, with a total of 435 representatives. The House's primary function is to pass federal laws, meaning laws that apply to all states. Bills (precursor documents to legislation) passed in the House also undergo debate in the Senate and presidential approval before becoming law.

And the House of Representatives can very well decide what will happen and how it will happen. Well, much like our Duma, and with the same potential effectiveness.

Although the Air Force has long advocated for the Warthog's retirement, recent demand for the aircraft during conflicts in the Middle East has delayed its retirement until 2030.

Several of the numerous amendments to the bill are proposed by Abe Hamadeh, a Republican representative from Arizona. He calls on the Secretary of the Air Force to continue funding pilot training, testing, experimentation, maintenance, and support for the A-10 until its scheduled retirement, and to utilize the accumulated experience and knowledge gained during A-10 operations to develop future replacement systems. This includes maintaining a formal training unit to train pilots until retirement.

This is especially noteworthy given that the 357th Fighter Squadron in question graduated its final class of A-10 pilots in April at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona. And the question of whether the flight school will close is still on the table…


Four A-10C aircraft from the 357th Fighter Squadron drop flares missiles over the test site near Gila Bend, Arizona, on May 1, 2026

Meanwhile, in February of this year, the Air Force officially ended depot-level maintenance of the A-10 aircraft, disestablishing the 571st Maintenance Squadron at Hill Air Force Base, Utah. The A-10 Weapons School is scheduled to close this year.


An A-10C aircraft sits next to a hangar during the "Hawg Out" ceremony, Feb. 12, 2026, at Hill Air Force Base, Utah.

The aircraft was the last A-10 to be maintained by the 571st Maintenance Squadron at Ogden AFB, which had been providing base-level maintenance since 1998.

When speaking about “maintaining combat experience,” Hamady points directly to the A-10’s recent combat operations in the Middle East, including its role in providing close aviation support for the evacuation of two downed F-15E crews from Iran during Operation Fury, as well as for its work to ensure the security of the Strait of Hormuz, a vital shipping corridor.

The results, frankly, are so-so. Especially with the strait. It's a real mess, and if the A-10s did anything to ensure safety, the results aren't visible with just any microscope.

The amendment also requires a report on the A-10's "combat performance, its relevance in today's environment, lessons learned for future forces, and modernization options that could improve the program's effectiveness."

Hamadeh lists a number of recent enhancements to the aircraft that "could enhance the effectiveness of the A-10 program." These include electronic warfare capabilities, decoys or false targets, digital communications, sensor integration, and precision-guided missile integration. weapons, survivability enhancement, open systems architecture and human-machine systems applications.

The amendment also mentions recent "improvements to the A-10's aerial refueling system," specifically the rapid implementation of a nose-mounted aerial refueling probe. This is a crucial feature for a ground-attack aircraft; without it, the Warthog is a worthless aircraft.


A U.S. Air Force A-10C Thunderbolt II aircraft refueled by an HC-130J Combat King II aircraft in the U.S. Central Command area of ​​responsibility, May 9, 2026.

At the same time, as they prepare to retire the Warthog, the amendment's authors propose "developing a plan for competitive experimentation with autonomous and unconventional capabilities consistent with the A-10's missions"—something rather odd, especially in terms of unconventional capabilities for a conventional aircraft.

According to the amended bill, this should "facilitate the autonomous replacement and modernization of the A-10, as well as prioritize the engagement of non-traditional defense companies." The amendment calls for the study of "autonomous, semi-autonomous, artificial intelligence-enabled, and support aircraft" to perform future A-10-type missions.

According to the amendment, the plan must include methods to ensure that operational experiments are conducted "in accordance with the principles of effective command and control by a qualified military pilot." This must cover critical functions such as target acquisition, weapons release, and mission abort decisions.


Well, let's put it this way: having an A-10 pilot control all these autonomous, semi-autonomous, AI-equipped, and support aircraft is a pretty dubious idea. An aircraft without radar can only provide targeting to UAVs and other unconventional devices with questionable effectiveness, and the Warthog's participation in network-centric combat is also highly questionable, since the pilot is supposed to be flying the aircraft, not staring at a computer screen. Then again, an autopilot without radar is a pretty dubious idea.

The idea of ​​an aircraft with a two-man crew clearly arises here, and such a version of the A-10B was developed, including an airborne radar, but it did not go into production.

To facilitate the development of new technologies that could replace or partially replace the A-10, the amendment also provides for the use of a limited number of aircraft to support this research. This makes sense: convert a number of A-10s into test labs and use their experience to see how unconventional methods perform.


Two A-10C Thunderbolt II aircraft from the 74th Fighter Squadron prepare for mid-air refueling over Wake Island, Oct. 23, 2022.

The House of Representatives believes that to accelerate the initiative, the study could involve alternative defense or venture-backed companies, commercial technology firms, or other companies that could quickly develop the necessary hardware, software, autonomous control, detection, communications, and targeting systems.

This amendment allows for the possibility that new technologies could eventually become effective replacements for many of the tasks performed by the A-10, rather than a direct analogue to the manned aircraft.

The representatives from the House are excused by the fact that none of them will get into the cockpit of an unconventional/alternative "Warthog" and fly to where they will be met by completely conventional means Defense.

Concerning drones, the lack of a successor to the MQ-9 Reaper, envisioned by the MQ-Next program, is another tangible problem. The Air Force is currently attempting to replace the MQ-9 again, which you can read about here, but it's unclear whether the new drone will be able to perform a significant portion of the A-10's missions.


