The Last War of Leonty Bennigsen
Bennigsen in Geitman's engraving
In previous articles, we discussed Leonty Bennigsen's origins, his service in the Russian army, and the military campaign of 1806-1807, which, having begun well, ended with a crushing defeat at the Battle of Friedland, after which Leonty Bennigsen was removed from his post as commander-in-chief and forced into retirement. Until the spring of 1812, he lived quietly and unnoticed on his estate.
1812 year
Alexander I remembered Bennigsen on the eve of the Patriotic War of 1812, and for a time he "attended the Emperor." Curiously, it was Bennigsen who hosted the ball in Zakret, at which Alexander I received news that Bonaparte's Grande Armée had crossed the Neman and entered the Russian Empire.
Bennigsen then served without a specific position at the headquarters of the 1st Western Army, but the Tsar strongly "recommended" Barclay de Tolly "to consult with him on all matters." Bennigsen immediately became one of the commander's most implacable opponents, criticizing all his orders.
Barclay de Tolly had already developed a plan for a “Scythian war” in 1807. The German historian B. G. Nieburg met with him at that time and reported Barclay’s words as follows:
In the event of his (Napoleon's) invasion of Russia, the enemy should be forced by a skillful retreat to move away from his operational base, to tire him out with small enterprises and to lure him into the interior of the country, and then, with the preserved troops and with the help of the climate, to prepare for him, at least behind Moscow, a new Poltava.
At the same time, there were numerous plans for an offensive war, the authors of which included P. I. Bagration, A. P. Ermolov, E. F. Saint-Priest, Prince A. of Württemberg, and the same L. L. Bennigsen, who presented it in 1811. However, it was Barclay de Tolly's plan that best suited the situation, and it was its implementation that prevented Napoleon from defeating Russian troops in border battles – something the French emperor so desired.
The two separated Russian armies retreated, and in early August 1812, enemy troops nearly broke into Smolensk. Lieutenant General Nikolai Raevsky, commander of the 7th Infantry Corps, decided to defend the city. Bennigsen tried to stop him, urging the general to refrain from decisive action, to delay the crossing, and under no circumstances to cross to the other bank. artillery – so as not to lose her. Raevsky recalled:
I felt too strongly that this was not a matter of preserving a few guns, but of saving Russia's main forces, and perhaps even Russia itself. I felt quite clearly that my duty was to perish with my entire detachment rather than allow the enemy to cut off our armies from all communications with Moscow.
N. Raevsky in a portrait by J. Dawe
Ignoring Bennigsen's admonitions, Raevsky held Smolensk until the main forces arrived. And Napoleon wrote on Saint Helena:
A fifteen-thousand-strong Russian detachment, coincidentally stationed in Smolensk, was given the honor of defending the city for 24 hours, giving Barclay de Tolly time to arrive the following day. Had the French army managed to take Smolensk by surprise, it would have crossed the Dnieper there and attacked the Russian army, which was divided and in disarray, from the rear. This decisive blow failed.
And he noted that N. Raevsky was “made of the stuff that marshals are made of.”
The following words were carved on Raevsky's tombstone:
He was the shield of Russia in Smolensk and the sword of Russia in Paris.
As a result, it was at Smolensk on July 21 (August 2), 1812, that the armies of Barclay de Tolly and Bagration were able to unite, and Bagration immediately began to demand a general battle, which went against Barclay’s plan.
It has long been recognized that Barclay de Tolly's actions were the only correct ones, and he retreated in such a way that "he left behind not a single cannon, not even a single cart" (Butenev) and "not a single wounded" (Caulaincourt). But the aristocrats in St. Petersburg demanded great victories, especially since Bagration, who hated Barclay, fiercely supported them in his letters. He urged an offensive, putting forward "ironclad arguments" such as:
By God, let's throw our hats at them!
He complained to St. Petersburg that the Russian people were having trouble living under the Germans, that Barclay de Tolly was "not just a bad general, but a lousy one," and that "the minister was indecisive, cowardly, incompetent, slow, and possessed every other bad quality," calling him "a scoundrel, a bastard, and a beast." Under widespread pressure, Alexander I began searching for a new commander-in-chief. Bennigsen was one of the candidates, but the nobles of St. Petersburg and Moscow demanded the appointment of a Russian, even naming Kutuzov, "Suvorov's disciple." Alexander I was also dissatisfied with Barclay de Tolly's actions, but he was extremely reluctant to appoint Kutuzov as commander-in-chief. However, he was ultimately forced to yield to public opinion.