At the same time, the lack of a program to develop a true combat unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that could serve as a follow-on to the MQ-Next or something similar also hinders the development of a more survivable unmanned successor to the A-10.

While not explicitly stated, other options may include Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA)—unmanned systems with artificial intelligence that can deliver weapons, conduct reconnaissance, conduct electronic warfare, detect and track targets, and operate independently or as part of manned platforms. However, while CCAs may be part of the solution, the A-10's mission is traditionally considered more suited to strike drones.

It's elementary: one A-10, in a good scenario, can carry as much ammunition as a dozen dronesAnd the issue of precise use is also less pressing for the older attack aircraft compared to drones. More than 7 tons of payload on 11 hardpoints is essentially the equivalent of 10 MQ-9 Reapers.

Of course, advances in autonomous systems offer certain prospects for the future creation of networks of disposable or easily destroyed drones that could continuously monitor the battlefield, quickly exchange target information, and deliver precision strikes while reducing risks to pilots. In such a model, the traditional A-10 attack aircraft would be replaced not by a single aircraft, but by a distributed system of sensors, gunners, and autonomous assistants. Naturally, this is especially relevant in combat situations, when low-flying attack aircraft are becoming increasingly vulnerable.


During testing, a US Air Force XQ-58 Valkyrie jettisons an ALTIUS-600 drone from its internal bay.

However, even modern UAVs, like the MQ-9 Reaper, can't boast total survivability. It's impossible to count how many have already landed in the sands of the Middle East against their will. And the losses continue.

Where to go, where to fly?

Following the A-10's retirement, the amendment directs the Secretary of Defense to evaluate the feasibility of transferring these aircraft to "another military department"—presumably within the U.S. military. While the topic is occasionally raised in the enthusiast community, it is unlikely that the Marine Corps or Army will receive Warthogs as humanitarian aid.

As for the Army, it long ago abandoned the use of manned combat aircraft. For its part, the Marine Corps lacks the capacity or funding to transition to a completely different tactical platform, especially given the reduction in its F/A-18 Hornet fleet to accommodate the F-35B/C as a tactical fighter. And the F-35B/C itself is currently experiencing more than its share of problems, as has been discussed repeatedly.

The idea of ​​transferring decommissioned A-10 aircraft to the armed forces of an ally or partner has been raised in the past and was included in the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). In addition to Jordan, which was mentioned in the 2024 NDAA, Colombia and Ukraine have also expressed interest in acquiring the A-10.

True, no one is seriously considering Ukraine, because these guys take everything, even corn chips, if it's free. The problem is that the A-10 program is anything but free. Moreover, given that these aircraft have never been exported, they can only be bought from the United States. And President Trump has clearly stated that American weapons will only reach Ukraine if someone (like Germany) pays for them in full.

In addition, the amendment allows for the re-establishment of the A-10 demonstration team. This will facilitate “educational work, attracting new members, preserving historical heritage, air shows, military ceremonies and commemorative events, including those marking the 250th anniversary of the founding of the United States."

For more than four decades, the A-10C Demonstration Team performed spectacular flights around the world, but at the end of the 2024 season, it ceased operations. The 355th Wing at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base stated at the time that the decision was made as part of the Air Force's Warthog retirement program.


An A-10C Thunderbolt II aircraft, part of the Davis-Monthan Air Force Base Air Demonstration Team.

Of course, it should be noted that all these amendments do not necessarily mean the Air Force will abandon the A-10. If the service can prove it can maintain its knowledge base and address all capability gaps, the question of retiring the Warthog will remain open.

As we've repeatedly emphasized, the A-10's combination of capabilities is difficult to replicate in a single aircraft. Designed from the ground up for close air support, it boasts high combat damage tolerance, making it ideal for operations close to friendly forces, providing continuous and rapid fire support.

However, with survivability in dense air defense environments becoming increasingly important in modern conflicts, the F-35A, which is intended to replace the A-10, offers capabilities unavailable to the older aircraft, including stealth, advanced sensor integration, networked targeting, and the ability to strike from greater distances.

And this is a fact that even the most rabid optimists would find difficult to argue with. However, the F-35 won't be able to do what the A-10 can: tactical cooperation and support for troops on the front lines. Here, the "penguin" is truly weak in terms of armor and survivability.

While the idea of ​​replacing the A-10 with the F-35 has generated much controversy, regardless of its merits, it's clear the Air Force needs a larger combat force to give Warthog supporters more ammunition to throw at the enemy.


An F-35A Lightning II fighter flies past an A-10 Thunderbolt II attack aircraft at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.

Meanwhile, the Air Force has abandoned the idea of ​​using the F-35 as a direct successor to the A-10, reflected in the fact that one former Warthog unit at Selfridge Air National Guard Base in Michigan has been selected to receive a squadron of F-15EX Eagle IIs. The balance of capabilities offered by the F-15EX means that other units are now considering it as part of their expanded fleet. And there's a lot of logic to this, as the F-15, through a series of upgrades, has become a very capable aircraft, capable of performing a wide variety of missions.

Regarding the current timeline for the A-10's retirement, Craig McKee news ABC15 in Phoenix, Arizona, received a brief outline of the plan from Air Force Command.

In fiscal year 2026, which runs through September 30, 2026, the 357th Fighter Squadron at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base will be inactivated, and its formal training program will end. Meanwhile, the A-10 Weapons School at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, will transition to other aircraft types, and the 422nd Test and Evaluation Squadron will be inactivated.

In fiscal years 2027 and 2028, two active A-10 squadrons are planned to remain at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, and one Air Force Reserve squadron at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri. This will bring the total number of A-10s to 63, of which 42 will be operational.

In fiscal year 2029, Moody AFB will have only one squadron left, and the total number of A-10 aircraft will be reduced to 42.


A-10C fighter jets from the 74th Fighter Squadron at Moody Air Force Base fly over southern Georgia in 2014.

Finally, the A-10 fleet is scheduled to be completely retired in fiscal year 2030.

All of this is in line with the Air Force's requirement to end the A-10's service by the end of the decade. This is the culmination of a lengthy process of retiring the aircraft, driven primarily by concerns about its survivability.

At the same time, the Warthog's unique capabilities remain in demand, including in the Middle East. However, it's worth noting that the Middle East is currently the most ideal location for operating aircraft like the A-10.

It previously seemed that legislative efforts to preserve A-10 might fizzle out, especially after the project lost two of its most vocal supporters. Specifically, after the death of Arizona Senator John McCain and then after Republican Representative Martha McSally lost her Senate race in Arizona.

Now that the A-10 has proven itself in Epic Fury and received a brief service life extension, it appears a new battle to preserve the Warthog is underway. However, I repeat, parliamentarians will never fly a Warthog, and so the resistance from the US Air Force, from generals to flight crews, will only grow with each passing year.

The reason is clear: the aircraft is too old to expect the impossible, like a B-52-style service life. Different loads, different designs. It's one thing to fly at high altitude and slowly drop a carpet of bombs on an enemy below, but it's quite another to maneuver between various small arms fire, dodge missiles, and fight your way through a curtain of fire to reach your target.

No chance. Only somewhere in the Third World, and nothing more. Both pilots and Air Force generals, who were also pilots, understand this. As for parliamentarians... They have similar understandings all over the world.

And parliamentarians will stubbornly drag the Warthog out of the swamp, despite the BBC's resistance. We'll see who wins.
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  1. -6
    15 June 2026 07: 10
    develop a plan for competitive experiments with autonomous and unconventional capabilities

    as well as the priority attraction of non-traditional defense companies

    There's something unconventional about everything they do there... wassat
    1. +4
      15 June 2026 10: 48
      The "non-traditional" part of this text is a gross translation error. It refers to manufacturers who have "not previously engaged" in such developments.
      1. 0
        15 June 2026 15: 45
        "Unconventional" in this text is a gross mistake by the translator.
        Maybe the author? Since he rushed for the A-10. Besides, Skomorokhov.
  2. +4
    15 June 2026 07: 15
    With the air defenses down, what's not to like? And a cannon!
    1. -2
      15 June 2026 07: 31
      With air defenses suppressed, what's not an eagle?
      If only he could reach the air defense first...
    2. -1
      15 June 2026 08: 24
      Quote: novel xnumx
      With the air defenses down, what's not to like? And a cannon!

      In Iran, after suppressing air defenses, the F-15E performed best, while the Thunderbolt fared less well. While it certainly did some work with its cannons, the effectiveness of that work is questionable.
      1. +8
        15 June 2026 09: 00
        He can see where he's shooting. This is important for close support. There's a video of him dismantling fortifications, literally 200-300 meters from the filmer.
        1. -1
          15 June 2026 09: 34
          Quote: novel xnumx
          There is a video where he is dismantling fortifications, literally 200-300 meters from the one filming

          In our time, when MANPADS are no longer a rarity, this is very dangerous.
          1. +4
            15 June 2026 11: 00
            A ground attack pilot was a dangerous job even before MANPADS. But they fly and do it.
            1. +1
              15 June 2026 12: 10
              Quote: novel xnumx
              Being a stormtrooper was a dangerous job even before MANPADS.

              They protected themselves from small anti-aircraft missiles with armor, but a rocket is more terrifying than a 23 mm Shilka shell.
          2. +7
            15 June 2026 12: 30
            During its combat career, the A-10 suffered very few losses from MANPADS. This is due to its "cold" turbofan engines, the largest inventory of IR flares in the history of world aviation, and the extremely high survivability of the attack aircraft's design.

            Of course, it lacks a laser countermeasure system now. I don't even know why they didn't try to integrate the AN/AAQ-24(V) LAIRCM laser countermeasure system, specifically the one used on the AC-130J Block 20 and MC-130J Commando II aircraft.
            1. -4
              15 June 2026 12: 46
              Quote: AlexanderA
              During its combat career, the A-10 suffered very few losses from MANPADS.

              MANPADS are improving and becoming more common. The best defense is to fly higher.
              1. +1
                15 June 2026 13: 32
                Quote: Puncher
                MANPADS are being improved and there are more of them.