Meanwhile, in mid-August 1812, Barclay de Tolly finally succeeded in removing Bennigsen, who had become tiresome, from the army. However, in Torzhok, he met the new commander-in-chief, Kutuzov, who rashly appointed him Chief of the Army General Staff. Bennigsen immediately opposed the commander-in-chief, and Kutuzov quickly realized his mistake and effectively removed him from practical work.
During the Battle of Borodino, Bennigsen was at the "Raevsky battery", then led a column moving from the right flank to help the left, and was later awarded the Order of St. Vladimir, 1st degree.
L. Bennigsen in a portrait by George Dawe
At the council in Fili on September 1 (13), 1812, Bennigsen demanded a new decisive battle between Fili and Vorobyovy Gory. He then proposed "shifting troops from the right flank to the left at night and attacking the enemy's right flank the following day, and in case of failure, retreating to the Old or New Kaluga roads."
Kutuzov stated:
I cannot approve of Baron Bennigsen's plan. Troop movements close to the enemy are always dangerous, and military story confirms this consideration. For example... Well, take the Battle of Friedland, which, I think, the baron remembers well, was... not entirely successful only because our troops were reforming too close to the enemy.
The allusion to Bennigsen's unsuccessful actions at Friedland was very caustic.
A. Kivshenko. Military Council in Fili
L. Bennigsen played by V. Gotovtsev, still from the film "Kutuzov", 1943.
Incidentally, in his 1812 poem "A Singer in the Camp of Russian Warriors," which was very popular in the army, Zhukovsky called Bennigsen "Nestor," "leader and man of counsel." Nestor is a character from the Iliad: a wise elder to whom the Greek heroes turn for advice. This is clear evidence of how unpopular Kutuzov's decision to surrender Moscow to the French was.
Moscow was abandoned, and after the famous "flank march," the Russian army found itself near the village of Tarutino: Kutuzov brought 87 soldiers, 14 Cossacks, and 622 guns there. And squabbling and intrigue immediately began in the Russian camp. The aforementioned hero of Smolensk, N. Raevsky, wrote:
I hardly ever go to headquarters... There are party intrigues, envy, malice, and even more... egoism, despite the circumstances of Russia, about which no one cares.
A. Ermolov, who recalled the “endless intrigues,” agrees with him.
Here is the opinion of D.S. Dokhturov:
Everything I see (in the Tarutino camp) fills me with complete disgust.
E. V. Tarle wrote on this matter:
"Where's that fool? Red? Coward?" Kutuzov shouted, pretending to have deliberately forgotten the name he needed and was struggling to recall it. When they dared to ask him if he was referring to Bennigsen, the field marshal replied, "Yes, yes, yes!" That's how it was on the very day of the Battle of Tarutino. The story of Bagration and Barclay was being repeated before the eyes of the entire army.
Here is a quote from the work of N. A. Troitsky:
Barclay... saw the discord between Kutuzov and Bennigsen, but did not support either one or the other, equally condemning both - "two weak old men", one of whom (Kutuzov) was in his eyes an "idler", and the other - a "robber".
By calling Bennigsen a robber, Barclay de Tolly was, of course, hinting at his role in the murder of Paul I.
Let us continue quoting N. Troitsky:
Barclay and Bennigsen had been enemies from the very beginning of the war, all the way through. Kutuzov, however, took the position of "the third one rejoicing" toward them.
It should be noted that, among his other talents, Kutuzov was a universally recognized master of intrigue. And in this situation, too, he emerged victorious: he forced both Barclay de Tolly and Bennigsen to leave the army.
But first there was the Battle of the Chernishni River, also known as Tarutino, and in France it is often called the Bataille de Winkowo (“battle at Vinkovo” – after the name of the nearest village).
Tarutino
Peter von Hess, Battle of Tarutino, October 6 (18), 1812
After the Battle of Borodino, a curious situation developed: Kutuzov's Russian army and Murat's French vanguard (approximately 20-22 strong) were encamped close to each other, making no attempt to attack the other. Yermolov recalled that officers from both sides were peacefully conversing at their outposts; the French were confident the war was over and expected news of a peace treaty any day. However, Alexander I, as is well known, refused to negotiate with Napoleon. The French emperor was merely wasting time, while the Russian army grew stronger with each passing day.