                Defenses against them are also being improved. Laser-guided anti-aircraft missiles (for example, we have laser-guided anti-aircraft missiles installed on the Su-57 and Mi-28NM) are considered effective in blinding missiles with modern matrix IR seekers. However, laser-guided systems, such as the RBS-70, RBS-90, Starstreak, Martlet/LMM, and QW-3, are also used, but they are relatively uncommon compared to missiles with IR seekers.
                1. -1
                  15 June 2026 16: 36
                  Quote: AlexanderA
                  an effective means of blinding missiles with modern matrix IR seekers

                  I don't particularly notice the use of helicopters in Ukraine, much less the Su-57. Apparently, the helicopter pilots aren't particularly keen on testing the effectiveness of the counter-aircraft missile system. MANPADS have completely blocked low-altitude airspace for both sides.
                  1. 0
                    15 June 2026 18: 01
                    The Russian Ministry of Defense has published footage of the Mi-28NM helicopter crew performing a combat mission:



                    Mi-28NM losses were minimal. I don't think I lost a single one to MANPADS missiles.
                    1. -1
                      16 June 2026 04: 22
                      Quote: AlexanderA
                      The Russian Ministry of Defense has published footage of the Mi-28NM helicopter crew performing a combat mission:

                      Have you heard many war correspondents say, "Our helicopters arrived and helped us capture position N"? Attack helicopters are designed to operate along the front lines, suppressing enemy ground resistance. Do you see this in the SVO?
                      1. -1
                        16 June 2026 09: 55
                        Quote: Puncher
                        Have you heard many war correspondents say "our helicopters arrived and helped us capture position N"?

                        I don't read war correspondents. They're amateurs. Russian Defense Ministry videos regularly show the combat use of the Mi-28NM during the Air Defense Forces. Throughout the Air Defense Forces, all Mi-28NM losses were irreparable—either on the ground or due to technical reasons. Even regarding the helicopter shot down during a combat sortie by an FPV drone on August 6, 2024 (although the video doesn't accurately identify the helicopter's model, many believe it was an Mi-28NM), the consensus is that the helicopter was only damaged. There's not a single claim that even one Mi-28NM was shot down by a MANPADS missile. Ukrainians didn't sound. At the same time Ukrainians They claim to have shot down approximately 20-25 Ka-52 and Ka-52M helicopters with MANPADS missiles. Helicopters of this type use obsolete gas-discharge lamp-based radars, not LSOEPs.
  3. + 10
    15 June 2026 07: 19
    It's clear from the very first lines who the author is... Those Americans are idiots, they don't write off such junk. They should have bought Su-35s, then yeah, that would have been awesome! But no, the author forgot about his favorite plane today...
    Seriously speaking, the A-10 is a good aircraft, possibly the best in its class (though there are only two of them – the A-10 and our Su-25) thanks to its incredible survivability, vast array of weapons, and low maintenance costs. It's also proven effective against attack drones with its new missiles. But the American leadership is understandable – politicians appreciate the wide range of capabilities and low cost of such a toy, while the military understands that the risks of air defense for an aircraft during combat missions are high. They don't want to have to rescue pilots, much less lose them, and who would refuse a new aircraft in exchange? Overall, I think we'll be seeing this Santa Barbara thing for at least another 5-10 years...
    1. -3
      15 June 2026 08: 22
      Quote: parma
      But seriously, the A-10 is a good car, possibly the best in its class.

      The aircraft is certainly not bad, but the concept of building an aircraft around a cannon is rather crude. Most sorties don't require a cannon, but you have to carry an extra 1,8 tons, otherwise the center of gravity will shift to the rear.
      Quote: parma
      The risks from air defense for aircraft during combat missions are high

      Despite the fact that it is mainly necessary to operate from high altitudes, like the F-15E.
      1. +7
        15 June 2026 08: 32
        In fact, even today, the A-10 is capable of tearing practically (and I think even without the "practically") any vehicle to pieces with its "brrrr," but today, yes, it's a vestige, a legacy of the Cold War, so to speak. On the other hand, the A-10 carries such an arsenal that there's physically no room for additional bombs and missiles, and not just because of its weight, but the gun...well, it's better to have it and not need it than to need it and not have it.
        1. -3
          15 June 2026 08: 45
          Quote: parma
          On the other hand, the A-10 carries such an arsenal that there's physically nowhere to hang additional bombs and missiles, and not because of the weight, but the gun...well, it's better to have it and not need it, than to need it and not have it)))

          It's still outdated. They could already create a similar attack aircraft today, but in an unmanned version, but they're apparently afraid the developer will ask for so much that no budget can handle it.
          1. +2
            15 June 2026 09: 17
            No matter how you look at it... building a new aircraft like this today probably makes no sense, assuming at least half of the "Western partners'" analysis regarding the remaining armored vehicles (both in service and in storage) is true—NATO no longer has to fear "steel avalanches"; the Soviet legacy is gone. The A-10 was designed precisely to welcome such "dear guests" (which is probably why no one else in the world has bought it or made a similar one; the Su-25 is a different beast, after all). Even in an unmanned version, a new aircraft like this is no longer needed; something lighter and more versatile is needed. The A-10 itself can easily be used until it falls apart from old age, which is precisely what the Melnikans are doing.
            1. -3
              15 June 2026 09: 45
              Quote: parma
              Even in an unmanned version, a new machine like this is no longer needed; something lighter and more multi-tasking is needed.

              If we assume that the Warthog is more of a clear-air aircraft and its mission is to directly interact with infantry on the front lines, then it's a larger Reaper with a 5-ton payload. Its payload is a drone container and a cellular electronics system. It has a Starlink control antenna. It patrols at altitude, releasing reconnaissance, attack, and interceptor drones, and controls the drones via radio. Infantry can connect to the drones from the ground—providing information, target selection, and intercepting enemy drones (especially via fiber optics). Essentially, it's a kind of "guardian angel" for the unit. In principle, it could be created today; everything necessary is already in place.
              1. +5
                15 June 2026 12: 41
                What makes you think that? The Warthog was originally a close-battlefield support vehicle, and it has proven its survivability. It's just that such a massive amount of firepower isn't required today, and likely never will be.
                Regarding drones, you're completely wasting your time trying to apply the logic of the Joint Forces Defense. The abundance of drones on both sides is essentially due to the paucity of their armies—neither side is capable of using NATO tactics in their original form. NATO's core idea is complete air superiority, followed by the isolation and destruction of ground forces from the air. In theory (and this has been demonstrated in practice many times), first the "wild weasels" destroy the enemy's air defenses, then the fighters destroy the enemy's aircraft, then the bombers destroy the logistics, and only then does the ground component advance, supported by A-10s and similar assets (though the time between these stages can be mere hours, depending on the balance of forces).
                Due to the lack of a Laska-like missile system in both our country and the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and the general lack of experience with such measures, air defenses have not been destroyed. Without destroying air defenses, fighters cannot achieve air superiority, even if they wanted to. To their credit, they figured out how to replace air superiority with drones, but due to technical limitations, they had to reverse the process: first, hunting for equipment on the front lines and supporting ground units, and now they're focusing on logistics.
                The reason this model isn't catching on, in my opinion, is that "rich countries" have air forces and all the means to exploit air superiority, and their aircraft are much more versatile. Meanwhile, poor countries simply can't afford to create an entire multi-billion dollar industry for the mass production of attack FPV aircraft.
                1. -2
                  15 June 2026 12: 58
                  Quote: parma
                  The reason this model isn't catching on, in my opinion, is that "rich countries" have air forces and all the means to exploit air superiority, and their aircraft are much more versatile. Meanwhile, poor countries simply can't afford to create an entire multi-billion dollar industry for the mass production of attack FPV aircraft.

                  I agree with some of your arguments, but air power has one drawback. It can't remain in the air 24/7. The war with Iran, by the way, demonstrated this very clearly. Having gained air superiority, the US and Israeli air forces couldn't suppress missile launchers, much less UAVs. The Iranian air force managed to position the launcher and launch a missile or UAV. And while a missile can at least be detected by its heat signature at launch, this is practically impossible with UAVs. Moreover, strike aircraft were unable to neutralize threats from optically guided SAMs, which resulted in losses, albeit minor ones. Now let's look at the situation in Lebanon. Israel was able to suppress radio-controlled drones, but it can't do anything against fiber-optic drones. Air power is powerless here; it needs to saturate the area with its own drones, hunting for the Israeli operators. In other words, the Jews need their own kill zone consisting of aircraft and drones.
                  1. +3
                    15 June 2026 13: 53
                    I disagree with your arguments, as the American-Israeli operation is purely airborne. A ground operation would have solved the drone and missile problem, but no one planned for that. Even so, the tempo of retaliatory strikes slowed dramatically by the end. Overall, judging by the lack of 24/7 oversight from the "predators" and other forces, no one even planned to prolong the conflict (Trump can't do that due to legislation, and Israel is too far gone).
                    Regarding the "green" drones - judging by the lack of any adequate defensive (open vehicle hatches, no nets, barbecues, shotguns, etc.) response from the IDF - all these FPVs are isolated in nature and it is highly likely that all we see are strikes, well, once every couple of days.
                    1. -1
                      15 June 2026 17: 00
                      Quote: parma
                      A ground operation would solve the problem with drones and missiles

                      Partly yes. But I wouldn't rule it out completely.
                      Quote: parma
                      Judging by the lack of 24/7 control from the "predecessors" and others, no one even planned to prolong the conflict

                      Do you understand why it didn't work? The Predator/Reaper launches Hellfires and needs to fly low to do so. They're slow and lack onboard defenses. Therefore, the Iranians had no trouble landing them with the meager assets they managed to preserve. In other words, the Americans and Jews planned to seize control of the skies with manned aircraft and hand over the task of constant control to the Heron and Reaper UAVs. But they miscalculated: the Iranians began shooting down the UAVs and, taking advantage of the gaps between strikes, launched the surviving missiles and drones. The aircraft simply didn't have time to reach the target.
                      A ground operation in a place like Iran is no trivial task. The entire coastline is mountainous, including the eastern part. Even with good preparation, it wouldn't last a month.
                      Quote: parma
                      all these FPVs are of a one-off nature

                      Yes, the Hezbollah has trouble with fiber-optic drones because they have no one to supply them to. Iran has no time for them right now, and there are no more land routes. But in any case, they cause problems for the Jews. And the front is small, so millions of FPVs aren't needed to create a kill zone.
                2. 0
                  22 June 2026 23: 54
                  Quote: parma
                  In theory...

                  Quote: parma

                  (and this has been demonstrated in practice more than once)

                  Just recently, after a month, their entire air operation "died".
                  Quote: parma
                  First, the "wild weasels" destroy the air defense... Due to the lack of an analogue of the "weasels" in both our country and the Ukrainian Armed Forces

                  Neither the US Navy nor the Israeli Air Force ever used "weasels." Both managed without them.
                  Quote: parma
                  and in general the lack of mastery of such air defense measures

                  What events?
      2. +1
        15 June 2026 12: 49
        Quote: Puncher
        The aircraft is certainly not bad, but the concept of building an aircraft around a cannon is rather crude. Most sorties don't require a cannon, but you have to carry an extra 1,8 tons, otherwise the center of gravity will shift to the rear.