Finally, under pressure from the "hawks" at Kutuzov's headquarters, the decision was made to "test their strength"—precisely against the obviously weaker French vanguard. According to the dispositions drawn up by Generals Leonti Bennigsen and Karl Toll, the attack was to be carried out in two columns, commanded by Miloradovich and Bennigsen. The first was to attack the French right flank, the second to outflank Murat's left flank.
However, the army's chief of staff, Yermolov, had gone to a dinner party at a nearby estate, and many units didn't receive the necessary instructions on time. As a result, not a single Russian division was present on the appointed day. Kutuzov was so furious that he ordered Yermolov "dismissed from service"—but then immediately reversed his decision.
The Battle of Tarutino had to begin a day later, but, oddly enough, it only turned out better.
The fact was that Murat had somehow learned of the Russian command's plans and, on the appointed day, had brought his troops to full combat readiness. No attack followed, and the French assumed they had received false information. Meanwhile, Russian units were still gathering near the French camp, and the first to arrive there on October 6 (18) were the Life Guards Cossacks of Adjutant General V.V. Orlov-Denisov.
V.V. Orlov-Denisov, portrait by George Doe from the Military Gallery of the Winter Palace
Finding no other Russian units there, Orlov-Denisov decided to attack the French with what forces he had. What happened next is recounted quite accurately in Leo Tolstoy's novel War and Peace:
One desperate, frightened cry from the first Frenchman who saw the Cossacks, and everything that was in the camp, undressed, half-asleep, abandoned their guns, rifles, horses and ran wherever they could.
Overall, the effect of this first strike exceeded all expectations, but, as often happened, instead of exploiting their success, the attackers began plundering the enemy camp. Tolstoy wrote about this:
If the Cossacks had pursued the French, heedless of what lay behind and around them, they would have captured Murat and everything there. That was precisely what their commanders wanted. But the Cossacks could not be moved once they had reached the loot and prisoners.
The French were, after all, highly experienced soldiers. Having grasped the situation, they quickly formed up for battle and met the approaching Russian Jäger regiments with such intense fire that they were forced to retreat, losing several hundred men, including General Baggovut.
In the end, only about 12 men of the entire Russian army took part in this battle: 7 cavalry and up to 5 infantry. Bennigsen, wounded in the leg, demanded troops from Kutuzov to attack the retreating enemy, but the field marshal declared:
They couldn’t take Murat alive in the morning and arrive at the scene on time, now there’s nothing to be done.
The French retreated to the village of Voronovo, and the Russian army returned to its camp with songs and the music of orchestras.
In a letter addressed to Alexander I, Bennigsen accused Kutuzov of passivity and inaction. The Emperor forwarded it to the field marshal, who devised a highly sophisticated plan of revenge. First, Captain Skobelev read out Kutuzov's letter to St. Petersburg in public, calling him "a venerable leader, crowned with laurels, renowned for his experience and resourcefulness." Kutuzov ceremoniously presented the complainant with the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called, a gold sword, and one hundred thousand rubles. Then he ordered Bennigsen's denunciation read, while he "stood as if thunderstruck, turning pale and blushing."
After this, Kutuzov ordered Bennigsen to leave the army; he wrote to the emperor:
Due to General Bennigsen's painful attacks and various other circumstances, I ordered him to go to Kaluga and await further orders from Your Majesty there, which I am fortunate to report.
Leonty Bennigsen during the Foreign Campaign
Alexander I continued to trust one of his father's assassins and, after Kutuzov's death, again considered him for the position of commander-in-chief of the Russian forces. However, he initially chose Peter Wittgenstein, and then, after the defeats at Lützen and Bautzen, handed the post over to Barclay de Tolly. Bennigsen was entrusted with command of the reserve army, which was being formed in Poland and arrived in Bohemia in September 1813.
Meanwhile, on October 7, Napoleon withdrew from Dresden, leaving behind up to 35 soldiers from the 1st and 14th Army Corps, led by Marshal Saint-Cyr. Upon approaching Dresden, Bennigsen left behind P. Tolstoy's militia corps, which was of little use for active mobile operations. It included militiamen from the Ryazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Penza, Simbirsk, and Kazan provinces. Then the 4th Corps of Austrian General Klenau arrived and took command of the allied forces stationed there. The siege of Dresden began on October 17. The French suffered from food shortages. A month later, Saint-Cyr capitulated, becoming the only one of Napoleon's marshals to surrender. He gave his sword to the little-known Russian General M. L. Bulatov.