        You can never tell whether a cannon will be needed during a combat sortie. The A-10 cannon is a "surgical instrument," allowing, for example, in urban combat to destroy an enemy entrenched in a building just a few dozen meters from friendly infantry positions. A pod-mounted version of a 30mm cannon with similar ballistics, as they say, "didn't fly." An attempt to mount a GPU-5/A cannon pod with the four-barreled GAU-13/A cannon on an F-16C Block 25 was a complete failure. Only a few combat sorties were flown by F-16C Block 25 aircraft with this cannon pod during Desert Storm—and the accuracy was predictably poor.

        If a powerful and accurate cannon is required on an airplane, the airplane must be built willy-nilly "around the cannon."

        At the same time, the A-10 is designed in such a way that its horizontal maneuverability near the ground, as well as other flight characteristics, are not detracted from by the presence of this powerful gun with its huge ammunition supply of 1150 rounds.

        I'll go even further: if it weren't for this gun and its capabilities, the A-10 would most likely have been removed from service long ago.
        1. -1
          15 June 2026 16: 28
          Quote: AlexanderA
          The A-10 gun is a "surgical instrument"

          Their ASP inventory is now full of "surgical" instruments. Most of them allow operations to be performed from a relatively safe height. A cannon is a risk these days, and often unjustified.
          Quote: AlexanderA
          The container version of a 30 mm cannon with similar ballistics, as they say, "didn't take off."

          I'm not talking about the container version. It could have been more modest in specifications, but for example, with a larger caliber. It was designed to be used against tanks, but it's being used against people, which is impractical, to put it mildly. The explosive charge is small, and the rate of fire is excessive.
          1. 0
            15 June 2026 17: 54
            Quote: Puncher
            Their ASP inventory is now full of "surgical" instruments. Most of them allow operations to be performed from a relatively safe height. A cannon is a risk these days, and often unjustified.

            Watch the 2007 war film "Wolves for Lambs." It shows how A-10 cannon fire rescues two wounded American soldiers from a downed helicopter in the mountains, after the Taliban had gotten within a few dozen meters of them in an attempt to take them alive. I won't spoil the ending.

            In 20 years of American war in Afghanistan, not a single A-10 attack aircraft was lost there.
            I'm not talking about the container version. It could have been more modest in specifications, but for example, with a larger caliber. It was designed to be used against tanks, but it's being used against people, which is impractical, to put it mildly. The explosive charge is small, and the rate of fire is excessive.

            So, you're going to "cancel" all 30mm cannons. But the Americans haven't even switched from 25mm cannons to the Bradley yet (and apparently never will).

            The PGU-13/B HEI round. The projectile itself weighs 378 grams. The projectile contains 56 grams of explosive. This round's performance is slightly superior to the domestic 30mm OFZ 3UOF8 round, which contains 49 grams of explosive.

            The muzzle velocity of the American projectile is 1020 m/s. The muzzle velocity of the domestic OFZ projectile from the 2A42 cannon is 960 m/s.

            What rate of fire for an aircraft cannon do you consider correct?

            The experimental 45mm TKB-700 cannon, developed for the Su-25T attack aircraft, "failed," as the saying goes. The TKB-700 had a rate of fire of 1250 rounds per minute. Its normal armor penetration (HEAT round) was 200 mm. Ammunition was planned to be 120-150 rounds, if I remember correctly.

            Which is better against infantry: 1150 30mm HE shells or 120-150 45mm HE shells? Did the ZSU-23-4, which was used against ground targets during actual combat in Afghanistan, have excessive rates of fire?
            1. 0
              16 June 2026 04: 13
              How A-10 cannon fire rescued two wounded American soldiers from a downed helicopter in the mountains.

              I don't deny the ability of an aircraft cannon to kill someone on the ground. Both the GAU-8 and the HP-30 can do this.
              In 20 years of American war in Afghanistan, not a single A-10 attack aircraft was lost there.

              But this is not thanks to the aircraft cannon.
              Quote: AlexanderA
              Well then, you should "cancel" all 30mm guns.

              Why go to such extremes...
              Quote: AlexanderA
              What rate of fire for an aircraft cannon do you consider correct?

              Let's go back a bit. An aircraft cannon on a strike aircraft is primarily designed to destroy targets on the ground. The GAU-8 was conceived as an effective anti-tank weapon in an era when guided weapons were unreliable and unguided rockets were inaccurate. At the time, a 30mm armor-piercing round seemed reliable, but a single hit wasn't enough to disable a tank, as a hole in the hull doesn't equal a complete failure, so a very high rate of fire was required. However, the aircraft cannon would quickly overheat, requiring the barrel to cool. Alternatively, a multi-barrel cannon could be used, at the cost of increased weight. Our GSh-30-2 is certainly less effective against armored vehicles. But for all other targets, the GAU-8 is redundant, and the GSh-30-2 is no less effective against ground targets, albeit ten times lighter.
              That is, today the A-10 has an anti-tank gun that is significantly inferior to the AGM-114 Hellfire and must be used against unarmored targets, which a lighter aircraft gun could do just as successfully.
              1. 0
                16 June 2026 09: 12
                Quote: Puncher
                I don't deny the ability of an aircraft cannon to kill someone on the ground. Both the GAU-8 and the HP-30 can do this.

                Su-17M4 - two NR-30 cannons, total ammunition load of 160 rounds, ammunition load was enough for approximately 5 seconds of firing.
                MiG-27K - GSh-6-30A cannon, 260 rounds of ammunition, less than 3 seconds of firing time.
                Su-25 - GSh-30-2 cannon. Ammunition: 250 rounds, for approximately 5 seconds of firing.
                Su-34 - GSh-30-1 cannon. Ammunition: 180 rounds, for 6 seconds of firing.

                The A-10A is a GAU-8/A cannon. It carries 1174 rounds of ammunition and has two firing modes: low (2100 rounds per minute) and high (4200 rounds per minute). The total firing time is 33 or 16,5 seconds.

                The A-10C is a GAU-8/A cannon. Ammunition capacity is 1150 rounds. 3900 rounds per minute. Firing time is 17,6 seconds. 18 one-second bursts with cutoff, 9 two-second bursts. However, it is possible to fire the entire ammunition load in a single burst, although this will significantly reduce the service life of the barrel assembly.

                A gun on board an airplane is only useful when it fires.
                But this is not thanks to the aircraft cannon.

                YouTube is full of videos of A-10 gun-attack attacks in Afghanistan filmed by American infantry.

                During Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the US Air Force expended 783,514 PGU-14/B 30mm armor-piercing incendiary rounds with depleted uranium cores. Considering that even with anti-tank warheads, there was one HE round for every five armor-piercing rounds fired from the 30mm guns, a total of approximately 940,000 rounds were expended—equivalent to 817,6 full GAU-8/A cannon loadouts. For 8077 combat sorties flown by the A-10A and OA-10A, that's quite a performance.

                Based on experience from the Great Patriotic War, the average consumption of Il-2 aircraft cannon shells per combat sortie was 68–72 shells per aircraft. This constituted approximately 35–45% of the attack aircraft's full onboard ammunition load.

                If we take the average consumption of 35% of the full ammunition load for the A-10A in Desert Storm, then the A-10A attack aircraft used the GAU-8/A cannon in approximately every third combat sortie in Desert Storm and carried out approximately 2,7 combat sorties in which the cannon was used for assault attacks.

                It's also known that the A-10As expended 4801 AGM-65 Maverick guided missiles of various modifications. Even if we assume that the average AGM-65 consumption per combat sortie involving these missiles was two missiles (a full complement of six missiles, a standard load of two or four missiles), the A-10As used guns more often than guided missiles during Desert Storm combat sorties.

                Five A-10As and one AO-10A were irretrievably lost during Desert Storm combat sorties—six aircraft. One loss per 1346 sorties.

                By comparison, Su-25s carried out approximately 60 combat sorties in Afghanistan. During these sorties, 31 attack aircraft were lost—one loss per 1935 combat sorties.

                However, the technological level of the air defense of the Afghan mujahideen and the military air defense of the Iraqi army (which corresponded to the level of air defense of the Soviet army in the 1970s) was incomparable.

                And yes, during the entire war in Afghanistan, American FIM-92 Stinger MANPADS shot down eight Su-25 attack aircraft. All these losses occurred between November 15, 1986, and January 7, 1989.
                Our GSh-30-2 is certainly less effective against armored vehicles. But for all other targets, the GAU-8 is superior, and the GSh-30-2 is no less effective against ground targets, albeit ten times lighter.

                How did you determine that the GAU-8/A is excessive for all other targets except armored vehicles?

                Su-25 - typical cannon burst of 1-2 seconds (50-100 rounds fired). Ammunition: 250 rounds. A total of 5 short bursts, or 2 long and one short burst. The total weight of the VPU-17A cannon mount with ammunition is ~440 kg.

                The A-10C has a typical 1-2 second burst (65-130 rounds fired), and carries 1150 rounds (enough for 18 one-second short bursts or 9 two-second long bursts). The gun mount's total weight is 1828 kg.

                In fact, you are criticizing the A-10 cannon mount for its ability to carry out up to 9 attack runs with cannon fire with its full ammunition load (which usually does not happen), while the full ammunition load of the Su-25 cannon mount was only enough for three attack runs with cannon fire.

                For comparison, during one combat sortie, the crews of Il-2 attack aircraft made an average of 2-3 passes at the target, and at the maximum (with weak air defense counteraction) this number could reach 5-7 passes.

                In terms of weight, the A-10's total gun mount weight and ammunition load is only ~4,15 times greater than the VPU-17A's total gun mount weight and ammunition load. The A-10's ammunition load is 4,6 times greater.

                The GAU-8/A cannon's ballistics aren't so superior to those of the GSh-30-2 that it's worth noting (incidentally, the barrels of the GSh-30-2K modification of the Mi-24P helicopter were lengthened to improve the ballistics of this helicopter cannon). Another issue is that the GAU-8/A's ammunition originally included a round with an armor-piercing discarding sabot projectile with a depleted uranium core, capable of penetrating the side armor of a T-62 tank. The GSh-30-2 cannon never had, and likely never will have, a round with comparable armor-piercing capabilities, meaning the GSh-30-2 cannon could only reliably defeat lightly armored vehicles.

                As for criticism of the US Air Force, I can point out that they never subsequently introduced a discarding sabot (SA-1) round into the GAU-8/A cannon's ammunition complement, which would have provided even greater armor-piercing capability. On the other hand, the effectiveness of AA rounds against a tank's chassis, external fuel tanks, and attachments is always superior to that of SA-1 rounds.
  4. -7
    15 June 2026 07: 52
    It's articles like this that make me want to read VO. They're deep, professional, and interesting. Thank you, Roman.
  5. -1
    15 June 2026 07: 55
    The A10 could very well replace the F-16.
  6. +1
    15 June 2026 08: 17
    In particular, the rapid implementation of a nose-mounted refueling probe. A crucial feature for a ground-attack aircraft; without it, the Warthog is a worthless aircraft.