M. Bulatov in an illustration from I. Sytin's Military Encyclopedia, 1911.
A dissatisfied Napoleon wrote:
Saint-Cyr's capitulation at Dresden was a schoolboy's mistake, in many ways similar to Mack's capitulation at Ulm. In Saint-Cyr's place, Rapp, Carnot, and Davout would have shown how to defend fortresses.
Meanwhile, Napoleon and his allies were gathering troops near Leipzig, where a grand battle took place on October 16-19, 1813, which went down in history as the "Battle of the Nations."
The Bohemian Army of Field Marshal von Schwarzenberg, the Silesian Army of General Blücher, the Northern Army of Crown Prince Karl Johan of Sweden (former Napoleonic Marshal Bernadotte), and, last of all, Bennigsen's Polish Army, joined by two Austrian corps and a Prussian brigade, arrived at Leipzig. It is worth noting that the Bohemian Army included Russian units under Generals Wittgenstein, Eugene of Württemberg, and Gorchakov, Count Pahlen's cavalry, and M. Platov's Cossacks. The commander of the Russian group of the Bohemian Army was M. Barclay de Tolly. The allied armies numbered over 300 men (127 Russian soldiers and officers, 89 Austrian, 72 Prussian, 89 Prussian, and 18 Swedish), with 1385 guns.
The Battle of Leipzig in a painting by V. Moshkov, painted in 1815. On the right, on a small hill on horseback, is Alexander I, in the center, against the backdrop of houses, is Barclay de Tolly, and on the left is Napoleon about to get into a carriage.
Napoleon had at his disposal approximately 200 French, Poles, Dutch, Saxons, Belgians, Italians, and representatives of several other nations, with over 700 cannons. The outcome of the battle was largely decided on October 18, when the Saxons and some regiments from other German states (between 15 and 20 men) defected to the allies. Napoleon recalled:
A terrible void gaped in the center of the French army, as if its heart had been torn out.
Here is what Byron wrote about this:
From the Lion the insinuating Saxon jackal ran away to the Fox, to the Bear, to the Wolf.
It is not difficult to guess that Byron calls Austria a fox, Russia a bear, and Prussia a wolf.
Meanwhile, the French artillerymen were almost out of ammunition.
On October 19, Napoleon's army abandoned Leipzig. His losses totaled between 70 and 80 soldiers (the Allies lost approximately 54). While crossing the Elster River, Józef Poniatowski, who had become Napoleon's next marshal just two days earlier, drowned. Marshals MacDonald, Marmont, and Ney were wounded. Six French generals were killed, and 35 were captured, including Jacques Alexandre Lauriston, Bonaparte's former ambassador to St. Petersburg and future marshal of Louis XVIII.
The victory of the allies determined the outcome of the 1813 campaign; Napoleon was forced to withdraw his troops beyond the Rhine.
After the Battle of Leipzig, Bennigsen commanded the troops besieging Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdeburg, and Hamburg, which was defended by Davout (he was unable to take this city). On December 29, 1813 (January 10, 1814), he was granted the title of Count of the Russian Empire.
After the conclusion of the Paris Peace Treaty, the awarding of the Order of St. George, 1st class followed.
The last years of Leonty Bennigsen's life
At the end of the war, Bennigsen was appointed commander of the 2nd Army, headquartered in Tulchin. By this time, he had already amassed an impressive collection of orders: the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called, the Order of St. George (1st, 2nd, and 3rd classes), the Order of St. Anne (1st degree) (1796), the Order of St. Alexander Nevsky, the Order of St. Vladimir (1st degree), the Prussian Order of the Black Eagle, the Danish Order of the Elephant, the French Legion of Honor, the Swedish Military Order of the Sword, and the Austrian Military Order of Maria Theresa.
However, during an 1818 audit, Pavel Kiselev discovered that Bennigsen was clearly unsuited to his position. The report stated that the commander was "old and weak" and "poorly versed in Russian language and Russian laws, and therefore easily made mistakes when signing orders and instructions prepared for him by self-interested individuals."
The result was numerous violations and abuses.
In May of that year, Bennigsen was dismissed and left Russia for Hanover, where his family estate, Banteln, was located. He lived there for another eight years, becoming blind at the end of his life. He died on September 21, 1826 (October 2), at the age of 81. His son, Alexander Levin von Bennigsen, born in the Russian Empire (near Vilnius), served as First Minister of Hanover and was elected president of the First and Second Chambers of the local parliament. He died in 1893.
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