    This is where it gets confusing. The boom was installed to allow refueling from Marine Corps tankers, which use a hose-and-cone system. Is this a necessary measure to avoid chasing down Air Force tankers, which is what prompted the author's sarcasm in this case?
  7. -1
    15 June 2026 08: 34
    The issue is not whether the Thunderbolt is needed or not, but whose lobby will prevail: the manufacturer of this aircraft or another one.
    1. +5
      15 June 2026 08: 54
      the manufacturer of one or another aircraft
      Warthog production ended in 1984. The manufacturing company ceased to exist in 2003.
      1. +1
        15 June 2026 09: 32
        "The manufacturing company ceased to exist in 2003."
        Well then, who's trying to modernize it? This is America, after all.
        1. +1
          15 June 2026 10: 17
          It is not necessary that the manufacturer can upgrade.
  8. 0
    15 June 2026 08: 53
    The classic "Why pay less!" from the military. But congressmen pose a different question: if a cheaper aircraft solves the problem, why write it off? A logical question, by the way...
    1. +2
      15 June 2026 11: 03
      Quote from solar
      The classic "Why pay less!" response from the military. But congressmen pose a different question: if a cheaper aircraft can solve the problem, why write it off?

      The Warthog isn't so clear-cut. Before the start of the Second World War, the Air Force itself was the one most keen to keep it in service—as a cheap means of infantry support in the typical US conflicts of the time. They came up with all sorts of excuses, like "When the "penguin" can perform all the tasks of the "warthog", including attacking ground targets with a cannon, then we will replace it".
      But already in 2023 the Air Force, looking at a medium-intensity war, sharply changed their shoes in mid-jump reforged - and decided that "Pilots' lives matter!"And they began to push not for a cheap attack aircraft, but for a guided weapons carrier that could deploy its combat load beyond the range of most enemy air defenses.
      The congressmen's main concern is how to keep their state alive, without any worries. Because cutting units at the state base means a potential reduction in state revenue. And the congressmen, like all elected officials, think about the federal budget not in terms of savings, but rather in terms of "finding another piece." smile
      1. -2
        15 June 2026 14: 15
        The A-10C is a precision-guided version. They want to upgrade all remaining aircraft to this level. Its supergun has proven to be of limited use, except perhaps against guerrillas.
        1. +1
          16 June 2026 11: 39
          Quote from solar
          The A-10C is a precision-guided munitions version. They plan to upgrade all remaining aircraft to this level.

          This reminds me of something... oh yeah - dreams of converting the Su-25 into a guided missile carrier. smile
          And the questions for A-10C will be the same:
          If the aircraft is planned to be used as a guided missile carrier for dropping payloads outside the air defense engagement zone of the frontline, then why does it need such armor? After all, it won't protect against "large" SAMs. And why does it need a cannon if it's going to be working on its own rear?
          But the armor and gun eat up a significant portion of the payload. And removing the gun from an aircraft practically built around it... laughing
          1. +1
            16 June 2026 15: 12
            If the aircraft is planned to be used as a guided missile carrier for dropping payloads outside the air defense engagement zone of the frontline, then why does it need such armor? After all, it won't protect against "large" SAMs. And why does it need a cannon if it's going to be working on its own rear?

            They're not needed. But you can't take them off.
  9. 0
    15 June 2026 09: 02
    Very slow, only for local air defense.
    For ground operations, a suitable radar is required, like the F-15E(X).
    1. +3
      15 June 2026 10: 24
      It does not have a radar; for ground operations, it is equipped with a universal AN/AAQ-28 Litening sighting container with high-resolution cameras of various types - infrared and visible - and a laser marker.
      1. 0
        16 June 2026 08: 28
        I know, I flew in the Tundra. An excellent container for target guidance and illumination.
  10. 0
    15 June 2026 10: 58
    This attack aircraft was developed as an ambulance to repel massive advances by Soviet armadas. At the time, MANPADS were rare and only targeted the target's tail. The idea was that a group of Warthogs would, upon infantry call, rush to a designated area and pulverize columns of Soviet tanks, whose only cover on the march consisted of anti-aircraft guns. Now, there are no advancing tank armadas, but there is an enemy with weak air defenses.
    1. +1
      15 June 2026 13: 24
      The aircraft was designed to survive both ZSU-23-4 and Soviet MANPADS fire. The Osa SAM system (as well as the Shilka radar) adopted by the USSR were intended to be countered by AN/ALQ-119 jamming pods (in the 1980s, the AN/ALQ-131; from the early 1990s to the present, the AN/ALQ-184, adopted in 1989) and the tactic of approaching the line of combat contact at altitudes of 15-30 meters.

      https://www.acc.af.mil/Portals/92/Docs/ACC%20SAFETY/COMBAT%20EDGE/TAC77_04.pdf

      Well thought out design and proven tactics.

      With the introduction of the Tunguska and Tor air defense missile systems into the Soviet Armed Forces, tactics changed dramatically, emphasizing the use of the latest AGM-65 Maverick modifications and close cooperation with AH-64 helicopters. However, during Desert Storm in 1991, tactics honed in the late 1970s were generally sufficient, as Iraqi air defense systems were roughly on par with Soviet air defense systems of the late 1970s in terms of technology. Then came wars where the aircraft's low vulnerability to small-caliber anti-aircraft guns, small arms fire, and man-portable air defense missiles proved effective. The Strela-10M and Roland-2 short-range air defense systems proved dangerous adversaries for the A-10A, but these were isolated incidents of downing, countable on the fingers of one hand.